737-500 missing in Indonesia
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ManaAdaSystem
it wouldn’t stop the engine Captain. It would raise one to whatever thrust is needed on an aircraft with a short rudder arm. It would also make it roll quickly and unexpectedly. We were vfr when it happens to us and we simultaneously got a “wind shear” caution with audible. I’m not a simulator maverick so I probably suck, however, the double startle factor of a caution with a rolling motion made for an alarming scenario that we thankfully caught. Night in a a storm, it might be kind of hairy. Then again, you trained for it so you tell us Captain.
it wouldn’t stop the engine Captain. It would raise one to whatever thrust is needed on an aircraft with a short rudder arm. It would also make it roll quickly and unexpectedly. We were vfr when it happens to us and we simultaneously got a “wind shear” caution with audible. I’m not a simulator maverick so I probably suck, however, the double startle factor of a caution with a rolling motion made for an alarming scenario that we thankfully caught. Night in a a storm, it might be kind of hairy. Then again, you trained for it so you tell us Captain.
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Your scepticism is understandable, but in view of the joint teams invited to participate, one would still expect a fairly decent report within a respectable time frame.
An international team dispatched to examine the plane’s recovered data and wreckage included four representatives from the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, four employees from Boeing, two officials from the Federal Aviation Administration, and an aircraft engineer from GE Aviation. Two investigators from Singapore’s Transport Safety Investigation Bureau are also helping with the probe in accordance with a cooperation agreement among member states that make up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
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The autothrottle theory has a 99.9% probability of being BS.
If the authorities are seriously considering it , well.............
Boeing autothrottles do not fail to idle in climb.
You can dispatch without it.
On rare occasions they can fail to come up evenly on hitting TOGA on take-off when a clutch doesn’t engage properly, but in climb , never.
How this theory got legs is a mystery.
If the authorities are seriously considering it , well.............
Boeing autothrottles do not fail to idle in climb.
You can dispatch without it.
On rare occasions they can fail to come up evenly on hitting TOGA on take-off when a clutch doesn’t engage properly, but in climb , never.
How this theory got legs is a mystery.
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https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/...6-e8bbc6683018
A reminder, albeit on a different aircraft, of how a sluggish engine can lead to a chain of events that do not end well.
A reminder, albeit on a different aircraft, of how a sluggish engine can lead to a chain of events that do not end well.
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The later pitch (not AVIAT.) in this thread seems familiar to me ... and I don't like it.
Having said that and not flying heavy iron:
I can understand not noticing split throttles timely.
I can understand not noticing a rudder input by AP (which can be ruled out due to 2 channels only?)
I cannot understand not noticing a significant aileron input by AP during wings level climb.
Maybe some 737 classic driver can elaborate on that?
Having said that and not flying heavy iron:
I can understand not noticing split throttles timely.
I can understand not noticing a rudder input by AP (which can be ruled out due to 2 channels only?)
I cannot understand not noticing a significant aileron input by AP during wings level climb.
Maybe some 737 classic driver can elaborate on that?
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it wouldn’t stop the engine Captain. It would raise one to whatever thrust is needed on an aircraft with a short rudder arm. It would also make it roll quickly and unexpectedly. We were vfr when it happens to us and we simultaneously got a “wind shear” caution with audible. I’m not a simulator maverick so I probably suck, however, the double startle factor of a caution with a rolling motion made for an alarming scenario that we thankfully caught. Night in a a storm, it might be kind of hairy. Then again, you trained for it so you tell us Captain.
You don’t see a difference between a AT cutback at low altitude when in a WS, and this accident which happened during climb at 11000 ft?
Well done getting out of your incident, but an engine failure in climb should never lead to an accident. Both throttles are set to climb thrust and one that retards to idle is less severe. Fact!
I have trained engine failures in a lot of diffrent situations. Climb and cruise are two of them. I’m not an ace, I’m just a well trained pilot.
ATR CLUTCH
The ADSB info shows a modest performance level of the aircraft from quite early on after takeoff. The loss of control is abrupt, as it almost always is, but the lead up to it, if due to an asymmetry in thrust is not abrupt, it has been there for a considerable time. If so, there will be some long hard looks at standards.
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
China Eastern was an abrupt event, the problem arose and caused a quick follow on to loss of control. The crew are startled and also not necessariy aware of the problem, an SA Level 1 type failure.
CI006 engine failure in cruise resulted in a decay of performance and while the crew were deliberating, the aircraft, well above it's 3 engine ceiling, lost speed, and the APLT lateral control diminished to the point the plane rolled over. an SA Level 3 failure of the engine loss, and an SA Level 1 failure related to the APLT aileron authority and airspeed decay.
Endsley (& Jones) came up with the taxonomies of Situational Awareness (SA) failures as:
Level 2 failures need well-understood warning systems (Helios type problem) and good crew training
Level 3 failures need soul searching by the selection and training and monitoring systems. They are fundamental to the humans involved and are hard to defend against, and are latent failures within our systems at all times.
Endsley evaluated ASRS reports and found that:
APLT CHANNELS
Apart from the curiosity of the A340-600, the majority if not all of the APLT fitted act as 2 axis autopilots, for flight path management. Only yaw damping is usually functioning by a rudder channel, or a torsion/load relief mode as in the B74 rudder. When configured to autoland, a rudder channel may be active for runway alignment manoeuver and rollout control, and a system such as the B777 and B787 Thrust Asymmetry Computer, TAC, may function. On most the yaw damper has a limited turn coordination function as well, however essentially APLTs function in 2 axis for operations, drivers feet still have a use.
The ADSB info shows a modest performance level of the aircraft from quite early on after takeoff. The loss of control is abrupt, as it almost always is, but the lead up to it, if due to an asymmetry in thrust is not abrupt, it has been there for a considerable time. If so, there will be some long hard looks at standards.
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
China Eastern was an abrupt event, the problem arose and caused a quick follow on to loss of control. The crew are startled and also not necessariy aware of the problem, an SA Level 1 type failure.
CI006 engine failure in cruise resulted in a decay of performance and while the crew were deliberating, the aircraft, well above it's 3 engine ceiling, lost speed, and the APLT lateral control diminished to the point the plane rolled over. an SA Level 3 failure of the engine loss, and an SA Level 1 failure related to the APLT aileron authority and airspeed decay.
Endsley (& Jones) came up with the taxonomies of Situational Awareness (SA) failures as:
- Level 1: failure to correctly perceive the information
- Level 2: failure to comprehend the situation
- Level 3: failure to project the situation into the future
Level 2 failures need well-understood warning systems (Helios type problem) and good crew training
Level 3 failures need soul searching by the selection and training and monitoring systems. They are fundamental to the humans involved and are hard to defend against, and are latent failures within our systems at all times.
Endsley evaluated ASRS reports and found that:
- 76.3% were Level 1 SA errors,
- 20.3% were Level 2, and
- 3.4% were Level 3
APLT CHANNELS
Apart from the curiosity of the A340-600, the majority if not all of the APLT fitted act as 2 axis autopilots, for flight path management. Only yaw damping is usually functioning by a rudder channel, or a torsion/load relief mode as in the B74 rudder. When configured to autoland, a rudder channel may be active for runway alignment manoeuver and rollout control, and a system such as the B777 and B787 Thrust Asymmetry Computer, TAC, may function. On most the yaw damper has a limited turn coordination function as well, however essentially APLTs function in 2 axis for operations, drivers feet still have a use.
Andrasz
Yes, it is very clear, maintain piloting skills! Virtually every fatal accident in recent times has been caused by pilots that can't fly aeroplanes when presented with a unusual situation.
Yes, it is very clear, maintain piloting skills! Virtually every fatal accident in recent times has been caused by pilots that can't fly aeroplanes when presented with a unusual situation.
aterpster
Jepp. I wonder how much line pilots could cope if unexpectedly faced with aerobatic maneuvering in IMC. As far as I know mainly prevention is teached. Once the ball (wing), is dropped stuff can go south in a hurry with no visual references.
Jepp. I wonder how much line pilots could cope if unexpectedly faced with aerobatic maneuvering in IMC. As far as I know mainly prevention is teached. Once the ball (wing), is dropped stuff can go south in a hurry with no visual references.
Pegase Driver
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A question from someone who is not familiar with A/P-A/T technical data : is this failure scenario only possible with older A/T or are modern ones also all subject to this ? and can this also occur on Airbus where the throttles are normally not moving ? Just curious.
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It cannot happen on Airbus even if one thrust goes to idle because yaw damper will automatically try to stop the yaw although with limited authority and the spiral will be prevented by opposite aileron and spoilers. It will do a skidding turn to that side with a moderate bank. This is basic demonstration of OEI in simulator.
As noted in previous posts, AT split is unlikely to generate a yawing moment beyond the aircraft capability. Also, this may require a significant change in thrust; e.g. recommencing climb, or intermediate level off, to result in clutch-slip.
The fin is more effective at high speed, vs thrust decrease with altitude.
The AP might have difficulty, but depending on roll power (no rudder servo), yaw - roll should be contained by the ailerons, thus maintaining heading - with slip.
LoC would require aerodynamic input; i.e. mistrimmed aircraft (no rudder or aileron AP autotrim ?). It is likely that the control indications with AP engaged would prompt the crew to add manual trim - with the AP engaged. Rudder trim might not be the first choice, particularly if the hand-wheel angle offset was large, indicating the amount of roll restoring force held by the ailerons; thus aileron trim might be applied.
All would be well until the AP ran out of authority - possible sudden disconnect, and / or the crew had to fly an out-of-trim aircraft without the normal zero-force wheel centre reference - requiring offset wheel force and position to maintain wings level.
I recall that a 737 suffered an upset, similar circumstances, but due to gross fuel imbalance during cross transfer (the aerodynamic / mass disturbance). The AP failed to fly a LNAV turn so the crew disconnected - surprise, big roll, high hand-wheel forces required to recover.
Searching (web and memory) for incident; probably UK AAIB investigation report - 20yrs ago?
The fin is more effective at high speed, vs thrust decrease with altitude.
The AP might have difficulty, but depending on roll power (no rudder servo), yaw - roll should be contained by the ailerons, thus maintaining heading - with slip.
LoC would require aerodynamic input; i.e. mistrimmed aircraft (no rudder or aileron AP autotrim ?). It is likely that the control indications with AP engaged would prompt the crew to add manual trim - with the AP engaged. Rudder trim might not be the first choice, particularly if the hand-wheel angle offset was large, indicating the amount of roll restoring force held by the ailerons; thus aileron trim might be applied.
All would be well until the AP ran out of authority - possible sudden disconnect, and / or the crew had to fly an out-of-trim aircraft without the normal zero-force wheel centre reference - requiring offset wheel force and position to maintain wings level.
I recall that a 737 suffered an upset, similar circumstances, but due to gross fuel imbalance during cross transfer (the aerodynamic / mass disturbance). The AP failed to fly a LNAV turn so the crew disconnected - surprise, big roll, high hand-wheel forces required to recover.
Searching (web and memory) for incident; probably UK AAIB investigation report - 20yrs ago?
safetypee
"I recall that a 737 suffered an upset, similar circumstances, but due to gross fuel imbalance during cross transfer (the aerodynamic / mass disturbance). The AP failed to fly a LNAV turn so the crew disconnected - surprise, big roll, high hand-wheel forces required to recover.
Searching (web and memory) for incident; probably UK AAIB investigation report - 20yrs ago?"
Sounds like this one:
https://assets.publishing.service.go...pdf_501724.pdf
"I recall that a 737 suffered an upset, similar circumstances, but due to gross fuel imbalance during cross transfer (the aerodynamic / mass disturbance). The AP failed to fly a LNAV turn so the crew disconnected - surprise, big roll, high hand-wheel forces required to recover.
Searching (web and memory) for incident; probably UK AAIB investigation report - 20yrs ago?"
Sounds like this one:
https://assets.publishing.service.go...pdf_501724.pdf
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safetypee
Your comments strike me as coming from one who has not flown the 737. If I’m mistaken, I apologize.
A pilot would not add aileron yaw with the A/P engaged. Asymmetric thrust can absolutely cause a roll that would exceed the ability to maintain heading.
Your comments strike me as coming from one who has not flown the 737. If I’m mistaken, I apologize.
A pilot would not add aileron yaw with the A/P engaged. Asymmetric thrust can absolutely cause a roll that would exceed the ability to maintain heading.
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Rudder trim might not be the first choice, particularly if the hand-wheel angle offset was large, indicating the amount of roll restoring force held by the ailerons; thus aileron trim might be applied.
