Air India Runway Excursion
"On Aug 9th 2020 India's Aviation Ministry reported that according to testimony by the tower controller the aircraft did not touch down until abeam taxiway C (editorial note: about 1030 meters/3380 feet past the runway threshold)"
India Express B738 at Kozhikode on Aug 7th 2020, overran runway and fell into valley
India Express B738 at Kozhikode on Aug 7th 2020, overran runway and fell into valley
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You get no objections from me. Add autobrake max to your statement, and we would be happy working in the same cockpit.
I use the term 'PILOT TRAP' to describe the situation where the crew landed up. The weather was bad but well within the minima. So diversion would not have been the first choice. Approach is made in heavy rain vis. 2km (within minima). As the glide slope was US it was a non precision approach with higher MDA. AT MDA RW is not sighted hence a GA is made. Nothing seriously wrong till now. The decision is taken here to do a tear drop and land on R10 may be due to higher MDA for R10 or on the spot judgement that approach path to R10 could have been better. Here it must have been ascertained that there are no wind shear and no excessively turbulence (as far as control of ac is concerned). Second approach is made in vis 2000mts (within minima) with tail winds close to 10kts (within minima). With these two things and RW picked up close to MDA things are not all that bad especially since the RW is fairly long (9000feet) and it is at seal level temp too are not very high. Here things start converging . Landing in heavy rain with wind shield wipers at top gear and added noise and night time it would have been fairy easy to have a few knots extra speed. Depth perception is poor could result in long float and TD with excess speed and touch down at 3200 feet (about 1000 feet ahead of the designated touch down zone). Still about 6000 feet of RW is there. Situation is not all that good but not really out of hand. Only thing wrong is here that now the crew just can not afford any mistake which appears happened. Bounce, aquaplaning or any malfunction in brakes, reversers, spoilers would convert this into an accident. We will have to wait for CVR FDR to know for sure what happened. The various scenarios that could have happened (I write this knowing fully well that it might be countered by the findings, but my aim is to learn from this) are as follows 1. Aquaplaning or bounce eats up lot of RW and its an overrun. 2. Something wrong with brakes / reversers/spoilers resulting in overrun. 3. Pilots notices that they are running short of RW decides to go round which is a late call but since the call was made the crew must have assessed that it was possible to escape out. During the GA things have gone wrong may be normal delayed spool up or in such cases the engine (one or two) surges. To summarise there were many difficulties and issues in this very difficult approach which the pilots made. Singularly or even up to 3/4 issues would have resulted in no incident. Unfortunately all things just combined (all holes in the cheese aligned). And mind you I have not even touched on the fatigue factor and pressures that comes with such rescue flights which are in the glare of all top notch people. Combination of bad weather, ILS (wo glide slope), poor vis, heavy rain, water logging, tail winds, RW friction anomaly,long landing, excess speed and many other factors turned it into a lethal cocktail. RIP to the crew who did their best.
Yeah, that's what I thought....
Also (avherald)":
"Passenger testimonies
On Aug 9th 2020 a passenger seated in the aft cabin reported that following the go around the aircraft positioned for another approach and touched down, however, [
did not appear to slow down but to accelerate again. After touchdown the aircraft overshot the end of the runway and went down the cliff, all of that happened within 15 seconds."
Also (avherald)":
"Passenger testimonies
On Aug 9th 2020 a passenger seated in the aft cabin reported that following the go around the aircraft positioned for another approach and touched down, however, [
did not appear to slow down but to accelerate again. After touchdown the aircraft overshot the end of the runway and went down the cliff, all of that happened within 15 seconds."
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Pilot decision
My guess: pilot tried RWY 28 in second attempt but cancelled as raindrops carrying into wind screen of plane causing poorer visibility overwhelmed advantages of Forward wind landing. Third attempt done at RWY10 but due to tail wind pushing the plane, it landed further down (1 kms) on the airstrip.
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It's Not All Just Rumour
alf5071h, disclaimers first. As SLF (and worse, attorney) and a decade less time on the forum, perhaps I should call this post off. But understanding the near-future changes percolating into the aviation safety ecosystem is a professional (and academic) interest, so here it goes.
Last item you linked is about 15 pages, heavily referenced (though not with notes), 2007 (Errors and Failures: Towards a New Safety Paradigm - Journal of Risk Research); second to last item is about 8 pages, heavily footnoted (Errors in Aviation Decision-Making: A Factor in Accidents and Incidents), by NASA Ames authors 1998. Perhaps some forum members have familiarity with these works but I'll safely presume they're for members' learning and mind-expansion. In other words, I don't speed read, not scholarly stuff like those.
Without intending to exaggerate for effect, your overall point appears to be, "it's all relative". Which is different from saying, "it's all relevant." I think the second version is what you actually mean - but your posts proceed into what reads like a theoretical direction. That discourse and information is highly important and useful, to be sure but.....in a given accident situation, is it not more important, and by far, to unearth the facts as cold hard realities first? Again it's perhaps an attorney's mindset, but there is little if anything theoretical about facts.
Not long ago I attended a presentation by NTSB Chairman Sumwalt about aviation safety and how the system, in the U.S. anyway, moves forward and doesn't move forward. Someone asked a question* about the need for better regulatory rules about pilot duty time and commuting time and fatigue issues. "We've already had that accident - Colgan Air" or words to that effect, the Board Chairman responded. There wasn't any room or space in that answer, in my understanding, for theoretical factors. It was about facts, lessons extracted, and what can be done to help solve or reduce the problem going forward. I don't pretend to know what, exactly, the proper place is for matters of theoretical content, but I do contend that deploying such matters as a kind of interference to traditional and customary accident investigation, causal analysis and safety recommendations is not the proper place.
(*SLF that I am, I did ask a question, but the one referenced was not mine.)
Last item you linked is about 15 pages, heavily referenced (though not with notes), 2007 (Errors and Failures: Towards a New Safety Paradigm - Journal of Risk Research); second to last item is about 8 pages, heavily footnoted (Errors in Aviation Decision-Making: A Factor in Accidents and Incidents), by NASA Ames authors 1998. Perhaps some forum members have familiarity with these works but I'll safely presume they're for members' learning and mind-expansion. In other words, I don't speed read, not scholarly stuff like those.
Without intending to exaggerate for effect, your overall point appears to be, "it's all relative". Which is different from saying, "it's all relevant." I think the second version is what you actually mean - but your posts proceed into what reads like a theoretical direction. That discourse and information is highly important and useful, to be sure but.....in a given accident situation, is it not more important, and by far, to unearth the facts as cold hard realities first? Again it's perhaps an attorney's mindset, but there is little if anything theoretical about facts.
Not long ago I attended a presentation by NTSB Chairman Sumwalt about aviation safety and how the system, in the U.S. anyway, moves forward and doesn't move forward. Someone asked a question* about the need for better regulatory rules about pilot duty time and commuting time and fatigue issues. "We've already had that accident - Colgan Air" or words to that effect, the Board Chairman responded. There wasn't any room or space in that answer, in my understanding, for theoretical factors. It was about facts, lessons extracted, and what can be done to help solve or reduce the problem going forward. I don't pretend to know what, exactly, the proper place is for matters of theoretical content, but I do contend that deploying such matters as a kind of interference to traditional and customary accident investigation, causal analysis and safety recommendations is not the proper place.
(*SLF that I am, I did ask a question, but the one referenced was not mine.)
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Ok, I missed this. Thanks. Found the METAR stating this. And light rain (-RA). So it's not very likely that they faced highly unusual conditions (standing water, hydroplaning affecting braking action), but we don't know. METAR is generic info. Actual info from Tower would be welcomed: Actual wind, actual conditions.
I also read official statement they were NOT low on fuel, diversion was still possible (Minister of Aviation)
We can't rule out another unknown technical issue, we can't rule out human error, we don't know a lot yet.
I also read official statement they were NOT low on fuel, diversion was still possible (Minister of Aviation)
We can't rule out another unknown technical issue, we can't rule out human error, we don't know a lot yet.
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United UA57 cleared for wrong runway - sweepover to lined up Easyjet
Usual apologies for professional pilot talk on PPRuNE about the control positions on the throttle quadrant.
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it appears that the throttle quadrant was removed and replaced because as shown it is back to front. As viewed from the cockpit door the speed brake lever should be on the left and the flap lever on the right and of course the numbers 1&2 for eng. Reverses , thrust levers, and start levers should have # 1 next to the left hand seat. Lever position may have been compromised.
it appears that the throttle quadrant was removed and replaced because as shown it is back to front. As viewed from the cockpit door the speed brake lever should be on the left and the flap lever on the right and of course the numbers 1&2 for eng. Reverses , thrust levers, and start levers should have # 1 next to the left hand seat. Lever position may have been compromised.
I won't repost it, but several variations showing the horrible damage, and displacement of the instrument panel and FMC keyboard and such, are on the Aviation Herald (link below). Apparently the nose hit and lodged in a heavy brick or stone wall - not pretty.
To me, the control positions in the picture (plus a survivor report that the plane accelerated after touchdown - make of that what you will, hydroplaning sometimes produces a similar sensation) suggests an attempt to reject the landing and get airborne, with insufficent time (~15 sec) and/or distance left.
Reported today (Sunday Aug. 9) on Aviation Herald (quoting Aviation Minister) that the aircraft still had sufficient diversion fuel on board.
Accident: India Express B738 at Kozhikode on Aug 7th 2020, overran runway and fell into valley
Unless those photos were taken before the recovery of the crew (which I doubt) then you cant read anything into the position of the levers. the thrust levers and the speedbrake lever would have been disturbed during the recovery process so they probably don't reflect their positions at the time of the accident The FDR will be able to confirm the positions of the flight controls and thrust levers up until the time of impact.
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topgunmaverick - with your two posts, you've highlighted one serious problem with Indian aviation!
If the previous flight had SIX attempts at landing, then it shows a huge failing in the system as well as a chronic lack of appreciation of current safety recommendations by all participants, and goes a long way to explaining the continuing appalling flight safety in that region.
It is well known that as crews attempt ever more approaches, the inherent human failings of frustration, pride, 'get-there-itis' and fear of employer-rebuke start to come into play. That's why every operator I've worked for in the last 15 to 20 years has mandated that after a second landing attempt, it is either an immediate diversion, or delay until there is NO doubt whatsoever as to the success of any third attempt.
In any case, more than three attempts were forbidden. Why, you might ask? The accident statistics have shown that the risk of something going very badly wrong increases dramatically after two attempts.
So, the Indian regulator (a disgusting cesspit of nepotism and cronyism that should instead be expending its limited abilities in encouraging or mandating that operators include such restrictions in the OM), the operators (for the most part money-hungry and unwilling to acknowledge that safety comes at a cost) and the pilots (who should know better, but to this day suffer from the clash between best-practise and outdated class / rank / age distinctions, as well as unjustifiable perception of greatness from some older left seat occupants) are all remiss.
As for the 1000m + float down the runway...in the conditions on the night, it is such a disgraceful example of pilotage that it needs to be treated with the contempt it deserves! Hero pilot? My 4rse!! How many fatal overruns does it take to convince these supposed 'top gun' pilots that the performance numbers don't lie. This captain was a class dux, a test pilot, had a great reputation. Yet on the night, it appears that he couldn't master the basics of landing in the TDZ (preferably on the aiming point) or, failing to have done that, to have made the timely decision to go around! Unbelievable.
If the previous flight had SIX attempts at landing, then it shows a huge failing in the system as well as a chronic lack of appreciation of current safety recommendations by all participants, and goes a long way to explaining the continuing appalling flight safety in that region.
It is well known that as crews attempt ever more approaches, the inherent human failings of frustration, pride, 'get-there-itis' and fear of employer-rebuke start to come into play. That's why every operator I've worked for in the last 15 to 20 years has mandated that after a second landing attempt, it is either an immediate diversion, or delay until there is NO doubt whatsoever as to the success of any third attempt.
In any case, more than three attempts were forbidden. Why, you might ask? The accident statistics have shown that the risk of something going very badly wrong increases dramatically after two attempts.
So, the Indian regulator (a disgusting cesspit of nepotism and cronyism that should instead be expending its limited abilities in encouraging or mandating that operators include such restrictions in the OM), the operators (for the most part money-hungry and unwilling to acknowledge that safety comes at a cost) and the pilots (who should know better, but to this day suffer from the clash between best-practise and outdated class / rank / age distinctions, as well as unjustifiable perception of greatness from some older left seat occupants) are all remiss.
As for the 1000m + float down the runway...in the conditions on the night, it is such a disgraceful example of pilotage that it needs to be treated with the contempt it deserves! Hero pilot? My 4rse!! How many fatal overruns does it take to convince these supposed 'top gun' pilots that the performance numbers don't lie. This captain was a class dux, a test pilot, had a great reputation. Yet on the night, it appears that he couldn't master the basics of landing in the TDZ (preferably on the aiming point) or, failing to have done that, to have made the timely decision to go around! Unbelievable.