Air India Runway Excursion
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PORT TO PORT - INDIA'S NO 1 VESSEL POSITION
The last prang about 10 years ago I thought would of brought to the attention for these mesa airports
to install net barriers that could be extended for the duty runway. Something that can absorb 60T at 40kts
The last prang about 10 years ago I thought would of brought to the attention for these mesa airports
to install net barriers that could be extended for the duty runway. Something that can absorb 60T at 40kts
Use to operate into Callicut Airport on the same type.The monsoon rains in Kerala are the heaviest I have ever seen compared to other tropical regions I operated to.
With that and in combination of poor runway conditions and general lack of infrastructure at the airport the Swiss cheese lines up pretty quickly.
Sad to see these “occurrences “still happening.
Ex AIX Driver.
With that and in combination of poor runway conditions and general lack of infrastructure at the airport the Swiss cheese lines up pretty quickly.
Sad to see these “occurrences “still happening.
Ex AIX Driver.
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& the stupidity in reporting continues. As is the nature there is a rush to start a narrative of making people into hero’s or villains. A post from a so called relative is going viral about how he came in for a belly landing because it was raining & there was no choice & switched off the engines. Surprisingly the media is lapping this up.
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Thrust levers at forward stop
From the cockpit picture posted above, it’s clear that the forward thrust levers are at/near the forward stop (max thrust) and both reverse thrust levers are stowed. Both engine start levers also seem to be in the idle detent (engines running), from the angle the picture was taken.
It seems puzzling why some members here, are putting the PIC on a pedestal and lauding his (presumed) actions, when the reality of this aircraft cockpit configuration speaks for itself. That throttle quadrant was set up for a max thrust go-around in panic mode (evident since the flap handle is still in flaps 30/40 whereas the standard go-around flaps setting of the -800 is flaps 15(2 engines) or flaps 1(1 engine inoperative). Also, the landing gear lever seems to be in the down position & the autobrake selector seems to be set at 3. For any non-pilots wondering, the speed brakes will auto-retract if the thrust levers are advanced after touchdown. That explains why the speed brakes & ground spoilers are stowed in the post crash images.
Why they didn’t go-around earlier, from this horribly unstable approach, I don’t know (CRM? Cockpit gradient? Get there itis?)
It seems puzzling why some members here, are putting the PIC on a pedestal and lauding his (presumed) actions, when the reality of this aircraft cockpit configuration speaks for itself. That throttle quadrant was set up for a max thrust go-around in panic mode (evident since the flap handle is still in flaps 30/40 whereas the standard go-around flaps setting of the -800 is flaps 15(2 engines) or flaps 1(1 engine inoperative). Also, the landing gear lever seems to be in the down position & the autobrake selector seems to be set at 3. For any non-pilots wondering, the speed brakes will auto-retract if the thrust levers are advanced after touchdown. That explains why the speed brakes & ground spoilers are stowed in the post crash images.
Why they didn’t go-around earlier, from this horribly unstable approach, I don’t know (CRM? Cockpit gradient? Get there itis?)
Last edited by C310driver; 9th Aug 2020 at 07:16.
Well, not necessarily. My airline does not identify the regulatory source of operational guidance or policy. So while we are aware of and adhere to the revised performance data, this is the first time I have encountered that nomenclature.
My angle is that we should look closely at how the latest in-flight runway performance information makes its way from the manufacturer and issuing Regulator to the Airline and finally to the PinC. Is that being done well enough considering the critical nature of the information?
Does the PinC have a clear understanding of when different condition codes should be used? If not why not?
This isn’t aimed at the PinC of the accident flight in any way. It’s just something that needs looking at IMO, Industry wide.
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Air India Flt. IX1344 crash at Kozhikode
The pilot appears to have done a TOGA, having done that, he should have landed at the alternate RWY at nearest Kannur (60 miles away) instead of coming back to the rain ravaged destination. The reserve fuel for Kannur is likely consumed in the two missed approaches which explains why there was no fire.
de minimus non curat lex
My bad for not being precise enough with my words earlier.
At this very moment, the facts are yet to fully surface. Instead of saying all the ‘the pilots should have done or should not have done’, let’s just explore possible contributing factors besides pilot error. Every aviation accident/incident I came across had some form of human error. Pilots, dispatcher, ATC, mechanics, etc. They flew the way that got themselves killed, no doubt that was an error. The investigation will eventually elaborate all the details.
At this very moment, the facts are yet to fully surface. Instead of saying all the ‘the pilots should have done or should not have done’, let’s just explore possible contributing factors besides pilot error. Every aviation accident/incident I came across had some form of human error. Pilots, dispatcher, ATC, mechanics, etc. They flew the way that got themselves killed, no doubt that was an error. The investigation will eventually elaborate all the details.
“they flew the way that got themselves killed, no doubt that was an error”.
I wouldn’t disagree with you. Their options reduced until they landed downwind & it ended in tragedy.
There are clearly other contributing factors which lead to this accident.
What isn’t in dispute is that a perfectly serviceable aircraft is now an insurance write off with tragic consequences.
Unless you can persuade those i/c PPRuNe that it is inappropriate to do so, that is exactly what the contributors will do. They will analyse the information as it becomes available. Different points of view will emerge. Disagreements will surface.
That is the nature, the very life blood of what PPRuNe does.
The FDR & CVR have been recovered. The investigation has commenced and hopefully an interim report will be published next month.
That will generate comment, as was recently demonstrated with the interim PIA 8303 report.
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i met a guy who wanted to apply to my gig,all of a sudden he comes out with this story:
"you know i am tired of flying the 737 here ,especially during monsoon times it is really hard.
Sometimes we have to do 6 go arounds before being able to land at destination".
"you know i am tired of flying the 737 here ,especially during monsoon times it is really hard.
Sometimes we have to do 6 go arounds before being able to land at destination".
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Wait for the preliminary report
Your question can be answered by an official source after the preliminary investigation report is published or by the airline itself. We will never know the MEL items open on that aircraft unless you have access to the Airplane Technical Log for VT-AXH or the airline engineering/technical department.
For any failures in-flight, it hasn’t been reported as yet if the pilots informed ATC or their ground operations about any technical issues affecting their approach & landing capabilities.
For any failures in-flight, it hasn’t been reported as yet if the pilots informed ATC or their ground operations about any technical issues affecting their approach & landing capabilities.
Seems to have been removed, or am I missing something ?
From the photos seen so far it appears to have gone off the end of the runway with a substantial speed for that kind of damage to occur. I would not be surprised if the FDR reveals yet another attempted G/A after reversers deployed...
From the photos seen so far it appears to have gone off the end of the runway with a substantial speed for that kind of damage to occur. I would not be surprised if the FDR reveals yet another attempted G/A after reversers deployed...
It would be interesting to know if AXB do much training in baulked landings. From what has surfaced so far, it appears that it was a deep touchdown on a contaminated runway with a considerable tailwind component. There is also some evidence that they were trying to get airborne again at a late stage. Since the EK accident in DXB, many airlines have put increased focus on stability and the option to reject up to reverser selection.
I prefer to think of pilot actions (or inaction) as opposed to “mistakes”, at least until something official comes out. They may have done things that were incorrect but we don’t know yet whether that was due to SOPs, technical failures, training, environmental issues, incapacitation, etc.
I prefer to think of pilot actions (or inaction) as opposed to “mistakes”, at least until something official comes out. They may have done things that were incorrect but we don’t know yet whether that was due to SOPs, technical failures, training, environmental issues, incapacitation, etc.
C310driver
Surely they didn’t do a 15kt tailwind landing, on a shortish runway, heavy, in driving rain on a smooth runway, and NOT select Max autobrake??
Unless they ran the numbers for the reciprocal prior to the first approach, reckon there was even enough time to crunch the numbers for this on that short reversal and approach?
Surely they didn’t do a 15kt tailwind landing, on a shortish runway, heavy, in driving rain on a smooth runway, and NOT select Max autobrake??
Unless they ran the numbers for the reciprocal prior to the first approach, reckon there was even enough time to crunch the numbers for this on that short reversal and approach?
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Did you at all consider that these overruns had nothing to do with the airplane type. Research all of them and post again if pilot error was a factor. The recent PIA A320 accident. Why wasn't that caused by the aircraft vs pilots? That's your theory right? Aircraft type causes accidents...
I asked a friend of mine who's flying the 737-800 to do the landing computation at the exact same weather condition and runway as I did on A320 CEO with Sharklets. For standard condition and a weight of 60T the VAPP on 737 is 138kt versus 135kt on A320. The landing distance with manual braking is 1207 meters versus 1153 meters on A320. So unless I'm missing something the 737 is slightly more prone to overrun the runway than an A320.
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TimmyTee
Hole #1. Wet, non grooved, slightly limited runway.
Hole #2. Tailwind landing.
Hole #3. Long landing.
Hole #4. Autobrake 3.
Bad decision and/or a very poor understanding of the situation.
Now we just need FL30 to add an extra hole in the cheese.
Regarding thrust levers at the forward position, that could have been caused by the impact. Time will tell.
Hole #1. Wet, non grooved, slightly limited runway.
Hole #2. Tailwind landing.
Hole #3. Long landing.
Hole #4. Autobrake 3.
Bad decision and/or a very poor understanding of the situation.
Now we just need FL30 to add an extra hole in the cheese.
Regarding thrust levers at the forward position, that could have been caused by the impact. Time will tell.
The term “human error” should be used carefully and sparingly - if at all
parkfell, #110 
et al,
'Error'; a word in many languages, but it has to be used in context - more often not so; thus 'error' is very emotive. If we choose to use error, then add explanation, context; failure to do so restricts opportunity for learning. *
Crews do not intend to make an error, but when we attribute it after the fact we only learn from our attributions - our biased point of view, not that of the crew, operator, or regulator. We should try to learn from 'adverse events' (link #65) opposed to 'error'.
'That is the nature, the very life blood of what PPRuNe does.'
A frustration with Pprune is that it is difficult to differentiate between simmers - want to be pilots, and some pilots who act like simmers, and other contributors with interest, knowledge, and wisdom. Then the 'wait for the report' group, who then fail to read, or understand it when published - a frozen mindset. This could be the 'life blood of Pprune' - may be good for the web site, but not necessarily for aviation - wrong blood type.
The relevance to this thread is that these 'human' features can be identified in most cultures, operations, and crews. A way forward is to try to understand 'their' point of view - national culture, operations and infrastructure, and the individuals.
We must not let our culture dictate what is appropriate for others, nor without explanation attempt to force our views on them.
A lesson learnt from a discussion with a senior airline manager during an international ALAR safety promotion (India). Error and thence blame were embedded in that culture; blame (and punishment) had to be identified for closure, and although this restricted what might be learnt it did not prevent learning in their way of thinking - their culture.
The Indian DGAC did publish materials (FSF ALAR tool kit) - their format; there was a 2 hr 'blockbuster' video on monsoon conditions - every aircraft at every wet runway in India - the message 'divert or go around'.
Each to their own, a balanced view, explanation, and justification.
'Error' after the event; risk before hand.
Risk - the amount of uncertainty that crews are expected to manage in a situation.
* https://www.ida.liu.se/~729A71/Liter...berti_2001.pdf
'… the gap between risk-control and actual risk-management. … collectively, our societies will have to agree not to lie to themselves about safety issues.' https://www.icesi.edu.co/blogs/bitac...nd-failure.pdf
et al,'Error'; a word in many languages, but it has to be used in context - more often not so; thus 'error' is very emotive. If we choose to use error, then add explanation, context; failure to do so restricts opportunity for learning. *
Crews do not intend to make an error, but when we attribute it after the fact we only learn from our attributions - our biased point of view, not that of the crew, operator, or regulator. We should try to learn from 'adverse events' (link #65) opposed to 'error'.
'That is the nature, the very life blood of what PPRuNe does.'
A frustration with Pprune is that it is difficult to differentiate between simmers - want to be pilots, and some pilots who act like simmers, and other contributors with interest, knowledge, and wisdom. Then the 'wait for the report' group, who then fail to read, or understand it when published - a frozen mindset. This could be the 'life blood of Pprune' - may be good for the web site, but not necessarily for aviation - wrong blood type.
The relevance to this thread is that these 'human' features can be identified in most cultures, operations, and crews. A way forward is to try to understand 'their' point of view - national culture, operations and infrastructure, and the individuals.
We must not let our culture dictate what is appropriate for others, nor without explanation attempt to force our views on them.
A lesson learnt from a discussion with a senior airline manager during an international ALAR safety promotion (India). Error and thence blame were embedded in that culture; blame (and punishment) had to be identified for closure, and although this restricted what might be learnt it did not prevent learning in their way of thinking - their culture.
The Indian DGAC did publish materials (FSF ALAR tool kit) - their format; there was a 2 hr 'blockbuster' video on monsoon conditions - every aircraft at every wet runway in India - the message 'divert or go around'.
Each to their own, a balanced view, explanation, and justification.
'Error' after the event; risk before hand.
Risk - the amount of uncertainty that crews are expected to manage in a situation.
* https://www.ida.liu.se/~729A71/Liter...berti_2001.pdf
'… the gap between risk-control and actual risk-management. … collectively, our societies will have to agree not to lie to themselves about safety issues.' https://www.icesi.edu.co/blogs/bitac...nd-failure.pdf
Last edited by alf5071h; 9th Aug 2020 at 11:11.
Mana #119
http://www.pacdeff.com/pdfs/Errors%2...n%20Making.pdf
Ambiguity, Underestimating risk, Goal conflicts, Consequences not anticipated.
http://www.pacdeff.com/pdfs/Errors%2...n%20Making.pdf
Ambiguity, Underestimating risk, Goal conflicts, Consequences not anticipated.
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pineteam
At 60 tons, FL30 the -800 has a Ref speed of 142 kts, so 147 kts with the 5 kts add. With autobrake 3 and 13 kts tailwind and standing water it will stop in 2672 m. The numbers for max auto and max manual are not very much different.
FL40 gives a Ref speed of 134 kts, and 2514 m. IF FL40 was used, a lot of pilots don’t like to use FL40.
These are raw numbers, no safety margins added and standing water on the runway.
Wet performance is very optimistic given the conditions, but FL30 AB3 gives 2191 m and 1717m with max manual.
FL40 AB3 gives 2024 m and 1610m with max manual.
Add about 3 kts and 100 m for 62 tons. The flights from ME to India are often landing weight limited so the numbers would most likely be in the region of 62-64 tons. Less than max since there is not enough space to bring all the luggage that pax want to bring home.
This landing was only possible with wet conditions and a landing at the correct spot.
Standing water. No.
Slippery when wet. Just, raw data only, but not with the required margins. Not even with FL40 and max manual.
At 60 tons, FL30 the -800 has a Ref speed of 142 kts, so 147 kts with the 5 kts add. With autobrake 3 and 13 kts tailwind and standing water it will stop in 2672 m. The numbers for max auto and max manual are not very much different.
FL40 gives a Ref speed of 134 kts, and 2514 m. IF FL40 was used, a lot of pilots don’t like to use FL40.
These are raw numbers, no safety margins added and standing water on the runway.
Wet performance is very optimistic given the conditions, but FL30 AB3 gives 2191 m and 1717m with max manual.
FL40 AB3 gives 2024 m and 1610m with max manual.
Add about 3 kts and 100 m for 62 tons. The flights from ME to India are often landing weight limited so the numbers would most likely be in the region of 62-64 tons. Less than max since there is not enough space to bring all the luggage that pax want to bring home.
This landing was only possible with wet conditions and a landing at the correct spot.
Standing water. No.
Slippery when wet. Just, raw data only, but not with the required margins. Not even with FL40 and max manual.
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IF FL40 was used, a lot of pilots don’t like to use FL40.
Reduced flap setting into a limited runway with a tailwind is asking for trouble in any aircraft type, from C150 to 747.