Air India Runway Excursion
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parkfell
Amazing how you've managed to resolve the priorities of a fairly complex nation in one sentence. You might as well say remove Donald Trump to reverse global warming. Please let's stick to inputs on the topic at hand and leave such comments/conversations to Twitter.
Amazing how you've managed to resolve the priorities of a fairly complex nation in one sentence. You might as well say remove Donald Trump to reverse global warming. Please let's stick to inputs on the topic at hand and leave such comments/conversations to Twitter.
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flightleader
You are contradicting yourself. First, you don't want pilot decisions questioned in this case. Then, you conclude that valuable lessons can be learned from this accident. Well, that requires a complete examination of the facts, an analysis of those facts, and conclusions.
You are contradicting yourself. First, you don't want pilot decisions questioned in this case. Then, you conclude that valuable lessons can be learned from this accident. Well, that requires a complete examination of the facts, an analysis of those facts, and conclusions.
TT, et al, lest we make the same mistake.
Learning involves being able to identify contributing factors, context, relevance, influences on human behaviour, and then applying these to other situations.
Starting from the statement '… learn from their mistakes …' assumes too much, akin to allocating blame.
Better to consider that the crew were attempting to do their best in the circumstances, as they understood it at the time, and from this, learn.
We can only truly learn from our own mistakes. Viewing the mistakes of others with hindsight, only constructs situations as we now see them.
flightleader #57
https://www.ergonomics.org.uk/common...rse-Events.pdf
https://hbr.org/2011/04/strategies-f...g-from-failure
https://safetydifferently.com/a-shor...learning-teams
https://facultyeportfolioresource.we...ingchapter.pdf
P.S. re tyres https://www.futuresky-safety.eu/wp-c..._D3.3_v2.0.pdf
Also see references by Horne, NASA.
Learning involves being able to identify contributing factors, context, relevance, influences on human behaviour, and then applying these to other situations.
Starting from the statement '… learn from their mistakes …' assumes too much, akin to allocating blame.
Better to consider that the crew were attempting to do their best in the circumstances, as they understood it at the time, and from this, learn.
We can only truly learn from our own mistakes. Viewing the mistakes of others with hindsight, only constructs situations as we now see them.
flightleader #57
https://www.ergonomics.org.uk/common...rse-Events.pdf
https://hbr.org/2011/04/strategies-f...g-from-failure
https://safetydifferently.com/a-shor...learning-teams
https://facultyeportfolioresource.we...ingchapter.pdf
P.S. re tyres https://www.futuresky-safety.eu/wp-c..._D3.3_v2.0.pdf
Also see references by Horne, NASA.
Last edited by alf5071h; 8th Aug 2020 at 13:36. Reason: PS
de minimus non curat lex
Or you could take the view that you need to learn from other people’s mistakes as you won’t live long enough to make them all yourself.
There is no doubt that the crew were “attempting to do their best in the circumstances” but unfortunately the options narrowed and they eventually “painted themselves into a corner”.
The salient aspects of the CVR transcript, if ever published, will be a valuable source of material for the CRMIs.
One Q yet to be answered : was the Command gradient a significant factor?
There is no doubt that the crew were “attempting to do their best in the circumstances” but unfortunately the options narrowed and they eventually “painted themselves into a corner”.
The salient aspects of the CVR transcript, if ever published, will be a valuable source of material for the CRMIs.
One Q yet to be answered : was the Command gradient a significant factor?
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Sorry, this reads like ignorance and ugly prejudice.
India's airports are crap like most of the rest of its infrastructure, true.
Factually, most of India's wasted resources which could help remedy the infrastructure are spent on government mismanagement of funds, not on space, which has an allocation of 1.8 bil. Out of a 460 bil total budget some 60 bil is spent on defence, 90 bil on debt servicing, 40 bil on various subsidies.
These other areas are more legitimate targets for pointing out where reductions could be made (if one ignores the basic issue that a poor legal and regulatory framework means that diverting more funds into a new area will not necessarily mean proportionately better results).
One might as well say, the US should shut down NASA and divert the money to stockpiling ventilators, PPE, better roads and bridges, water systems in Flint, etc.. But that would be stupid and counterproductive, because NASA has disproportionate value to the US technological edge and is not such a large part of overall spending.
The same is actually true of India, if one is actually interested in looking at the facts rather than in spewing frankly quite ugly and disgusting prejudice.
India's airports are crap like most of the rest of its infrastructure, true.
Factually, most of India's wasted resources which could help remedy the infrastructure are spent on government mismanagement of funds, not on space, which has an allocation of 1.8 bil. Out of a 460 bil total budget some 60 bil is spent on defence, 90 bil on debt servicing, 40 bil on various subsidies.
These other areas are more legitimate targets for pointing out where reductions could be made (if one ignores the basic issue that a poor legal and regulatory framework means that diverting more funds into a new area will not necessarily mean proportionately better results).
One might as well say, the US should shut down NASA and divert the money to stockpiling ventilators, PPE, better roads and bridges, water systems in Flint, etc.. But that would be stupid and counterproductive, because NASA has disproportionate value to the US technological edge and is not such a large part of overall spending.
The same is actually true of India, if one is actually interested in looking at the facts rather than in spewing frankly quite ugly and disgusting prejudice.
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"Perhaps their investment in Space should be diverted into aviation?" (parkfell)
But investment by India in ISRO allows the country, and its cadres in air and space law salons, to say it has become a "space-faring" state. There is no equivalent glamour in asserting status as a "sky-faring" or "high-fidelity aviation" state. (Whether the latter type of technical and managerial finesse is a prerequisite for the former, can be an interesting question.)
But investment by India in ISRO allows the country, and its cadres in air and space law salons, to say it has become a "space-faring" state. There is no equivalent glamour in asserting status as a "sky-faring" or "high-fidelity aviation" state. (Whether the latter type of technical and managerial finesse is a prerequisite for the former, can be an interesting question.)
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Originally Posted by parkfell
One Q yet to be answered : was the Command gradient a significant factor?
Originally Posted by ManaAdaSystem
They are often very uneven, so you bounce along after landing with the tires hardly in contact with the surface
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Originally Posted by cats_five
Legitimate question, do those above whom are suggesting that we "let them be" and don't delve into their actions, happen to either be or have Indian heritage?
-I can't remember the last time I saw multiple posts on here arguing for no investigation/learnings after a deadly crash which clearly had factors that could and almost certainly should have been mitigated..
If an State aviation body took that attitude it would be criminal negligence
-I can't remember the last time I saw multiple posts on here arguing for no investigation/learnings after a deadly crash which clearly had factors that could and almost certainly should have been mitigated..
If an State aviation body took that attitude it would be criminal negligence
de minimus non curat lex
WillowRun 6-3
I had already come to that conclusion a few years ago. Perhaps the politicians need to press the reset button and think again.......chances probably remote
I had already come to that conclusion a few years ago. Perhaps the politicians need to press the reset button and think again.......chances probably remote
CRM, monitoring, yes, but they only work until they don't
parkfell, #65 ( - 800 per manual ?)
But what will we learn, individually or collectively; how, why, apply …
I doubt that your 'no doubt' can be proven; individual opinion, judgement, interpretation of CVR etc.
Also we cannot tell what options the crew had, what they saw or believed; as above a drift into 'error', 'blame' is very difficult to avoid - because we are human.
A skill in aviation is to avoid the corner points; go around, diversion. What we might see as a corner position now, could have been a landing opportunity to the crew at the time, but with hindsight it wasn't.
White Knight, TT,
CRM, HF, etc. It is difficult to define these terms, thus they can mean different things to different people - cultures, context.
Nowadays investigators and regulators (mis)use these terms as an alternative for 'error', and accident reports are overwhelmed with 'failures' in CRM, HF, monitoring. What is overlooked is to ask why.
It is difficult to prove that CRM, etc, are a benefit; whether or not, we dare not consider otherwise, thus why are these factors reported in accidents; - an inability to explain human performance.
The weakness, the issue to be learnt, is that the regulations and accident reports expect these safety initiatives to work all of the time. People are surprised that crews don't behave as excepted, that humans are human and occasionally behave contrary to expectation, thus 'blame' the crew.
CRM, monitoring, yes, but they only work until they don't, then, unfortunately we seek to 'blame' someone.
( - 800 per manual ?)But what will we learn, individually or collectively; how, why, apply …
I doubt that your 'no doubt' can be proven; individual opinion, judgement, interpretation of CVR etc.
Also we cannot tell what options the crew had, what they saw or believed; as above a drift into 'error', 'blame' is very difficult to avoid - because we are human.
A skill in aviation is to avoid the corner points; go around, diversion. What we might see as a corner position now, could have been a landing opportunity to the crew at the time, but with hindsight it wasn't.
White Knight, TT,
CRM, HF, etc. It is difficult to define these terms, thus they can mean different things to different people - cultures, context.
Nowadays investigators and regulators (mis)use these terms as an alternative for 'error', and accident reports are overwhelmed with 'failures' in CRM, HF, monitoring. What is overlooked is to ask why.
It is difficult to prove that CRM, etc, are a benefit; whether or not, we dare not consider otherwise, thus why are these factors reported in accidents; - an inability to explain human performance.
The weakness, the issue to be learnt, is that the regulations and accident reports expect these safety initiatives to work all of the time. People are surprised that crews don't behave as excepted, that humans are human and occasionally behave contrary to expectation, thus 'blame' the crew.
CRM, monitoring, yes, but they only work until they don't, then, unfortunately we seek to 'blame' someone.
Buttonpusher
https://avinashchikte.com/2020/08/08...bXJxEGUgbfR2mc
Opinion and insight about the pilot from one of his personal friends.
Opinion and insight about the pilot from one of his personal friends.
FLCH
Thank you for a very timely post. I hope others who post here read the account in the link and think before they post.
Thank you for a very timely post. I hope others who post here read the account in the link and think before they post.
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A little more on the crew from a press conference (mostly in English, parts in Hindi and Malayalam) held today by Civil Aviation Minister Hardeep Singh Puri.
The captain was 59 years old, joined Air India Express in 2013. He had 10830 hours of flight time, 6662 in command and 4244 in command of the 737.
He had landed at Calicut 27 times.
The first officer had 1073 hours total time.
Minister Singh Puri (wearing the blue dastar) visits the accident site:
The captain was 59 years old, joined Air India Express in 2013. He had 10830 hours of flight time, 6662 in command and 4244 in command of the 737.
He had landed at Calicut 27 times.
The first officer had 1073 hours total time.
Minister Singh Puri (wearing the blue dastar) visits the accident site:
Last edited by Airbubba; 8th Aug 2020 at 16:36.
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The captain has always done well before this accident will always remain. If anything is found wanting then it's only human but will help prevent recurrence. I remember NTSB Chairman in 2000 James Hall saying"I am a history major. I believe past is prologue. But all accidents are not acts of God. We take what we learn so it doesn't happen again. But that ain't gonna happen if nobody says anything". So investigation will have look into everything.
It is my understanding, gleaned from 737-800/900 pilots on these forums, that the higher likelihood of a tailstrike (due to the stretched tail) means those aircraft approach and land in a slightly flatter trajectory, at higher speeds (to compensate for lower AoA as well as weight).
Came up particularly in reference to the AA/Jamaica overrun, and also one at O'Hare (runway 9R, snow/ice, can't recall the carrier - maybe United 1977, Dec. 30, 2015).
And thus it can be harder to nail the perfect speed and flare and avoid a long touchdown or a float in those conditions - less tolerance for small errors. Which can be made even tighter with a slick or compromised runway and/or a tailwind or a Vref additive for gusts.
Nothing to do with deceleration hardware engineering - just that there is more speed to get rid of.
And not necessarily accidents - sometimes just embarrassing "incidents" into the overrun, EMAS, or grass.
Came up particularly in reference to the AA/Jamaica overrun, and also one at O'Hare (runway 9R, snow/ice, can't recall the carrier - maybe United 1977, Dec. 30, 2015).
And thus it can be harder to nail the perfect speed and flare and avoid a long touchdown or a float in those conditions - less tolerance for small errors. Which can be made even tighter with a slick or compromised runway and/or a tailwind or a Vref additive for gusts.
Nothing to do with deceleration hardware engineering - just that there is more speed to get rid of.
And not necessarily accidents - sometimes just embarrassing "incidents" into the overrun, EMAS, or grass.
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Can't comment on the -900, but tail strike worries on the -800 relate mostly to take offs. On landing you fly at the most with a 3 degres nose up, nowhere near tailstrike. The only time you float is when you hold the nose up more and more during flare, or you carry too much speed. At FL40 you don't need much nose up at all. Where pilots go wrong on the -800 is they go high at the very end, like below 100-200 ft, then try to correct and may end up with a last minute speed increase and float because of this. I've seen this many times, and if you add tailwind it gets worse.
We are only as good as our last landing. What we did 30 years ago matters very little. And being a nice guy doesn't mean you are a good pilot.
We are only as good as our last landing. What we did 30 years ago matters very little. And being a nice guy doesn't mean you are a good pilot.
FMS82
Indeed. But I'm not conscious of the other recent variants of the 737 having anything like this record of serious overruns. And it seems it's all round the world, including US operators. The 737 (with or without these other subtypes) is not a majority of aviation, but the records are there. It would be good to analyse, objectively, and indeed without some of the fanboy/skygod approach we see above, just why it is such an outlier in runway overruns. It must surely reflect in hull loss insurance premiums.
I'm sure there were those who described the MD-11 as "amazing" etc, notwithstanding its record.
Indeed. But I'm not conscious of the other recent variants of the 737 having anything like this record of serious overruns. And it seems it's all round the world, including US operators. The 737 (with or without these other subtypes) is not a majority of aviation, but the records are there. It would be good to analyse, objectively, and indeed without some of the fanboy/skygod approach we see above, just why it is such an outlier in runway overruns. It must surely reflect in hull loss insurance premiums.
I'm sure there were those who described the MD-11 as "amazing" etc, notwithstanding its record.
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The -800 is a very different beast than the -700. Not so much on paper, but you can feel this when you operate on shorter, contaminated runways. The short field version of the -800 is a much better aircraft than the standard -800 in runway limited situastions.
