Iranian Airbus avoids F15 - injured passengers
This wouldn't be the first time that a TCAS alert was responded to excessively, however I doubt that a military jet flying over hostile territory would be using its transponder. It sounds like an excessive evasion maneuver, thankfully limited by the Airbus control laws.
https://www.flightglobal.com/excessi.../82412.article
https://www.flightglobal.com/excessi.../82412.article
Join Date: Oct 2011
Location: NV USA
Posts: 260
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The real question here is why the Iranian airliner was off its filed route, over a sensitive military installation,
not responding to radio interrogations, and finally, making abnormal abrupt maneuvers when they realized they had been intercepted?
Playing a very dangerous game with passengers lives perhaps?
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...bus-over-syria
not responding to radio interrogations, and finally, making abnormal abrupt maneuvers when they realized they had been intercepted?
Playing a very dangerous game with passengers lives perhaps?
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...bus-over-syria
I also believe al Tanf is not marked on aeronautical charts as a sensitive military installation. As far as the controlling body for that airspace (Damascus FIR) is concerned it doesn’t exist.
EDIT
Actaully on second inspection the track of the Syrian IL-76 was both lower, closer and more directly headed towards the al Tanf garrison than the Mahan Air flight was.
https://avherald.com/h?article=4da54d79&opt=0
From the flight track on the map at the avherald link you can see Mahan Air was never directly headed towards al Tanf, and stayed to the north/east of that dry salt lake to the north of al Tanf.
Now Syrian Air isn’t in any more contact with the US military than Mahan Air is, so why weren’t they intercepted (along with what seems to be Qatar, MEA and Iraqi airliners as well) while Mahan Air was on the same route?
Last edited by dr dre; 26th Jul 2020 at 01:23.
Join Date: Dec 2018
Location: Canada
Posts: 170
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The Americans knew EXACTLY who they were and where they were and where they were going.
This is pure American provocation of Iran.
Join Date: Dec 2018
Location: Canada
Posts: 170
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Further to my post #24 as of 0610 UTC I can see from FR24 the base at al Tanf has been overflown within 10nm by a QR 777 DOH-CMN, an MEA 320 BEY-KWI, along with two QR aircraft headed to BCN and GRU about to cross into Syrian territory from Iraq very close to that base from the east.
Whilst not the world’s busiest air route it does seem a number of civilian airliners regularly fly on the same route as Mahan 1152 and have passed as close or even closer to the base at al Tanf as Mahan did, so why weren’t fighters sent to intercept those airliners???
The track of Mahan 1152 (from this AvHerald link) had it changing course over the Syria/Iraq border (as all the aircraft I’ve watched fly that route have) slightly to the right flying westwards to sort of parallel Syrian Highway 2 and stay north east of al Tanf.
The flying time from the border course change to over/abeam al Tanf is less than 2 minutes. I can’t seriously believe any Air Force could detect, analyse and decide an aircraft needed to be intercepted, and then order an intercept and get jets there in that time. The USAF must have been tracking the aircraft from well within Iraqi airspace. This just gives more credence to the theory the decision to make a fighter intercept of Mahan was made well before it got near to al Tanf.
Whilst not the world’s busiest air route it does seem a number of civilian airliners regularly fly on the same route as Mahan 1152 and have passed as close or even closer to the base at al Tanf as Mahan did, so why weren’t fighters sent to intercept those airliners???
The flying time from the border course change to over/abeam al Tanf is less than 2 minutes. I can’t seriously believe any Air Force could detect, analyse and decide an aircraft needed to be intercepted, and then order an intercept and get jets there in that time. The USAF must have been tracking the aircraft from well within Iraqi airspace. This just gives more credence to the theory the decision to make a fighter intercept of Mahan was made well before it got near to al Tanf.
Last edited by dr dre; 26th Jul 2020 at 06:27.
The US military has established a 55km/35nm radius “deconfliction zone” centred on al Tanf garrison. However this doesn’t explain why other civilian airlines like Qatar and MEA have been crossing well within that zone without any harassment?
According to FR24 (see first post) there was an initial climb with a reduction in airspeed and then a descent and increase in airspeed back to the original altitude/airspeed. Seems like there must have been a sharpish push over the top.
A standing passenger could have been forced to the floor and then have 'fallen' from there all the way to the ceiling at whatever the max -ve acceleration allowed by the airbus protection is.
I found an unofficial reference to the A320
https://www.theairlinepilots.com/for...imitations.pdf
FLIGHT MANEUVERING LOAD ACCELERATION LIMITS Clean configuration: -1 g to +2.5 g
A standing passenger could have been forced to the floor and then have 'fallen' from there all the way to the ceiling at whatever the max -ve acceleration allowed by the airbus protection is.
I found an unofficial reference to the A320
https://www.theairlinepilots.com/for...imitations.pdf
FLIGHT MANEUVERING LOAD ACCELERATION LIMITS Clean configuration: -1 g to +2.5 g
No, the FR24 data (though not very granular) shows an initial loss of height, followed by a climb to above the cruise FL and then a not particularly rapid descent back to FL340, all over the course of about two and a half minutes.
It's hard to reach any firm conclusions based on such sparse data, but it looks like it was the initial pushover that resulted in the reported heads hitting the ceiling.
It's hard to reach any firm conclusions based on such sparse data, but it looks like it was the initial pushover that resulted in the reported heads hitting the ceiling.
Join Date: Jan 2007
Location: Outside the 12 mile limit
Posts: 76
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Old Dogs
Just a question/scenario
Ok so there's a flight plan.
Ok so some bad actor puts a civilian transponder on a bomber with all the correct data in it
Ok the target flies the flight plan route.
Ok so the yanks see these 'civilian' plane on primary and secondary radar squawking the correct code, on the flight path
So how do they 'know' what the target is without sending up something to visually ID it??
Just asking for a friend...
Just a question/scenario
Ok so there's a flight plan.
Ok so some bad actor puts a civilian transponder on a bomber with all the correct data in it
Ok the target flies the flight plan route.
Ok so the yanks see these 'civilian' plane on primary and secondary radar squawking the correct code, on the flight path
So how do they 'know' what the target is without sending up something to visually ID it??
Just asking for a friend...
It should be possible, however, to do that in a manner that doesn't alarm the crew (if it turns out to be a civilian) and/or trigger a TCAS RA.
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: Within AM radio broadcast range of downtown Chicago
Age: 71
Posts: 842
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
IMHO the best point made so far, in questioning the USAF intercept or more pointedly, in arguing that it was in one or more ways improper, is to note the terrible legacy of the Vincennes incident. Which was years ago yet still is a prime factor.
A lesser factor is that other airline operators have, according to the interpretations of flight track data made by others, flown the same, similar, or even more attention-attracting routes without action by the U.S. This cuts both ways, though.
First, those other operators, isn't it clear that they are not standing relative to the U.S. in the confrontational if not adversarial posture that Iran's chief local operator holds? Meaning that the deconfliction processes ostensibly devoted to U.S.-Russia air operations very easily could have been adapted so as to facilitate and enhance assurances about those flights. Mahan, in other words, isn't exactly on the same speaking terms as the other operators.
But second, as noted previously, it's a long-standing conflict zone. Other operators have flown quite comparable routes without difficulty, as far as anyone knows. Mahan knows it is not regarded as the same as those operators - regardless of whose side you take as between the U.S. and Iran, after the Solemani killing, the missile strikes by Iran, and the shooting down of the Ukrainian flight, the fact of anomisity and distrust is . . . a fact.
So if you are flying the Mahan aircraft, shouldn't you be more on guard and anticipating a possible intercept, not just as nominally professional as the other operators - and even more stable at the controls so as not to conduct a sudden evasive manuever?
If, on the other hand, facts emerge that the USAF aircraft approached in unusual, erratic or otherwise threatening ways outside ordinary visual inspection approaches, that would change the facts, considerably.
Might as well go all the way out on the limb: today is the date Iran had committed to delivering the recorders from Ukrainian Flight 752 to the French authorities, per their statement at a recent ICAO Council meeting. If the U.S. decided to conduct a gratuitous, and/or significantly disproportional intercept chiefly or even largely just as provocation for provocation's sake, and the recorders don't get delivered as a result, I'll turn my sarcastic and sometimes valid posts in Washington's direction. Incompetence is a mortal sin.
A lesser factor is that other airline operators have, according to the interpretations of flight track data made by others, flown the same, similar, or even more attention-attracting routes without action by the U.S. This cuts both ways, though.
First, those other operators, isn't it clear that they are not standing relative to the U.S. in the confrontational if not adversarial posture that Iran's chief local operator holds? Meaning that the deconfliction processes ostensibly devoted to U.S.-Russia air operations very easily could have been adapted so as to facilitate and enhance assurances about those flights. Mahan, in other words, isn't exactly on the same speaking terms as the other operators.
But second, as noted previously, it's a long-standing conflict zone. Other operators have flown quite comparable routes without difficulty, as far as anyone knows. Mahan knows it is not regarded as the same as those operators - regardless of whose side you take as between the U.S. and Iran, after the Solemani killing, the missile strikes by Iran, and the shooting down of the Ukrainian flight, the fact of anomisity and distrust is . . . a fact.
So if you are flying the Mahan aircraft, shouldn't you be more on guard and anticipating a possible intercept, not just as nominally professional as the other operators - and even more stable at the controls so as not to conduct a sudden evasive manuever?
If, on the other hand, facts emerge that the USAF aircraft approached in unusual, erratic or otherwise threatening ways outside ordinary visual inspection approaches, that would change the facts, considerably.
Might as well go all the way out on the limb: today is the date Iran had committed to delivering the recorders from Ukrainian Flight 752 to the French authorities, per their statement at a recent ICAO Council meeting. If the U.S. decided to conduct a gratuitous, and/or significantly disproportional intercept chiefly or even largely just as provocation for provocation's sake, and the recorders don't get delivered as a result, I'll turn my sarcastic and sometimes valid posts in Washington's direction. Incompetence is a mortal sin.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: europe
Posts: 42
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Ok so there's a flight plan.
Ok so some bad actor puts a civilian transponder on a bomber with all the correct data in it
Ok the target flies the flight plan route.
Ok so the yanks see these 'civilian' plane on primary and secondary radar squawking the correct code, on the flight path
So how do they 'know' what the target is without sending up something to visually ID it??
Ok so some bad actor puts a civilian transponder on a bomber with all the correct data in it
Ok the target flies the flight plan route.
Ok so the yanks see these 'civilian' plane on primary and secondary radar squawking the correct code, on the flight path
So how do they 'know' what the target is without sending up something to visually ID it??
If you’re specifically referring to Syria, then I ask again why weren’t the Qatari and Lebanese Aircraft flying the exact route over the same base intercepted?