Boeing 737 Max Recertification Testing - Finally.
I agree it can be grey. Put aside basic questions such as whether the 737 Max is aerodynamically stable across the performance envelope, and whether it is physically possible (and realistic) to move the trim wheel in extremis. Boeing test pilots could not meet the performance standard (reaction time) required for MCAS to be safe as certified. This was not grey at all.
Keeping Danny in Sandwiches
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"The wheel got smaller again compared to the NG and is not intended be changed now AFAIK."
And the wheel on the original 200 was certified when there weren't any (or very few) female pilots. Has manual trimming on the Max been certified with them in mind?
And the wheel on the original 200 was certified when there weren't any (or very few) female pilots. Has manual trimming on the Max been certified with them in mind?
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Twitter account of publisher of The Air Current earlier today:
"BREAKING: FAA Administrator Steve Dickson will fly the 737 MAX on September 30, a key symbolic step before the jet's return to service first in the United States."
"BREAKING: FAA Administrator Steve Dickson will fly the 737 MAX on September 30, a key symbolic step before the jet's return to service first in the United States."
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"And the wheel on the original 200 was certified when there weren't any (or very few) female pilots. Has manual trimming on the Max been certified with them in mind?"
Valarie Walker was a pilot for Western and Delta. She and a lot of other ladies would kick your butt for that remark.
Valarie Walker was a pilot for Western and Delta. She and a lot of other ladies would kick your butt for that remark.
How many with families to support have had to stand up in a meeting and declare that xxx piece of kit cannot go "out the door" unless it is fixed properly, and had to state why it is necessary to intervene in a rubber stamping regulatory process.
Engineers are usually very alone when placed in that situation. The usual suspects go to ground very quickly, not even their eyes show above the parapet. They can be recognized by the way they slink into a chair at the back of the meeting, where they start nodding like a dog while avoiding eye contact with their peers. The bean counters sit alongside the head honcho ready to state that the project cannot be stopped or it will "probably go belly up". Since one is then left holding the can, 20 hour days and sleeping under your desk becomes the norm.
"Listen up, your next move, punk" comes to mind.
Engineers are usually very alone when placed in that situation. The usual suspects go to ground very quickly, not even their eyes show above the parapet. They can be recognized by the way they slink into a chair at the back of the meeting, where they start nodding like a dog while avoiding eye contact with their peers. The bean counters sit alongside the head honcho ready to state that the project cannot be stopped or it will "probably go belly up". Since one is then left holding the can, 20 hour days and sleeping under your desk becomes the norm.
"Listen up, your next move, punk" comes to mind.
Seattle Times says EASA will sign off the Max at the end of November. Next variant will have synthetic airspeed and it will be retrofitted to the current fleet. No mention of dates by which this is to be achieved.
Imagegear
And when you don't people die, 346 in this case to be exact. Pilots' incomes are on the line at every compulsory medical, let alone every time they operate a flight. Engineers ditto, every time they are called upon to sign off that something has been done IAW the Regs, let alone giving it tacit approval by not speaking out when they should. Both disciplines call for you to carry out your duties responsibly. That includes your duty of care to those who rely on you doing the right thing. It comes with the rations and if families stand in the way of that go find another job where they don't.
And when you don't people die, 346 in this case to be exact. Pilots' incomes are on the line at every compulsory medical, let alone every time they operate a flight. Engineers ditto, every time they are called upon to sign off that something has been done IAW the Regs, let alone giving it tacit approval by not speaking out when they should. Both disciplines call for you to carry out your duties responsibly. That includes your duty of care to those who rely on you doing the right thing. It comes with the rations and if families stand in the way of that go find another job where they don't.
How true Chug,
It's a bit like owning a weapon, if one has not come to terms with the fact that one day you may have a need to use it to kill someone, don't buy it.
If you have considered all the circumstances, your best decision may be to walk out of the store with nothing but your integrity and peace of mind intact.
It's a bit like owning a weapon, if one has not come to terms with the fact that one day you may have a need to use it to kill someone, don't buy it.
If you have considered all the circumstances, your best decision may be to walk out of the store with nothing but your integrity and peace of mind intact.
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DaveReidUK
Can't recall if it was a third AOA vane or a third AOA source, but I think it is the latter, in which case I guess it could be synthetic provided the calculation is independent of the other two AOA sources / vanes.
Can't recall if it was a third AOA vane or a third AOA source, but I think it is the latter, in which case I guess it could be synthetic provided the calculation is independent of the other two AOA sources / vanes.
Unable to access the Ethiopian 737MAX final or even preliminary reports from their respective links. Anyone else having similar problem? Was able to access the Lion Air 737MAX final report no problem
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ET final is not out yet (pretty sure), preliminary report is available via archive.org if official site not working (I have it and can send it, if I can attach to PMs, but the archive link should work):
https://web.archive.org/web/20190404...8ET-AVJ%29.pdf
https://web.archive.org/web/20190404...8ET-AVJ%29.pdf
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hunbet
So was the trim wheel certified taking account of the reduction in size and therefore turning force available? And I really can't see anything that any female pilot would have an issue with, I would hope and expect that they would endorse my comment
So was the trim wheel certified taking account of the reduction in size and therefore turning force available? And I really can't see anything that any female pilot would have an issue with, I would hope and expect that they would endorse my comment
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Some news here : https://www.reuters.com/article/us-b...-idUSKCN26G2Y2
FAA chief to make his own evaluation flight next week, EASA said Boeing agreed to their demands and the aircraft back in service date could be end November .
FAA chief to make his own evaluation flight next week, EASA said Boeing agreed to their demands and the aircraft back in service date could be end November .
Most of the time stress engineers are the conscience of a company where structural and often manufacturing concerns exist. It'll be us that puts our hands up and says no. And it'll be us working the 16hr days to figure out how we can bend physics and maths to suit someones ms project graph, whilst other people stand over us asking why we haven't done it yet. The timeline comes first. That's it. Anything else is wishful thinking.
Well, two fatal accidents have really “bent” the timeline. Hopefully MS Project can handle that.
It is that pressure that cannot be accepted. This cannot happen again. Lessons must be learned by now.
Plus it would cost the company.
Plus it would cost the company.
Many of the engineering decisions were judgements and interpretations of descriptive requirements; the critical aspects were not clear-cut 'yes/no' choices. Many levels of the certification process could have thier 'say'; who were these people, what was said, why … hard evidence of a 'soft', fallible human judgement - difficult to identify, if at all.
Much of the judgement depends on engineering expertise, but its not clear if this was generally lacking (manufacturer and regulator) or specifically about the 'old' 737, its precedents, and justifications.
Judgements on the Max could have been made based on recent experience of modern aircraft, and this could bias retrospective application to older aircraft, particularly previous versions of the 737 with a history of judgmental changes, e.g. trim wheel, yo-yo manoeuvre, crew reaction time.
Its difficult to learn from that which is not known. Time might tell, but meantime the industry needs expertise at all levels, reliable processes of double checking - manufacturer and regulator, and management commitment to safety.
Unfortunately identifying 'need' does not ensure 'gets'.
Much of the judgement depends on engineering expertise, but its not clear if this was generally lacking (manufacturer and regulator) or specifically about the 'old' 737, its precedents, and justifications.
Judgements on the Max could have been made based on recent experience of modern aircraft, and this could bias retrospective application to older aircraft, particularly previous versions of the 737 with a history of judgmental changes, e.g. trim wheel, yo-yo manoeuvre, crew reaction time.
Its difficult to learn from that which is not known. Time might tell, but meantime the industry needs expertise at all levels, reliable processes of double checking - manufacturer and regulator, and management commitment to safety.
Unfortunately identifying 'need' does not ensure 'gets'.
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Even in a situation loaded with both tragedy and outrage, some irony surfaces. Particularly, it does appear that the aircraft is headed for a return to service. Leaving aside the very specific questions about a third AoA vane or some synthetic substitute, as well as related questions about fine points of handling characteristics, what is one of the outcomes of Boeing's pretty well-documented effort to avoid including pilot training requirements specific to the 737 MAX? There will be pilot training requirements not only as large and extensive as what the company had been trying to avoid but even more extensive, won't there? Especially in light of the added complexity (if that is the right word) imposed by the several reconfigurations or rearrangements of the MCAS (as well as some other systems, if I understood accurately).
As for larger lessons learned, a good guess is that trying to boil down many years of corporate senior management obtuseness (and, it appears, venality) into bite-size and readily understandable lessons is mostly a waste of time. If the history has been told correctly (and that does not mean I am questioning whether it has been told correctly) and one main root of what went wrong is the corporate acquisition of McDonnell Douglas, then what is the lesson to be learned from such a massive misstep? Maybe the answer is "stakeholder capitalism" and a rejection of the Milton Friedman bedrock economic guidance. Yet those are big wrenching changes and so wouldn't help much in the present day with engineers confronted by questionable practices.
Litigation, legal types such as this SLF like to say, has a way of focusing the mind. There's no shortage of lawsuits, on top of multiple U.S. and other countries' inquiry boards. But, "who decides?" What is the decision-making authority for what the lessons truly are? (apropos of safetypee's post above). It seems too clear that the matter of "who decides", at this moment . . . . is just getting improvised. Doesn't there have to be a better way?
As for larger lessons learned, a good guess is that trying to boil down many years of corporate senior management obtuseness (and, it appears, venality) into bite-size and readily understandable lessons is mostly a waste of time. If the history has been told correctly (and that does not mean I am questioning whether it has been told correctly) and one main root of what went wrong is the corporate acquisition of McDonnell Douglas, then what is the lesson to be learned from such a massive misstep? Maybe the answer is "stakeholder capitalism" and a rejection of the Milton Friedman bedrock economic guidance. Yet those are big wrenching changes and so wouldn't help much in the present day with engineers confronted by questionable practices.
Litigation, legal types such as this SLF like to say, has a way of focusing the mind. There's no shortage of lawsuits, on top of multiple U.S. and other countries' inquiry boards. But, "who decides?" What is the decision-making authority for what the lessons truly are? (apropos of safetypee's post above). It seems too clear that the matter of "who decides", at this moment . . . . is just getting improvised. Doesn't there have to be a better way?
