Boeing 737 Max Recertification Testing - Finally.
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And, yep, Xi looks hesitating, though that is because he fears more (and long-lasting) sanctions, not because of principles of honesty. Be aware, we will have many difficulties to find out what is done sneaky, China is still largely walled off for foreigners. Not so say, the anti-foreigner atmosphere makes most foreigners flee the country, asap.
The Max is still grounded in China and :
Add the COMAC C919 coming up next year and I cannot see a bright future for Boeing in China, But as you said, with the MAGA messiah possibly coming back in 2024, who knows what deals might be made then , and who will benefit ...
Add the COMAC C919 coming up next year and I cannot see a bright future for Boeing in China, But as you said, with the MAGA messiah possibly coming back in 2024, who knows what deals might be made then , and who will benefit ...
Xi perfectly knows, the China state of technology as well the way the society is organized, doesn't work to reach the quality level, Airbus has reached.
You mean the guy who first implemented heavy tariffs against China (much to the distress of the other party, even though they left them largely in place once they were back in power)?
It took a while (far too long IMHO), but the powers that be have finally figured out that China isn't our friend.
It took a while (far too long IMHO), but the powers that be have finally figured out that China isn't our friend.
So, yeah, the moment Xi does know about the MAGA messiah, what Putin knows, the impossible deals with China will suddenly be arranged on a Sunday afternoon, before the congress or what-ever government bureau is able to object.
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Case dismissed
On a related subject...
News reports state that the federal district court in Chicago has dismissed the class action complaint filed by pilots whose careers were negatively affected after they gained qualification to operate the 737 MAX but the aircraft then was grounded.
Basis of the ruling is a principle of state tort law - absence of proximate cause linking Boeing's wrongful acts and omissions on one hand, and the injuries claimed on the other.
News reports state that the federal district court in Chicago has dismissed the class action complaint filed by pilots whose careers were negatively affected after they gained qualification to operate the 737 MAX but the aircraft then was grounded.
Basis of the ruling is a principle of state tort law - absence of proximate cause linking Boeing's wrongful acts and omissions on one hand, and the injuries claimed on the other.
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737 MAX in the Lame Duck Congress
Wall Street Journal reporting on development of legislative initiatives to deal with the imminent end-date for the certification process for the MAX 7 and MAX 10, particularly with regard to updated crew alerting systems (as compared to systems and configurations in currently certified MAX variants). The date, it should be noted, isn't any sort of magical - it was included in wide-ranging legislation originated out of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee that addresses several areas in the wake and/or aftermath of the two 737 MAX accidents.
WSJ reporting indicates the scorecard for the inside baseball going on - United, Delta and Southwest want the MAX 7 & 10 variants with orders reaching approx. 50 billion USD; Southwest's pilots union and ALPA support extension of the date, along with former NTSB head Robert Zumwalt. Opposed are the pilots union at American, and a group of family members of the accident victims. House Transportation & Infrastructure Chair, Rep. Peter DeFazio (D.-Ore.) also opposes extension. (The estimable Mr. DeFazio retires from the Congress at the end of this session.)
State of play in Congress reportedly is that Sen. Maria Cantwell (D.-Wash.) is driving legislative measures to extend the date, with a requirement for "additional safety improvements" not otherwise identified in the reporting. The measure "would require newly produced 737 MAX jets and the existing fleet to be retrofitted with safety features currently slated for the 737 MAX 10." (Though stated in plain enough English, this SLF/attorney doesn't quite understand what is being proposed here.)
Perhaps, if the date is extended, then as an earlier poster suggested, the result might be two sub-variants of the MAX 7 and MAX 10 - a "commonality" sub-variant, and a "new alerting" sub-variant. And what is within "additional safety improvements"?
In other Boeing news, WSJ also reporting that United is close to a deal for dozens of 787 Dreamliner aircraft, as segments of its wide-body aircraft fleet continue to age out. Some things do get better with age, but not everything.
WSJ reporting indicates the scorecard for the inside baseball going on - United, Delta and Southwest want the MAX 7 & 10 variants with orders reaching approx. 50 billion USD; Southwest's pilots union and ALPA support extension of the date, along with former NTSB head Robert Zumwalt. Opposed are the pilots union at American, and a group of family members of the accident victims. House Transportation & Infrastructure Chair, Rep. Peter DeFazio (D.-Ore.) also opposes extension. (The estimable Mr. DeFazio retires from the Congress at the end of this session.)
State of play in Congress reportedly is that Sen. Maria Cantwell (D.-Wash.) is driving legislative measures to extend the date, with a requirement for "additional safety improvements" not otherwise identified in the reporting. The measure "would require newly produced 737 MAX jets and the existing fleet to be retrofitted with safety features currently slated for the 737 MAX 10." (Though stated in plain enough English, this SLF/attorney doesn't quite understand what is being proposed here.)
Perhaps, if the date is extended, then as an earlier poster suggested, the result might be two sub-variants of the MAX 7 and MAX 10 - a "commonality" sub-variant, and a "new alerting" sub-variant. And what is within "additional safety improvements"?
In other Boeing news, WSJ also reporting that United is close to a deal for dozens of 787 Dreamliner aircraft, as segments of its wide-body aircraft fleet continue to age out. Some things do get better with age, but not everything.
Last edited by WillowRun 6-3; 3rd Dec 2022 at 14:48.
Thread Starter
State of play in Congress reportedly is that Sen. Maria Cantwell (D.-Wash.) is driving legislative measures to extend the date, with a requirement for "additional safety improvements" not otherwise identified in the reporting. The measure "would require newly produced 737 MAX jets and the existing fleet to be retrofitted with safety features currently slated for the 737 MAX 10." (Though stated in plain enough English, this SLF/attorney doesn't quite understand what is being proposed here.)
Perhaps, if the date is extended, then as an earlier poster suggested, the result might be two sub-variants of the MAX 7 and MAX 10 - a "commonality" sub-variant, and a "new alerting" sub-variant. And what is within "additional safety improvements"?
Perhaps, if the date is extended, then as an earlier poster suggested, the result might be two sub-variants of the MAX 7 and MAX 10 - a "commonality" sub-variant, and a "new alerting" sub-variant. And what is within "additional safety improvements"?
DR - I think the MAX 7 is appealing to current MAX operators that want something a little smaller, but don't want to add another type (e.g. the A220) to their fleet. I keep hearing that Southwest really wants them for their lighter routes. Southwest currently has a huge fleet of 737-700s.
f that market is large enough to justify the expense of development/cert is a different question. Certainly it wouldn't justify a multi-Billion dollar effort to update the flight deck (especially since it would adversely affect the common type rating).
My understanding is that due to the fact that the computational power of the legacy 386 chip in the MAX is already maxed out, incorporating the third AOA input is problematic so Boeing is resisting this with an all out lobbying blitz.
Thread Starter
The lobbying is being directed at not having to change the flight deck for the MAX-7 and -10. Third AOA is too late to back out of...
I think the management of validity of the AoA system should be with the ADIRUs. This should remove code within the flight/nav computer and would move the interface to noting any AoA sensor failure reported by the ADIRU. It's important that the ADIRU do this task in order to avoid the previous panic inducing trigger of a false stall warning that is issued directly by the ADIRU.
If Congress doesn’t mandate Boeing 737 MAX safety retrofits, Europe will
A continuous false alarm stick shaker was one major distraction for the pilots throughout the two crash flights.
What makes little sense is Gate's confusing this with an EASA requirement - his previous article said the stick shaker cutout was an addition only from Transport Canada who wanted stick shaker circuit breaker training and maybe some tactile indicators of which breakers they are. What EASA wanted in that regard was a vaguely described solution to the general warning system problem.
Does anyone have information directly from EASA, et al, rather than through the Dominic filter?
That's just dumb. The stick shaker is a hand massager if the pilots understand that the stall warning is false. If they think it is true then shutting it off is insane. Why would Transport Canada or any other agency think it's useful to disable the stick shaker? Disabling an audio alarm that might cover other alarms or communication in the cockpit makes sense, but not the shaker.
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Stick Shaker Canon Plug . . . . . . . . Disconnect
Crew Communications . . . . . . . . . . Establish
Seriously, unplug it. Why fly with something that obviously is hindering the flight crew?
Crew Communications . . . . . . . . . . Establish
Seriously, unplug it. Why fly with something that obviously is hindering the flight crew?
I'd have to disagree there. I had an unusual pitot heat failure mode a bit more than a decade ago on an NG. The stick shaker and overspeed warning were triggered simultaneously along with a plethora of master cautions. While we figured out pretty quickly it was unreliable airspeed, communication in the flightdeck became very difficult and stressful. The overspeed stopped but the stick shaker continued until touchdown and it's a noisy bit of kit.
Consider that at least two aircraft have been dispatched with aileron controls reversed fresh from service (one by cable and the other fly-by-wire,) especially if this was added to a limited number of planes, there is a good chance of overrides set incorrectly and being overlooked.
The purpose from Transport Canada seemed to be related to pilot mental overload by the stick shaker, but that opens the question of why that is not being demanded of all aircraft in operation. However, adding silencer controls does open the opportunity that the override will prevent a legitimate alert from sounding/shaking when it is supposed to. It's easy to imagine a service operation where the override is checked and not reset.
Consider that at least two aircraft have been dispatched with aileron controls reversed fresh from service (one by cable and the other fly-by-wire,) especially if this was added to a limited number of planes, there is a good chance of overrides set incorrectly and being overlooked.
Consider that at least two aircraft have been dispatched with aileron controls reversed fresh from service (one by cable and the other fly-by-wire,) especially if this was added to a limited number of planes, there is a good chance of overrides set incorrectly and being overlooked.
Seriously? If you have a false stick shaker event which you manage, then disable the warning, what do you estimate the chances are of having a subsequent 1x10e9 stall event later on the same flight?
The 737 needs three independent alpha sensors as per modern thinking on the subject. anything less is …primitive
The 737 needs three independent alpha sensors as per modern thinking on the subject. anything less is …primitive
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It seems the outlook all 737-8s/-9s in operation will need to be modified, pilots trained etc. next to the new 737-10 and 737-7 made Boeing fight back, for economic reasons.
Maria Cantwell bit the bullet I think firmly including the -8 modifications and setting deadlines. That will probably create good will at the FAA, AESA and CAAC.
Maria Cantwell bit the bullet I think firmly including the -8 modifications and setting deadlines. That will probably create good will at the FAA, AESA and CAAC.
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There seems to be a lot of misunderstanding as to how the stick shaker on the 737 works, and how it can be disabled (at the pilot's discretion), in the TC/EASA (and probably for many other regulators) versions of the Airspeed Unreliable NNC - already in place ever since the MAX re-certification.
The 737 has two SMYDs (Stall Management Yaw Damper computers), which take various inputs (including AoA) to calculate whether stick shaker needs to operate or not. Each SMYD is connected to its onside stick shaker (left SMYD to captain's stick shaker motor and right SMYD to the first officer one), so one SMYD can only make one stick shaker motor to operate. That being said, even with a single stick shaker motor operating, there will be vibration felt on both control columns (as they are interconnected), but it will be stronger on the side where stick shaker is operating.
Now, if one of the AoA sensors fails, or other malfunction occurs on that side, only one stick shaker motor will operate - potentially continuously. With both control columns vibrating, detecting a difference between this false stick shaker and an actual stall detected by the other SMYD will bevery difficult. For that reason, the NNC gives the crew an option to disable the false stick shaker (currently by pulling a collared CB for the onside stick shaker motor), which will make subsequent detection of an actual stall extremely simple, as it will be identical to a normal approach to stall with a fully serviceable aircraft.
Nobody is talking about disabling both stick shakers when one goes crazy, it's all just about disabling that single one to lower the workload for the crew. MAX 10 prototypes have been seen with stick shaker inhibit switches, which is probably a safer solution than having crew pulling circuit brakers:
The 737 has two SMYDs (Stall Management Yaw Damper computers), which take various inputs (including AoA) to calculate whether stick shaker needs to operate or not. Each SMYD is connected to its onside stick shaker (left SMYD to captain's stick shaker motor and right SMYD to the first officer one), so one SMYD can only make one stick shaker motor to operate. That being said, even with a single stick shaker motor operating, there will be vibration felt on both control columns (as they are interconnected), but it will be stronger on the side where stick shaker is operating.
Now, if one of the AoA sensors fails, or other malfunction occurs on that side, only one stick shaker motor will operate - potentially continuously. With both control columns vibrating, detecting a difference between this false stick shaker and an actual stall detected by the other SMYD will bevery difficult. For that reason, the NNC gives the crew an option to disable the false stick shaker (currently by pulling a collared CB for the onside stick shaker motor), which will make subsequent detection of an actual stall extremely simple, as it will be identical to a normal approach to stall with a fully serviceable aircraft.
Nobody is talking about disabling both stick shakers when one goes crazy, it's all just about disabling that single one to lower the workload for the crew. MAX 10 prototypes have been seen with stick shaker inhibit switches, which is probably a safer solution than having crew pulling circuit brakers:
My mistake on the ADIRU. It's been a while since I looked and I'd forgotten the SMYD. Still, I think that is the level of evaluating if there is an actual stall and not a sensor failure rather than, for example, making that the MCAS software responsibility. If the plane is not in fact stalling there should not be a stick shaker running. I recall that the stick shaker control is not routed through the flight computer.
If the AoA sensor or SMYD is falsely reporting a stall aren't all outputs from that side suspect and should see power pulled from that side SMYD and ADIRU?
If the AoA sensor or SMYD is falsely reporting a stall aren't all outputs from that side suspect and should see power pulled from that side SMYD and ADIRU?
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According to multiple press reports, the Congress has not included an extension of the timeline for the certification of the 737 MAX 7 and 10 in the annual "defense policy bill", actually the NDAA, National Defense Authorization Act. Since the NDAA is annually a must-pass legislative measure, often times "riders" are attached to it, to ease their passage.
Options for getting an extension done in this Congress are narrowing (insert details of legislative process here).
Options for getting an extension done in this Congress are narrowing (insert details of legislative process here).