West Atlantic ATP runway excursion in Birmingham
It doesn't appear to satisfy the Annex 13 criteria for either an accident or a serious incident, so I suspect any interest the AAIB may have will be very short-lived.
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See Definition of Aircraft Accident and Serious Incident
de minimus non curat lex
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It is more than likely that ATC notified the AAIB that day.
The AAIB website on current field investigations is dated 17 February 2020.
Under current investigation is a runway excursion by a Global 6000 on 11 December 2019 at Liverpool.
So my money is that the AAIB will be taking an interest, with a field investigation as this will be regarded as a “serious incident”.
It is reportable as a "serious incident", covered by "Takeoff or landing incidents, such as undershooting, overrunning or running off the side of runways."
See Definition of Aircraft Accident and Serious Incident
See Definition of Aircraft Accident and Serious Incident
As the Annex 7 definition that you're quoting from says, the event must also involve "circumstances indicating that there was a high probability of an accident" to satisfy the definition. Obviously, that judgement is the AAIB's call.
ATC will have filed a MOR, and the pilot will have filed a ASR/MOR.
It is more than likely that ATC notified the AAIB that day.
The AAIB website on current field investigations is dated 17 February 2020.
Under current investigation is a runway excursion by a Global 6000 on 11 December 2019 at Liverpool.
It is more than likely that ATC notified the AAIB that day.
The AAIB website on current field investigations is dated 17 February 2020.
Under current investigation is a runway excursion by a Global 6000 on 11 December 2019 at Liverpool.
But if they investigated every MOR and ASR, they would require many times the number of staff that they currently have.
Time will tell if we see the report in a future AAIB Bulletin. I'm not holding my breath.
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I’d be interested in your qualifications for making that assertion.
A few here have a great deal more extremely relevant experience and would say that Nil further is making an understatement. Have you read some of the Branch’s recent output?
A few here have a great deal more extremely relevant experience and would say that Nil further is making an understatement. Have you read some of the Branch’s recent output?
de minimus non curat lex
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If an Air Safety Report is not a MOR, it remains internal within the airline, and may have extracts published to crews. It might generate a Notice to Crews. It may modify a SOP, and even result in an amendment to the Part A or B etc.
Having said that the FOI may well attend the regular flight safety meetings where all new ASRs are discussed and actioned as required.
They were fortunate to regain the paved surface intact. They did get perilously close to it ending in tears.
Last edited by parkfell; 19th Jun 2020 at 14:19. Reason: syntax
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Remember the Airlander crash?
The ‘world’s biggest aircraft’, operating under an EASA flight test scheme, overseen by the CAA, crushed its crew compartment because of an screw-up with a mooring line. The crew lost control and were in mortal jeopardy; they survived by chance not design.
Bedford is under two hours from Farnborough by car.
The AAIB sent a form to the captain for him to fill in.
No examination of the flight test programme or its oversight.
So the likelihood that they’ll look into a foreign-registered ATP having a bit of a hop and a skip and jump is debatable.
The ‘world’s biggest aircraft’, operating under an EASA flight test scheme, overseen by the CAA, crushed its crew compartment because of an screw-up with a mooring line. The crew lost control and were in mortal jeopardy; they survived by chance not design.
Bedford is under two hours from Farnborough by car.
The AAIB sent a form to the captain for him to fill in.
No examination of the flight test programme or its oversight.
So the likelihood that they’ll look into a foreign-registered ATP having a bit of a hop and a skip and jump is debatable.
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Well, the airline has appeared in the AAIB reports quite a lot of late. Last year, it' had two ATP, serious incidents in one AAIB bulletin. These were highly detailed investigations. I don't think that the AAIB will (or can) ignore this event, especially when it has been broadcast all over the internet.
Does anyone remember Emerald Airways and how that played out?
Does anyone remember Emerald Airways and how that played out?
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My qualifications are that I can read. Nil furthers post suggested to me that they felt the AAIB were in cahoots with the manufacturers and the airlines to make problems disappear. I do read what the AAIB writes and have done for about 15 years and personally I haven’t detected any trend to support that hypothesis. Perhaps you or nil could elaborate. I’m not saying your wrong, I just haven’t seen it so i’m open to examples that demonstrate it.
de minimus non curat lex
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Well, the airline has appeared in the AAIB reports quite a lot of late. Last year, it' had two ATP, serious incidents in one AAIB bulletin. These were highly detailed investigations. I don't think that the AAIB will (or can) ignore this event, especially when it has been broadcast all over the internet.
The two incidents were in December 2017 (autopilot refused to disconnect) and February 2018 (frozen flight controls). There was also a loss of electrical power during cruise in May 2018.
It's not clear what conclusions we should draw from those three occurrences.
The Chief Inspector of Air Accidents has the power under The Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations 2018 to investigate any aircraft incident he sees fit if he thinks there safety lessons to be drawn from it, whether it meets the ICAO accident/serious incident definitions or not. The Ethiopia B787 lithium battery fire at Heathrow in 2013 was one such event - vacant aircraft, stationary, not being prepared for flight, no injuries, no statutory requirement for an investigation, but findings that grounded the whole fleet while a fix was found.
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I assume that's a reference to the December 2018 bulletin, so rather more than a year ago.
The two incidents were in December 2017 (autopilot refused to disconnect) and February 2018 (frozen flight controls). There was also a loss of electrical power during cruise in May 2018.
It's not clear what conclusions we should draw from those three occurrences.
The two incidents were in December 2017 (autopilot refused to disconnect) and February 2018 (frozen flight controls). There was also a loss of electrical power during cruise in May 2018.
It's not clear what conclusions we should draw from those three occurrences.
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When I trained in Canada (1956) we were taught the "wing down" technique which was much as Parkfell described except that the wing down was initiated after establishing on finals. This worked well on Chipmunk, Harvard and T33. On return to UK "kick off drift" was the RAF order of the day and QFIs insisted on it. I, even then, considered wing down preferable but sensibly did the latter. However, I never forgot the former. Much later, when I became a TP and resumed my love affair with the Harvard, I was able to resume the affair and was able to to some experimenting. I became even more convinced in my opinion. Subsequently I was tasked to cary out trials on Nimrod and Hercules in very adverse X wind conditions. I was able to compare the handling using both techniques. There was no doubt at all as to which resulted in the most consistent and accurate performance. Subsequently I flew the Lancaster which had an evil reputation in a xwind. Wing down allied to a "slow cut" made it a pussy cat. Unfortunately the RAF were unwilling to change the habit of a lifetime. Of course wing down is inadvisable with 4 engined jets but there is nothing to use it with 2 engine types. Indeed the Tristar autoland computer uses wing down, and why does the B52 crank its landing gear to avoid having to use KOD (wing down would not be practible)? Sorry to have gone on at such length but this is my lifelong hobby horse.
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Although someone will no doubt have a moan
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......... On return to UK "kick off drift" was the RAF order of the day and QFIs insisted on it. I, even then, considered wing down preferable but sensibly did the latter. However, I never forgot the former.........Sorry to have gone on at such length but this is my lifelong hobby horse.
Fortunately All Nippon Airways (ANA) were training at Carlisle under some hybrid FAA style syllabus. Japanese examiners would sit in the back of PA30/39 on their IRTs.
They were taught ‘wing down technique’ where you went cross controls probably after passing 500’ QFE. Held that during the flare, to centralise on touchdown. So much easier for me to do. Confidence grew.
So later in life when crabbing it in was required, going cross control as you started the flare was a piece of cake.
I remember seeing on TV, NIMROD crosswind trials at Lossiemouth/Kinloss (?) 50-60 knots across. Not exactly pretty but it worked.
When I am feeling brave I will demonstrate to MPL students crosswind landings in the B737-800 sim. They train to 30 kts.
Start at 30 knots x/w. Increasing each time.
I stop at 60 knots x/w. Quite a handful with max control deflection required.
Good confidence building exercise in case that 10 to the minus X event occurs and no other bolt holes exist.
Learnt about max control deflection flying the Shorts 360 in Scotland with 30 knot limit.
Again, not at all pretty.
My other pet topic is TRIMMING....
Last edited by parkfell; 19th Jun 2020 at 16:55. Reason: Insert SH360
I'd certainly call that a contol failure. As in a failure to control.
Hard to tell in the first vid but in the second as they are departing the centreline there is not only no sign of right rudder at all but a brief stab of left rudder (!!) as the left main gear lifts off but that's accompanied and followed by a protracted period of right-roll aileron - ie further lifting the flying port wing that continues as they stabilise parallel to the runway, but the swing reoccurs briefly as the large left aileron input remains in place and the port gear becomes unweighted again.. It's almost as though the crossed controls got crossed!
No wonder the swing and wing-lift immediately got worse after touchdown.
Hard to tell in the first vid but in the second as they are departing the centreline there is not only no sign of right rudder at all but a brief stab of left rudder (!!) as the left main gear lifts off but that's accompanied and followed by a protracted period of right-roll aileron - ie further lifting the flying port wing that continues as they stabilise parallel to the runway, but the swing reoccurs briefly as the large left aileron input remains in place and the port gear becomes unweighted again.. It's almost as though the crossed controls got crossed!
No wonder the swing and wing-lift immediately got worse after touchdown.
Last edited by meleagertoo; 19th Jun 2020 at 13:42.