Vietjet runway excursion VVTS Saigon
de minimus non curat lex
You might get a better appreciation by looking at AVHerald.com
The operator made no mention of a mechanical issue ~ simply skidded off the runway during heavy rain.
There are other remarks made by other commentators which include landing in tropical storm NURI, windshear, flooded runway etc.
The human factors involved will hopefully be dissected in the accident report, including the training regime.
The PF/PM (crew) protocols started to fail at the moment the refuelling decision was taken.
To quote a phrase said to me by an old hand many moons ago:
”if you think training is expensive, wait until you have an accident”
The operator made no mention of a mechanical issue ~ simply skidded off the runway during heavy rain.
There are other remarks made by other commentators which include landing in tropical storm NURI, windshear, flooded runway etc.
The human factors involved will hopefully be dissected in the accident report, including the training regime.
The PF/PM (crew) protocols started to fail at the moment the refuelling decision was taken.
To quote a phrase said to me by an old hand many moons ago:
”if you think training is expensive, wait until you have an accident”
Last edited by parkfell; 15th Jun 2020 at 14:32.
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That it skidded off the runway in wet weather is self evident, but why is, at this point in time, not. I have in the past seen many dubious statements made by airline "officials" in that part of the world. Let's not hang the crew until the full facts are known.
N4790P
de minimus non curat lex
All airline cultures emanates from the top. They set the style and tone which cascades all the way down through the employees and contractors.
The answer as to why the aircraft came off the paved surface may well be revealed by studying, inter alia, the HUMAN FACTORS of this incident from a Report Time ( or even before ) to the end of the crews working day. They would clearly be feeling wretched and sick as to what occurred, and wish they could rewind the clock.
Start with management’s style and then work down to the ‘shop floor’.
Normal mindset
So every time it rains this kind of incident is the norm? … … or not.
'Normal Mindset' is part of the problem. Rain and TX may be normal; follow the SOP, but no reason not to check how far conditions deviate from the Standard, and change Operational Procedure depending on the actual conditions.
Runways are often wet - SOP based on wet performance plus % safety margin, autobrake level 'x', reliance on reported braking action, normal reverse.
But if the 'normal' SOP does not encourage (allow) change, or require a check of the actual runway conditions, calculating the actual landing distance required for both wet and flooded, reassessment and increasing the % distance safety margin, considering the runway surface type and condition for every runway end, crosswind effect, tyre tread on that particular flight, adjusting autobrake setting for each flight, use manual brake, mentally noting the distance still available after slowing down, areas of puddles.
Then without thinking about these issues - a new normal will be established with each overrun; opposed to improving experience on each and every flight.
'Normal Mindset' is part of the problem. Rain and TX may be normal; follow the SOP, but no reason not to check how far conditions deviate from the Standard, and change Operational Procedure depending on the actual conditions.
Runways are often wet - SOP based on wet performance plus % safety margin, autobrake level 'x', reliance on reported braking action, normal reverse.
But if the 'normal' SOP does not encourage (allow) change, or require a check of the actual runway conditions, calculating the actual landing distance required for both wet and flooded, reassessment and increasing the % distance safety margin, considering the runway surface type and condition for every runway end, crosswind effect, tyre tread on that particular flight, adjusting autobrake setting for each flight, use manual brake, mentally noting the distance still available after slowing down, areas of puddles.
Then without thinking about these issues - a new normal will be established with each overrun; opposed to improving experience on each and every flight.
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All airline cultures emanates from the top. They set the style and tone which cascades all the way down through the employees and contractors.
There is no end to airlines that foster a culture of "Real men don't go around." With these operators, unless directed to go around by ATC, a go-around is seen as a loss of face. That is why it is unheard of in these cultures for the copilot to take control from the captain for the purpose of going around. It has ever been thus and always will be.
