Here's something to keep you at the edge of your seat
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Another point is that if the approach conditions are blustery with significant crosswind and turbulence, it is useful to take manual control much earlier than 470' agl. 7 miles gives one time to "get in the groove" of blustery weather conditions and get your responses up to speed before getting to short finals and the flare 
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as well as towards the difference between an honest mistake and a violation. Which, in turn, often translates into reluctance to fly manually on part of many crews. It gets to the point where even some instructors frown upon pilots flying manually above 1000 feet AAL
And who can forget the tragic crash into the sea of the Flash Air Boeing 737-300 following a night departure from Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt. The aircraft slowly rolled to 111 degrees and 43 degrees nose down after the autopilot was disconnected within a few minutes after takeoff.
The CVR recorded the voice of the captain repeatedly shouting to the copilot to engage the autopilot even though the 737 was rolling past the vertical. Automation dependency at its worst.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flash_..._of_the_flight
Last edited by sheppey; 31st May 2020 at 03:32.
So from day 1 the trainees are taught to follow the thrust levers forward as TOGA button is pressed, and during any scheduled thrust changes.
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Nemo Me Impune Lacessit
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I believe Airbus designed their thrust control system to avoid this problem. Also, by not having the levers back driven, Airbus pilots are required to look at the N1/EPR gauges to confirm thrust changes and not rely on the proxy of moving levers: So they keep in practise of looking at the gauges, which of course is good practice anyway.
As I understand it, yes.
The accident you refer to was caused, I believe, by the pilots trying to be clever, ignoring the SOP and f*****g it up. They decided it would look impressive to rely on the Alpha floor protection system to automatically apply TOGA and lift them off the runway, giving them a touch-and-go without them touching the thrust levers. However, they hadn't read their manuals properly or they would have noticed that Alpha floor protection is inhibited below 100' RA on approach. So the system didn't apply TOGA for them and they crashed.
The only way to manually apply TOGA in the FBW Airbus is to move the thrust levers fully forward. This is a natural instinctive response and there are no other manual TOGA switches to confuse pilots - the levers must be moved fully forward to engage TOGA thrust, (and in this position, the FADECs will not over-thrust or over-heat the engines).
I don't know about the MD82 but in the 737-300/400 go-around the pilot has to: Press a TOGA switch, Push the levers to arm's length, (overriding the back-drive clutches), and then ask PM to set TOGA thrust. More to do in the heat of the moment compared to the Airbus system of simply moving the levers fully forward.
The accident you refer to was caused, I believe, by the pilots trying to be clever, ignoring the SOP and f*****g it up. They decided it would look impressive to rely on the Alpha floor protection system to automatically apply TOGA and lift them off the runway, giving them a touch-and-go without them touching the thrust levers. However, they hadn't read their manuals properly or they would have noticed that Alpha floor protection is inhibited below 100' RA on approach. So the system didn't apply TOGA for them and they crashed.
The only way to manually apply TOGA in the FBW Airbus is to move the thrust levers fully forward. This is a natural instinctive response and there are no other manual TOGA switches to confuse pilots - the levers must be moved fully forward to engage TOGA thrust, (and in this position, the FADECs will not over-thrust or over-heat the engines).
I don't know about the MD82 but in the 737-300/400 go-around the pilot has to: Press a TOGA switch, Push the levers to arm's length, (overriding the back-drive clutches), and then ask PM to set TOGA thrust. More to do in the heat of the moment compared to the Airbus system of simply moving the levers fully forward.
Last edited by Uplinker; 31st May 2020 at 08:21.
You are misrepresenting what I said.
I was merely pointing out how I believe Airbus have improved the thrust selection system by design.
I was merely pointing out how I believe Airbus have improved the thrust selection system by design.
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Unfortunately, as I'm sure some trainers on here will agree, the Go-Around is one of the most cocked up items in recurrent sims, and judging by my old internal incident reports, often cocked up on the line.
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In the Airbus you have report of almost accident because of this system, an airfrance plane almost crash (easy to find the report on the BEA website)
When you are light, even more of Go around altitude is low, if you go with 2 engine on TOGA you rocket yourself to the sky, so what some Airbus pilot do is to go all the way to activate TOGA FD, then reduce the trust to climb gate
the PF didn't go all the way to TOGA gate
In the air France, the PF didn't go all the way, so didn't activate FD TOGA, trust went to CLB but FD stay on ILS and same, pilot didn't pay attention of what they were doing and followed the FD until 50ft with overspeed of the flaps ...and finally do the right thing ...
In the Boeing, if you press TOGA switch once with autotrust ON, plane will give you power for your weight for a climb rate of 1000ft/MN if you press a second time TOGA, max trust is set.
No system if perfect and all go advantage in some situation and flaw in other ...
In that case of the incident with the MD, problems for me and people relying too much on automatic and not checking what they do, when I go around (or my FO), I want nose up and trust, once I m sure I m climbing, I can do other stuff ... Because of all those case of accident / incident, I really pay attention of my action or my First officer in case of go around.
When you are light, even more of Go around altitude is low, if you go with 2 engine on TOGA you rocket yourself to the sky, so what some Airbus pilot do is to go all the way to activate TOGA FD, then reduce the trust to climb gate
the PF didn't go all the way to TOGA gate
In the air France, the PF didn't go all the way, so didn't activate FD TOGA, trust went to CLB but FD stay on ILS and same, pilot didn't pay attention of what they were doing and followed the FD until 50ft with overspeed of the flaps ...and finally do the right thing ...
In the Boeing, if you press TOGA switch once with autotrust ON, plane will give you power for your weight for a climb rate of 1000ft/MN if you press a second time TOGA, max trust is set.
No system if perfect and all go advantage in some situation and flaw in other ...
In that case of the incident with the MD, problems for me and people relying too much on automatic and not checking what they do, when I go around (or my FO), I want nose up and trust, once I m sure I m climbing, I can do other stuff ... Because of all those case of accident / incident, I really pay attention of my action or my First officer in case of go around.
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Actually in the 737-100,200,300,400,500 and 800s
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A hyper focus on the pitch attitude or speed, which is common to see, drops the power cross check. It's seen approach, landing, go-around, windshear, terrain avoidance training, etc. It's present in a lot of the accident reports - a lack of awareness of the thrust levels of the engines.
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Flocks - AB technique is the 'soft' G/A. Advance to TOGA, verify TOGA guidance and power, then reduce to CLB power. Very similar to the Boeing's first TOGA push (2000 FPM???).
Full power TOGA at landing weight, or lighter, is a great introduction to vertigo refresher training. It's also a great re-introduction into 'low altitude level off from a high thrust/rate of climb". Slowing down the drama helps. Vertical speed intervention, or horrors of all horrors, reducing thrust during a manually flown go-around reduces the vertigo threat and the rapid acceleration and closure with the, often low, go-around altitude.
Full power TOGA at landing weight, or lighter, is a great introduction to vertigo refresher training. It's also a great re-introduction into 'low altitude level off from a high thrust/rate of climb". Slowing down the drama helps. Vertical speed intervention, or horrors of all horrors, reducing thrust during a manually flown go-around reduces the vertigo threat and the rapid acceleration and closure with the, often low, go-around altitude.
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Thank god they were flying a Douglas. I think it is safer to fly all go-arounds manually, messing up with automatics so close to ground is looking for trouble.
A lot of pilots screw up with the automatics so close to ground in such a short amount of time.
All you have to do is advance the throttles to full power and pitch up to a go-around attitude. Then you worry about the rest.
Power + Attitude = Performance
A lot of pilots screw up with the automatics so close to ground in such a short amount of time.
All you have to do is advance the throttles to full power and pitch up to a go-around attitude. Then you worry about the rest.
Power + Attitude = Performance
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Over-reliance on automation which is not fully understood seems to be the case in way too many incidents and accidents.
Has training become the bare minimum these days to minimise the costs as much as possible?
Have airlines created this themselves by prohibiting pilots to manually fly the aircraft and creating a fear culture by punishing mistakes resulting in lack of flying skills and airmanship?
I believe the answer is yes.
From all the companies I have worked for, the one that allowed us to switch off all the automation and where pilots weren’t actually afraid of doing so, had the best pilots and was the safest airline in my opinion.
With all the others, I was never 100% relaxed when flying with them as a passenger, because I knew there were some pilots with sub-standard flying skills and airmanship.
As for Airbus design discussion: I like the AB design, but that’s probably because I’m very familiar with it.
It’s (usually) not the design that kills you, it’s improper usage of it. AB, Boeing, MD, ... They all have their own design with pros and cons. If you are properly trained and you follow the manufacturer’s SOPs, it shouldn’t matter.
Has training become the bare minimum these days to minimise the costs as much as possible?
Have airlines created this themselves by prohibiting pilots to manually fly the aircraft and creating a fear culture by punishing mistakes resulting in lack of flying skills and airmanship?
I believe the answer is yes.
From all the companies I have worked for, the one that allowed us to switch off all the automation and where pilots weren’t actually afraid of doing so, had the best pilots and was the safest airline in my opinion.
With all the others, I was never 100% relaxed when flying with them as a passenger, because I knew there were some pilots with sub-standard flying skills and airmanship.
As for Airbus design discussion: I like the AB design, but that’s probably because I’m very familiar with it.
It’s (usually) not the design that kills you, it’s improper usage of it. AB, Boeing, MD, ... They all have their own design with pros and cons. If you are properly trained and you follow the manufacturer’s SOPs, it shouldn’t matter.
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I could say a lot on the subject of training. Even the bare minimum (which most carriers sadly rely upon to cull costs) can be implemented in a way that will make it a bit more challenging and educational. Less rigidity in the sim sessions would be a good idea, I think. Most of the time, the scenarios repeat themselves to the point where each failure starts being mentally linked to one very specific set of circumstances. Engine failure after V1 always occurs right after V1 - and it's all well and good with most pilots because they've done it enough times to feel comfortable with everything happening in the same way every time. However, if you try introducing the very same failure at 800 feet AAL, many will make a mess out of it. The same goes for loss of braking during taxiing as opposed to right after touchdown. The same goes for pretty much any failure if you introduce it at a time different from the one when it happened in the last 20 sessions of the crew members concerned. And that's actually quite worrying because real-world failures almost never follow an exact scenario. Hence, developing competencies to deal with a situation, no matter when and how it occurs, shall be prioritized over rote learning of rigid scenarios.
As for manual flying skills, lots of pitiful examples can be seen. Things go as far as some people classifying it as unprofessional, irresponsible and whatnot else. And never asking themselves what will happen on the day when George goes belly-up and you will have to fly the plane manually all the way from FL350, fly a non-precision approach and land - and the skills required for that are simply not there. The safety and quality departments of many outfits will hang you if the snapshot at 1000 feet AAL on final is not quite right, so many prefer to keep the autopilot engaged through 1000 feet AAL just to make sure that they're off the hook. And the FDM watchers are all happy and not at the slightest concerned that said pilot would not have been able to achieve the same snapshot if it hadn't been for the autopilot. Which gives some food for very disturbing thoughts. The entire culture and attitude towards automation needs to change as the individuals, with all their weaknesses, are just a product of the system.
As for manual flying skills, lots of pitiful examples can be seen. Things go as far as some people classifying it as unprofessional, irresponsible and whatnot else. And never asking themselves what will happen on the day when George goes belly-up and you will have to fly the plane manually all the way from FL350, fly a non-precision approach and land - and the skills required for that are simply not there. The safety and quality departments of many outfits will hang you if the snapshot at 1000 feet AAL on final is not quite right, so many prefer to keep the autopilot engaged through 1000 feet AAL just to make sure that they're off the hook. And the FDM watchers are all happy and not at the slightest concerned that said pilot would not have been able to achieve the same snapshot if it hadn't been for the autopilot. Which gives some food for very disturbing thoughts. The entire culture and attitude towards automation needs to change as the individuals, with all their weaknesses, are just a product of the system.
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I could say a lot on the subject of training. Even the bare minimum (which most carriers sadly rely upon to cull costs) can be implemented in a way that will make it a bit more challenging and educational. Less rigidity in the sim sessions would be a good idea, I think. Most of the time, the scenarios repeat themselves to the point where each failure starts being mentally linked to one very specific set of circumstances. Engine failure after V1 always occurs right after V1 - and it's all well and good with most pilots because they've done it enough times to feel comfortable with everything happening in the same way every time. However, if you try introducing the very same failure at 800 feet AAL, many will make a mess out of it. The same goes for loss of braking during taxiing as opposed to right after touchdown. The same goes for pretty much any failure if you introduce it at a time different from the one when it happened in the last 20 sessions of the crew members concerned. And that's actually quite worrying because real-world failures almost never follow an exact scenario. Hence, developing competencies to deal with a situation, no matter when and how it occurs, shall be prioritized over rote learning of rigid scenarios.
As for manual flying skills, lots of pitiful examples can be seen. Things go as far as some people classifying it as unprofessional, irresponsible and whatnot else. And never asking themselves what will happen on the day when George goes belly-up and you will have to fly the plane manually all the way from FL350, fly a non-precision approach and land - and the skills required for that are simply not there. The safety and quality departments of many outfits will hang you if the snapshot at 1000 feet AAL on final is not quite right, so many prefer to keep the autopilot engaged through 1000 feet AAL just to make sure that they're off the hook. And the FDM watchers are all happy and not at the slightest concerned that said pilot would not have been able to achieve the same snapshot if it hadn't been for the autopilot. Which gives some food for very disturbing thoughts. The entire culture and attitude towards automation needs to change as the individuals, with all their weaknesses, are just a product of the system.
As for manual flying skills, lots of pitiful examples can be seen. Things go as far as some people classifying it as unprofessional, irresponsible and whatnot else. And never asking themselves what will happen on the day when George goes belly-up and you will have to fly the plane manually all the way from FL350, fly a non-precision approach and land - and the skills required for that are simply not there. The safety and quality departments of many outfits will hang you if the snapshot at 1000 feet AAL on final is not quite right, so many prefer to keep the autopilot engaged through 1000 feet AAL just to make sure that they're off the hook. And the FDM watchers are all happy and not at the slightest concerned that said pilot would not have been able to achieve the same snapshot if it hadn't been for the autopilot. Which gives some food for very disturbing thoughts. The entire culture and attitude towards automation needs to change as the individuals, with all their weaknesses, are just a product of the system.