PIA A320 Crash Karachi
Can someone enlighten me as to whether the Insurers are likely to pay out given what has all the hallmarks of grave Gross Misconduct by the crew.
Add to that, the issue of whether any evidence is uncovered as to whether the licences were issued “fair and square”, and their continuing validity iaw licensing regulations.
Simply asking the question. I have no information one way or the other.
Add to that, the issue of whether any evidence is uncovered as to whether the licences were issued “fair and square”, and their continuing validity iaw licensing regulations.
Simply asking the question. I have no information one way or the other.
Well it's likely it wasn't the passengers fault, so it's only a question of who has the deepest pockets and the strongest storey
Fairness is only a third level of assessment.
The insurers have a way of recouping by upping the Insurance premiums across the board
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I want address questions like this one. According to the FDR Graphs, on first approach the aircraft speed was in the 200-210KIAS region when they overflew 0NM (=start of runway 25L).
We know that they didn't have wheel brakes and thrust reverser available
Not knowing A320, but I assume Auto Speed Brakes also depend on WoW sensor logic.
Anyway, at ~1.3NM they just slowed down to ~160KIAS! That's roughly at 8000ft of the available 11,100ft of 25L. From there its speed accelerated again, as Go around was initiated.
Of course it's a nogo-around after Thrust Reverser, but this case here is so outside the norm that it really doesn't matter.
(Sorry, as newbe writing this might appear much later in the thread)
We know that they didn't have wheel brakes and thrust reverser available
Not knowing A320, but I assume Auto Speed Brakes also depend on WoW sensor logic.
Anyway, at ~1.3NM they just slowed down to ~160KIAS! That's roughly at 8000ft of the available 11,100ft of 25L. From there its speed accelerated again, as Go around was initiated.
Of course it's a nogo-around after Thrust Reverser, but this case here is so outside the norm that it really doesn't matter.
(Sorry, as newbe writing this might appear much later in the thread)
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Roger that
homebuilt
I agree with all the points. This was in no way a SOP for landing a passenger aircraft, maybe fighter jet or military cargo in manpad danger zone. Good that no one yet came with suggestions of S-like manoeuvre to kill horizontal AS in this case. My point was only that if we look at the available picture from the prelim report and else, it looks like that pilots were not in two minds what to do, otherwise they'd followed the suggestion to take an orbit (they were not ordered specifically to take an orbit, so I do not see that they disobeyed the ATC commands here). And simply were determined to land the AC and somehow where "comfortable" with that. So it was only logical was to assume that they were confident this is going to work, and they going to make it, at least at the initial stage. I don't know why, but perhaps they done this before, but this is crucial point of the story. Yes, again, this is not how things should be and it was a complete madness. But the assumption to land the aircraft being so high and fast above normal and that they were prepared to ignore the warning lights, might explain why they missed another noise of too low gear warning. They did not forget about the gear completely, they used it to kill some speed as it looks, just did not control this properly... though I don't understand why at 1740ft with the gears they deactivated speed brakes.. Too concentrated on the sink rate? Yes, as situation developed they were getting into much deeper waters, hunting for GS and missed the gear check.
But as pointed before, they were way too fast to be anywhere close to a normal landing at the threshold: 190-210 kts IAS and slats/flaps at 3 is way too fast at this point, regardless of the wind and actual LW, so even with the gears down, full thrust reverse and max breaking things would not end nicely for them as it looks, can anyone confirm? But somehow they were determined and wanted to make this work, so I don't think they were choosing in their heads between these two scenarios: overshoot or TGOA.
I agree with all the points. This was in no way a SOP for landing a passenger aircraft, maybe fighter jet or military cargo in manpad danger zone. Good that no one yet came with suggestions of S-like manoeuvre to kill horizontal AS in this case. My point was only that if we look at the available picture from the prelim report and else, it looks like that pilots were not in two minds what to do, otherwise they'd followed the suggestion to take an orbit (they were not ordered specifically to take an orbit, so I do not see that they disobeyed the ATC commands here). And simply were determined to land the AC and somehow where "comfortable" with that. So it was only logical was to assume that they were confident this is going to work, and they going to make it, at least at the initial stage. I don't know why, but perhaps they done this before, but this is crucial point of the story. Yes, again, this is not how things should be and it was a complete madness. But the assumption to land the aircraft being so high and fast above normal and that they were prepared to ignore the warning lights, might explain why they missed another noise of too low gear warning. They did not forget about the gear completely, they used it to kill some speed as it looks, just did not control this properly... though I don't understand why at 1740ft with the gears they deactivated speed brakes.. Too concentrated on the sink rate? Yes, as situation developed they were getting into much deeper waters, hunting for GS and missed the gear check.
But as pointed before, they were way too fast to be anywhere close to a normal landing at the threshold: 190-210 kts IAS and slats/flaps at 3 is way too fast at this point, regardless of the wind and actual LW, so even with the gears down, full thrust reverse and max breaking things would not end nicely for them as it looks, can anyone confirm? But somehow they were determined and wanted to make this work, so I don't think they were choosing in their heads between these two scenarios: overshoot or TGOA.
The book says don't do a go-around after the reversers are deployed. BUT, the real world can throw a curve that will cause you to ignore the book (e.g. a large obstacle appears on the runway in front of you).
https://aviation-safety.net/database...?id=19780211-0
Short story, 737-200 lands in a snowstorm, deploys the reversers, then a snowplow appears out of the snow. They stow the reversers, firewall the throttles and perform a go-around and miss the snowplow. Unfortunately one of the reversers hadn't completed the stow cycle before liftoff - lack of WoW removed the hydraulic pressure from the T/R circuit, and the aero forces pushed the reverser back to deploy (clam shell style reversers on the 737-100/200 series). Aircraft control could not be maintained at that low altitude/airspeed and they crashed.
So, although the book says don't do it, it has been a design requirement on every subsequent Boeing design that if there was an aborted landing after T/R deployment, the reversers would stow and lock even if air/ground goes 'air' before the stow cycle is completed.
Again, no first hand knowledge, but I suspect Airbus has a similar requirement.
Is trying that in the sim really good training for crews? It will just make people more likely to press on with a very hot and high approach because 'it might just work out'. I reckon I could get it down, but practising it in the sim with an aim to prove that it is no big deal and possibly a bad idea.
Originally Posted by FullWings
... on the whole I would say it is good training in what the aircraft is capable (or not capable) of. As long as the SAC are attained and maintained, then it’s using the tools in the box.
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Every so often someone posts a gentle hint that maybe these two pilots ignored all the warnings and apparently all common sense because they thought they could get away with it. Perhaps because they had done this before, and perhaps more than once. So far, there is no evidence that the bizarre series of events leading up to this crash was caused by anything other than the deliberate actions of the pilots, contrary to normal operating procedure and in spite of functioning controls and alarms. There is no end of evidence that this has happened to some degree before, but nothing quite like this. There must be some other explanation.
Only half a speed-brake
I hope so, yet the Occam's razor principle is on the opposite team.
People do wierd stuff and once they get away with it, reinforce their self confidence. To a point of being subconsciously proud of it. Have a look at the Mogadishu W. I. G. E. 360 thread. A seasoned veteran's illicit fun becomes a highly raised bar of true airmanship for many.
I still cannot imagine anyone pushing through landing inside flap overspeed and not discontinuing the approach. However in absolute majority of human factor accidents the people involved honestly believed to be doing the right thing. No matter how freaking absurd it actually was.
People do wierd stuff and once they get away with it, reinforce their self confidence. To a point of being subconsciously proud of it. Have a look at the Mogadishu W. I. G. E. 360 thread. A seasoned veteran's illicit fun becomes a highly raised bar of true airmanship for many.
I still cannot imagine anyone pushing through landing inside flap overspeed and not discontinuing the approach. However in absolute majority of human factor accidents the people involved honestly believed to be doing the right thing. No matter how freaking absurd it actually was.
Last edited by FlightDetent; 29th Jun 2020 at 09:29.
de minimus non curat lex
The fact that they continued the first approach must indicate that they believed a successful landing (And the Gear was DOWN) possible which to those who contribute to theads was extremely unlikely, if not impossible.
If the airline hopes to regain its reputation, then robust flight data monitoring must take place.
It would be further enhanced if the usual suspects were not involved, and say the department was staffed by French aviators who are regarded as independent.
The chances of this occurring ~ virtually NIL.
Then of course the little matter of licences issued by deception / fraud, not to mention recurrent training and testing in the simulator by responsible competent pilots.
A big ask which will be a step too far given the culture?
Only half a speed-brake
- they put it down once when too high to control the energy
- they put it down the second time in the usual spot of 1700 ft, including the full routine of arming the spoilers in sequence (hence stowing the speed brake)
- they did not see or hear any warning for L/G
Are we are quite clear here regarding commercial aircraft not cleared for in flight reverser deployment ( I recall locking systems were reinforced post the Lauda Air B767 accident).
This report states the crew selected R.T. but with landing gear up there would be no W.O.W. the reverser's would not have deployed, in most types the crew would have felt a baulk in the thrust levers movement aft.
I don't know the A320 specific but most engines, without WOW, would have stayed at a flight idle not the lower ground idle and therefore more responsive to a go around command.
This report states the crew selected R.T. but with landing gear up there would be no W.O.W. the reverser's would not have deployed, in most types the crew would have felt a baulk in the thrust levers movement aft.
I don't know the A320 specific but most engines, without WOW, would have stayed at a flight idle not the lower ground idle and therefore more responsive to a go around command.
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The same applies to the A320
per the FCOM - ACTUATION LOGIC
Deployment requires :
‐ One FADEC channel, operating with its associated throttle reverse signal ;
‐ Right and left main gear compressed signal from the corresponding LGCIUs ;
‐ A Thrust Lever Angle (TLA) reverse signals from at least one Spoiler Elevator Computer (SEC).
Before deployment is completed, the FADEC sets reverse idle thrust on the engine that is having its
thrust reversed.is
per the FCOM - ACTUATION LOGIC
Deployment requires :
‐ One FADEC channel, operating with its associated throttle reverse signal ;
‐ Right and left main gear compressed signal from the corresponding LGCIUs ;
‐ A Thrust Lever Angle (TLA) reverse signals from at least one Spoiler Elevator Computer (SEC).
Before deployment is completed, the FADEC sets reverse idle thrust on the engine that is having its
thrust reversed.is
Only half a speed-brake
The TL's mechanism will move to REV position without W.O.W. on the type under discussion. The crew have no way of knowing if the TRs have deployed or not.
As for the question whether a REV FAULT message has precedence over the overspeed clacker and / or the TOO LOW TERR from the GPWS, no pilot really wants to know.
As for the question whether a REV FAULT message has precedence over the overspeed clacker and / or the TOO LOW TERR from the GPWS, no pilot really wants to know.
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Every so often someone posts a gentle hint that maybe these two pilots ignored all the warnings and apparently all common sense because they thought they could get away with it. Perhaps because they had done this before, and perhaps more than once. So far, there is no evidence that the bizarre series of events leading up to this crash was caused by anything other than the deliberate actions of the pilots, contrary to normal operating procedure and in spite of functioning controls and alarms. There is no end of evidence that this has happened to some degree before, but nothing quite like this. There must be some other explanation.
Only half a speed-brake
Basically yes. Neither applied since the TR would had been stowed due to lack of wheels on the ground signal. The next best is REV FAULT (i.e. selected but not deployed), which is displayed on a screen. Order of priority applies for that, see my second sentence in the previous post.
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It just does not seem possible that they could have made so many bad decisions along the way without realizing they were getting deeper and deeper into trouble and taking some corrective action. The fact that, as ferry pilot stated, they made so many deliberate actions that were all wrong begs for a better explanation other than they thought they could get away with it.
Over-confidence can arise from a well known phenomenon called "normalization of deviance". There is no need to invoke fumes, medical issues or anything else. The fact is, healthy, alert, fully aware people will occasionally do very stupid things. Bear in mind this type of accident is very rare, we are talking one in billions of flights.
The risks of continuing an unstable approach are also well known, and better emphasis of that will surely be the focus of any recommendations.
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What happened here was a "could you land an airliner if the pilots died" challenge.
“PIA acknowledges the AAIB report and has already taken measures learning from it. An independent Flight Data Monitoring setup established to monitor & analyze all flights. All pilots with dubious licenses will be grounded. Safety is more imp. than any commercial interest.”
What happened here was a "could you land an airliner if the pilots died" challenge.
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According to this tweet from an American expat in Pakistan (she famously claims to be a #MeToo victim of local politicians), the PK8303 captain had failed a psych test when he first applied to PIA as a Cadet Pilot. He appealed and a Sindh judge ordered him hired.
