PIA A320 Crash Karachi
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: Wanderlust
Posts: 3,403
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
. The "gear not down warning" in the ECAM might have been missed because of the anyways ongoing CRC and ECAM warnings for flap overspeed.
But ignoring the aural "too low gear" would be inexplicable for me
But ignoring the aural "too low gear" would be inexplicable for me
Join Date: Apr 2002
Posts: 1
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Looking at the preliminary report I also suspect that the biggest evidence will come from the CVR and from a psychological assessment especially as there is already a documented lack of CRM and adherence to standard call outs. Is this sort of thing normal for PIA?
Finally, the prelim report doesn't talk about the crew lowering the gear at all on approach. I know that previously it was suggested that the gear was lowered but aircraft protection kicked in due to the high speed so I'm hoping that question is resolved in the full report.
Join Date: Apr 2002
Posts: 1
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Join Date: Jan 2018
Location: Leatherhead
Posts: 12
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Gear mentioned
From the interim report
"The FDR indicated action of lowering of the landing gears at 7221 ft at around 10.5 Nautical Miles from Runway 25L."
"Landing approach was not discontinued. However, FDR shows action of raising of the landing gears at 1740 ft"
"The FDR indicated action of lowering of the landing gears at 7221 ft at around 10.5 Nautical Miles from Runway 25L."
"Landing approach was not discontinued. However, FDR shows action of raising of the landing gears at 1740 ft"
Join Date: May 2005
Location: On a good day - at sea
Posts: 263
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I'm puzzled by the GPWS related posts.
Could somebody independently look at what GPWS warnings they would have encountered. As best I can tell - Given their airspeed and gear selection and flap selection from the report, they would have heard the Mode 4A TOO LOW TERRAIN" warning somewhere around 500 ft. That's it. There would have not been a TOO LOW GEAR warning at all.
Last edited by nnc0; 26th Jun 2020 at 16:11.
[QUOTE Finally, the prelim report doesn't talk about the crew lowering the gear at all on approach. I know that previously it was suggested that the gear was lowered but aircraft protection kicked in due to the high speed so I'm hoping that question is resolved in the full report.
"The FDR indicated action of lowering of the landing gears at 7221 ft at around 10.5 Nautical Miles from Runway 25L."
"Landing approach was not discontinued. However, FDR shows action of raising of the landing gears at 1740 ft"
"Landing approach was not discontinued. However, FDR shows action of raising of the landing gears at 1740 ft"
I don't recall any historical incident that might apply in the last 30 years
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: Wanderlust
Posts: 3,403
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I'm puzzled by the GPWS related posts.
Could somebody independently look at what GPWS warnings they would have encountered. As best I can tell - Given their airspeed and gear selection and flap selection from the report, they would have heard the Mode 4A TOO LOW TERRAIN" warning somewhere around 500 ft. That's it. There would have not been a TOO LOW GEAR warning at all.
Join Date: Apr 2002
Posts: 1
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
[QUOTE Finally, the prelim report doesn't talk about the crew lowering the gear at all on approach. I know that previously it was suggested that the gear was lowered but aircraft protection kicked in due to the high speed so I'm hoping that question is resolved in the full report.
"The FDR indicated action of lowering of the landing gears at 7221 ft at around 10.5 Nautical Miles from Runway 25L."
"Landing approach was not discontinued. However, FDR shows action of raising of the landing gears at 1740 ft"[/QUOTE]
Yup, it does say that - sorry, my initial post could have been clearer. The report doesn't say anything about the gear not going down because of the speed protections.
Join Date: May 2005
Location: On a good day - at sea
Posts: 263
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: USA
Posts: 2,513
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thanks for the info. But let me insist on one thing: some basic data (after having lost engine thrust) seem to be quite important for the investigation :speed, altitude, vertical speed, flight control inputs, attitude.....are Airbus planes designed to lose FDR operation in this condition????
PIA A320 Crash Karachi
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: USA
Posts: 2,513
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Some of the older planes have mechanical stby instruments. If this was one such plane, I doubt there's any means to record data.
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: USA
Posts: 2,513
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Ok, I’ve read it, but doesn’t help much. The question is: do A320’s lose FDR after a loss of thrust on both engines? It’s clear RAT will deploy, it’s clear RAT will power an emergency generator (as it will power a hydraulic system which will power that generator), and I believe FDR readouts are essential for investigators, before and after the thrust loss. It’s clear, though, that FDR is not essential for flying the plane safely after the thrust loss....
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: USA
Posts: 2,513
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The A320 FCOM says the same thing. I deduced from that, the APU would have to be running in order to get that information. The way it's written in the FCOM lead me to believe it was powered at all times though.
AFAIKT it sounds like they were never switched to tower. Approach cleared them to land after making a phone call to tower, and tower phoned approach to tell them about the "pod strike".
Join Date: Feb 2002
Location: at my computer
Posts: 250
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Perhaps if you had bothered to actually read the Preliminary Report and numerous posts in this thread you would have known that the aircraft was not on the tower frequency.
h) Since the approach to land was continued, “Karachi Approach” instead of changing over the aircraft to “Aerodrome Control”, sought telephonic landing clearance from the “Aerodrome Control”. The “Aerodrome Control” conveyed a landing clearance of the aircraft (without observing the abnormality that the landing gears were not extended) to “Karachi Approach”. Subsequently “Karachi Approach” cleared the aircraft to land
Pegase Driver
Join Date: May 1997
Location: Europe
Age: 73
Posts: 3,668
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Did not want to comment on the many inaccuracies or rather misconceptions regarding the regulations and how ATC works , but since I am grounded today due CBs here it is :
Yes normally after established on ILS and clear of other traffic an APP controller transfers the aircraft to the Tower controller who will issue a landing clearance . Keeping the aircraft on the APP frequency and issuing the landing clearance is however foreseen in the regulations (ICAO annex 11 ) and frequently done in LVP ops. Keeping the aircraft on the frequency is even recommended in case of emergency of difficulties to avoid switching frequencies and de-concentrating a crew trying to solve problems. This recommendation has been one of the recommendation and consequences of the El Al B747 accident in Amsterdam .
I am not saying this is the reason he kept it , but could well be. In any case what he did was in accordance with ICAO regulations and it made sense.
The tower controller sawing the pod strike and informing the APP controller, did the correct thing .
The APP controller not passing that info to the Crew: Does anyone honestly think that the crew did not notice they hit the runway 3 times and telling them this would have made the lightest difference to the outcome ? But having had the info, the APP controller could already treat the aircraft as an emergency before the crew declared it .
ATC is not there to fly the aircraft , speed ( when not restricted) , when and where to set flaps and gear is the PIC prerogative and we do not comment on those on the frequency ( in the bar that is another matter
). Airport controllers are here to make sure no other traffic is conflicting with you and the runway is clear and passing weather, wind and anywhere relevant information , not to tell you how to fly the aircraft.
The remark of the Pakistani aviation Minister that the controller did not follow procedures is therefore incorrect , according ICAO regulations at least ,I think he was badly advised and possibly trying to score issues with his CAA. There could be local procedures I am unaware of , but as far as we see so far ATC did nothing to contribute to this accident .
Yes normally after established on ILS and clear of other traffic an APP controller transfers the aircraft to the Tower controller who will issue a landing clearance . Keeping the aircraft on the APP frequency and issuing the landing clearance is however foreseen in the regulations (ICAO annex 11 ) and frequently done in LVP ops. Keeping the aircraft on the frequency is even recommended in case of emergency of difficulties to avoid switching frequencies and de-concentrating a crew trying to solve problems. This recommendation has been one of the recommendation and consequences of the El Al B747 accident in Amsterdam .
I am not saying this is the reason he kept it , but could well be. In any case what he did was in accordance with ICAO regulations and it made sense.
The tower controller sawing the pod strike and informing the APP controller, did the correct thing .
The APP controller not passing that info to the Crew: Does anyone honestly think that the crew did not notice they hit the runway 3 times and telling them this would have made the lightest difference to the outcome ? But having had the info, the APP controller could already treat the aircraft as an emergency before the crew declared it .
ATC is not there to fly the aircraft , speed ( when not restricted) , when and where to set flaps and gear is the PIC prerogative and we do not comment on those on the frequency ( in the bar that is another matter
). Airport controllers are here to make sure no other traffic is conflicting with you and the runway is clear and passing weather, wind and anywhere relevant information , not to tell you how to fly the aircraft. The remark of the Pakistani aviation Minister that the controller did not follow procedures is therefore incorrect , according ICAO regulations at least ,I think he was badly advised and possibly trying to score issues with his CAA. There could be local procedures I am unaware of , but as far as we see so far ATC did nothing to contribute to this accident .
