PIA A320 Crash Karachi
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Intriguing indeed. Apparently Khan had listened to the voice recordings, and was able to draw his own conclusions based on that, while not adhering much to the actual contents of the report.
(1) CC should have promptly informed the flight crew of the scrape, but didn't.
As if they would not have figured it out themselves when observing the position of the L/G lever. So more likely perhaps:
(2) The flight crew were eagerly discussing covid-19 not only among themselves, but possibly also including visitors to the flight cabin during critical phases of flight.
(1) CC should have promptly informed the flight crew of the scrape, but didn't.
As if they would not have figured it out themselves when observing the position of the L/G lever. So more likely perhaps:
(2) The flight crew were eagerly discussing covid-19 not only among themselves, but possibly also including visitors to the flight cabin during critical phases of flight.
Are there prior instances of an AAIB releasing an entire CVR transcript in the interests of safety improvements, for example to have as near a complete record of activities by the pilots as possible? - given the severe degree of deviations from SOP by the crew in this accident?
https://historyofpia.com/forums/view...199464#p199464
Only half a speed-brake
If true, it's a coarse play by Providence. The only thing that intersected that crew's universe with the world of normal piloting, is to call L/G down at 5 NM and they did. One of them moved the handle in the opposite direction and with that the one and only normal SOP call blew a hole below the waterline. Probably the F/O having had his brain squeezed out.
Sidenote: remarks had been made here that perhaps they saw the G/S upper false lobe, luring them to think the situation was manageable initially. If so, the confusion would double as that false G/S has an opposite polarity, i.e. the flight directors would be showing rubbish.
Your link appears to be broken. Is this where it was supposed to go to?
https://historyofpia.com/forums/view...199464#p199464
https://historyofpia.com/forums/view...199464#p199464
I got a phone call while I was trying to compse it.
Only half a speed-brake
The raising of the gear and stowing of the speedbrake comes shortly after the last 'offer' of an orbit by Approach Control - is there a possibility that one crew 'accepted' this and the other pressed on? How do you make sense of any of this?
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(1) CC should have promptly informed the flight crew of the scrape, but didn't.
de minimus non curat lex
When the Aviation Minister Mr Sarwar was briefing PM Imran ( a fantastic retired international cricketer) shortly after this tragic accident, he stated that 12 (TWELVE) crashes had occurred in our recent history.
There is psychologist as a member of the AAIB team. The human factors aspects, with the reported disregard for CRM etc will make interesting reading.
Hope they also consider the location of the VCR and whether the aerodrome controller should have used binoculars to check if the gear was down. Previous aspect raised by me earlier in this thread. My view as an ex ATCO is yes, especially as it was quiet.
There is psychologist as a member of the AAIB team. The human factors aspects, with the reported disregard for CRM etc will make interesting reading.
Hope they also consider the location of the VCR and whether the aerodrome controller should have used binoculars to check if the gear was down. Previous aspect raised by me earlier in this thread. My view as an ex ATCO is yes, especially as it was quiet.
Last edited by parkfell; 24th Jun 2020 at 16:50. Reason: Added ATC aspect
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Did they mistake the gear lever and the flap lever when the gear was selected UP?
The report mentions under 'The Way Forward':
(h) Assessment of preflight medical actions, and post-crash initial response by CAA, is also underway at AAIB.
I hope this includes a blood sugar analysis.
Interesting that the minister mentions the Cabin Crew. Was there a cabin crew member in the cockpit that 'needed to be impressed' by the Skygod? Or was the minister just talking without having the faintest clue what he was talking about?
The report mentions under 'The Way Forward':
(h) Assessment of preflight medical actions, and post-crash initial response by CAA, is also underway at AAIB.
I hope this includes a blood sugar analysis.
Interesting that the minister mentions the Cabin Crew. Was there a cabin crew member in the cockpit that 'needed to be impressed' by the Skygod? Or was the minister just talking without having the faintest clue what he was talking about?
Last edited by KingAir1978; 24th Jun 2020 at 21:56.
A cabin crew member doesn’t need to be in the flightdeck to pass on important information to the pilots. CRM extends throughout the Crew, from most junior to the most Senior. Perhaps the Minister was alluding to the fact that the cabin crew didn’t communicate important information to the flightdeck after the gear up go around? On the other hand, perhaps you’re right..he doesn’t have a clue what he’s talking about.
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From the Dawn article linked above:
Decrying that pilots were not hired on merit, Khan said that fake degrees and licenses were issued. "Almost 40 per cent of pilots have fake licenses," he said, adding that they did not have flying experience either.
He added that the government had started to take action against all such pilots. "In the first phase, 54 such pilots were identified. Show cause notices were issued to 24 and nine others confessed that they were unqualified.
We discussed the fake license problem in the region earlier on the thread and some of the posts by Fawad and others were modded out, perhaps they were considered irrelevant or culturally insensitive.
He said that the ATC told the pilot thrice that the plane was too high to land but he refused to listen. Another important factor was that the pilot closed the landing gears at a distance of five nautical miles from the runway even though they were open before, he added.Talking about further mistakes, [Aviation Minister Ghulam Sarwar] Khan said that the plane was on auto-landing but the pilot brought it back to manual landing before the crash. It should have come in at 40 degrees but it dived at 60 degrees [sic], he added.
'Almost 40pc pilots have fake licenses'
The minister said that the government had observed that major airlines in other countries did not have such a history of crashes and therefore, started to investigate pilots. There are 860 active pilots in the country, he said, adding that of these 860, 262 pilots did not even take their exams themselves.Decrying that pilots were not hired on merit, Khan said that fake degrees and licenses were issued. "Almost 40 per cent of pilots have fake licenses," he said, adding that they did not have flying experience either.
He added that the government had started to take action against all such pilots. "In the first phase, 54 such pilots were identified. Show cause notices were issued to 24 and nine others confessed that they were unqualified.
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I am sure many of us have flown past TOD, at one time or another either because we were held up by ATC or were momentarily distracted for some reason. Airbus aircraft will say "Decelerate", and in most cases it is very easy to gently regain the profile. Even if all that fails, ATC will help by adding track miles at your request or allowing an orbit - and ATC advised the pilots several times in this incident.
None of these options were taken by the pilots. Maybe there was a fumes event in the cruise which the pilots did not detect, so they did not don their oxygen masks, and were mentally befuddled.
Ah, Sikpilot, you beat me to it
None of these options were taken by the pilots. Maybe there was a fumes event in the cruise which the pilots did not detect, so they did not don their oxygen masks, and were mentally befuddled.
Ah, Sikpilot, you beat me to it
And if nothing of the above works, one has to ask ATC for vectors or a 360° turn.
I can see no reason for such a ass over one’s head approach. Even a student pilot having his first lesson on a Cessna 172 would catch this. In my own case I’m still sticking to the idea that these guys were physically unfit for flying that day. Or only the captain was unfit, and the FO was a ‘‘yes sir’’ robotic monkey, which is often an occurence in this part of the world.
Thanks - I'd missed that sentence about the CVR, Para 19:
19.The CVR recording was found to be of good quality and covered complete flight. However, FDR included the data of the entire flight except after the time when electric power was not available for the FDR. This is as per its designed limitation.
So I guess Airbus and PIA had ?retro?-fitted the 2108 recommended independent, 10 minute-after-main-power-failure battery pack, which I believe had been preferred to RAT-derived power.
19.The CVR recording was found to be of good quality and covered complete flight. However, FDR included the data of the entire flight except after the time when electric power was not available for the FDR. This is as per its designed limitation.
So I guess Airbus and PIA had ?retro?-fitted the 2108 recommended independent, 10 minute-after-main-power-failure battery pack, which I believe had been preferred to RAT-derived power.
BTW, again no first hand knowledge, but I'd be a bit surprised if the A320 RAT has electrical power generation capability (at most a simple PMA dedicated to the FBW). For all engine out, most aircraft depend entirely on the battery to power the critical electrical systems. Adding anything to the battery load pretty much requires an act of god - battery power is simply to precious.
de minimus non curat lex
As for the FO.......”Cultural compliance” with the SKYGOD.
The toxicology/ blood sugar / dehydration etc etc might prove interesting.
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Joining some dots .. ... ...
A cabin crew member doesn’t need to be in the flightdeck to pass on important information to the pilots. CRM extends throughout the Crew, from most junior to the most Senior. Perhaps the Minister was alluding to the fact that the cabin crew didn’t communicate important information to the flightdeck after the gear up go around? On the other hand, perhaps you’re right..he doesn’t have a clue what he’s talking about.
They are sitting a good distance ahead of the engines, they SHOULD be wearing headsets and the various audio warnings etc. have been widely referred to elsewhere.
Information such as this is not usually included in a preliminary report, or a brief pertaining to that report, unless there is a line of enquiry open.
Certainly, the cabin crew should be on the interphone pdq if they had heard the scrape, and or seen the sparks, on the flip side, they are trained to not be over insistent with the emergency call button at a time that they believe the flight crew may be extremely busy, perhaps dealing with the very thing they are about to report.
Perhaps the question is whether that call was actually made.
On the gear and speedbrake question: for that we will definitely have to await the CVR information, but it does seem to fit in terms of timeframe with the idea that one crew member had reason to believe that the approach was being discontinued.
Just observations obviously, and we await further.