PIA A320 Crash Karachi
From 20k of the Interim Report:
Intention to undertake another ILS approach for landing on runway 25Lwas conveyed, however shortly after the go-around both engines failed one by one. Ram Air Turbine (RAT) was deployed to power the essential systems. FDRdata recording stopped during this timeframe (as per the designed limitation).
Any thoughts on anything crucial / interesting to the full inquiry that might thus not be on the FDR for those last 2 or so minutes? I assume (????) that the CVR did still operate with RAT power, or will that have cut off too?
Intention to undertake another ILS approach for landing on runway 25Lwas conveyed, however shortly after the go-around both engines failed one by one. Ram Air Turbine (RAT) was deployed to power the essential systems. FDRdata recording stopped during this timeframe (as per the designed limitation).
Any thoughts on anything crucial / interesting to the full inquiry that might thus not be on the FDR for those last 2 or so minutes? I assume (????) that the CVR did still operate with RAT power, or will that have cut off too?
Last edited by Gary Brown; 24th Jun 2020 at 10:22. Reason: typo
21h has what looks to me like an oddity, unless it's just standard "further investigation" language:
(h) Assessment of preflight medical actions, and post-crash initial response by CAA, is also underway at AAIB.
[my empashis in bold]
(h) Assessment of preflight medical actions, and post-crash initial response by CAA, is also underway at AAIB.
[my empashis in bold]
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surprises involved?
So it's still mainly (or all) human factors leading to this accident? Just more dynamic than many people thought?
(I'm new, this post might appear much later than I submitted it)
(I'm new, this post might appear much later than I submitted it)
Only half a speed-brake
The gear sequence, as well as the actions post the first touchdown, is terrifying but possible to understand. An extreme case indeed, but still an error chain.
On the contrary, attempting to land in flap overspeed, that is beyond any comprehension. For the non-pilots reading, a stabilized approach is typically flown around 40 kt slower than the Flaps(max) speed. Allowed overshoot +15, let's say, i.e. no closer than 25 knots below Flaps(max). The doomed aircraft was brought to the runway over the red line at Flaps(max) speed +30.
Madness.
On the contrary, attempting to land in flap overspeed, that is beyond any comprehension. For the non-pilots reading, a stabilized approach is typically flown around 40 kt slower than the Flaps(max) speed. Allowed overshoot +15, let's say, i.e. no closer than 25 knots below Flaps(max). The doomed aircraft was brought to the runway over the red line at Flaps(max) speed +30.
Madness.
Last edited by FlightDetent; 24th Jun 2020 at 14:33.
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I would say the whole sequence of post TOD late, high speed, high profile, gear down later 500 ft gear up, flaps overspeed, GPWS, no landing checklist, ignored warnings, et al is complete madness. That has to be the most botched descent and approach ever? Why was this madness approach not abandoned earlier, or at least at PAPI. No landing checklist? - right, no time? Incompetence in both seats hardly addresses the errors made in this approach. Distraction of COVID-19 - I don't buy that. For sure no pilot intends to crash even on this approach but what made them think they could make this landing work? So at 500 ft FO raises the landing gear and the captain continues the descent and flare without the FO intervention? I can't believe it would be the reverse. Tragic.
Last edited by LandIT; 24th Jun 2020 at 11:24.
Intersting moderation.
My post pulled outlining the status of the gear from the report.
The report makes clear reference to incorrect CRM procedures.
Did I go wrong postulating that an overbearing Captain possibly barked "gear" and a meek FO just moved the handle any way it would go?
My post pulled outlining the status of the gear from the report.
- Down when high (~7000')
- UP on GP intercept
- Down in the Go Around
- Up again shortly after.
The report makes clear reference to incorrect CRM procedures.
The crew did not follow standard callouts and did not observe CRM aspects during most parts of flight
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I would love to see the toxicology report on both flight crew. It seems like they were not 100%, either due to fumes or diet. It was almost as if 2 guys off the street were asked to land the plane.
What a mess.
Looking at the graph of speed and altitude, I suspect that just before 5 miles the pilots realised (finally !!) that they were not going to make it, so they raised the gear and stowed the speed-brakes to execute a discontinued approach.
Then suddenly the G/S pointer came off the end stop, and they changed their mind and went for the landing - forgetting the gear was up - and as many have pointed out; the 'gear not down' warnings would have been suppressed by their excessive speed
I wonder if the Captain was having some sort of stroke or other mental issue or heart attack - his decision making seems truly bizarre - although if that were the case why did the F/O not take control?
I am sure many of us have flown past TOD, at one time or another either because we were held up by ATC or were momentarily distracted for some reason. Airbus aircraft will say "Decelerate", and in most cases it is very easy to gently regain the profile. Even if all that fails, ATC will help by adding track miles at your request or allowing an orbit - and ATC advised the pilots several times in this incident.
None of these options were taken by the pilots. Maybe there was a fumes event in the cruise which the pilots did not detect, so they did not don their oxygen masks, and were mentally befuddled.
Ah, Sikpilot, you beat me to it
Looking at the graph of speed and altitude, I suspect that just before 5 miles the pilots realised (finally !!) that they were not going to make it, so they raised the gear and stowed the speed-brakes to execute a discontinued approach.
Then suddenly the G/S pointer came off the end stop, and they changed their mind and went for the landing - forgetting the gear was up - and as many have pointed out; the 'gear not down' warnings would have been suppressed by their excessive speed
I wonder if the Captain was having some sort of stroke or other mental issue or heart attack - his decision making seems truly bizarre - although if that were the case why did the F/O not take control?
I am sure many of us have flown past TOD, at one time or another either because we were held up by ATC or were momentarily distracted for some reason. Airbus aircraft will say "Decelerate", and in most cases it is very easy to gently regain the profile. Even if all that fails, ATC will help by adding track miles at your request or allowing an orbit - and ATC advised the pilots several times in this incident.
None of these options were taken by the pilots. Maybe there was a fumes event in the cruise which the pilots did not detect, so they did not don their oxygen masks, and were mentally befuddled.
Ah, Sikpilot, you beat me to it
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Lax and indisciplined operating culture SOPs only for lesser mortals, Nepotism to get away with incidents,/accidents, absense of SMS or as a mere formality, strong militant union, may be tired crew with low blood sugar. Cultural and religious fatalism. No cheese only the wrapping around a big hole. Tragic but that's what it is.
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Simply unbelievable the actions of this flight crew.
Preliminary report states reverse thrust was selected after landing then the go around was initiated.
I truly hope a full CVR transcript is published.
Preliminary report states reverse thrust was selected after landing then the go around was initiated.
I truly hope a full CVR transcript is published.
The link I posted above to an interview this morning with the Pakistan Aviation Minister may possibly have some significance (or then again, perhaps not...). I quoted his words about the present crash; but he then went on to talk about the problem in PIA of pilots with forged qualifications. Whether he was linking the one to the other was not clear.
BTW, I asked above whether the A320 CVR remains powered after dual engine failure, either by the RAT or by some other battery power. I know that this was under discussion by Airbus, the FAA, CAA etc etc in 2018. But I'm not sure what was decided and what actually implemented, for what a/c. It's therefore possible that both the FDR and CVR went down on engine failure, and that the last couple of minutes of the flight was unrecorded. Anyone know differently?
BTW, I asked above whether the A320 CVR remains powered after dual engine failure, either by the RAT or by some other battery power. I know that this was under discussion by Airbus, the FAA, CAA etc etc in 2018. But I'm not sure what was decided and what actually implemented, for what a/c. It's therefore possible that both the FDR and CVR went down on engine failure, and that the last couple of minutes of the flight was unrecorded. Anyone know differently?
Last edited by Gary Brown; 24th Jun 2020 at 12:13.
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Looking at the graph of speed and altitude, I suspect that just before 5 miles the pilots realised (finally !!) that they were not going to make it, so they raised the gear and stowed the speed-brakes to execute a discontinued approach.
When you don't want to continue approch you don't retract the gear. First you change the flight path either by hitting TOGA or disconnecting the approach mode then select a vertical mode. Gear comes later. But the conduct of approach was so crazy we don't want to believe it. But exactly the same thing has happened before on the same date ten years ago 22/05/20010 AI Express 812 at Mangalore India. Only difference they landed with gear reversed and attempted a goaround hit an obstruction end of runway and crashed.
Last edited by vilas; 24th Jun 2020 at 16:17.
The link I posted above to an interview this morning with the Pakistan Aviation Minister may possibly have some significance (or then again, perhaps not...). I quoted his words about the present crash; but he then went on to talk about the problem in PIA of pilots with forged qualifications. Whether he was linking the one to the other was not clear.
BTW, I asked above whether the A320 CVR remains powered after dual engine failure, either by the RAT or by some other battery power. I know that this was under discussion by Airbus, the FAA, CAA etc etc in 2018. But I'm not sure what was decided and what actually implemented, for what a/c. It's therefore possible that both the FDR and CVR went down on engine failure, and that the last couple of minutes of the flight was unrecorded. Anyone know differently?
BTW, I asked above whether the A320 CVR remains powered after dual engine failure, either by the RAT or by some other battery power. I know that this was under discussion by Airbus, the FAA, CAA etc etc in 2018. But I'm not sure what was decided and what actually implemented, for what a/c. It's therefore possible that both the FDR and CVR went down on engine failure, and that the last couple of minutes of the flight was unrecorded. Anyone know differently?
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Intersting moderation.
My post pulled outlining the status of the gear from the report.
The report makes clear reference to incorrect CRM procedures.
Did I go wrong postulating that an overbearing Captain possibly barked "gear" and a meek FO just moved the handle any way it would go?
My post pulled outlining the status of the gear from the report.
- Down when high (~7000')
- UP on GP intercept
- Down in the Go Around
- Up again shortly after.
The report makes clear reference to incorrect CRM procedures.
Did I go wrong postulating that an overbearing Captain possibly barked "gear" and a meek FO just moved the handle any way it would go?
This report doesn’t state who was the pilot flying. Although, I’d argue that nobody was flying that day.
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Thanks - I'd missed that sentence about the CVR, Para 19:
19.The CVR recording was found to be of good quality and covered complete flight. However, FDR included the data of the entire flight except after the time when electric power was not available for the FDR. This is as per its designed limitation.
So I guess Airbus and PIA had ?retro?-fitted the 2108 recommended independent, 10 minute-after-main-power-failure battery pack, which I believe had been preferred to RAT-derived power.
19.The CVR recording was found to be of good quality and covered complete flight. However, FDR included the data of the entire flight except after the time when electric power was not available for the FDR. This is as per its designed limitation.
So I guess Airbus and PIA had ?retro?-fitted the 2108 recommended independent, 10 minute-after-main-power-failure battery pack, which I believe had been preferred to RAT-derived power.
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Just to get all pieces of the puzzle together...
Does anybody have experience how strict Pakistan ATC is about the maximum speed of 250kt below FL100 ?
I know it is the rule almost everywhere, but I also know that in several countries this is systematically violated...
A slightly higher speed in the beginning (Vmo is 356 kt?) may have helped to reduce altitude faster and intercept the glide much earlier, giving more time to sort out the mess they created and to stabilize the approach.
Does anybody have experience how strict Pakistan ATC is about the maximum speed of 250kt below FL100 ?
I know it is the rule almost everywhere, but I also know that in several countries this is systematically violated...
A slightly higher speed in the beginning (Vmo is 356 kt?) may have helped to reduce altitude faster and intercept the glide much earlier, giving more time to sort out the mess they created and to stabilize the approach.
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CVR
Are there prior instances of an AAIB releasing an entire CVR transcript in the interests of safety improvements, for example to have as near a complete record of activities by the pilots as possible? - given the severe degree of deviations from SOP by the crew in this accident?