PIA A320 Crash Karachi
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well just because there wasnt any technical issue to report to operators of airbus doesnt mean there wasnt anything wrong with the aircraft specific just to keep in mind.When will the cvr recordings be public?
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According to this ARY News report the CVR and FDR will be sent back to Pakistan in a few hours with the head of the investigating team.
Salah Uddin On Jun 6, 2020 Last updated Jun 6, 2020
KARACHI: Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) plane crash investigations have hit another milestone after french experts submitted decoded blackbox data of the ill-fated flight PK-8303 to Pakistan, ARY News reported on Saturday.
Along with the black box, flight data recorder and cock-pit voice recorder were also handed over to the head of Pakistan’s investigative party on the national tragedy.
Head of the investigation board, Air Commodore Usman Ghani is set to arrive with the data from Frankfurt, Germany.
Ghani is set to arrive back to the country tomorrow, June 7 via flight PK-8734 from Frankfurt to Islamabad, he is set to arrive the same day, tentatively by 10pm, revealed sources.
On the other hand, the Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) and Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) technical teams have failed to pull out the engine and the landing gear of the crashed PK-8303 aircraft for further investigations.
The teams consisting of technical experts remained unsuccessful in pulling out the engine present inside a dilapidated residential building after 14 days since the crash.
https://arynews.tv/en/all-data-of-fl...d-to-pakistan/
Blackbox decoded, all data of flight PK-8303 submitted to Pakistan by French experts
Salah Uddin On Jun 6, 2020 Last updated Jun 6, 2020
KARACHI: Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) plane crash investigations have hit another milestone after french experts submitted decoded blackbox data of the ill-fated flight PK-8303 to Pakistan, ARY News reported on Saturday.
Along with the black box, flight data recorder and cock-pit voice recorder were also handed over to the head of Pakistan’s investigative party on the national tragedy.
Head of the investigation board, Air Commodore Usman Ghani is set to arrive with the data from Frankfurt, Germany.
Ghani is set to arrive back to the country tomorrow, June 7 via flight PK-8734 from Frankfurt to Islamabad, he is set to arrive the same day, tentatively by 10pm, revealed sources.
On the other hand, the Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) and Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) technical teams have failed to pull out the engine and the landing gear of the crashed PK-8303 aircraft for further investigations.
The teams consisting of technical experts remained unsuccessful in pulling out the engine present inside a dilapidated residential building after 14 days since the crash.
https://arynews.tv/en/all-data-of-fl...d-to-pakistan/
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tbh its not a memory item, its a QRH item. It'll direct you to that limitation as you'll never reach that speed in normal ops... and it isnt death or life.
de minimus non curat lex
A normal fit person who has had a (usually copious) meal at, let's say 22;00 and six hours of good sleep will NOT be hypoglycemic when they wake up. Their blood glucose should be towards the low end of normal and will actually rise somewhat as they get busy. The body has plenty of glycogen reserves in the liver and muscles. If they continue to fast they may get thirsty after a few hours, but that'll do them no harm. I reckon that it would be at least 36 hrs before their blood glucose started to fall to such degree that they cannot fly a modern aircraft safely. They'd certainly be hungry.
I certainly done gigs like that and never felt faint, though you can't keep sharp indefinitely!
In an open boat, three days without any water, three weeks without any food is about the human limit
So I don't take that Ramadan stuff seriously, unless they were complete wimps.
Crusty Mac
I certainly done gigs like that and never felt faint, though you can't keep sharp indefinitely!
In an open boat, three days without any water, three weeks without any food is about the human limit
So I don't take that Ramadan stuff seriously, unless they were complete wimps.
Crusty Mac
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That could be an explaination. On the A330 tire speed limitation and the speed you have to fly to when doing a flap-in landing (VRF + 50) exactly match when coming back after a MTOW take-off : 204 kts.
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A normal fit person who has had a (usually copious) meal at, let's say 22;00 and six hours of good sleep will NOT be hypoglycemic when they wake up. Their blood glucose should be towards the low end of normal and will actually rise somewhat as they get busy. The body has plenty of glycogen reserves in the liver and muscles. If they continue to fast they may get thirsty after a few hours, but that'll do them no harm. I reckon that it would be at least 36 hrs before their blood glucose started to fall to such degree that they cannot fly a modern aircraft safely. They'd certainly be hungry.
I certainly done gigs like that and never felt faint, though you can't keep sharp indefinitely!
In an open boat, three days without any water, three weeks without any food is about the human limit
So I don't take that Ramadan stuff seriously, unless they were complete wimps.
Crusty Mac
I certainly done gigs like that and never felt faint, though you can't keep sharp indefinitely!
In an open boat, three days without any water, three weeks without any food is about the human limit
So I don't take that Ramadan stuff seriously, unless they were complete wimps.
Crusty Mac
Indeed. Pretty obviously the immediate cause of the crash was "technical": extensive damage to both engines during the earlier go-around........ a technical issue if ever there was one (and which will at least have techie folks looking at anything that could be done differently in engine design, even in these bizarre circumstances).
Airbus merely indicated that they had no immediate safely recommendations to make: ie, there's no bit of kit airlines, engineers and crew need to be looking at right now on any Airbus a/c.
Airbus merely indicated that they had no immediate safely recommendations to make: ie, there's no bit of kit airlines, engineers and crew need to be looking at right now on any Airbus a/c.
I sincerely hope the authorities release at least a CVR transcript as I'm aghast at how this accident appears to have occurred. Having had the benefit of over 30 years multi-crew training over the period of CRM/NASA team skills I felt I was equipped to avoid this scenario.
Just what was being discussed during this approach is going to be "interesting" I think.
Just what was being discussed during this approach is going to be "interesting" I think.
Indeed. Pretty obviously the immediate cause of the 2nd crash was "technical": extensive damage to both engines during the earlier go-around........ a technical issue if ever there was one (and which will at least have techie folks looking at anything that could be done differently in engine design, even in these bizarre circumstances).....................
Seriously, with hindsight, a real shame they managed to fly it out of the first "crash" which may have happened just before/just after the go-around was initiated - we'll find out IDC I guess. So the first "crash" seems likely, from what's been said so far, to be non-technically-induced and may have had a far higher survival rate had it played out to a stop on the ground. We await the Report of course for that.
As for the second "crash", and what could be done about it, I should think that risk will already have featured in Hazard Analysis work over many generations of engine designs and will probably be largely unaffected by this. If something is predicted to be once in gazillion flight hours, and it finally happens, means it's still a "once in gazilion flight hours" event. In theory, we'd not see this again for a gazillion hours. If folks were skating along runways on engine pods and getting airborne again on a weekly (or even a 10-yearly basis), then of course that means the initial likelyhood was underestimated so the probability would have to be increased. But that does not seem to be the case here.
Of course, it will be noted but I doubt it will change the design given the probability attributed to it will not change radically, if at all, and it's criticality will have been well known anyway. I'm sure the effects of that particular Hazard (sliding along on the pods) are well documented - but probably looking at the far, far more likely scenario of what would happen to the ancillaries and what risks they present (such as being a fire initiation source) during the slide-out to a stop aka Emirates at Dubai in 2016.
What a dreadful mess. H 'n' H
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If the actual audio on the CVR gets leaked, or an excerpt of it, that would seem unusual. But the information available on the recorder up until the initial landing attempt seems extremely valuable to gain insight into why missing TOD, not following the instructions from ATC, not lowering L/G(?), ignoring Master Caution, going in way over fast. As well as speaking to the mindsets of the pilots once they realize that something is wrong and they decide on G/A, and finally(?) on getting the L/G down after all. It is this whole story that we are currently missing.
If the actual audio on the CVR gets leaked, or an excerpt of it, that would seem unusual. But the information available on the recorder up until the initial landing attempt seems extremely valuable to gain insight into why missing TOD, not following the instructions from ATC, not lowering L/G(?), ignoring Master Caution, going in way over fast. As well as speaking to the mindsets of the pilots once they realize that something is wrong and they decide on G/A, and finally(?) on getting the L/G down after all. It is this whole story that we are currently missing.
This link has been posted before, but here it is again: https://flightsafety.org/wp-content/...tudy_final.pdf
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They not only missed the TOD considering that the overspeed warning was on through out I am not sure if they even activated approach. Not that it would have made much difference but at least the thrust if in Auto would have remained at idle through out with appropriate speed target.
Only half a speed-brake
Yeah, confusing once I re-read it - "very low go-around rate for the number of non-stabilized approaches indicated in the data", is what I meant to convey.
There! Fixed if for ya AGBagb!
Seriously, with hindsight, a real shame they managed to fly it out of the first "crash" which may have happened just before/just after the go-around was initiated - we'll find out IDC I guess. So the first "crash" seems likely, from what's been said so far, to be non-technically-induced and may have had a far higher survival rate had it played out to a stop on the ground. We await the Report of course for that.
As for the second "crash", and what could be done about it, I should think that risk will already have featured in Hazard Analysis work over many generations of engine designs and will probably be largely unaffected by this. If something is predicted to be once in gazillion flight hours, and it finally happens, means it's still a "once in gazilion flight hours" event. In theory, we'd not see this again for a gazillion hours. If folks were skating along runways on engine pods and getting airborne again on a weekly (or even a 10-yearly basis), then of course that means the initial likelyhood was underestimated so the probability would have to be increased. But that does not seem to be the case here.
Of course, it will be noted but I doubt it will change the design given the probability attributed to it will not change radically, if at all, and it's criticality will have been well known anyway. I'm sure the effects of that particular Hazard (sliding along on the pods) are well documented - but probably looking at the far, far more likely scenario of what would happen to the ancillaries and what risks they present (such as being a fire initiation source) during the slide-out to a stop aka Emirates at Dubai in 2016.
What a dreadful mess. H 'n' H
Seriously, with hindsight, a real shame they managed to fly it out of the first "crash" which may have happened just before/just after the go-around was initiated - we'll find out IDC I guess. So the first "crash" seems likely, from what's been said so far, to be non-technically-induced and may have had a far higher survival rate had it played out to a stop on the ground. We await the Report of course for that.
As for the second "crash", and what could be done about it, I should think that risk will already have featured in Hazard Analysis work over many generations of engine designs and will probably be largely unaffected by this. If something is predicted to be once in gazillion flight hours, and it finally happens, means it's still a "once in gazilion flight hours" event. In theory, we'd not see this again for a gazillion hours. If folks were skating along runways on engine pods and getting airborne again on a weekly (or even a 10-yearly basis), then of course that means the initial likelyhood was underestimated so the probability would have to be increased. But that does not seem to be the case here.
Of course, it will be noted but I doubt it will change the design given the probability attributed to it will not change radically, if at all, and it's criticality will have been well known anyway. I'm sure the effects of that particular Hazard (sliding along on the pods) are well documented - but probably looking at the far, far more likely scenario of what would happen to the ancillaries and what risks they present (such as being a fire initiation source) during the slide-out to a stop aka Emirates at Dubai in 2016.
What a dreadful mess. H 'n' H
It's one of the things I love about the aviation community - there's always someone who will be saying, Hmmm - is there anything I could do to stop those cheese-holes lining up quite like this next time?
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