PIA A320 Crash Karachi
For the benefit of non Airbus Pilots, the thrust levers are normally in the "CL" or climb detent throughout the approach. This allows the autothrust to command any power setting from idle to climb but the levers don't move whilst A/T is engaged. At the speed they were going on final, if the approach phase had been activated (automatically or manually) the engines would have been at idle, approach idle if flaps were deployed.
If the approach phase isn't activated, the A/T defaults to 250 kts below 10 000'. Many pilots have been caught out by going from selected speed into managed speed on approach without confirming that APP phase is active. A sudden power increase results as the system targets 250 kts regardless of flap/gear configuration. Doing it once is usually enough for most pilots and few repeat the mistake, as the master warning going off during the overspeed and subsequent visit to the Chief Pilot leave a lasting impression.
It's possible that they dived down from above the profile with A/T commanding idle thrust and if the APP phase wasn't activated, as the speed dropped below 250 kts there was a sudden increase in thrust.
If the approach phase isn't activated, the A/T defaults to 250 kts below 10 000'. Many pilots have been caught out by going from selected speed into managed speed on approach without confirming that APP phase is active. A sudden power increase results as the system targets 250 kts regardless of flap/gear configuration. Doing it once is usually enough for most pilots and few repeat the mistake, as the master warning going off during the overspeed and subsequent visit to the Chief Pilot leave a lasting impression.
It's possible that they dived down from above the profile with A/T commanding idle thrust and if the APP phase wasn't activated, as the speed dropped below 250 kts there was a sudden increase in thrust.
kris, who is flying the plane?
The pilot or some kind of software?
It is very weird (to me) that thrust changes without the throttle levers moving.
I am sure that those who fly with that system get used to it.
well, I guess that most do.
The pilot or some kind of software?
It is very weird (to me) that thrust changes without the throttle levers moving.
I am sure that those who fly with that system get used to it.
well, I guess that most do.
I am sure that those who fly with that system get used to it. Well, I guess that most do.
Murphy is always with us.
who is flying the plane?
The pilot or some kind of software?
The pilot or some kind of software?
With what occurred in this crash the range of possible errors is much wider than usual, and theories which would normally go on the back burner and only be looked at once the obvious ones have been ruled out, can't easily be discounted.
Gliding in from way too high with the engines back at idle, followed by a sudden application of climb power by the A/T once the speed drops below 250 kts could be an additional factor in further de-stabilising an approach which was already well out of limits. Given the known excess speed, the drop below 250 kts would have happened relatively close to the airport and at low altitude.
SkyGod
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and presumably the pilot who crashed through being low and slow approaching SFO on a manually flown approach ? It was reported that although hand flying he had engaged the auto throttle, but in fact he,or it, hadn't actually engaged, so being fresh off the Airbus and new to the B.777 he presumably wasn't concerned that the throttles weren't moving ? There were other factors of course, but I bet that was one of the "holes" in the cheese ?
Murphy is always with us.
Murphy is always with us.
and presumably the pilot who crashed through being low and slow approaching SFO on a manually flown approach ? It was reported that although hand flying he had engaged the auto throttle, but in fact he,or it, hadn't actually engaged, so being fresh off the Airbus and new to the B.777 he presumably wasn't concerned that the throttles weren't moving ? There were other factors of course, but I bet that was one of the "holes" in the cheese ?
One of the recommendations should have been greatly enhanced training when switching between Airbus and Boeing (or visa-versa) to emphasize the basic differences in how they work.
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Those guys in SFO had no idea how to fly a perfectly good airplane in perfect VMC to a successful landing, just like these PIA A-320 guys. 😢
If the captain was ex military with 17000 hours I’d respectfully suggest he knew how to fly and land . He would know all about how you need to put the gear down , gates , stabilisation criteria and check lists .
If the captain was ex military with 17000 hours I’d respectfully suggest he knew how to fly and land . He would know all about how you need to put the gear down , gates , stabilisation criteria and check lists .
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Apologies for the thread drift, but I think the NTSB and FAA largely missed this contributing aspect of a recent transfer from an Airbus to a Boeing. SOP for doing an A/T landing in a Boeing is to keep one hand resting lightly on the throttles as a tactile indication of what the throttles (and hence the engines) are doing. It's painfully obvious that the Asiana pilot hadn't been taught that.
One of the recommendations should have been greatly enhanced training when switching between Airbus and Boeing (or visa-versa) to emphasize the basic differences in how they work.
One of the recommendations should have been greatly enhanced training when switching between Airbus and Boeing (or visa-versa) to emphasize the basic differences in how they work.
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A Bloomberg article citing experts who say that you shouldn't land an A320 gear up at 203 miles an hour.
BloombergA deadly plane crash in Pakistan is prompting questions about how the crew could touch down without landing gear when their sophisticated jetliner was bristling with equipment to prevent pilots from doing just that.
After an abrupt descent that had unnerved air-traffic controllers, the pilots of the Pakistan International Airlines Corp. jet on Friday briefly put the aircraft on the runway without the landing gear, grinding along on its two engines at a speed of more than 327 kilometers (203 miles) per hour, according to preliminary data.
The pilots aborted the landing attempt, climbing back into the sky, but reported shortly afterward they’d lost power. The Airbus SE A320 apparently glided into a neighborhood as pilots were attempting to return to the same runway, killing 97 of 99 people aboard.
“It is unbelievable to me that an airline crew on a jet like an Airbus, with all the warning systems, would attempt to land the plane without the gear extended,” said John Cox, an aviation safety consultant who formerly flew the A320 as a U.S. airline pilot.
In addition to checklists designed to make sure pilots don’t attempt to touch down without the landing gear, the jetliner has multiple warning systems designed to alert crews if they somehow forget or the gear aren’t working.
“The airplane is not happy that you’re this close to the ground without the gear extended,” said Cox, who is president of consulting company Safety Operating Systems.
It’s not yet clear why the two jet engines quit after functioning well enough for about two minutes to lift them about 3,000 feet (915 meters) above the runway. Engines have become so reliable that losing two at the same time is almost always because of some common factor, such as damage from hitting a runway or a problem with the fuel supply.
Regardless, the bizarre landing attempt — which was carried out without any indication from the crew that they’d had an emergency during their initial descent — either triggered the accident or was a catalyst that worsened the situation, according to Cox and others who have studied crashes.
A Pakistan International spokesman declined to comment on “incomplete information.” An Airbus spokesman referred queries to Pakistani authorities. Civil aviation spokesman Abdul Sattar Khokhar didn’t respond to a call on his mobile phone.
As Flight 8303 from Lahore approached Karachi’s Jinnah International Airport last Friday afternoon, air-traffic controllers were concerned that it wasn’t descending on the proper path, according to a report cited by Sky News. A controller cautioned the pilots that they were “high” and urged them to adjust, according to the leaked preliminary report.
Turn Back
“We are comfortable. We can make it,” the pilot can be heard telling the controller, according to a recording of Karachi’s air-traffic radio posted on the LiveATC.net website.
Twice as the plane neared the runway, a controller told pilots to turn and break off their approach, according to the report. Again, the pilot declined, responding on the radio he was “comfortable” and was prepared to land on runway 25-Left.
At no point did the pilots say they had a problem with their landing gear or any other type of emergency, according to the radio calls.
Approaching a runway with such a rapid descent, which often leads to higher-than-recommended speeds, is a harbinger of danger, according to decades of warnings from investigative agencies such as the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board and the nonprofit Flight Safety Foundation.
After the controllers finally cleared the plane to land — despite their earlier warnings — the pilot replied, “Roger.” In the background, the sound of a cockpit warning chime can be heard.
Too Much Energy
The jetliner was well above the normal speed as it neared the runway, said Jeffrey Guzzetti, the former chief accident investigator for the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration. It was traveling at roughly 250 miles an hour at about 1,000 feet above the ground, according to the tracking website, Flightradar24.
That’s more than 50 miles per hour faster than is typical for jets like the A320, Guzzetti said.
“They have too much energy for a normal landing,” he said.
It not only increases the chances of skidding off the runway, but puts additional pressure on the pilots to slow the big jet and can lead to other things going wrong.
Flightradar24’s data suggests that the jet was traveling at 375 kilometers (233 miles) per hour when it reached the runway and slowed to about 327 kilometers per hour as it lifted off. The data hasn’t been validated by investigators.
The airline said Thursday that the cockpit voice recorder, a key to piecing together the events, had been found in the debris from the wreckage. The flight data recorder was located earlier.
While it’s possible that in the chaos and confusion they might have have forgotten about the landing gear, it’s still puzzling, according to Guzzetti and Cox.
Computer System
The A320’s on-board computer system issues both a warning sound and illuminates a light to draw attention to a text message if the gear isn’t out as the plane nears the ground.
A separate safety system designed to prevent aircraft from inadvertently striking the ground also senses when the gear isn’t deployed before landing. Its recorded voice repeatedly says “Too low, gear” if the problem continues.
Before-landing check lists also require crews to verify that the plane’s instruments show the gear is locked into place.
“It’s very unusual in modern transport category aircraft to have a no-gear landing, just because the checklist and the warnings that go off,” Guzzetti said.
At about 2:34 p.m., the plane slammed onto the runway. Its engines left a series of black smudge marks, starting at 4,500 feet from the start of the landing strip, according to video of the runway broadcast by news outlets. It shows three separate patches, as if the plane skipped into the air between impacts.
“Going around,” a pilot on the jet told controllers, the term for aborting a landing and taking off again.
The plane climbed about 3,000 feet, but couldn’t hold its altitude, according to the radio transmissions and flight data.
“Sir, we have lost engines,” a pilot said. Then, 30 seconds later, he said, “Mayday. Mayday. Mayday.”
Seconds later, the plane hit the ground.
–With assistance from Khalid Qayum, Anurag Kotoky, Siddharth Philip and Ismail Dilawar.
Crashed Pakistan Plane First Tried to Land Without Landing Gear at 203 Miles Per Hour
By Alan Levin | May 28, 2020BloombergA deadly plane crash in Pakistan is prompting questions about how the crew could touch down without landing gear when their sophisticated jetliner was bristling with equipment to prevent pilots from doing just that.
After an abrupt descent that had unnerved air-traffic controllers, the pilots of the Pakistan International Airlines Corp. jet on Friday briefly put the aircraft on the runway without the landing gear, grinding along on its two engines at a speed of more than 327 kilometers (203 miles) per hour, according to preliminary data.
The pilots aborted the landing attempt, climbing back into the sky, but reported shortly afterward they’d lost power. The Airbus SE A320 apparently glided into a neighborhood as pilots were attempting to return to the same runway, killing 97 of 99 people aboard.
“It is unbelievable to me that an airline crew on a jet like an Airbus, with all the warning systems, would attempt to land the plane without the gear extended,” said John Cox, an aviation safety consultant who formerly flew the A320 as a U.S. airline pilot.
In addition to checklists designed to make sure pilots don’t attempt to touch down without the landing gear, the jetliner has multiple warning systems designed to alert crews if they somehow forget or the gear aren’t working.
“The airplane is not happy that you’re this close to the ground without the gear extended,” said Cox, who is president of consulting company Safety Operating Systems.
It’s not yet clear why the two jet engines quit after functioning well enough for about two minutes to lift them about 3,000 feet (915 meters) above the runway. Engines have become so reliable that losing two at the same time is almost always because of some common factor, such as damage from hitting a runway or a problem with the fuel supply.
Regardless, the bizarre landing attempt — which was carried out without any indication from the crew that they’d had an emergency during their initial descent — either triggered the accident or was a catalyst that worsened the situation, according to Cox and others who have studied crashes.
A Pakistan International spokesman declined to comment on “incomplete information.” An Airbus spokesman referred queries to Pakistani authorities. Civil aviation spokesman Abdul Sattar Khokhar didn’t respond to a call on his mobile phone.
As Flight 8303 from Lahore approached Karachi’s Jinnah International Airport last Friday afternoon, air-traffic controllers were concerned that it wasn’t descending on the proper path, according to a report cited by Sky News. A controller cautioned the pilots that they were “high” and urged them to adjust, according to the leaked preliminary report.
Turn Back
“We are comfortable. We can make it,” the pilot can be heard telling the controller, according to a recording of Karachi’s air-traffic radio posted on the LiveATC.net website.
Twice as the plane neared the runway, a controller told pilots to turn and break off their approach, according to the report. Again, the pilot declined, responding on the radio he was “comfortable” and was prepared to land on runway 25-Left.
At no point did the pilots say they had a problem with their landing gear or any other type of emergency, according to the radio calls.
Approaching a runway with such a rapid descent, which often leads to higher-than-recommended speeds, is a harbinger of danger, according to decades of warnings from investigative agencies such as the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board and the nonprofit Flight Safety Foundation.
After the controllers finally cleared the plane to land — despite their earlier warnings — the pilot replied, “Roger.” In the background, the sound of a cockpit warning chime can be heard.
Too Much Energy
The jetliner was well above the normal speed as it neared the runway, said Jeffrey Guzzetti, the former chief accident investigator for the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration. It was traveling at roughly 250 miles an hour at about 1,000 feet above the ground, according to the tracking website, Flightradar24.
That’s more than 50 miles per hour faster than is typical for jets like the A320, Guzzetti said.
“They have too much energy for a normal landing,” he said.
It not only increases the chances of skidding off the runway, but puts additional pressure on the pilots to slow the big jet and can lead to other things going wrong.
Flightradar24’s data suggests that the jet was traveling at 375 kilometers (233 miles) per hour when it reached the runway and slowed to about 327 kilometers per hour as it lifted off. The data hasn’t been validated by investigators.
The airline said Thursday that the cockpit voice recorder, a key to piecing together the events, had been found in the debris from the wreckage. The flight data recorder was located earlier.
While it’s possible that in the chaos and confusion they might have have forgotten about the landing gear, it’s still puzzling, according to Guzzetti and Cox.
Computer System
The A320’s on-board computer system issues both a warning sound and illuminates a light to draw attention to a text message if the gear isn’t out as the plane nears the ground.
A separate safety system designed to prevent aircraft from inadvertently striking the ground also senses when the gear isn’t deployed before landing. Its recorded voice repeatedly says “Too low, gear” if the problem continues.
Before-landing check lists also require crews to verify that the plane’s instruments show the gear is locked into place.
“It’s very unusual in modern transport category aircraft to have a no-gear landing, just because the checklist and the warnings that go off,” Guzzetti said.
At about 2:34 p.m., the plane slammed onto the runway. Its engines left a series of black smudge marks, starting at 4,500 feet from the start of the landing strip, according to video of the runway broadcast by news outlets. It shows three separate patches, as if the plane skipped into the air between impacts.
“Going around,” a pilot on the jet told controllers, the term for aborting a landing and taking off again.
The plane climbed about 3,000 feet, but couldn’t hold its altitude, according to the radio transmissions and flight data.
“Sir, we have lost engines,” a pilot said. Then, 30 seconds later, he said, “Mayday. Mayday. Mayday.”
Seconds later, the plane hit the ground.
–With assistance from Khalid Qayum, Anurag Kotoky, Siddharth Philip and Ismail Dilawar.
de minimus non curat lex
Ex military can, but not always, find it the most difficult to “adjust” to the new “style”. After all they are human, and not a machine you can reprogram with an updated software.
Is that not what the history of accidents often point to.......destroying a perfectly serviceable aircraft with tragic consequences?
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Experience can lead to great things or a reckless mind. The culture towards experienced (and/or ex military) in eastern and southern cultures is one of respect without question. And it's deadly.
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Safety valve operation and related warnings
As you said. And just to share. An instructor friend of mine tried in our FTD today to lower the gears above 260kt. No warning; Just the L/G CTL memo will appear amber on the Wheels page meaning the landing gear lever and the landing gear position do not agree. As soon as the speed drops below 260kt, the gears come down automatically ( No need to recycle the gears lever) and the overspeed warning kicks as the Max speed for gears extension is 250kt then it stops when the gears is locked. I assume because the max speed with gears down is 280kt.
According to ECAM SYSTEM LOGIC DATA (ESLD), a manual that is used for troubleshooting there is a 30 seconds time delay until the warnings activate. That makes sense because without this time delay any time the flight crew extends the LG they would have all those attention getters for something that is normal operation. My explanation is that the test was carried out within this 30 seconds time frame. Could you ask your friend about the details? If this was not the case we may have one more surprise from Airbus.
Regarding the need to recycle the LG lever, according to the logic diagrams there is no need to recycle. A/C SPEED WITHIN LIMIT + LG LEVER EXT => LG EXTENSION. It's that simple. I believe the requirement for recycling the LG lever has to do with the standard operational practices. In maintenance we also have this kind of practice. We don't want to have discrepancy between the flight deck controls status and the respective system actual status. From a human factors point of view any discrepancy is a minefield and has to be avoided.
Overspeed warning due to landing gear extension? I bet that it won't sound above 260kts because the LG can't extend. On the contrary it would sound if the speed increased above 280kts with LG already extended because there is no automatic retraction. Anybody that has experience this?
Last edited by kardavan; 29th May 2020 at 06:42. Reason: overspeed warning
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Apologies for the thread drift, but I think the NTSB and FAA largely missed this contributing aspect of a recent transfer from an Airbus to a Boeing. SOP for doing an A/T landing in a Boeing is to keep one hand resting lightly on the throttles as a tactile indication of what the throttles (and hence the engines) are doing. It's painfully obvious that the Asiana pilot hadn't been taught that.
One of the recommendations should have been greatly enhanced training when switching between Airbus and Boeing (or visa-versa) to emphasize the basic differences in how they work.
One of the recommendations should have been greatly enhanced training when switching between Airbus and Boeing (or visa-versa) to emphasize the basic differences in how they work.
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The A320 will happily fly right past TOD and it will not start a descent even if a lower altitude has been set. You need to start the descent yourself. The only trigger you get is a weird «deselerate» message to remind you.
The approach mode engages automatically, except when it doesn’t. You may have to select it yourself.
You will not even get the ILS indications unless you press LS, even if the correct approach has been loaded and frequencies checked.
Some aspects of this aircraft are not user friendly.
The approach mode engages automatically, except when it doesn’t. You may have to select it yourself.
You will not even get the ILS indications unless you press LS, even if the correct approach has been loaded and frequencies checked.
Some aspects of this aircraft are not user friendly.
Then the question would become, how did the relatively benign slip-up of flying past TOD rapidly degenerate into a total cluster****? All I read here about penalties for failure to follow SOPs would seem to create perverse incentives following a minor transgression. In other specialities, there is machinery for saying 'I screwed-up, I recognized the screw-up, I took appropriate action' without risking unemployment.
Apologies for the thread drift, but I think the NTSB and FAA largely missed this contributing aspect of a recent transfer from an Airbus to a Boeing. SOP for doing an A/T landing in a Boeing is to keep one hand resting lightly on the throttles as a tactile indication of what the throttles (and hence the engines) are doing. It's painfully obvious that the Asiana pilot hadn't been taught that.
One of the recommendations should have been greatly enhanced training when switching between Airbus and Boeing (or visa-versa) to emphasize the basic differences in how they work.
One of the recommendations should have been greatly enhanced training when switching between Airbus and Boeing (or visa-versa) to emphasize the basic differences in how they work.
They are just one more thing to take the "P/F" out of the loop.
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