PIA A320 Crash Karachi
While everyone is scrambling to find the CVR module, here's a picture of the FDR on site.
Looks like it took quite a knock and may explain why only part of the CVR has been recovered so far
Looks like it took quite a knock and may explain why only part of the CVR has been recovered so far
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As you said. And just to share. An instructor friend of mine tried in our FTD today to lower the gears above 260kt. No warning; Just the L/G CTL memo will appear amber on the Wheels page meaning the landing gear lever and the landing gear position do not agree. As soon as the speed drops below 260kt, the gears come down automatically ( No need to recycle the gears lever) and the overspeed warning kicks as the Max speed for gears extension is 250kt then it stops when the gears is locked. I assume because the max speed with gears down is 280kt.
Cabin crew get training in how to approach and talk to angry passengers etc, and calm them down, but I have never seen the scenario of an F/O overriding a difficult Captain addressed in CRM courses.
(I am not saying that any of this applied in the Karachi crash, I am just making a general point about CRM. Why such a poorly executed approach was continued rather than them going around and doing it again properly, absolutely mystifies me).
(I am not saying that any of this applied in the Karachi crash, I am just making a general point about CRM. Why such a poorly executed approach was continued rather than them going around and doing it again properly, absolutely mystifies me).
For that the CVR is needed.
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Why such a poorly executed approach was continued rather than them going around and doing it again properly, absolutely mystifies me).
Mentioned earlier, possibly crew were observing Ramadan and would have been awake for twelve hours at time of the accident with very low blood sugar level and the accompanying inability to either concentrate or coordinate.
Was assured many times, by Muslim FOs, when working for a ME airline, that pilots on duty are excused fasting during Ramadan with the tacit understanding that they will make up for 'lost' periods of fasting at more suitable times.
Ian at FlightRadar24 has harvested some indicated airspeed data from the extended Mode-S data fields:
Additional Extended Mode S data decoded
Flightradar24 has now retrieved and processed extended Mode S data from individual receivers in the area. Unlike ADS-B data, which always contains the same known data points, Extended Mode S may contain data from a variety of fields like aircraft identification, meteorological data, heading, speed, and others. The data sent varies based on the fields requested by the Secondary Surveillance Radar ground stations used by air traffic control.
The data sent via Extended Mode S does not include the Binary Data Selector (BDS) identifying the type of data. Flightradar24 interprets this data using advanced scripts and historical comparative data, but there may be errors in individual frames due to misinterpreted data fields. Overall trends in the data are correct as reported. We have included the raw data, downloadable below.
Included in much of the Extended Mode S data sent by PK8303 were data on Indicated airspeed. The below graph shows the aircraft’s calibrated altitude and Indicated airspeed from 10,000 feet to the final data received.
Flightradar24 has now retrieved and processed extended Mode S data from individual receivers in the area. Unlike ADS-B data, which always contains the same known data points, Extended Mode S may contain data from a variety of fields like aircraft identification, meteorological data, heading, speed, and others. The data sent varies based on the fields requested by the Secondary Surveillance Radar ground stations used by air traffic control.
The data sent via Extended Mode S does not include the Binary Data Selector (BDS) identifying the type of data. Flightradar24 interprets this data using advanced scripts and historical comparative data, but there may be errors in individual frames due to misinterpreted data fields. Overall trends in the data are correct as reported. We have included the raw data, downloadable below.
Included in much of the Extended Mode S data sent by PK8303 were data on Indicated airspeed. The below graph shows the aircraft’s calibrated altitude and Indicated airspeed from 10,000 feet to the final data received.
While the IAS values in the FR24 data may or may not be accurate, the accompanying TAS values clearly aren't. I queried this by email with FR24 and received only a boilerplate response, so I've just asked the same question on their Twitter feed:
"Can you explain why the True Airspeed (TAS) values in your download, before and during the go-around, are consistently shown as 314 knots? That's up to 140 kts higher than the IAS values at the same point in time, which is clearly nonsense."
Similar considerations apply to the Heading values in the FR24 dataset, which show near-instantaneous heading changes of 180° or more at a couple of points.
I'll post any response that I receive.
Couple of points, in this case and possibly a cultural issue, loss of face counted for more than unintended loss of life.
Mentioned earlier, possibly crew were observing Ramadan and would have been awake for twelve hours at time of the accident with very low blood sugar level and the accompanying inability to either concentrate or coordinate.
Was assured many times, by Muslim FOs, when working for a ME airline, that pilots on duty are excused fasting during Ramadan with the tacit understanding that they will make up for 'lost' periods of fasting at more suitable times.
Mentioned earlier, possibly crew were observing Ramadan and would have been awake for twelve hours at time of the accident with very low blood sugar level and the accompanying inability to either concentrate or coordinate.
Was assured many times, by Muslim FOs, when working for a ME airline, that pilots on duty are excused fasting during Ramadan with the tacit understanding that they will make up for 'lost' periods of fasting at more suitable times.
If so, that is preposterous!!
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Not sure that it matters though it is certainly of interest vis a vis CRM and human factors.
Consider: Asiana flight 214 at SFO that made a gross error in airspeed (35+ knots slow) in the opposite direction to 8303's over-speed approach. In that case, two Captains in two seats.
Consider: Asiana flight 214 at SFO that made a gross error in airspeed (35+ knots slow) in the opposite direction to 8303's over-speed approach. In that case, two Captains in two seats.
That is pretty much what I am interested in. At this point in time we know the plane lost both engines after the gear up landing but the unknown is why? Did a new FO just sit there? Where both Captains arguing "I got this" "No you don't" or was this just 2 rusty pilots. This is very important because the layoff was only 2 short months and eventually thousands of pilots will be climbing back in to the cockpits after who knows how long a layoff. Pilot Unions should be asking for answers as to what happened on this flight ASAP. The FDR and CVR will be extremely interesting to all of us and probably be discussed in training classrooms for the next 100 years.
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Rushed approach
PJ2 indicates that this was not a rushed approach. I agree....until ATC told them they were at 3500' at 5 miles out. After that I disagree and eagle21 I believe has it. The attempted landing from that position (and possible configuration) lead to a 'touchdown' on the engine pods with gear up. The unfortunate thing about the CFM56 engine is that the accessory gearbox is at the bottom of the fan casing. This drives quite a lot of critical engine machinery and is also (I believe) where the generators are fitted. The subsequent damage to both engines was enough to seal the disaster. My question is how weree they able to be 2000' higher at 5 miles than they should have been. I admit to not having flown the Airbus but I did do 36 years on VC10,747-100, L1011, BAC1-11, 747-400 and 737-400 and -700. A horrible day. An immediate go-around from the initial problem of being in the wrong place....and we wouldn't be talking about it. 20/20 hindsight. Stay safe all.
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in this case and possibly a cultural issue, loss of face counted for more than unintended loss of life.
OK so there are motherhood words in the book like "Captain go around." but to a captain intent on pressing on regardless, a mere comment by an F/O using the company approved warning expression, means nothing to some culture driven personalities.
Exactly how does the F/O take over control at such a potentially dangerous moment within a few seconds of landing? To have two pilots fighting over the controls does not even bear thinking about. All is not lost however.
For years there has been one simple and effective remedy which could prevent such accidents. Buy you won't see it in any manuals.
That is the F/O must act decisively to call aloud "Captain Go Around - Landing Gear coming up" . Simultaneously the F/O deliberately selects gear up without waiting for a response. . Even the most culture driven pilot in command would be shocked to the core and be forced into a go-around. There is no risk of confusion of who is flying the aircraft. There is no way even the most fanatical captain would continue with the approach and deliberately land wheels up just to make a point. This action by the PNF should be mandated in the company operations manual so that all pilots are aware of this last ditch solution to prevent a certain overrun on landing or a deliberate pressing on in IMC below DH or MDA.
Until this practical advice is promulgated in company operations manuals, the danger of pressing on regardless with an unstable approaches, will continue unabated and accidents such as this one will always be on the cards. Whether some would admit it or not, it is a demonstrated fact that some cultures transcend flight safety commonsense. For every accident involving a seriously unstable approach there are literally hundreds of other unstable approaches that go unrecorded for various reasons. The perpetrators get away with it time and again and cutting it fine becomes a sport and a challenge. We have all seen the type and kept our mouths shut for fear of making waves; or worse, losing our job
Last edited by A37575; 27th May 2020 at 10:22.
Nowhere in any manual I am aware of are specific instructions on how a first officer can force a captain to execute a go-around when it is obvious an approach is so unstabilised as to be dangerous to life and limb.
OK so there are motherhood words in the book like "Captain go around." but to a captain intent on pressing on regardless, a mere comment by an F/O using the company approved warning expression, means nothing to some culture driven personalities.
Exactly how does the F/O take over control at such a potentially dangerous moment within a few seconds of landing? To have two pilots fighting over the controls does not even bear thinking about. All is not lost however.
For years there has been one simple and effective remedy which could prevent such accidents. Buy you won't see it in any manuals.
That is the F/O must act decisively to call aloud "Captain Go Around - Landing Gear coming up" . Simultaneously the F/O deliberately selects gear up without waiting for a response. . Even the most culture driven pilot in command would be shocked to the core and be forced into a go-around. There is no risk of confusion of who is flying the aircraft. There is no way even the most fanatical captain would continue with the approach and deliberately land wheels up just to make a point. This action by the PNF should be mandated in the company operations manual so that all pilots are aware of this last ditch solution to prevent a certain overrun on landing or a deliberate pressing on in IMC below DH or MDA.
Until this practical advice is promulgated in company operations manuals, the danger of pressing on regardless with an unstable approaches, will continue unabated and accidents such as this one will always be on the cards. Whether some would admit it or not, it is a demonstrated fact that some cultures transcend flight safety commonsense. For every accident involving a seriously unstable approach there are literally hundreds of other unstable approaches that go unrecorded for various reasons. The perpetrators get away with it time and again and cutting it fine becomes a sport and a challenge. We have all seen the type and kept our mouths shut for fear of making waves; or worse, losing our job
OK so there are motherhood words in the book like "Captain go around." but to a captain intent on pressing on regardless, a mere comment by an F/O using the company approved warning expression, means nothing to some culture driven personalities.
Exactly how does the F/O take over control at such a potentially dangerous moment within a few seconds of landing? To have two pilots fighting over the controls does not even bear thinking about. All is not lost however.
For years there has been one simple and effective remedy which could prevent such accidents. Buy you won't see it in any manuals.
That is the F/O must act decisively to call aloud "Captain Go Around - Landing Gear coming up" . Simultaneously the F/O deliberately selects gear up without waiting for a response. . Even the most culture driven pilot in command would be shocked to the core and be forced into a go-around. There is no risk of confusion of who is flying the aircraft. There is no way even the most fanatical captain would continue with the approach and deliberately land wheels up just to make a point. This action by the PNF should be mandated in the company operations manual so that all pilots are aware of this last ditch solution to prevent a certain overrun on landing or a deliberate pressing on in IMC below DH or MDA.
Until this practical advice is promulgated in company operations manuals, the danger of pressing on regardless with an unstable approaches, will continue unabated and accidents such as this one will always be on the cards. Whether some would admit it or not, it is a demonstrated fact that some cultures transcend flight safety commonsense. For every accident involving a seriously unstable approach there are literally hundreds of other unstable approaches that go unrecorded for various reasons. The perpetrators get away with it time and again and cutting it fine becomes a sport and a challenge. We have all seen the type and kept our mouths shut for fear of making waves; or worse, losing our job
PJ2 indicates that this was not a rushed approach. I agree....until ATC told them they were at 3500' at 5 miles out. After that I disagree and eagle21 I believe has it. The attempted landing from that position (and possible configuration) lead to a 'touchdown' on the engine pods with gear up. The unfortunate thing about the CFM56 engine is that the accessory gearbox is at the bottom of the fan casing. This drives quite a lot of critical engine machinery and is also (I believe) where the generators are fitted. The subsequent damage to both engines was enough to seal the disaster. My question is how weree they able to be 2000' higher at 5 miles than they should have been. I admit to not having flown the Airbus but I did do 36 years on VC10,747-100, L1011, BAC1-11, 747-400 and 737-400 and -700. A horrible day. An immediate go-around from the initial problem of being in the wrong place....and we wouldn't be talking about it. 20/20 hindsight. Stay safe all.
Last edited by hoistop; 27th May 2020 at 10:45. Reason: adding details
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From what I remember from my dim and distant 'minibus' years.
Press and hold the priority button on the sidestick.
LOUDLY announce 'I have control' as the system calls 'Priority right/left'.
Execute the go-around and then, when safe, explain to the now 'unloaded' PF why you took control.
We all get tunnel vision at some point and start to lose senses whilst we grapple with a deteriorating situation of our own devising. I brief my colleagues on my sectors that I am distinctly average and not clever enough to be clever therefore if I am doing something stupid intervene!!!
At the company I work for co-pilot intervention is often taught as a module in the sim and very welcome it is too.
Press and hold the priority button on the sidestick.
LOUDLY announce 'I have control' as the system calls 'Priority right/left'.
Execute the go-around and then, when safe, explain to the now 'unloaded' PF why you took control.
We all get tunnel vision at some point and start to lose senses whilst we grapple with a deteriorating situation of our own devising. I brief my colleagues on my sectors that I am distinctly average and not clever enough to be clever therefore if I am doing something stupid intervene!!!
At the company I work for co-pilot intervention is often taught as a module in the sim and very welcome it is too.
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@A37575.... The answer to that question works from either seat. Hint - Tip - Take Control. The most important inter-personal skill of an FO is appropriate assertiveness. If you see it is going to rat-**** drop some hints, if no joy then you should directly tell the other guy what he should be doing to correct the issue. As a final resort you should decisively take control in the prescribed manner. Moreover if the guy you are flying with fails to respond TWICE to stuff you say to him you should take control anyway as he may have suffered subtle incapacitation. In a simulator check FOs can get away with average skills and no initiative but lack of appropriate assertiveness is looked upon very poorly (in the west). Do you think we might just see some cultural issues brought out in the investigation?
I do fear that our industry has gone down a road from which it is impossible to return. The industry needs pilots today more than ever before and training departments are under constant pressure to produce them. For some time now we have had guys arriving on the line with c.200 hours, a frozen ATPL and, by definition, zero experience. The demand for pilots has galvanised airline training departments into shaving personal suitability, flying ability, courses and standards to an absolute minimum. The objective is to get the candidate through an LPC and onto the line in the shortest time possible. To support this objective there is a belief that an ever-expanding rule-set will keep the pilot and therefore the operation safe. The result is that you give the pilot less & less ability to make his own low-level mistakes and learn from them. Removing discretion from the operator makes for a safer operation - Right? What's more - Not only will we tie him up with so many rules that it will be impossible for him to remember them all, but we will threaten him with disciplinary action or even termination him if he busts an approach gate or gets a rule wrong.
Our experience is the sum-total of our past cock-ups. We made mistakes, most of them small, and we learnt not to do it again. Today our flights are tied to such a narrow avenue of acceptability that we do not have the latitude any more to make our own mistakes - and by definition we are accruing no experience. De-skilling is not a trend confined to aviation, if you reduce an employee's latitude for discretion to an absolute minimum you can reduce his task to that of a simple flowchart. You can employ someone of a lower calibre, less qualified and therefore pay him less. Today's new Captains are a product of that narrow mindset and the new guys who sit next to them, hoping to learn from their experience..... don't find any. When the day comes that there is no page in the QRH for the problem you have - they are out of ideas. They have no experience to fall back on.
Pilots that are unable to recognise the dangers of crossing the FAF 2 dots high or crossing the threshold at 200kts are a product of just that system.
I do fear that our industry has gone down a road from which it is impossible to return. The industry needs pilots today more than ever before and training departments are under constant pressure to produce them. For some time now we have had guys arriving on the line with c.200 hours, a frozen ATPL and, by definition, zero experience. The demand for pilots has galvanised airline training departments into shaving personal suitability, flying ability, courses and standards to an absolute minimum. The objective is to get the candidate through an LPC and onto the line in the shortest time possible. To support this objective there is a belief that an ever-expanding rule-set will keep the pilot and therefore the operation safe. The result is that you give the pilot less & less ability to make his own low-level mistakes and learn from them. Removing discretion from the operator makes for a safer operation - Right? What's more - Not only will we tie him up with so many rules that it will be impossible for him to remember them all, but we will threaten him with disciplinary action or even termination him if he busts an approach gate or gets a rule wrong.
Our experience is the sum-total of our past cock-ups. We made mistakes, most of them small, and we learnt not to do it again. Today our flights are tied to such a narrow avenue of acceptability that we do not have the latitude any more to make our own mistakes - and by definition we are accruing no experience. De-skilling is not a trend confined to aviation, if you reduce an employee's latitude for discretion to an absolute minimum you can reduce his task to that of a simple flowchart. You can employ someone of a lower calibre, less qualified and therefore pay him less. Today's new Captains are a product of that narrow mindset and the new guys who sit next to them, hoping to learn from their experience..... don't find any. When the day comes that there is no page in the QRH for the problem you have - they are out of ideas. They have no experience to fall back on.
Pilots that are unable to recognise the dangers of crossing the FAF 2 dots high or crossing the threshold at 200kts are a product of just that system.
TOO LOW GEAR envelope
Thanks again Airbubba
took the liberty of highlighting a couple of key areas below, although it's comes as no surprise to most here.
Based on the FR24 CSV data
- (best approximation, due to periodicity and latency of recorded data)
-
took the liberty of highlighting a couple of key areas below, although it's comes as no surprise to most here.
Based on the FR24 CSV data
- (best approximation, due to periodicity and latency of recorded data)
-
- 251 IAS out of FL100
- 240 during descent, give or take
- 236 IAS at 2,000'
- ~215 IAS on tarmac, skipping down to 191 IAS
- recording a minimum of 173 IAS, 200' AGL into the GA
With that speed over the threshold, I believe the crew would never have received a TOO LOW GEAR warning during the first approach; they would have received TOO LOW TERRAIN instead (or another mode if that would have priority). I can see how a crew would discard the latter GPWS warning as being erroneous/nuisance when approaching a runway in VMC, especially a crew that had already lost their situational awareness due to extreme (probably self-induced) tunnel-vision.
Here's the mode 4a envelope.
@A37575.... The answer to that question works from either seat. Hint - Tip - Take Control. The most important inter-personal skill of an FO is appropriate assertiveness. If you see it is going to rat-**** drop some hints, if no joy then you should directly tell the other guy what he should be doing to correct the issue. As a final resort you should decisively take control in the prescribed manner. Moreover if the guy you are flying with fails to respond TWICE to stuff you say to him you should take control anyway as he may have suffered subtle incapacitation. In a simulator check FOs can get away with average skills and no initiative but lack of appropriate assertiveness is looked upon very poorly (in the west). Do you think we might just see some cultural issues brought out in the investigation?
I do fear that our industry has gone down a road from which it is impossible to return. The industry needs pilots today more than ever before and training departments are under constant pressure to produce them. For some time now we have had guys arriving on the line with c.200 hours, a frozen ATPL and, by definition, zero experience. The demand for pilots has galvanised airline training departments into shaving personal suitability, flying ability, courses and standards to an absolute minimum. The objective is to get the candidate through an LPC and onto the line in the shortest time possible. To support this objective there is a belief that an ever-expanding rule-set will keep the pilot and therefore the operation safe. The result is that you give the pilot less & less ability to make his own low-level mistakes and learn from them. Removing discretion from the operator makes for a safer operation - Right? What's more - Not only will we tie him up with so many rules that it will be impossible for him to remember them all, but we will threaten him with disciplinary action or even termination him if he busts an approach gate or gets a rule wrong.
Our experience is the sum-total of our past cock-ups. We made mistakes, most of them small, and we learnt not to do it again. Today our flights are tied to such a narrow avenue of acceptability that we do not have the latitude any more to make our own mistakes - and by definition we are accruing no experience. De-skilling is not a trend confined to aviation, if you reduce an employee's latitude for discretion to an absolute minimum you can reduce his task to that of a simple flowchart. You can employ someone of a lower calibre, less qualified and therefore pay him less. Today's new Captains are a product of that narrow mindset and the new guys who sit next to them, hoping to learn from their experience..... don't find any. When the day comes that there is no page in the QRH for the problem you have - they are out of ideas. They have no experience to fall back on.
Pilots that are unable to recognise the dangers of crossing the FAF 2 dots high or crossing the threshold at 200kts are a product of just that system.
I do fear that our industry has gone down a road from which it is impossible to return. The industry needs pilots today more than ever before and training departments are under constant pressure to produce them. For some time now we have had guys arriving on the line with c.200 hours, a frozen ATPL and, by definition, zero experience. The demand for pilots has galvanised airline training departments into shaving personal suitability, flying ability, courses and standards to an absolute minimum. The objective is to get the candidate through an LPC and onto the line in the shortest time possible. To support this objective there is a belief that an ever-expanding rule-set will keep the pilot and therefore the operation safe. The result is that you give the pilot less & less ability to make his own low-level mistakes and learn from them. Removing discretion from the operator makes for a safer operation - Right? What's more - Not only will we tie him up with so many rules that it will be impossible for him to remember them all, but we will threaten him with disciplinary action or even termination him if he busts an approach gate or gets a rule wrong.
Our experience is the sum-total of our past cock-ups. We made mistakes, most of them small, and we learnt not to do it again. Today our flights are tied to such a narrow avenue of acceptability that we do not have the latitude any more to make our own mistakes - and by definition we are accruing no experience. De-skilling is not a trend confined to aviation, if you reduce an employee's latitude for discretion to an absolute minimum you can reduce his task to that of a simple flowchart. You can employ someone of a lower calibre, less qualified and therefore pay him less. Today's new Captains are a product of that narrow mindset and the new guys who sit next to them, hoping to learn from their experience..... don't find any. When the day comes that there is no page in the QRH for the problem you have - they are out of ideas. They have no experience to fall back on.
Pilots that are unable to recognise the dangers of crossing the FAF 2 dots high or crossing the threshold at 200kts are a product of just that system.
In essence we have produced a load of robots who aren't able to think, leave alone outside the box.
Last edited by Dan_Brown; 27th May 2020 at 11:43.
de minimus non curat lex
.........This crew were in excess of normal parameters by about double, ATC should have the authority to discontinue an approach when it exceedes normal plus a certain percentage, unless a MAYDAY call has been made....
....Complying with an ATC instruction enables the crew to save face, anyone who has flown in Asian knows how important that is, and it cuts through confusion and tunnel vision.....
......safety might be improved if ATC were to enforce a "gate" on arriving aircraft which if not met would result in an immediate instruction to go-around.
....Complying with an ATC instruction enables the crew to save face, anyone who has flown in Asian knows how important that is, and it cuts through confusion and tunnel vision.....
......safety might be improved if ATC were to enforce a "gate" on arriving aircraft which if not met would result in an immediate instruction to go-around.
However, if the Aerodrome Controller had been paying attention, the ATCO would have observed that the GEAR was NOT down, and been totally justified in ordering a GO AROUND.
Just why the ATCO was not paying attention, has yet to be revealed....
Workload management; situational awareness, to name but two aspects which fell apart.
Rich in CRM aspect, not to mention the ‘Swiss Cheese’ model. Enough for a complete conference.
Another mission for Angelo C perhaps......?
Is this SOP ? I think not and frankly unrealistic at any busy airport. And what about night / low vis landings ? I'd say it is the responsibility of the crew to make sure the gear is extended...
de minimus non curat lex
LVP were not in force.
Are you speaking as an (ex) ATCO?
True, the buck stops with the aircraft commander.
However think Swiss Cheese?
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The above video is a joke. Good on eye candy and detail and obviously produced by a seasoned YouTuber. I would say the video posted above, linked here again:
https://youtu.be/9NJpBdg3xrM ..is more accurate in terms of speeds and configuration. But it's low on detail, sounds and dramatics. More likely produced by someone who actually flies the thing?
https://youtu.be/9NJpBdg3xrM ..is more accurate in terms of speeds and configuration. But it's low on detail, sounds and dramatics. More likely produced by someone who actually flies the thing?