PIA A320 Crash Karachi
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Human factors and may not be relevant here . In some countries there are ex military captains who where very high ranking officers while in the military, they still have many connections . The ATC officer might be a military employee . ATC can be very weary of being to forthright over the radio as a bit worried what might come back at them .
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I watched one of those Takbir One arrivals while I was on the ground at DXB waiting for pax boarding years ago. The controller repeatedly mentioned that the plane was high on path and offered vectors for another try. The plane touched down halfway down the runway but it was a long runway on a clear day so they got it stopped.
After landing the plane taxied to a stand. The pax got out and some, instead of heading for Dubai Duty Free, consulted each other for the Qibla and said a prayer on the ramp. And then they headed for Duty Free I would imagine.
The expat controller in the tower said 'glad you were able to get it on the ground'. The captain pitched a fit on the radio demanding 'explain comment, explain comment!'
Very similar in some respects. Total disregard for the proper approach profile and stable approach criteria. The FO called for a go around at least three times. They crossed the marker at over 4000 feet and touched down 5200 feet down an 8000 foot runway. They attempted a go around after deploying the thrust reversers with 800 feet of runway remaining.
The CVR had the expat captain snoring for an hour and forty minutes before top of descent. The NTSB might blame the crash on sleep apnea these days, they analyzed the data from a pilot's CPAP machine in one recent report.
I'd like to think this sort of approach is becoming less acceptable in some parts of the world.
Last edited by Airbubba; 26th May 2020 at 00:53.
Without weight on wheels the ground spoilers won't deploy, as well as not having reverse thrust, wheel brakes or drag from the landing gear. Floating along at high speed in ground effect just above the runway there would have been little cause for the aircraft to slow down until the cowlings scraped the pavement, which was well down the runway. Do we have an indication of the flap setting on the first attempt as 236 kts (at 2000') is over limit for any flap stage ?
215 kts at touchdown is well in excess of the limit just for FLAPS 2 and when configuring in the air FLAPS 1 gives slats only, no trailing edge surfaces extend. With the engines being bumped up to approach idle, the first stage has very little effect on slowing down and is often more use in allowing greater speed brake extension due to a reduction in VLS.
Standard method for configuring an A320 for landing which I would give to a new F/O on the "do this and you won't get into trouble basis", with the appropriate speeds used. Some airlines may require the aircraft to be fully configured earlier, and some pilots might be happy to push it a bit further but this is pretty acceptable for general use.
3000' AGL FLAPS - 1
2500' AGL FLAPS - 2
2000' AGL GEAR DOWN - FLAPS 3
+ 1500' AGL FLAPS - FULL
215 kts at touchdown is well in excess of the limit just for FLAPS 2 and when configuring in the air FLAPS 1 gives slats only, no trailing edge surfaces extend. With the engines being bumped up to approach idle, the first stage has very little effect on slowing down and is often more use in allowing greater speed brake extension due to a reduction in VLS.
Standard method for configuring an A320 for landing which I would give to a new F/O on the "do this and you won't get into trouble basis", with the appropriate speeds used. Some airlines may require the aircraft to be fully configured earlier, and some pilots might be happy to push it a bit further but this is pretty acceptable for general use.
3000' AGL FLAPS - 1
2500' AGL FLAPS - 2
2000' AGL GEAR DOWN - FLAPS 3
+ 1500' AGL FLAPS - FULL
Human factors and may not be relevant here . In some countries there are ex military captains who where very high ranking officers while in the military, they still have many connections . The ATC officer might be a military employee . ATC can be very weary of being to forthright over the radio as a bit worried what might come back at them .
The CVR had the expat captain snoring for an hour and forty minutes before top of descent. The NTSB might blame the crash on sleep apnea these days, they analyzed the data from a pilot's CPAP machine in one recent report.
I'd like to think this sort of approach is becoming less acceptable in some parts of the world.
I'd like to think this sort of approach is becoming less acceptable in some parts of the world.
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Georgina
You won’t get reverse with no gear. But it’s a bit academic. Reverse was probably wrecked by the impact on the engines. If they had simply let it slide to a halt someone will one day work out that it would have gone off the end at 30’kts with little damage and no Loss of life. Or something like that. But they didn’t have a lot of time to ponder that one I suspect. If you are so overloaded as to land halfway down the runway with the gear up at high speed, I suggest that there wasn’t a lot of thinking space left?
The main issue here is why did the Crew of the plane not observe the landing gates which are there to force a go around long before it becomes a crash. Been an SOP for years and in well run airlines it’s mandatory and there’s a no blame culture for executing a go around at any stage when the approach is becoming too unstable to safely continue. Cheers Ret’d Guy
You won’t get reverse with no gear. But it’s a bit academic. Reverse was probably wrecked by the impact on the engines. If they had simply let it slide to a halt someone will one day work out that it would have gone off the end at 30’kts with little damage and no Loss of life. Or something like that. But they didn’t have a lot of time to ponder that one I suspect. If you are so overloaded as to land halfway down the runway with the gear up at high speed, I suggest that there wasn’t a lot of thinking space left?
The main issue here is why did the Crew of the plane not observe the landing gates which are there to force a go around long before it becomes a crash. Been an SOP for years and in well run airlines it’s mandatory and there’s a no blame culture for executing a go around at any stage when the approach is becoming too unstable to safely continue. Cheers Ret’d Guy
There was no issue of L/Gs, L/Gs were down during 1st attempt.
G/A was opted to avoid runway overshoot due to high altitude approach leading the acft to 4500 ft from threshold.
Now this is the catch:- Probably Flaps selection to position 3 from 4 and Gears Up selection was too early while engines still spooling up from approach Idle to TOGA,.
Too early retraction of Flaps caused loss of lift and acft sank while the Gears already retracted up and engines dragged along the runway 3 times( as witnessed on runway)
First mark : Eng 1
2nd mark: Eng 2
3rd mark: Both engines
Acft climbed with struggling engines to 3000 ft but couldn't hold the Alt and ATC warned the crew about this and crew asked for 2000 ft but due to complete loss of power acft kept on descending and crashed on to residential area.
Pic taken by plane spotter shows dragged engines with black marks and RAT auto deployed due to dual eng failure( AC Bus 1 & 2 being dead ).
Having lost G&B Hyd crew extended the Gears by Manual Gravity Extension, L/Gs extended can be seen in the video just before crash.
Aircraft was still maneourable as Flt Control being supplied by Blue Hyd circuit pressurised by RAT and Flight Control computers by Emergency Generator but no power to keep the acft up.
When an explanation was demanded of him, the pilot said "Well I couldn't think straight! There was this horn that was blasting in my ear."
https://www.avcom.co.za/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?t=55384
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Wasn't there a CFIT accident when the last thing heard on the CVR was the sound of the warning horn and the Captain saying " Shut up, Gringo" as he cancelled the horn ?
https://www.avcom.co.za/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?t=55384
https://www.avcom.co.za/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?t=55384
The accident usually associated with the 'shut up gringo!' call is Avianca 11 operating CDG-MAD on November 27, 1983.
However, the published CVR transcript has no mention of the legendary last words:
http://www.fomento.es/NR/rdonlyres/D...66/Anexo_A.pdf
Another CFIT accident sometimes claimed to have the exclamation was Avianca 410 CUC-CTG on March 17, 1988. It was a 727 doing a high speed climb into the haze in mountainous terrain, with the FO flying and the captain chatting over his shoulder with a jumpseat rider.
I first recall hearing about this callout a couple of decades ago at the Pan Am training center in MIA. PAA trained Avianca's 747 and 727 crews in those days I believe.
However, the published CVR transcript has no mention of the legendary last words:
http://www.fomento.es/NR/rdonlyres/D...66/Anexo_A.pdf
Another CFIT accident sometimes claimed to have the exclamation was Avianca 410 CUC-CTG on March 17, 1988. It was a 727 doing a high speed climb into the haze in mountainous terrain, with the FO flying and the captain chatting over his shoulder with a jumpseat rider.
I first recall hearing about this callout a couple of decades ago at the Pan Am training center in MIA. PAA trained Avianca's 747 and 727 crews in those days I believe.
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Wouldn't 210->192 KIAS over the runway provide enough energy to prevent ground contact even though the engines had not fully spooled up at the time? The airspeed information seems to point more to a gear up landing than a failed GA (unless the PF failed to pitch up enough during the GA).
Wouldn't 210->192 KIAS over the runway provide enough energy to prevent ground contact even though the engines had not fully spooled up at the time? The airspeed information seems to point more to a gear up landing than a failed GA (unless the PF failed to pitch up enough during the GA).
The final 30 sec segment down to flare alt equates to a rate of -1200 fpm. Approximation of course, but in keeping with the profile.
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Most probable:
Unstable approach due in part from lack of recency.
Gear was down.
CRC warnings were from flap overspeeds.
Improper go around. Selecting Flex/MCT instead of TOGA/GA or TOGA Tap. Recency issue again.
Gear selected up as aircraft was still pointing towards the runway.
Two impacts due to skip. TOGA finally selected or manual raising of the nose for go around.
Both engines fail on downwind due impact damage.
Its almost happened before.
Unstable approach due in part from lack of recency.
Gear was down.
CRC warnings were from flap overspeeds.
Improper go around. Selecting Flex/MCT instead of TOGA/GA or TOGA Tap. Recency issue again.
Gear selected up as aircraft was still pointing towards the runway.
Two impacts due to skip. TOGA finally selected or manual raising of the nose for go around.
Both engines fail on downwind due impact damage.
Its almost happened before.
I don’t know if this will turn out to be the worst ever approach, but it is going to make the top 10.
Any instructor has had students mess things up with alarms going off, but anyone with a bare CPL should have known that continuing wasn't a good option.
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It might be a while before we see an accident report according to this editorial in the local paper The Dawn:
The plane crash must be investigated in a transparent manner so the findings are credible and provide the families the most definitive answer possible as to why their loved ones died. However, eyebrows are already being raised over the composition of the team formed by the government to probe the disaster with oversight from the Special Investigation Board. Of the four members that have been named, three belong to the air force. The CEO of PIA happens to be Air Marshal Arshad Mahmood Malik; the PAF officers on the committee are all junior to him in rank. Surely there are worthy civilians who could acquit themselves equally well in their task and whose objectivity, or deference to a senior air force officer, would not be an issue?
The pilots’ association has also asked that it, and international aviation bodies, be involved in the probe. Independent plane crash investigation bodies worldwide usually do include airline pilots and co-opt personnel from the relevant aircraft manufacturer. Doubts about how the inquiry into the crash of PK-8303 will unfold are not misplaced.
After all, it has been nearly four years since another PIA flight, PK-661, crashed en route to Islamabad from Chitral. Yet the SIB has still not released its final report that explains why 48 people had their lives cut short that day.
Published in Dawn, May 24th, 2020
The pilots’ association has also asked that it, and international aviation bodies, be involved in the probe. Independent plane crash investigation bodies worldwide usually do include airline pilots and co-opt personnel from the relevant aircraft manufacturer. Doubts about how the inquiry into the crash of PK-8303 will unfold are not misplaced.
After all, it has been nearly four years since another PIA flight, PK-661, crashed en route to Islamabad from Chitral. Yet the SIB has still not released its final report that explains why 48 people had their lives cut short that day.
Published in Dawn, May 24th, 2020
There is always a lot to learn. The more interesting part will be the first few holes of that cheese. What was their set of mind at FL350 to even try this? They started their descend late, but why keep an impossible straight path? What was the mindset behind this? Why did CRM not prevent this decision making process?
I doubt that you make it with this decision making to 17000h, so what was different this time?
I doubt that you make it with this decision making to 17000h, so what was different this time?
Another logical assumption emerged by a A320 pilot:
There was no issue of L/Gs, L/Gs were down during 1st attempt.
G/A was opted to avoid runway overshoot due to high altitude approach leading the acft to 4500 ft from threshold.
Now this is the catch:- Probably Flaps selection to position 3 from 4 and Gears Up selection was too early while engines still spooling up from approach Idle to TOGA,.
Too early retraction of Flaps caused loss of lift and acft sank while the Gears already retracted up and engines dragged along the runway 3 times( as witnessed on runway)
There was no issue of L/Gs, L/Gs were down during 1st attempt.
G/A was opted to avoid runway overshoot due to high altitude approach leading the acft to 4500 ft from threshold.
Now this is the catch:- Probably Flaps selection to position 3 from 4 and Gears Up selection was too early while engines still spooling up from approach Idle to TOGA,.
Too early retraction of Flaps caused loss of lift and acft sank while the Gears already retracted up and engines dragged along the runway 3 times( as witnessed on runway)
(At 220 kts that would be sufficient to gain >2000ft until down to 130kts, assuming a glide ratio of 8 - 10)
The only little catch hindering you from leaviong the runway again might be the nose down momentum from the drag of the pods scratching the tarmac being significantly below your cg. That is where the engines might help you getting unstuck again. But for preventing contact with Terra Firma you wouldn't have needed them in that situation.
Last edited by henra; 26th May 2020 at 07:49.
Another logical assumption emerged by a A320 pilot:
There was no issue of L/Gs, L/Gs were down during 1st attempt.
G/A was opted to avoid runway overshoot due to high altitude approach leading the acft to 4500 ft from threshold.
Now this is the catch:- Probably Flaps selection to position 3 from 4 and Gears Up selection was too early while engines still spooling up from approach Idle to TOGA,.
Too early retraction of Flaps caused loss of lift and acft sank while the Gears already retracted up and engines dragged along the runway 3 times( as witnessed on runway)
There was no issue of L/Gs, L/Gs were down during 1st attempt.
G/A was opted to avoid runway overshoot due to high altitude approach leading the acft to 4500 ft from threshold.
Now this is the catch:- Probably Flaps selection to position 3 from 4 and Gears Up selection was too early while engines still spooling up from approach Idle to TOGA,.
Too early retraction of Flaps caused loss of lift and acft sank while the Gears already retracted up and engines dragged along the runway 3 times( as witnessed on runway)
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I noticed exactly where. Many posts ago oribably on day one someone just threw it in as a question. The post literally read "Two captains?". It's incredible how quickly it got traction as a new piece of information. Fascinating to watch.