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PIA A320 Crash Karachi

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PIA A320 Crash Karachi

Old 24th May 2020, 04:25
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Thanks to Airbubba for the data, which I subsequently de-duplicated and harmonized

A closer look at the final ten minutes, starting from the transition at FL100 - altitude (orange) and inferred ROD (blue histogram)



Clarky, clearly a steep plunge (4 ~ 6,000+ fpm) to capture the ILS gs. At no point did this resemble a stable approach

P.S. Exactly four minutes from FL100 to "touchdown", 90 secs from FL80 to 2,000' (= 4,000 fpm).

Brisk.

Last edited by unworry; 24th May 2020 at 05:09.
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Old 24th May 2020, 05:03
  #362 (permalink)  
 
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The Smartlynx A320 incident at Tallinn 28th Feb 2018 has been mentioned previously on this thread.
Whilst an underlying technical issue led to the main event (aircraft contacted the runway once the gear had been selected up), both engines subsequently failed shortly thereafter.

Well worth a read : https://avherald.com/h?article=4b57c3dd/0000&opt=0

Last edited by Teddy Robinson; 24th May 2020 at 05:05. Reason: Context
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Old 24th May 2020, 06:36
  #363 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Iron Duck
I've not heard the entire ATC recording, but from first spotting they were high and fast, and offering delaying vectors, ATC should have paid particular attention to this approach. An observer with binoculars should have seen the ground strike and climb-away trailing smoke. I would at least have expected ATC to have warned them that they'd hit the ground, were smoking, and probably had engine damage. I would then have expected ATC pro-actively to have vectored them clear of built-up areas either by suggesting a tear-drop return or an approach that avoided the Model Colony, which is built up almost to the runway threshold.
m an ATC and that’s exactly my point .
if theres any mention of gear issues there will be at least 1-2 ppl up in the Tower immediately with binoculars holding their breath for safe landing being on a high alert ready for emergency response if needed.
but listening to the recording ATC seems quite reserved ... not proactive at all.
if they failed first attempt to land and scratched like that thats already an emergency to me without even pilot declaring Mayday on the freq .
But in many third countries they would await the pilot to initiate anything before they do and proactiveness and suggestions are sometimes frowned upon .
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Old 24th May 2020, 06:39
  #364 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Ollie Onion
and the Gear was selected up prior to a confirmed positive climb
Unless I've missed something, we don't actually know yet whether the gear was lowered at all prior to the GA.
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Old 24th May 2020, 06:51
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I totally agree.
The scraping of the runway was probably observed by the tower controller and conveyed to the approach controller, and is not heard in the audio clip.
It was the approach radar controller in the audio clip who made the query about the 'belly landing'. I sensed a hesitation in the query and probably he intended to inform the pilot of the observation made by the tower controller.
Another observation is that the radar controller appeared to be a trainee.
He suggested a heading even when the pilot was established on final, during the first approach.
Also, the voice that has pointed out the observation of 'turning left' from the assigned heading of 110, appears to be that of the supervisor.
The trainee, with whatever limited wits ( and vocabulary) repeated the availability of both runways. The availability of the runways had probably been conveyed to him by the tower controller and the trainee radar controller has repeated the same twice.
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Old 24th May 2020, 06:53
  #366 (permalink)  
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This may be of interest:

PIA flight #PK8303 scraped left engine on runway at touchdown on 4500 feet mark, then right engine scraped runway. Then the plane took off briefly, then both engines scraped the runway at 5500 feet mark.
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Old 24th May 2020, 06:53
  #367 (permalink)  
 
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I think the chance of continuing below 750’ RA with the TO LOW GEAR warning sounding down to a height low enough to impact the engines is almost to hard to believe. It is more likely with those rates of descents and speeds that the gear was out early to even make it onto GS.
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Old 24th May 2020, 06:55
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Just had a scan, the pervading view seems to be that there is no way they could have missed the gear not being down. ECAM, EGPWS etc. I call BS on that. Until you have actually been affected by startle you are astounded how useless you can become.

The first thing to go when overloaded and startled is hearing. Been there in military flight training, also seen it on occasion in civil aircraft, it’s a bitch, your brain drops to fight or flight and stops processing data effectively. Having trained on the Airbus for 20 years, I have seen crews fail to lower the gear, fail to retract it even above 10,000’. It’s all about their mental model disagreeing with the actual situation.

The data from Air Bubba is pretty compelling, over 2000fpm at 1000’. With the overspeed warning and that altitude profile there is no way they could have achieved a sensible energy by the runway. Moreover, thrust would have been irrelevant in achieving a climb in the initial stages of the Go-around, they would have had plenty of kinetic energy.

The data shows 275’ and the QNH was 1006 so about 210’ error for pressure and the runway is what 100’. It all ties up, particularly with scrapes marks on the runway.

When you have removed the probable, the improbable however unlikely can be true. It doesn’t mean they were “bad” pilots but I bet they weren’t current, were probably fasting (yes many pilots do) and got themselves into a situation that overloaded them.

The lesson for us all, irrespective of the final cause, is look after yourself, accept you will be nowhere near your normal skill level and fly as conservatively as possible once released to fly again.

Blue skies to all. Eid Mubarak.
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Old 24th May 2020, 07:06
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Airbubba
I agree that you really have to work hard to ignore visual and aural warnings in a modern airliner. But history has shown time and time again that some folks work really hard at it
I've seen it happen more than once like this

Get aural warning, PNF takes action to silence warning but action changes state of aircraft unrecognized by crew. Later in time when the aircraft does something not expected, escape action causes crew confusion.
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Old 24th May 2020, 07:21
  #370 (permalink)  
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Having read every msg in the thread and considered the information in the runway marks, and the distances between them (as I posted above) there seems little chance that the gear was down.

There would not appear to be enough time for the sequence of doors open / gear swing / doors closed. The lack of damage to the doors - as clearly seen - indicates the gear was stowed throught the first attempt.

For me, the most significant factor of the ATC recording is the shock in the voice from the flight deck, as they struggle to reach 2,000. They start with a routine readback of the GA and 3,500 and then begin to realise what the instruments (and ATC) are telling them.

Hopefully, FDR and CVR will, once again, tell the truth.
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Old 24th May 2020, 07:22
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Here is a link to an article giving a detailed description of the recommended procedures for descending an Airbus, from cruising altitude to the threshold.

It's published by the folks who built the thing, so should be accurate.

Hope some of you find it interesting - I certainly am better informed after reading it.
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Old 24th May 2020, 07:23
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Ollie Onion described very well (probably better than I can) what I believe may have happened. There are some things we know for sure and some things which are less certain but plausible. What is undisputed is that they made a first approach intercepting way above the glide slope. The ensuing approach was unstable and at some point they went around. For some reason the engines (but apparently nothing else) made contact with the runway. It seems both engines were damaged before the aircraft then climbed away and made another approach resulting in it crashing with the gear down into a built up area some way short of the runway. Whether the gear was down and selected up prior to making contact with the runway or they never lowered the gear is not yet known. Why the aircraft did not initially climb away as expected on the missed approach is also net yet certain. Some of us with experience on the aircraft have referred to previous events where TOGA was not properly engaged. It is quite different to Boeing TOGA triggers and whilst it seems incredible that something as easy as firewalling the thrust levers could be got wrong, people continue to do so. As for the gear we will no doubt find out soon enough, but either way it doesn't change much, a bit like choosing between plague and cholera as we say in Germany, both are just as bad.
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Old 24th May 2020, 07:35
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Originally Posted by Dropp the Pilot
"Training for positive rate/climb identification is based on teaching pilots to recognise a positive V/S trend and increasing RA."

Two wrong
statements in less than twenty words - pretty impressive even for a thread which is wanna-bee infested to a degree not often seen.

Neither of these things are "positive rate". A V/S trend is a measure of vertical acceleration. It will happily read a positive vertical rate with both main gear planted on the runway with say, a gross error in take-off performance calculations or wind shear. RA is valueless for rate as the reading which the pilots see is a product of an algorithm of pitch attitude and gear tilt and is by no means a direct reading of actual height.

The ONLY measure for positive rate is a sustained and progressive increase in the altitude displayed on the altimeter.

Should you doubt any of this, consult any FCTM from a company called Boeing. They've been doing this stuff for quite some time.
Should you doubt any of the above statements, I suggest you consult any FCOM from a company called Airbus. They also have a bit of knowledge on the matter, and we are not discussing Boeing here.
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Old 24th May 2020, 07:37
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2 captain operation on this flight.
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Old 24th May 2020, 07:54
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Originally Posted by Cloudtopper
2 captain operation on this flight.
Interesting. Do you have a source?
Let me guess: Management pilots? After a long period of inactivity due to the covid crisis?
So how exactly does one captain, in Pakistan, tell the other captain, that he is a tad high on approach?

This accident is starting to be just as unbelievable as the LATAM accident a few years back. I clearly remember us discussing that on Pprune: “No way they ran out of fuel. That would not be possible!” Turned out is was true after all.
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Old 24th May 2020, 07:56
  #376 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by PAXboy
Having read every msg in the thread and considered the information in the runway marks, and the distances between them (as I posted above) there seems little chance that the gear was down.
I would adjust that to zero chance. Lack of WOW signal while at zero field altitude shows that there was no touchdown with gear extended, and lack of damage to gear doors indicate that the gear was not in transit while making ground contact. The sequence of events does not provide enough time for the gear to have been cycled at any point from down and locked to fully retracted with doors closed (unless a good 8 seconds or more before first touchdown). The first touchdown looks consistent with an "Oh sh*t" moment, with an instinctive pull up on realising that the gear is not down, and the second one would have been made as the engines were spooling up for a g/a. By the time of the second touchdown they were mentally committed to going around.

Someone mentioned earlier that it was a two captains operation? As several smoking holes in the past taught us, that is probably the most risky setup from a CRM perspective.
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Old 24th May 2020, 08:05
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Originally Posted by double_barrel
The thing I find surprising about the emerging hypothesis, is that it seems to require equivalent damage with almost identical consequences to two engines/systems following a double pod impact. I wonder if there will be lessons in improved redundancy?
The thing that has struck me as surprising was the apparently symmetrical damage to both engines with near identical consequences/timelines following a bang on the rwy. But I think the latest Broncolirio update offers some insights into this

Broncolirio focuses on the accessory gearbox (AGB) which powers all fuel, oil, hydraulics for/from each engine. It looks like a hard bang could displace this unit which is mounted in a vulnerable area and represents a common point of failure. Any displacement would likely shear the drive shaft from the engine or cause sufficient misalignment for the entire unit to seize. I had previously imagined a maze of plumbing and pumps couldn't understand a perfectly symmetrical set of consequences from an arbitrary whack on the rwy. The AGB seems to provide a credible mechanism for this.
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Old 24th May 2020, 08:07
  #378 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by andrasz
I would adjust that to zero chance. Lack of WOW signal while at zero field altitude shows that there was no touchdown with gear extended, and lack of damage to gear doors indicate that the gear was not in transit while making ground contact. The sequence of events does not provide enough time for the gear to have been cycled at any point from down and locked to fully retracted with doors closed (unless a good 8 seconds or more before first touchdown). The first touchdown looks consistent with an "Oh sh*t" moment, with an instinctive pull up on realising that the gear is not down, and the second one would have been made as the engines were spooling up for a g/a. By the time of the second touchdown they were mentally committed to going around.

Someone mentioned earlier that it was a two captains operation? As several smoking holes in the past taught us, that is probably the most risky setup from a CRM perspective.
Sounds like a plausible sequence of events, but what leaves me puzzled is the fact that TWR did not speak a word while seeing the aircraft about to land with no landing gear ?
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Old 24th May 2020, 08:14
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Originally Posted by parabellum
From what I have been told it was much as written previously here, aircraft 3500' at 3 miles, inevitable long landing, (gear down), a/c bounced several time.
That explanation would require that, while airborne during just one of those bounces, the MLG doors opened, gears retracted and doors closed again without any contact between the doors and the runway.

Hmmm.
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Old 24th May 2020, 08:24
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Originally Posted by Cloudtopper
2 captain operation on this flight.
Probably a contributing factor in itself. Sure it wasn't 2 trainers together?
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