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PIA A320 Crash Karachi

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PIA A320 Crash Karachi

Old 30th Jun 2020, 18:55
  #1521 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by olster View Post
Whatever the excuses trotted out, covid etc, truly shocking levels of incompetence.
Yep, the excuses will become ever more convoluted with time.

We must pretend that this could happen to any of us, low blood sugar, some warnings were inhibited, we must not judge from a Western cultural perspective etc.

And, I realize that the report must come up with some convenient fiction to explain away this idiotic Banzai Kamikaze flight profile. They did not know, the controller didn't tell them that they shouldn't cross the threshold at 210 knots gear up, the cabin crew didn't tell the captain that the engines scraped.

I realize that very few folks here are professional pilots so I hope my criticism doesn't sound insensitive or harsh. The PIA crew were good people who made poor choices and were trying to turn their lives around when the engines quit.

I remember flying in the Third World decades ago with a Pan Am captain named Doug. He was a grizzled old Marine, gruff and to the point. When I would be amazed at how screwed up things were in the air and on the ground he would comment, 'What you have to remember Airbubba is that these people are not from Chicago!'

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Old 30th Jun 2020, 21:00
  #1522 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Airbubba View Post
And, I realize that the report must come up with some convenient fiction to explain away this idiotic Banzai Kamikaze flight profile. They did not know, the controller didn't tell them that they shouldn't cross the threshold at 210 knots gear up, the cabin crew didn't tell the captain that the engines scraped.'
Minister Khan seemed to have sorted all that out already. Only thing the rest of us are still unaware of is what omissions were made by the passengers.
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Old 30th Jun 2020, 21:16
  #1523 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Rednerib
Pilots swear by their ability to juggle multiple tasks while flying but the fact is that human as species just can not multitask. Most of the times we are not aware of of our inherent limitations. Juxtaposing this limitation with the scene in side PIA 8303 there is no doubt that the crew would have been mentally saturated by the number of events taking place.
OK, if humans cannot multitask, we can call it time-slicing. The fact remains that on the face of it, this crew were unable to manage their aircraft in a situation where the vast majority of other crews would have been so able......and probably would not have got themselves into any one of the multitude of adverse situations that arose on the day of the flight.
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Old 30th Jun 2020, 21:35
  #1524 (permalink)  

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Originally Posted by Airbubba View Post
... very few folks here are professional pilots so I hope my criticism doesn't sound insensitive or harsh.
And you have not even started. Here's one for you, they did narrowly missed a school. Pin at the crash location. Zoom out and then there's no need to tell each other which dots need connecting...

Last edited by FlightDetent; 30th Jun 2020 at 23:34.
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Old 30th Jun 2020, 22:45
  #1525 (permalink)  
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I doubt anyone that was sounding like Joe Cool, would be suffering from hypoglycaemia. Their bold, erm, and spelling.

These are often called the “warning signs” of hypoglycemia. Lack of glucose to the brain can cause trouble concentrating, changes in vision, slurred speech, lack of coordination, headaches, dizziness, and drowsiness. Hypoglycemia can also cause changes in emotions and mood.
I've told so many tales of bewildering things happening that you might think I'm not fazed by this accident. But I am. Bewildered. I can usually come up with some bit of lateral thinking that would explain things, at least is someone's universe, but not for this. Given their speech wasn't slurred (ATC data) then there's not much left but a native incompetence that has been rescued time and again with automation. But I somehow I even doubt that.
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Old 30th Jun 2020, 23:37
  #1526 (permalink)  
 
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Excuse me if I do not unnerstan the ROE here.

I see countless posts about ethnic and political characteristics of various airline crews. I do not like that, but it is likely a fact of life that crews will tend to follow their background for many aspects of their professional performance. I also do not relish reading opinions about how incompetent a crew is until all the facts are known - wait until it's your eulogy at the funeral, huh? I'll meet you at that neat bar in the sky for a beer.

So an attempt to get all the crapola outta the way and talk about some technical and FCOM procedural things concerning gear up/down, go around, etc, was deleted over on the "tech log". Beats the hell outta me, and lots less ethnic and political discussion. Seems we could discover how the 'bus gear up/down criteria works and other stuff that may be a factor in the crash.

But what do I know? I just wanna have a happy feeling next time I fly in one of those jets.
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Old 30th Jun 2020, 23:54
  #1527 (permalink)  
 
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Fife by, Gums!
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Old 1st Jul 2020, 02:21
  #1528 (permalink)  
 
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Bewildered. I can usually come up with some bit of lateral thinking that would explain things, at least is someone's universe, but not for this. Given their speech wasn't slurred (ATC data) then there's not much left but a native incompetence that has been rescued time and again with automation. But I somehow I even doubt that.
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The only thing I can come up with is that the crew panicked and were no longer capable of thinking logically. Was it fear of punishment if they went around? Was it stress from being stood down and thinking they would be out of work again? No-one will ever know. I don't agree that it was native incompetence but in my mind the only thing that can explain such irrational decision making is panic by the PIC which affected the F/O. How do you counter that? I don't think you can as it is an individual response and will only manifest itself in unusual circumstances.
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Old 1st Jul 2020, 03:08
  #1529 (permalink)  
 
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GUMS
Seems we could discover how the 'bus gear up/down criteria works and other stuff that may be a factor in the crash.
If it had been a factor Airbus would have issued a Technical Notification to all airlines. Unfortunately some "pilots" can screw up royally, probably did not set out to do it but did. Recognizing you have messed up and doing something about it is what makes a "professional" pilot, not "pressonitus".
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Old 1st Jul 2020, 05:22
  #1530 (permalink)  

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Originally Posted by gums View Post
Excuse me if I do not unnerstan the ROE here.
Fair call.

gums, any thoughts about the crashing technique?

Cactus 1549 was brought back down at full AoA limiter. PIA8303 seem to have stalled in. Approaching with a right circuit, topography suggests there were other choices available for a controlled crash-landing. The undershoot of 25R for instance.

Does your ilk receive any training in that apart from the ejector seat, which might be beneficial for the busdrivers among us?

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Old 1st Jul 2020, 06:13
  #1531 (permalink)  
 
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The thinking process had stopped from the time they kept saying we are comfortable. There's a possibility that they never realized they landed on the Engines because why would they pull reverse? and they went around only because they had doubt about stopping. That's why they asked for another radar vector. Had they realized landing on Engines then they may not have gone around or if they did they would have asked for visual circuit and definitely made it to the runway.That's why perhaps they are involving the cabin crew about not informing them of landing without gear. Also their gear operations appear more like habit interference. First approach they raised it normally they would lower it. After GA they would raise it but lowered it and then realizing it put the lever up. More of mechanical actions that at this altitude gear status has to be changed. Lots of grey areas if they raised flaps it should go to 1+F. If Both engines failed then gear should have been lowered by gravity but there's no evidence of that.
And does ever a discussion take place after the full report is out because in the years that it takes the focus shifts to more recent ones. If report is going to take years it's useless because some more accidents could have taken place due to same causes.

Last edited by vilas; 1st Jul 2020 at 08:52.
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Old 1st Jul 2020, 07:47
  #1532 (permalink)  
 
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I can usually come up with some bit of lateral thinking that would explain things, at least is someone's universe, but not for this.
Since the crew had selected the gear down early and declined ATC help suggests to me that they were indeed comfortable with their position. I wonder if they had done similar types of approach before? If the gear had remained down at the 5 mile point then perhaps we wouldn't be having this discussion and PIA's lack of data monitoring would have gone unnoticed for a lot longer. (see post 12 of "PIA banned from Europe" which shows EASA reason for the ban).

I suspect the gear was raised in error at 5 miles because PF normally called for gear at that point (learned reflex) and the PNF normally moved the gear lever. When the aircraft ceased to decelerate as expected, then confusion overloaded their last brain cell.

I'll wait for the CVR and accident report with interest.
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Old 1st Jul 2020, 08:19
  #1533 (permalink)  
 
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Gums you of all people surely understand a robust debrief. I believe that in the military a no holds barred approach is used where opinions are direct. Mistakes are admitted. Shortcomings acknowledged. How to make it better next time. Ok off to the bar.
This used to be how it worked in civil aviation until (picking my words) a more ‘sensitive’, no hurt feelings etc style , was introduced for a whole set of well documented reasons. So, let us say you were assessing this accident in the simulator without the inconvenience of all the lives lost. What would you say to every rule broken? Stabilised approach criteria busted by a mile. Going around after selection of reverse thrust? Those are definitely fail items! So the ROE are analysing all that without upsetting anyone.

By the way I really do enjoy your posts, amusing and to the point.

Cheers
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Old 1st Jul 2020, 08:26
  #1534 (permalink)  
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There's a possibility that they never realized they landed on the Engines
I doubt anyone here has ever landed an A320 without gear , except perhaps in a sim , but having had this unfortunate experience on a GA aircraft , I can tell you you cannot miss it ,the lower than normal position on touch down , lack of suspension makes the actual landing quite harder , the faster deceleration with vibrations and the noise...
I realize the main gear on an A320 is not that much higher than the cowlings, but still with a few hundreds landing under the belt on the type you should notice the difference, OK, a hard landing can be the same as on wheels and not sure if the eventual pressurization remaining would suppress all that noise, but the vibrations caused by the scraping should be felt and the deceleration quite abnormal..So I doubt they did not notice..
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Old 1st Jul 2020, 09:26
  #1535 (permalink)  
 
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I doubt anyone here has ever landed an A320 without gear , except perhaps in a sim , but having had this unfortunate experience on a GA aircraft , I can tell you you cannot miss it
The way this approach was flown so many warnings, visual staring in the face, audio warnings driving them deaf were ignored, there's absolutely nothing that one can say you cannot this or cannot that. Everything is in the realm of possibility. All posters by now know what happened but they are desperately trying to find some method in the madness. That's all.
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Old 1st Jul 2020, 14:24
  #1536 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Airbubba View Post
We must pretend that this could happen to any of us, low blood sugar, some warnings were inhibited, we must not judge from a Western cultural perspective etc.
Yeah! We need to throw away all the PCishness and ask ourselves the hard question: would the crew originally trained by the USAF ever be able to plonk their DC-9-32 N10556 onto the KIAH runway 27, gear up, at Vapp+61 kt and let it slide 6850 ft down the runway till it stops in the grass, 140 ft left of the runway centerline?

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Old 1st Jul 2020, 15:43
  #1537 (permalink)  
 
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I'll wait for the CVR and accident report with interest
golden your patience will be tested for sure. Their last fatal was in 2016 report is not yet out. May be EASA ban will expedite matters in this case.
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Old 1st Jul 2020, 15:59
  #1538 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Clandestino View Post
Yeah! We need to throw away all the PCishness and ask ourselves the hard question: would the crew originally trained by the USAF ever be able to plonk their DC-9-32 N10556 onto the KIAH runway 27, gear up, at Vapp+61 kt and let it slide 6850 ft down the runway till it stops in the grass, 140 ft left of the runway centerline?
Here’s a link to the report on the accident referred to above. A lot of similarities, and certainly shows that the PIA accident cannot only be blamed on a non-“Western cultural” mindset.

For those who don’t wish to read the whole Houston DC9 report, the Co-pilot (PF) realised the flaps had not deployed, and that they were way too fast, (but not that the gear was not down)

Five seconds after the captain rejected his go-around request by stating “no you’re alright,” the first officer said “I can’t slow it down here now.” The captain again stated “you’re alright,” and the first officer replied “we’re just smokin’ in here.”
The Co pilot three times suggested going around before the captain took control, and landed, gear-up, at 40kts above the flaps up vref, and >60kts above the vref for the selected flap setting.

Both ex-USAF pilots.


https://reports.aviation-safety.net/...C93_N10556.pdf

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Old 1st Jul 2020, 16:01
  #1539 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Clandestino View Post
Yeah! We need to throw away all the PCishness and ask ourselves the hard question: would the crew originally trained by the USAF ever be able to plonk their DC-9-32 N10556 onto the KIAH runway 27, gear up, at Vapp+61 kt and let it slide 6850 ft down the runway till it stops in the grass, 140 ft left of the runway centerline?
Number of fatalities in that accident in 1996 was, let me check, oh, yes, here it is: 0
"Any landing that you can walk away from ..." (But I'll go with 'sometimes, better lucky than good' on that one)
The Co pilot three times suggested going around before the captain took control, and landed, gear-up,
One would hope that in the last quarter of a century, CRM has improved a bit at Continental.

Is learning from someone else's mistake acceptable, or must one make one's own mistake to learn the same lesson and then decide "Yeah, that could happen to me too"?
Answers on a post card, if you please.
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Old 1st Jul 2020, 17:16
  #1540 (permalink)  
 
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Karachi, part 99

The strength of the international civil aviation system including the parts of it within the area of 'public international air law' derives in major part from the sovereign capacity of each country to work through official processes as it best sees fit - in this instance the Annex 13 official AAIB report of course. But a weakness of that same international civil aviation system derives from that sovereign and independent capacity - it's not actually too realistic to expect someone in a position of authority to pick up a phone to call somebody in Pakistan and put a boot in a backside to get the report done in a lot less time (and still done properly). As I have said earlier there really isn't much imagination required for the system (as described above) to lose its virginity and have a subgroup of the AAIB under Annex 13 plus a select few professional people (like, huh, hey about EASA, they're sort of interested already, no?) join in, and hear the entire CVR output. Not public dissemination, but whose important stake in civil aviation safety globally could possibly suffer if the preliminary report is supplemented with some significant additional information from that evidently critically important CVR output??

With the speed with which places like forum threads dig into accident facts as they emerge and yield up a great many insights even as just based on partial information, one would think the investigation process cannot stay in slow motion. I'm an SLF certainly but I've traveled by air since I was less than 2 years of age (that's a fact) and something like this accident which sends pro pilots scratching their heads in bewildered or at least quite puzzled concern is not the norm, not even close. So the post by vilas about not waiting, I'm on that bandwidth.

And as for Goldenrivetts postulating a wrong-directional push of the gear lever, based on a routine call-out having been made despite that call-out having been obviated by previous action (if I read that post right), if that is what turns out to have occurred, well it'll be a case of aviator daydreaming or sleepwalking. This is not a matter of cultural factors but it is a matter of whether you're playing in a realm where rigor counts or it does not.

(And Toulouse says nothing about an aircraft issue, that speaks volumes, does it not?)
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