PIA A320 Crash Karachi
de minimus non curat lex
1. Is there a radar feed for the aerodrome controller to monitor? Primary/Secondary?
2. Did the approach radar controller notify the aerodrome controller of the abnormal ‘presentation’
of the aircraft in terms of speed, range, altitude once on final?
3. Looking at the aerodrome charts the VCR is poorly situated especially for runways 25 L/R.
To what extent is traffic on final clearly visible.
4. Given the ‘presentation’ of the aircraft, would using binoculars have spotted that the gear was NOT down.
All questions which I am sure the final report will cover and explain.
Within a year would be useful, otherwise we will have moved onto the next major nasty, and the lessons to be learnt will start to fade away?
Pegase Driver
Join Date: May 1997
Location: Europe
Age: 73
Posts: 3,669
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Parkfell :
Neither am I , but I have visited numerous TWRs around the world and set up and procedures are relatively standard .
attempting answers :
1- do not know, but if there is one it is likely a PC monitor replicated the TMA setting . But it is not there for monitoring APP but to verify position of traffic (e.g. VFR , etc..) many TWR controllers are not trained/qualified radar .
2. must be very unusual situation to do so. What we saw here would not be such a case in my opinion , since the aircraft rejoined the Glide at some point and declared he was "comfortable" withe the APP.
3. It is in the vast majority of cases impossible to verify gear from the TWR , too far away and anyway it is not part of his duties at all. In some modern new High TWRs ( like BKK for instance) the TWR is so high that an aircraft even on the runway looks like ant, a 1-2 mm spot..In addition he angle often prevent to see the gear on app..if you look from above. And you also need perfect visibility , which is often not the case due pollution or wx.
4- TWR Binoculars are not made and used for that , they are used to spot vehicles or persons near runways , or in case of emergency . The fist APP did not require this. Plus see point 3 above.
I doubt this since the TWR ATC had no influence on this accident .
Which lessons in this case ? Go around if not stabilized by 1000 or 500 ft ? already there. but to be cynical , it does not matter which recommendations comes out of any report , they all fade away . I was a bit involved in Teneriffe, lots of good recommendations came out at the time ,but it took a few years to implement the " line up and wait " phraseology , and even then our US friends did not like it and it took decades to convince them ... Learning from others mistakes and implementing changes is one of the most difficult things in aviation ...
I am not familiar with Karachi airport or their ATC set up. Perhaps someone can clarify a few points.
attempting answers :
1- do not know, but if there is one it is likely a PC monitor replicated the TMA setting . But it is not there for monitoring APP but to verify position of traffic (e.g. VFR , etc..) many TWR controllers are not trained/qualified radar .
2. must be very unusual situation to do so. What we saw here would not be such a case in my opinion , since the aircraft rejoined the Glide at some point and declared he was "comfortable" withe the APP.
3. It is in the vast majority of cases impossible to verify gear from the TWR , too far away and anyway it is not part of his duties at all. In some modern new High TWRs ( like BKK for instance) the TWR is so high that an aircraft even on the runway looks like ant, a 1-2 mm spot..In addition he angle often prevent to see the gear on app..if you look from above. And you also need perfect visibility , which is often not the case due pollution or wx.
4- TWR Binoculars are not made and used for that , they are used to spot vehicles or persons near runways , or in case of emergency . The fist APP did not require this. Plus see point 3 above.
All questions which I am sure the final report will cover and explain.
Within a year would be useful, otherwise we will have moved onto the next major nasty, and the lessons to be learnt will start to fade away?
ATC Watcher, good posts 
Why are people trying to blame ATC?
There were two (supposedly) qualified pilots on that flight deck, and the most fundamental thing you need to do to land is lower the landing gear.
ATC did warn the pilots several times about their descent profile, but ATC's advice was pushed aside
The two pilots on the flight deck were either monumentally incompetent or they were suffering an undetected fumes event, or perhaps undetected food poisoning, or undetected depressurisation. (no MAYDAY call).
To screw up the descent is one thing - we all have bad days and we all make mistakes. But to then NOT take appropriate action to recover the profile and the situation tells me that these pilots were either unqualified or mentally affected in some way.
Why are people trying to blame ATC?
There were two (supposedly) qualified pilots on that flight deck, and the most fundamental thing you need to do to land is lower the landing gear.
ATC did warn the pilots several times about their descent profile, but ATC's advice was pushed aside
The two pilots on the flight deck were either monumentally incompetent or they were suffering an undetected fumes event, or perhaps undetected food poisoning, or undetected depressurisation. (no MAYDAY call).
To screw up the descent is one thing - we all have bad days and we all make mistakes. But to then NOT take appropriate action to recover the profile and the situation tells me that these pilots were either unqualified or mentally affected in some way.
I agree that it is ludicrous to try to put any blame onto ATC, or worse, the cabin crew, for this fiasco. How can anyone imagine that a message saying 'for information, you appear to have crashed' would have changed anything? And imagine the slippery slope if it becomes ATC's job to examine each approaching a/c to decide if it is correctly configured!
But one persistent question is that instruction to turn left which was ignored. I was under the impression that such instructions require acknowledgment, and compliance. Or an explanation if unable or unwilling. Even if established on the ILS. Why did ATC not repeat that instruction and demand a response ? 'Established on ILS' is not a response. 'Negative, established on ILS' would have been. Strictly speaking, ATC did not know their request had been received and so were they not required to immediately repeat it?
But one persistent question is that instruction to turn left which was ignored. I was under the impression that such instructions require acknowledgment, and compliance. Or an explanation if unable or unwilling. Even if established on the ILS. Why did ATC not repeat that instruction and demand a response ? 'Established on ILS' is not a response. 'Negative, established on ILS' would have been. Strictly speaking, ATC did not know their request had been received and so were they not required to immediately repeat it?
Join Date: Mar 2010
Location: Often in Jersey, but mainly in the past.
Age: 79
Posts: 7,803
Received 135 Likes
on
63 Posts
Whilst full agreeing with comments by fellow ATC colleagues up-thread, there is one significant aspect ... I doubt any Pakistani ATCO would be assertive enough to demand an acknowledgment of, or compliance with, an ATC instruction. We come back to cultural aspects, I regret.
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: Wales
Posts: 532
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Gear put up at 1700 ft
The real mystery is why the gear was put up at 1700 ft. If they had left it down, as they were on the glide-slope by then, in the next 4 miles their speed would have reduced, and nobody would even know of this flight.
Perhaps the FO was setting up for a go-around, but the captain was not.
Perhaps the FO was setting up for a go-around, but the captain was not.
I assume they just selected the gear up at the usual trigger point for selecting it down. This is assumption here, but SOPs, practical drift or perhaps the reality of repetitive line flying may dictate that in normal circumstances, the gear comes down at 1700 ft or whatever, this would have triggered them to reach and move the gear lever, without thinking what they were actually doing. Due to the panic/overload they were paying no attention to what they were doing and that is where the slips and errors just start to cascade. That is the only reason I can imagine this happening. Sure it has been done before but without these awful consequences.
Join Date: May 2005
Location: On a good day - at sea
Posts: 263
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
There was an OEB in effect a few years re L/G NOT DOWNLOCKED that required you recycle the gear to clear a jam of the Hydraulic actuator but had that been the case here then AIRMAN would have flagged it for Maintenance and Airbus and we'd most likely have seen something to that effect in the initial report.
Join Date: Apr 2014
Location: Korea
Posts: 126
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I assume they just selected the gear up at the usual trigger point for selecting it down. This is assumption here, but SOPs, practical drift or perhaps the reality of repetitive line flying may dictate that in normal circumstances, the gear comes down at 1700 ft or whatever, this would have triggered them to reach and move the gear lever, without thinking what they were actually doing.
Then there is a brief interval when they descend below the slope, presumably because of the drag of the gear doors that open to let the gear back in.
There follows a period when the descent rate is about 1 degree, much less than the 3 degrees of the GS, and the IAS remains about 225kts.
This changes about 2.3NM before touchdown, possibly by the pilots noticing the need for correction, to another 5-6 degree dive to rejoin the glide slope, which they achieve about 1NM before the start of runway and by maintaining a speed of only about 215kts throughout the dive.
Did they engage any braking action during this interval? The report does not indicate such.
About 20 seconds later they meet the planet in an unexpected scratching fashion.
Is the above a possible scenario?
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: Wanderlust
Posts: 3,403
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I don't understand what's set up for go around. No aircaft GA starts with gear or flaps. It's TOGA, PITCH then everything else. How can you retract gear? One can understand instead flap one step gear retracted but even flap is not retracted first. It's not known whether they activate approch even. So speed wasn't going to reduce unless thrust was in manual at idle all along.
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: USA
Posts: 2,513
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I could imagine a situation where a poorly trained person immediately goes for gear and flaps when they hear "go around". For all intents and purposes, the FDR suggests they were both incapacitated. Trying to find logic in their actions will be futile. The CVR will only help a little in my opinion.
-At 15nm to go, they were at 10,000ft at 250 kts. At that stage, a competent crew would see that they had excess energy. The last (only?) logical action of this whole sequence was the disengagement of the AP.
-At 10nm to go, they were at 7000ft, still close to 250kt. If you thought you could salvage it before, it's clearly not going to work now.
-At 5nm to the runway, they're actually on the glideslope. Well done! Still 250kt and config 1 though. How'd they plan to lose over 100kt while on a 3 degree path? Forget about a stable approach. Now is a great time to go around.
-Less than 2 miles from the runway, at 500ft, they were at 220kt descending at 2000fpm, with the CRC sounding, and the EGPWS alternating between sink rate, terrain and gear. The ASI is well into the red band. Apart from death, what outcome could one reasonably expect?
-At 15nm to go, they were at 10,000ft at 250 kts. At that stage, a competent crew would see that they had excess energy. The last (only?) logical action of this whole sequence was the disengagement of the AP.
-At 10nm to go, they were at 7000ft, still close to 250kt. If you thought you could salvage it before, it's clearly not going to work now.
-At 5nm to the runway, they're actually on the glideslope. Well done! Still 250kt and config 1 though. How'd they plan to lose over 100kt while on a 3 degree path? Forget about a stable approach. Now is a great time to go around.
-Less than 2 miles from the runway, at 500ft, they were at 220kt descending at 2000fpm, with the CRC sounding, and the EGPWS alternating between sink rate, terrain and gear. The ASI is well into the red band. Apart from death, what outcome could one reasonably expect?
The preliminary reports that states the during runway contact, reverse was selected and gear was selected down then up. That would indicate to me that the flight deck crew knew they were on the ground. My understanding is both Airbus and Boeing state that you do not go around once reversers are selected.
If your situational awareness is low, the logical action would be to do something to increase it, eg hand over control, increase the automatics or what they really should have done, is request an orbit or delaying actions to give themselves more time. The autopilot of a perfectly functioning aircraft does a very good job of helping you not to crash.
I'll open up a can of worms here, but before someone brings up the Children of the Magenta line video, I really don't think it applies here. There problem was a loss of SA and resultantly, capacity. The PF was so focused on the PFD that he couldn't even hear the TOO LOW GEAR call outs.
Join Date: Apr 2014
Location: Korea
Posts: 126
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The landing was discontinued and a go-around was executed. FDR recording indicates a brief action of selection of landing gear lever to down position, which was
immediately followed by its movement to up position.
Only half a speed-brake
I read that as: After the G/A decision once airborne, they selected L/G down and up again immediately. I.e. they intended to close the L/G up, but the only direction the lever would move was in the opposite direction - DN. Having realized, perhaps for the first time, it was on the wrong side, it was selected UP again.
Join Date: Dec 2019
Location: Cariboo country BC
Posts: 14
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I expected to put to rest some or most of the more disconcerting possibilities once the prelim was released, but if anything I'm now even more astonished after digesting it for a few days! Like a good mystery this one just keeps getting stranger and stranger -- putting aside the tragic loss of life of course.
And I will respectfully disagree with some comments that there surely must have been fumes or some other debilitating circumstance affecting cognitive function. Indeed, it's more than possible the cockpit crew were incapacitated to some degree, but in my travels through several serious, non-aviation incidents I've seen multiple instances of perfectly capable individuals acting in the most peculiar ways when under stress while the bucket is full. Some of the most competent people engaging in their fields of expertise can go completely off the rails under the right stimulus. We've all seen such behavior described here at this site many, many times unfortunately.
It's just my own hunch from the start, but I think I already know why so many mistakes were made (as do most here methinks) and I shall keep such speculation to myself -- for now. My previous attempts to "sum it up" were quite rightly removed and I'd like to avoid adding to my shockingly poor track record for moderated commentary!
Happy vapour trails to you all.
Edited for spelling. The artificial incompetence on my phone keeps changing perfectly good English into gibberish.
And I will respectfully disagree with some comments that there surely must have been fumes or some other debilitating circumstance affecting cognitive function. Indeed, it's more than possible the cockpit crew were incapacitated to some degree, but in my travels through several serious, non-aviation incidents I've seen multiple instances of perfectly capable individuals acting in the most peculiar ways when under stress while the bucket is full. Some of the most competent people engaging in their fields of expertise can go completely off the rails under the right stimulus. We've all seen such behavior described here at this site many, many times unfortunately.
It's just my own hunch from the start, but I think I already know why so many mistakes were made (as do most here methinks) and I shall keep such speculation to myself -- for now. My previous attempts to "sum it up" were quite rightly removed and I'd like to avoid adding to my shockingly poor track record for moderated commentary!
Happy vapour trails to you all.
Edited for spelling. The artificial incompetence on my phone keeps changing perfectly good English into gibberish.
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: USA
Posts: 2,513
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
giggitygiggity
I don't necessarily disagree, but the problem is that you are usually unaware that your SA has been lowered. It'd require some cognitive dissonance (I hope I'm using that term properly) to realise that your SA is decreased.
I don't necessarily disagree, but the problem is that you are usually unaware that your SA has been lowered. It'd require some cognitive dissonance (I hope I'm using that term properly) to realise that your SA is decreased.
