PIA A320 Crash Karachi
Also in the report, a nod to the captain's apparently gung-ho approach to flying: "After the accident, flights of Captain for last 12 months were analysed which indicated, numerous triggers during Approach related to High Speed, Path High, High Rate of Descent, Long Flare Distance and GPWS Warnings. There was no Go-Around initiated and several Unstabilized Approaches were continued." Again, there are no such comments against the FO.
It's not dangerous to perform a maneuver that's under control. What's dangerous is to be in an unexpected, unwanted position, unintentionally. In this case it shows that the pilot does not control the flight path.
Unstable approaches are forbidden, so when they happen, it's a sign that the pilot is behind the aircraft, or that he voluntarily disregards the rule.
The latter case is not necessarily dangerous. At least, in my opinion, less than the first case. Again, do you think airbus test pilots fly stabilized approaches ? They disregard this safety rule, yet they're not dangerous.
To claim the captain was incompetent, it would require to prove that all these violations of usual rules were unintentional. You proved that he was either incompetent, or disregarding voluntarily the rules.
In my opinion it's not clear which is true, however the F/O really didn't help him in this case. There is a clear disregard for the rule, but the fact that the CPT could say "they're gonna be amazed we did it" when indeed his flight path was consistent with a landing (assuming the gear was let down...) pleads, in this case, for the second part.
Constant disregard of the rule giving him some proficiency in this kind of situations (high energy approaches). Not enough obviously...
Do you think airbus test pilots fly stabilized approaches ? What do you think about aerobatics, spins, barrels.. ?
It's not dangerous to perform a maneuver that's under control.
....
To claim the captain was incompetent, it would require to prove that all these violations of usual rules were unintentionnal.
It's not dangerous to perform a maneuver that's under control.
....
To claim the captain was incompetent, it would require to prove that all these violations of usual rules were unintentionnal.
1) Aerobatics (in particular, barrel rolls), spins and test flying are hazardous activities where risk is controlled through application of mitigations in respect of pilot qualifications, experience, supervision, geographic location, etc - and perhaps most importantly in this context, numbers of commercial passengers: ie none.
2) Any captain of a commercial passenger flight who intentionally violates rules in the absence of extenuating circumstances is, by any reasonable definition, incompetent in their role. So I don't think any consideration of intent is necessary.
Yes I am sure they do, whenever they land after a test flight if the landing is not part of the evaluation. I am also sure that they perform all sorts of non-nominal approaches - if those are part of their test plan - with full ground backup and cleared airspace if necessary.
I think those manoeuvres - along with Airbus test pilots - constitute whataboutery and are irrelevant to the PIA incident which was not a test flight and which went south because of an abject failure to operate the aircraft properly... on the part of both pilots (I do agree with you there!)
I think those manoeuvres - along with Airbus test pilots - constitute whataboutery and are irrelevant to the PIA incident which was not a test flight and which went south because of an abject failure to operate the aircraft properly... on the part of both pilots (I do agree with you there!)
Unstable approaches are forbidden, so when they happen, it's a sign that the pilot is behind the aircraft, or that he voluntarily disregards the rule. The latter case is not necessarily dangerous. At least, in my opinion, less than the first case. Again, do you think airbus test pilots fly stabilized approaches ? They disregard this safety rule, yet they're not dangerous.
I would think that test pilots fly stabilised approaches, just like everyone else, unless they are doing something that has been pre-briefed as non-standard and a safety case made for it. Airbus lost a jet and four test pilots in one go at Toulouse, due to an unplanned/unbriefed engine shut down on a perfectly serviceable aeroplane, when one of them decided to show how good the automatics were in this scenario but hadn’t thought it through fully, or involved the other crew members in the decision. I would expect that test pilots are in reality pretty cautious as a group (certainly the ones I know, the older, less bold ones), as I would be if operating much closer to the edge of the flight envelope than in normal ops.
It has been well established that the captain on the PIA flight was more akin to a crash test dummy than a test pilot, and would be a perfect example of the Dunning-Kruger Effect. He was disregarding the rules in some part because he was incompetent; it seems he got away with it up until then because PIAs FOQA was almost non-existent and/or serious issues were flagged but nothing done about them, breeding Normalization of Deviance.
There is a clear disregard for the rule, but the fact that the CPT could say "they're gonna be amazed we did it" when indeed his flight path was consistent with a landing (assuming the gear was let down...) pleads, in this case, for the second part.
Also in the report, a nod to the captain's apparently gung-ho approach to flying: "After the accident, flights of Captain for last 12 months were analysed which indicated, numerous triggers during Approach related to High Speed, Path High, High Rate of Descent, Long Flare Distance and GPWS Warnings. There was no Go-Around initiated and several Unstabilized Approaches were continued." Again, there are no such comments against the FO.
Your claim is way too broad.
You should restrict it to rules which have a direct impact on safety.
Furthermore, the approach is to be stabilized by 500ft (VMC).
Hence, it's perfectly by the book to fly a high energy approach where you descend at an angle of negative 10° of flight path angle, then join the glide path and configure for landing and lift your thrust levers at 540ft AGL and reach VAPP+13kt (my airline allows +15) with some thrust by 500ft AGL. Sometimes it's even part of recurrent training to do this sort of thing.
The PIA8303 was, give or take, close to this sort of profile.
The moment where landing became less likely was when the F/O pulled the gear up.
Had he not done that, the landing would have been nominal. I can't guarantee the approach would have been stabilized (Vapp+15 could have been reached below 500ft, so unstable), but it's 99% sure the captain would have landed and stopped without any passenger noticing anything wrong. Like he did all the time before.
It's easy to notice and compensate for one's own mistakes. It's much more difficult when someone like this guy does completely unexpected things.
Yes I am sure they do, whenever they land after a test flight if the landing is not part of the evaluation.
I didn't have to look for very long to find a sidestep performed below 500ft and finished at 300ft AGL, on flightradar.
For example when they need to gather data about braking or flaring, they will make very short circuits.
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Do you respect the entirety of your tens of thousands of pages of OM A-B-C-.. ? I doubt it. Or, your manuals are much smaller than they could be.
Your claim is way too broad.
You should restrict it to rules which have a direct impact on safety.
Furthermore, the approach is to be stabilized by 500ft (VMC).
Hence, it's perfectly by the book to fly a high energy approach where you descend at an angle of negative 10° of flight path angle, then join the glide path and configure for landing and lift your thrust levers at 540ft AGL and reach VAPP+13kt (my airline allows +15) with some thrust by 500ft AGL. Sometimes it's even part of recurrent training to do this sort of thing.
The PIA8303 was, give or take, close to this sort of profile.
The moment where landing became less likely was when the F/O pulled the gear up.
Had he not done that, the landing would have been nominal. I can't guarantee the approach would have been stabilized (Vapp+15 could have been reached below 500ft, so unstable), but it's 99% sure the captain would have landed and stopped without any passenger noticing anything wrong. Like he did all the time before.
It's easy to notice and compensate for one's own mistakes. It's much more difficult when someone like this guy does completely unexpected things.
If you lived in Toulouse, you would regularly see, during weekdays, white and blue jetliners turning to final lower than 500ft AGL.
I didn't have to look for very long to find a sidestep performed below 500ft and finished at 300ft AGL, on flightradar.
For example when they need to gather data about braking or flaring, they will make very short circuits.
Your claim is way too broad.
You should restrict it to rules which have a direct impact on safety.
Furthermore, the approach is to be stabilized by 500ft (VMC).
Hence, it's perfectly by the book to fly a high energy approach where you descend at an angle of negative 10° of flight path angle, then join the glide path and configure for landing and lift your thrust levers at 540ft AGL and reach VAPP+13kt (my airline allows +15) with some thrust by 500ft AGL. Sometimes it's even part of recurrent training to do this sort of thing.
The PIA8303 was, give or take, close to this sort of profile.
The moment where landing became less likely was when the F/O pulled the gear up.
Had he not done that, the landing would have been nominal. I can't guarantee the approach would have been stabilized (Vapp+15 could have been reached below 500ft, so unstable), but it's 99% sure the captain would have landed and stopped without any passenger noticing anything wrong. Like he did all the time before.
It's easy to notice and compensate for one's own mistakes. It's much more difficult when someone like this guy does completely unexpected things.
If you lived in Toulouse, you would regularly see, during weekdays, white and blue jetliners turning to final lower than 500ft AGL.
I didn't have to look for very long to find a sidestep performed below 500ft and finished at 300ft AGL, on flightradar.
For example when they need to gather data about braking or flaring, they will make very short circuits.
I don’t know why You are mentioning Airbus test pilots but anyway those guys have a very specific job to do and they are also highly trained for that, their margins are different from a standard line flight crew, regardless of the crew experience, for many different reasons already mentioned above.
