EK-131: Airbus seconds from doom over Moscow (Report in The Times)
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EK-131: Airbus seconds from doom over Moscow (Report in The Times)
Article in The times today.
A giant Airbus carrying 448 people came within seconds of crashing into a Moscow suburb when its pilots failed to realise how near the ground they were.
A controller had to intervene as a flight deck alarm barked: “Terrain ahead, pull up!”
Still eight miles from Domodedovo airport, the Emirates A380 was banking in a turn 395ft (120m) above the ground — only one and a half times its wingspan — when the captain realised the error and slammed on power to abort the approach and climb to safety.
Details of the near disaster have emerged after an inquiry. Flight EK-131 from Dubai was flying towards the airport in good weather in the dark in September 2017 with the 39-year-old co-pilot at the controls, monitored by the 54-year-old captain.
Under a heavy workload, the co-pilot descended and turned the “superjumbo” to intercept the instrument landing system, the radio beams that guide aircraft towards the runway.
However, the radio signal was unreliable as the aircraft was too far away, and the co-pilot continued to descend, believing he was on the normal path. He failed to check the altitude with his instruments, the investigators of the United Arab Emirates Civil Aviation Authority said.
“The commander . . . was concentrating on communications with air traffic control to such an extent that his situational awareness of what was occurring in the cockpit and of the actual aircraft state was significantly degraded,” the report said. With the jet at 195mph, dropping at 1,600ft per minute and about 25 seconds from hitting the ground in Gorkiy Leninskiye, the controller ordered the pilots to halt their descent. However, the Russian’s command of English meant he had to repeat the instruction three times.
The captain applied thrust to climb as the automated terrain warnings began blaring in the cockpit. The plane, weighing well over 300 tonnes, continued to descend for more than 100ft after power was applied.
In their second attempt to land the crew made errors setting up their automated system and aborted again, circling to land safely at their third try.
The investigators had no voice recording of the incident because it had been overwritten by sound from the return flight but investigators pieced together details from the black box and tapes from air traffic control. The report criticised the crew for failing to report the incident immediately, which would have preserved the recording.
The investigators depicted the near-accident as the latest in a series of serious incidents caused by pilots’ inability to keep pace with modern automated flight systems. However, it blamed the crew for poor judgment due to “insufficient communication and co-ordination between them”.
The co-pilot became “erroneously focused” on readings that “supported . . . his expectation that the aircraft was high”, the inquiry found, adding that the captain’s “stress level may have reached a point that led to anxiety and a reduction in his performance.
The passengers were unaware of how close they came to death.
A controller had to intervene as a flight deck alarm barked: “Terrain ahead, pull up!”
Still eight miles from Domodedovo airport, the Emirates A380 was banking in a turn 395ft (120m) above the ground — only one and a half times its wingspan — when the captain realised the error and slammed on power to abort the approach and climb to safety.
Details of the near disaster have emerged after an inquiry. Flight EK-131 from Dubai was flying towards the airport in good weather in the dark in September 2017 with the 39-year-old co-pilot at the controls, monitored by the 54-year-old captain.
Under a heavy workload, the co-pilot descended and turned the “superjumbo” to intercept the instrument landing system, the radio beams that guide aircraft towards the runway.
However, the radio signal was unreliable as the aircraft was too far away, and the co-pilot continued to descend, believing he was on the normal path. He failed to check the altitude with his instruments, the investigators of the United Arab Emirates Civil Aviation Authority said.
“The commander . . . was concentrating on communications with air traffic control to such an extent that his situational awareness of what was occurring in the cockpit and of the actual aircraft state was significantly degraded,” the report said. With the jet at 195mph, dropping at 1,600ft per minute and about 25 seconds from hitting the ground in Gorkiy Leninskiye, the controller ordered the pilots to halt their descent. However, the Russian’s command of English meant he had to repeat the instruction three times.
The captain applied thrust to climb as the automated terrain warnings began blaring in the cockpit. The plane, weighing well over 300 tonnes, continued to descend for more than 100ft after power was applied.
In their second attempt to land the crew made errors setting up their automated system and aborted again, circling to land safely at their third try.
The investigators had no voice recording of the incident because it had been overwritten by sound from the return flight but investigators pieced together details from the black box and tapes from air traffic control. The report criticised the crew for failing to report the incident immediately, which would have preserved the recording.
The investigators depicted the near-accident as the latest in a series of serious incidents caused by pilots’ inability to keep pace with modern automated flight systems. However, it blamed the crew for poor judgment due to “insufficient communication and co-ordination between them”.
The co-pilot became “erroneously focused” on readings that “supported . . . his expectation that the aircraft was high”, the inquiry found, adding that the captain’s “stress level may have reached a point that led to anxiety and a reduction in his performance.
The passengers were unaware of how close they came to death.
I Have Control
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Dear Lord, EK's record is looking worse by the day. Is their Training Department accountable for their near-catastrophes in recent times? What with JFK, the 777 at DXB, and now this, there are 3 events that should never have happened had the flight crews been functioning correctly.
:
As I said at the time, over a lit suburb, after dark but CAVOK. What's not to see outside.
Emirates A388 - Moscow UUDD, GA from 400 feet AGL, 8nm out.
Also surprised at comments about ATC command of English. Although Russian controllers may hesitate in general chatting, in ICAO standard phraseology they are normally spot on.
Emirates A388 - Moscow UUDD, GA from 400 feet AGL, 8nm out.
Also surprised at comments about ATC command of English. Although Russian controllers may hesitate in general chatting, in ICAO standard phraseology they are normally spot on.
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As a (former?) EK 777 driver predicted at the time:
I really feel for this crew - not because of the error they made (Unlike some) - but because they knew in those moment after of “uh oh - we screwed up” - that while they were preparing to come around and fly the 22 approach - they were fubar’d, pending upgrade gone, final warning coming, safety Dept position in question, Augmentors interrogation on PM’ing, possible downgrade, possible termination - yada yada yada.
The big one will come here not because of the error, but because of the cloud of punitive measures that are coming, as a crew tries to fix errors- because they know that with Fleet , unlike with a good trainer, resilience in getting it on the ground - will be met with swift, warped justice
Tragic
The big one will come here not because of the error, but because of the cloud of punitive measures that are coming, as a crew tries to fix errors- because they know that with Fleet , unlike with a good trainer, resilience in getting it on the ground - will be met with swift, warped justice
Tragic
Unless I'm missing something, this is incident number four... instead of punishment for pilots perhaps a total revamp of the training department is in order. This is getting to be ridiculous now...EK is on my no fly list. And no, I don't think all pilots there are bad...
Last edited by Pugilistic Animus; 22nd Apr 2020 at 14:47.
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I dust this link off occasionally, perhaps it should be more frequent; for everyone.
Black Hole, FMS - altitude / distance cross check, route planning, visual 'map-slip',
These are as much technology, procedure, or airspace complexity related incidents as human. The issue is how and when contributing factors combine; how can we identify those situations - its not training in isolation.
https://www.icao.int/safety/fsix/Lib...plus%20add.pdf
Black Hole, FMS - altitude / distance cross check, route planning, visual 'map-slip',
These are as much technology, procedure, or airspace complexity related incidents as human. The issue is how and when contributing factors combine; how can we identify those situations - its not training in isolation.
https://www.icao.int/safety/fsix/Lib...plus%20add.pdf
Last edited by safetypee; 22nd Apr 2020 at 16:38.
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Last time, while ATIS and clearance talking about ILS and appropriate procedure, every direct was for the RNAV RWY 24L.
That created some extra workload.
As well on the ground, as the taxiway 15 is not to identify from Jeppesen plates because the 1 is part of a dashed line.
That created some extra workload.
As well on the ground, as the taxiway 15 is not to identify from Jeppesen plates because the 1 is part of a dashed line.
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There are several ways to know your distance from the runway. Three miles = 1000' of elevation awareness should be SOP. You can be below, or above, the 3 to 1 rule so it's not a requirement to follow it blindly. Fast and below the 3:1? You're doing ok. Fast and one, or above, the 3:1? Things need to change (drag). It should be part of the overall S.A. picture.
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There are several ways to know your distance from the runway. Three miles = 1000' of elevation awareness should be SOP. You can be below, or above, the 3 to 1 rule so it's not a requirement to follow it blindly. Fast and below the 3:1? You're doing ok. Fast and one, or above, the 3:1? Things need to change (drag). It should be part of the overall S.A. picture.
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Maybe they were doing exactly that but possibly got confused with the QFE setting
Last time, while ATIS and clearance talking about ILS and appropriate procedure, every direct was for the RNAV RWY 24L.
That created some extra workload.
As well on the ground, as the taxiway 15 is not to identify from Jeppesen plates because the 1 is part of a dashed line.
That created some extra workload.
As well on the ground, as the taxiway 15 is not to identify from Jeppesen plates because the 1 is part of a dashed line.
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misd-again : agreed and your advice already well articulated on the Middle East Forum regarding the same subject. The real problem here is one I fear will never be addressed and rectified..
All singing, dancing, high-tech , Fly By Wire, Fadec engines, etc etc etc were bought or leased by the Bean Counter Department. They insisted to the Flt Ops Dept that the aircraft should be operated, at all times, in accordance with the high tech facilities as this ensured incredible fuel savings based on optimal, computerised predictions. The Flt Ops dept had no option (Arse covering) but to bow to commercial pressure and, in turn, increasingly, were peopled by the new breed of computer loving nerds who relished consulting home computers before even getting out of bed !
We, ordinary, every day line jocks were forced to resolve everything, heads down, through the damned computer. Airmanship went out of the window as, in busy airspace, we were encouraged to look down at the FMC instead of look up out of the window.
Like many contributors on this subject, I too, am old school. Well trained in good old techniques of piloting and airmanship. As the automatics were introduced and built up, the notion was always the same ; if you don't like what is going on, knock it all out & fly it like an ordinary aeroplane . Airbus even fooled us into thinking that we were doing that with sidesticks linked to multiple FCC's and dummy throttles (called thrust selector levers clicked into idents ) . Boeing even fooled us because they. made the all singing, dancing 777 look and feel like other Boeings . No fool like an old fool but I too was blind sided ! So. knocking it all out and "flying" it like before was frowned on.
Again, being trained on to a new all singing dancing type by a great believer in TOTAL faith in the computer systems , I was pushed into a tricky sim situation where I did the unthinkable. Overwhelmed with modern tech, I just "knocked it all out" and hand flew the daft scenario where I successfully pulled off an engine out, max X-wind , multiple failure scenario on limiting runway. I was told " Nice piece of flying but "..........yeah, all together now..........." that's not how we do it" ! Back to Ground school for "refresher Training". I think the Chinese call it "Re-education".
Until we get back to old school basic pilot training (yes, teach the newbees stalling, spinning, recovery from unusual attitudes, AIRMANSHIP, etc, etc, etc, ) and encourage fall back to high standards of hand flying , we will have more incidents like the ones currently being reported. Remember, many are not reported.
ASR's ? Don't make me laugh. I often thought that one paper basket in my last Fleet Office should have been labled......."ASR's". That is where most wound up.
All singing, dancing, high-tech , Fly By Wire, Fadec engines, etc etc etc were bought or leased by the Bean Counter Department. They insisted to the Flt Ops Dept that the aircraft should be operated, at all times, in accordance with the high tech facilities as this ensured incredible fuel savings based on optimal, computerised predictions. The Flt Ops dept had no option (Arse covering) but to bow to commercial pressure and, in turn, increasingly, were peopled by the new breed of computer loving nerds who relished consulting home computers before even getting out of bed !
We, ordinary, every day line jocks were forced to resolve everything, heads down, through the damned computer. Airmanship went out of the window as, in busy airspace, we were encouraged to look down at the FMC instead of look up out of the window.
Like many contributors on this subject, I too, am old school. Well trained in good old techniques of piloting and airmanship. As the automatics were introduced and built up, the notion was always the same ; if you don't like what is going on, knock it all out & fly it like an ordinary aeroplane . Airbus even fooled us into thinking that we were doing that with sidesticks linked to multiple FCC's and dummy throttles (called thrust selector levers clicked into idents ) . Boeing even fooled us because they. made the all singing, dancing 777 look and feel like other Boeings . No fool like an old fool but I too was blind sided ! So. knocking it all out and "flying" it like before was frowned on.
Again, being trained on to a new all singing dancing type by a great believer in TOTAL faith in the computer systems , I was pushed into a tricky sim situation where I did the unthinkable. Overwhelmed with modern tech, I just "knocked it all out" and hand flew the daft scenario where I successfully pulled off an engine out, max X-wind , multiple failure scenario on limiting runway. I was told " Nice piece of flying but "..........yeah, all together now..........." that's not how we do it" ! Back to Ground school for "refresher Training". I think the Chinese call it "Re-education".
Until we get back to old school basic pilot training (yes, teach the newbees stalling, spinning, recovery from unusual attitudes, AIRMANSHIP, etc, etc, etc, ) and encourage fall back to high standards of hand flying , we will have more incidents like the ones currently being reported. Remember, many are not reported.
ASR's ? Don't make me laugh. I often thought that one paper basket in my last Fleet Office should have been labled......."ASR's". That is where most wound up.
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Denis Okan posted some notes about flying to Moscow he prepared for Oman Air pilots before their first flight there (it includes a review of the EK incident): https :// yadi.sk/i/BzJJimZHbiM4dQ It's a good read.