Pegasus accident in SAW; just reported
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F9, Hocam (pronounced Ho-jam) is a term of respect. Normally used when referring to someone with respected qualifications and probably but not necessarily older. Doctors, professors, religious clerics and the like are often addressed that way. On the flight deck I would guess that a training captain might be addressed that way but whether it is more widely used I couldn't say. Info from Mrs EA who is a native Turkish speaker but with no aviation background.
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"Hocam" literally means "my teacher" so it is quite appropriate to call one's instructor that. However, "hoca" is quite similar to Hebrew "rabbi", meaning "teacher" but traditionally far more often used to denote priest. In contemporary general use , "hocam" is a honorific liberally bestowed on the senior people.
Now, the idea that we should "not be coy or PC about these sort accidents" has some merit in it but all to often it boils down to racist BS, based on severe ignorance of what HF people wrote and meant when analyzing cultural factors. Before we go on let's clear up a few things.
First, there is no such a thing as an American, Turkish, Soviet, Roman-Catholic, AfD or any other culturally affected aerodynamics, aircraft performance or similar. Yes, engineering solutions are culturally affected but in order to be successful, they can differ in details only. The aeroplane is a machine, it can't care at all about pilot's: political beliefs, religious affiliation, gender, age, social status, experience... just name it. It just demands to be flown properly here and now. There are few ways to do that but the crew has some leeway how to get to them.
Second, there are some cultural traits that are really not compatible with high risk activities like flying, e.g. avoiding face loss, so flying in some countries really entails greater culture-related risk. Aplenty of folks try to interpret it negatively; if there are worse cultures then there must be better ones and then overextend it into idea then there must be best and really go over the top with the notion that the best culture is perfect. Idea that one's own culture is the best is actually basic human trait. Unfortunately, even the societies whose cultural norms are best adjusted to the business of flying have their issues that have to be dealt with. It's all so nice to concentrate just on the last crash and think "How nice if the local mores allowed the first officer to be more assertive" but assertiveness comes at a cost; it is a trait associated with high individualism and self-reliance. As a downside, the societies promoting these can easily produce selfish and reckless individuals, caring only about themselves and those who perceives as his social group (e.g. his company, in the meaning of the business entity). Such a culture may result in, for example, designer bureau covering their aeroplane's shortcomings with potentially lethal crutch and then bullying the certifying authorities and airlines into accepting everything is actually all right. Legal boilerplate: I'm not claiming such a thing actually happened, I'm just warning what may happen if we consider our nation god's gift to aviation and every other aviationally challenged while failing to check what our aeroplane makers and aviation authority are actually doing.
Third: jump from realizing that our culture actually fares better than others when flight safety is considered to getting an idea that we need to graft our weltanschaaung onto everyone to improve safety requires a lot of magical (EK Gann would say: medieval) thinking. It's not very damaging and I find it mildly amusing when such ideas are posted on anonymous forum but quite misjudged when actually tried. Yes, there was attempt at that and well-meaning folks that took part in it are still baffled why it didn't work and why those Far Eastern people rejected their enlightened teachings as soon as they left, after all they unambiguously pointed out what was done wrong and how to fix it. Culture is changeable but it has a lot of inertia. For all the talk about steep cockpit authority gradient that overrides even F/Os self-preservation instinct, the captain that plonked his fuel starved DC-8 into the woods didn't go by the surname Brumoğlu but rather McBroom. Even better, take "Fate is the Hunter". Read just the dedication. Heavy stuff, isn't it? So, if Americans came from there to here, it is doable but not overnight and needs careful adjusting instead of attempting to make a clear break. No matter what the aviation people believe in privately, while discharging their professional functions they need to believe that worldly life of the people who fly is something precious and has to be protected by all means available. I don't think anyone would be able to find contemporary culture whose basic tenets would be at odds with that, issue is with the ways of knowing and performing the aforementioned means at the proper time.
Now, without any prejudice about whether the story is true or its location, regarding the "captain landed from unstabilized approach and F/O didn't dare to say a thing" it is not even a half of the story. The real issue is what happened to captain after the FDM discovered transgression. If the incident got buried, or worse; if the captain was commended for salvaging the difficult approach, the message the F/O gets is that stabilized approach criteria, no matter how often written in OMs or mentioned at refreshers & CBTs, are merely there as a rule to satisfy the bureaucrats and not realize they are a tool to save one's head.
Regarding the non-supporting company, personally, I am in far better luck now than previously but it still didn't change my long ago conceived plan of performing my flights in the way that would allow me too keep my job, my licence and my life at the end of each, in ascending order of importance. So far, it has served me well.
Now, the idea that we should "not be coy or PC about these sort accidents" has some merit in it but all to often it boils down to racist BS, based on severe ignorance of what HF people wrote and meant when analyzing cultural factors. Before we go on let's clear up a few things.
First, there is no such a thing as an American, Turkish, Soviet, Roman-Catholic, AfD or any other culturally affected aerodynamics, aircraft performance or similar. Yes, engineering solutions are culturally affected but in order to be successful, they can differ in details only. The aeroplane is a machine, it can't care at all about pilot's: political beliefs, religious affiliation, gender, age, social status, experience... just name it. It just demands to be flown properly here and now. There are few ways to do that but the crew has some leeway how to get to them.
Second, there are some cultural traits that are really not compatible with high risk activities like flying, e.g. avoiding face loss, so flying in some countries really entails greater culture-related risk. Aplenty of folks try to interpret it negatively; if there are worse cultures then there must be better ones and then overextend it into idea then there must be best and really go over the top with the notion that the best culture is perfect. Idea that one's own culture is the best is actually basic human trait. Unfortunately, even the societies whose cultural norms are best adjusted to the business of flying have their issues that have to be dealt with. It's all so nice to concentrate just on the last crash and think "How nice if the local mores allowed the first officer to be more assertive" but assertiveness comes at a cost; it is a trait associated with high individualism and self-reliance. As a downside, the societies promoting these can easily produce selfish and reckless individuals, caring only about themselves and those who perceives as his social group (e.g. his company, in the meaning of the business entity). Such a culture may result in, for example, designer bureau covering their aeroplane's shortcomings with potentially lethal crutch and then bullying the certifying authorities and airlines into accepting everything is actually all right. Legal boilerplate: I'm not claiming such a thing actually happened, I'm just warning what may happen if we consider our nation god's gift to aviation and every other aviationally challenged while failing to check what our aeroplane makers and aviation authority are actually doing.
Third: jump from realizing that our culture actually fares better than others when flight safety is considered to getting an idea that we need to graft our weltanschaaung onto everyone to improve safety requires a lot of magical (EK Gann would say: medieval) thinking. It's not very damaging and I find it mildly amusing when such ideas are posted on anonymous forum but quite misjudged when actually tried. Yes, there was attempt at that and well-meaning folks that took part in it are still baffled why it didn't work and why those Far Eastern people rejected their enlightened teachings as soon as they left, after all they unambiguously pointed out what was done wrong and how to fix it. Culture is changeable but it has a lot of inertia. For all the talk about steep cockpit authority gradient that overrides even F/Os self-preservation instinct, the captain that plonked his fuel starved DC-8 into the woods didn't go by the surname Brumoğlu but rather McBroom. Even better, take "Fate is the Hunter". Read just the dedication. Heavy stuff, isn't it? So, if Americans came from there to here, it is doable but not overnight and needs careful adjusting instead of attempting to make a clear break. No matter what the aviation people believe in privately, while discharging their professional functions they need to believe that worldly life of the people who fly is something precious and has to be protected by all means available. I don't think anyone would be able to find contemporary culture whose basic tenets would be at odds with that, issue is with the ways of knowing and performing the aforementioned means at the proper time.
Now, without any prejudice about whether the story is true or its location, regarding the "captain landed from unstabilized approach and F/O didn't dare to say a thing" it is not even a half of the story. The real issue is what happened to captain after the FDM discovered transgression. If the incident got buried, or worse; if the captain was commended for salvaging the difficult approach, the message the F/O gets is that stabilized approach criteria, no matter how often written in OMs or mentioned at refreshers & CBTs, are merely there as a rule to satisfy the bureaucrats and not realize they are a tool to save one's head.
Regarding the non-supporting company, personally, I am in far better luck now than previously but it still didn't change my long ago conceived plan of performing my flights in the way that would allow me too keep my job, my licence and my life at the end of each, in ascending order of importance. So far, it has served me well.
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Unfortunately the culture has not much tolerance for speaking against authority, and it has been increasing with the current political climate. Today’s news. Pegasus fired training pilot who criticized the government on live TV while talking about the reasons for the Pegasus crash. This one is highly visible. Considering these events the systematic pressure on individual pilots must be enormous.
https://www.turkishminute.com/2020/0...-turkish-govt/
https://www.turkishminute.com/2020/0...-turkish-govt/
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According to Mode-S data transmitted by the aircraft the aircraft landed long and hot, 1500 meters before the runway threshold the aircraft was descending through 950 feet MSL (corrected for local pressure, actual Mode-S reading 1500 feet)/661 feet AGL at 194 knots over ground, touched down about abeam taxiways T/F (about 1950 meters/6400 feet past the threshold, about 1000 meters/3300 feet before the runway end) at about 130 knots over ground, overran the end of the runway at about 63 knots over ground veering slightly to the left (last transponder transmission), hit the localizer antenna runway 06, went over an airport road and a cliff and impacted the airport perimeter wall.
It is as astonishing as it is disappointing that this simple reality must be constantly reinforced.
Now, without any prejudice about whether the story is true or its location, regarding the "captain landed from unstabilized approach and F/O didn't dare to say a thing" it is not even a half of the story. The real issue is what happened to captain after the FDM discovered transgression. If the incident got buried, or worse; if the captain was commended for salvaging the difficult approach, the message the F/O gets is that stabilized approach criteria, no matter how often written in OMs or mentioned at refreshers & CBTs, are merely there as a rule to satisfy the bureaucrats and not realize they are a tool to save one's head.
Last edited by PJ2; 8th Feb 2020 at 16:25.
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If we ever get to see the recorded data it would be very interesting reading and lessons to us all.
I've been waiting for your other shoe to drop by way of explaining to others why it's wrong. If so, please say why. We fly 800s with the package and I can't find anything in the FCTM, the FCOM or the QRH performance section except data on the pitch-roll angles at which various extremities of the airframe are at risk or not depending upon whether an SFP package is installed.
The only information I am able to find online is from non-Boeing sites which in itself points to another issue regarding getting information for operators from Boeing, but I'll leave that aside.
Here is what B737.org has to say, as linked to previously:
The only information I am able to find online is from non-Boeing sites which in itself points to another issue regarding getting information for operators from Boeing, but I'll leave that aside.
Here is what B737.org has to say, as linked to previously:
The Short Field Performance improvement package was developed in 2005/6 to allow GOL airlines to operate their 737-800s into the 1,465m (4,800ft) Santos Dumont airport. The modifications enable weight increases of approx 4,700kg (10,000lbs) for landing and 1,700kg (3,750lbs) for take-off from short runways. It includes the following changes:
- Flight spoilers are capable of 60 degree deflection on touchdown by addition of increased stroke actuators. This compares to the current 33/38 degrees and reduces stopping distances by improving braking capability.
- Slats are sealed for take-off to flap position 15 (compared to the current 10) to allow the wing to generate more lift at lower rotation angles.
- Slats only travel to Full Ext when TE flaps are beyond 25 (compared to the current 5). Autoslat function available from flap 1 to 25.
- Flap load relief function active from flap 10 or greater.
- Two-position tailskid that extends an extra 127mm (5ins) for landing protection. This allows greater angles of attack to be safely flown thereby reducing Vref and hence landing distance.
- Main gear camber (splay) reduced by 1 degree to increase uniformity of braking across all MLG tyres.
- Reduction of engine idle-thrust delay time from 5s to 2s to shorten landing roll.
- FMC & FCC software revisions.
Here are the photos
Re Clandestino's post (#213):
Best post of a general nature regarding culture and safety in a very long time. Should be mandatory reading for those heading off on their first foray into a culture different from their own.
Grizz
Best post of a general nature regarding culture and safety in a very long time. Should be mandatory reading for those heading off on their first foray into a culture different from their own.
Grizz
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This site is showing name and photo of a Korean CoPilot, also of the Turkish CPT
Here are the photos
Here are the photos
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(But as usual ADS-B data are not always reliable)
Pegase Driver
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XPMorten on G/S perhaps but this animation shows IAS 190 KTS above threshold out at 500 Ft . How realistic is that ? once again perhaps people should stop treating FR24 like if it is the Bible, Great tool for today-day ops but it is not an accident investigation tool..
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XPMorten on G/S perhaps but this animation shows IAS 190 KTS above threshold out at 500 Ft . How realistic is that ? once again perhaps people should stop treating FR24 like if it is the Bible, Great tool for today-day ops but it is not an accident investigation tool..
Last edited by XPMorten; 9th Feb 2020 at 09:43.
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I've been waiting for your other shoe to drop by way of explaining to others why it's wrong. If so, please say why. We fly 800s with the package and I can't find anything in the FCTM, the FCOM or the QRH performance section except data on the pitch-roll angles at which various extremities of the airframe are at risk or not depending upon whether an SFP package is installed.
The only information I am able to find online is from non-Boeing sites which in itself points to another issue regarding getting information for operators from Boeing, but I'll leave that aside.
Here is what B737.org has to say, as linked to previously:
The only information I am able to find online is from non-Boeing sites which in itself points to another issue regarding getting information for operators from Boeing, but I'll leave that aside.
Here is what B737.org has to say, as linked to previously:
I fly both versions, and I don’t need a book to tell me this package reduces landing distance. I can feel it. We fly these versions into airports with short runways, and it makes a big difference.
The challenge is you only get full leading edges when flaps extends beyond 25. That makes tailwind approaches a challenge, more so if the GS angle is more than 3 degrees. Early speed reduction and the use of landing gear to slow down is common.
ManaAdaSystem, I'm saying nothing of the sort. I'm trying to understand the SFP, (I don't fly the B737 at all), and a previous comment made by another contributor regarding SFP who was claiming what had been said earlier in the thread "..was wrong.".
Kindly re-read my post carefully, and the earlier post to which I referred.
Thank you.
PJ2
Kindly re-read my post carefully, and the earlier post to which I referred.
Thank you.
PJ2
PJ2.
Your statement about SFP was straight out wrong. The reason there has been a bit of reaction to it is that like many posts on the internet now days it was made as a statement of fact with an air of authority about it. This kind of confident posting of inaccurate information is rife and frustrates many.
There are many differences between SFP and non-SFP. One difference that I notice is that the thrust reduces to idle in two seconds if you quickly close the thrust levers rather than five seconds on the non-SFP. It’s much nicer on the SFP than the non-SFP as you can more accurately control the point of touch-down in gusty conditions. Also, if you accurately set your Vref it is slower than on the non-SFP aircraft by a knot or two.
Hope that helps, Cheers
Your statement about SFP was straight out wrong. The reason there has been a bit of reaction to it is that like many posts on the internet now days it was made as a statement of fact with an air of authority about it. This kind of confident posting of inaccurate information is rife and frustrates many.
There are many differences between SFP and non-SFP. One difference that I notice is that the thrust reduces to idle in two seconds if you quickly close the thrust levers rather than five seconds on the non-SFP. It’s much nicer on the SFP than the non-SFP as you can more accurately control the point of touch-down in gusty conditions. Also, if you accurately set your Vref it is slower than on the non-SFP aircraft by a knot or two.
Hope that helps, Cheers
