Air Canada 767 Problems at Madrid
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: Rockytop, Tennessee, USA
Posts: 5,898
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
I've sure struggled through different configurations in the same aircraft fleet from leases, mergers and model updates.The MAD 767 was not original to either Canadian Airlines or Air Canada, but was brought into the fleet as a lease aircraft by Robert Himself. It was an earlier model 767-300 and as noted above in previous posts, quite likely never had a fuel jettison system installed.
The MAD 767 was not original to either Canadian Airlines or Air Canada, but was brought into the fleet as a lease aircraft by Robert Himself. It was an earlier model 767-300 and as noted above in previous posts, quite likely never had a fuel jettison system installed.
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: Buenos Aires
Posts: 98
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The F18 pilot talks about his role here (in Spanish but google/deepl should do the trick for those unversed in the language of Cervantes)
https://www.europapress.es/nacional/...205134433.html
https://www.europapress.es/nacional/...205134433.html
Thanks, so the installed fuel jettisons were deactivated at one time, that's what I thought. I've sure struggled through different configurations in the same aircraft fleet from leases, mergers and model updates.
Are you sure about that? C-GHOZ is listed as a B-767-375(ER). The 75 Boeing customer code indicates Pacific Western/Canadian.
I've sure struggled through different configurations in the same aircraft fleet from leases, mergers and model updates.Are you sure about that? C-GHOZ is listed as a B-767-375(ER). The 75 Boeing customer code indicates Pacific Western/Canadian.
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: Canada
Posts: 603
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: Rockytop, Tennessee, USA
Posts: 5,898
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
I once flew for an airline that operated over a dozen variants of the B-727-200. And some with mixed engines.
I am curious about the decision to raise the gear while holding with a blown tire and excess fuel to burn. Was this done for passenger comfort perhaps? I've always been taught to leave the gear down with possible brake or tire damage lest it jam in the well on retraction.
Join Date: Jan 2020
Location: 900m
Posts: 0
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Commander Taco is very knowledgeable about the Air Canada fleet and my thinking that B-763 fuel dump was at one time deactivated by Air Canada is probably from an old ground school conversation in the pre-Y2K era. At least we know that fuel jettison still works on at least one of Delta's Triples.
I once flew for an airline that operated over a dozen variants of the B-727-200. And some with mixed engines.
I am curious about the decision to raise the gear while holding with a blown tire and excess fuel to burn. Was this done for passenger comfort perhaps? I've always been taught to leave the gear down with possible brake or tire damage lest it jam in the well on retraction.
I once flew for an airline that operated over a dozen variants of the B-727-200. And some with mixed engines.
I am curious about the decision to raise the gear while holding with a blown tire and excess fuel to burn. Was this done for passenger comfort perhaps? I've always been taught to leave the gear down with possible brake or tire damage lest it jam in the well on retraction.
Tyre/wheel damage, retract the landing gear?
Collateral damage may affect the decision
Join Date: Aug 2008
Location: in a cigar lounge smoking a Partagas P2
Posts: 119
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The F18 pilot talks about his role here (in Spanish but google/deepl should do the trick for those unversed in the language of Cervantes)
https://www.europapress.es/nacional/...205134433.html
https://www.europapress.es/nacional/...205134433.html
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: Sandy Surroundings!
Posts: 183
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Shocked when I listened to the ATC transcript. The crew sounded like a bunch of amatures. Cannot raise the landing gear initially with an Engine failure, but managed to raise it later. WTF?
Secondly cannot fly a radial to hold.
Holding for hours on 1 engine. And this is considered a safer option than landing overweight?
Always thought that Air Canada is one of the better trained operators, but I have been proven wrong.
Secondly cannot fly a radial to hold.
Holding for hours on 1 engine. And this is considered a safer option than landing overweight?
Always thought that Air Canada is one of the better trained operators, but I have been proven wrong.
Shocked when I listened to the ATC transcript. The crew sounded like a bunch of amatures. Cannot raise the landing gear initially with an Engine failure, but managed to raise it later. WTF?
Secondly cannot fly a radial to hold.
Holding for hours on 1 engine. And this is considered a safer option than landing overweight?
Always thought that Air Canada is one of the better trained operators, but I have been proven wrong.
Secondly cannot fly a radial to hold.
Holding for hours on 1 engine. And this is considered a safer option than landing overweight?
Always thought that Air Canada is one of the better trained operators, but I have been proven wrong.
Shocked when I listened to the ATC transcript. The crew sounded like a bunch of amatures. Cannot raise the landing gear initially with an Engine failure, but managed to raise it later. WTF?
Secondly cannot fly a radial to hold.
Holding for hours on 1 engine. And this is considered a safer option than landing overweight?
Always thought that Air Canada is one of the better trained operators, but I have been proven wrong.
Secondly cannot fly a radial to hold.
Holding for hours on 1 engine. And this is considered a safer option than landing overweight?
Always thought that Air Canada is one of the better trained operators, but I have been proven wrong.
fuel for one or even two hours.
I have several friends now retired from Air Canada for several years that flew the 767 and Airbus and during their career there they tell me that the policy was to land immediately and they are dumbfounded by the last two events they read about (787 and 767) that the crew decided to stay airborne instead of landing immediately.
Join Date: Feb 2020
Location: London
Posts: 0
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Yes I don’t understand why on a twin engined aircraft that can land overweight, a crew would decide to burn or dump
fuel for one or even two hours.
I have several friends now retired from Air Canada for several years that flew the 767 and Airbus and during their career there they tell me that the policy was to land immediately and they are dumbfounded by the last two events they read about (787 and 767) that the crew decided to stay airborne instead of landing immediately.
fuel for one or even two hours.
I have several friends now retired from Air Canada for several years that flew the 767 and Airbus and during their career there they tell me that the policy was to land immediately and they are dumbfounded by the last two events they read about (787 and 767) that the crew decided to stay airborne instead of landing immediately.
Join Date: Nov 2019
Location: unknown
Posts: 3
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Yes I don’t understand why on a twin engined aircraft that can land overweight, a crew would decide to burn or dump
fuel for one or even two hours.
I have several friends now retired from Air Canada for several years that flew the 767 and Airbus and during their career there they tell me that the policy was to land immediately and they are dumbfounded by the last two events they read about (787 and 767) that the crew decided to stay airborne instead of landing immediately.
fuel for one or even two hours.
I have several friends now retired from Air Canada for several years that flew the 767 and Airbus and during their career there they tell me that the policy was to land immediately and they are dumbfounded by the last two events they read about (787 and 767) that the crew decided to stay airborne instead of landing immediately.
Why do you think that Boeing says this? Only three out of four tires are available on that bogie. The aircraft is overweight and it will have a higher touchdown speed. There is a significant chance that there could be more tires lost. How will that affect directional control and stopping capability. Even if the remaining tires are not affected, how will braking be? And, there is no reverse from one engine in this case. Don't you think that it would be higher risk to land overweight with both deceleration devices(brakes and reverse) degraded.
There seems to be this panic mindset that one has to land ASAP(airbus term)/at the nearest suitable airport because that is what the manual says. But this airplane was flying just fine. Why not burn off the fuel.
During the time that they were above their MLW, no airport in the world was suitable unless there was another overriding factor(which there was not) because the rest of the tires could easily blow out leading to significant directional issues or exacerbating deceleration issues. Once they were down to MLW, Madrid became their nearest suitable airport.
In fact based on their subsequent actions, it is a damn good thing they burned the extra fuel. Why? Because of the subsequent decision to accept a tailwind landing on a relatively short runway instead of landing into wind on the runway with the much longer LDA. Listen to the end of the ATC tape, they state that their brakes are very hot. Not good if hydraulic fluid is leaking, a distinct possibility in this incident, and evidence that they could have had an increased likelihood of an overrun
Finally from the FCTM, in part....
"Situations Beyond the Scope of Non-Normal Checklists It is rare to encounter in-flight events which are beyond the scope of the Boeing recommended NNCs. These events can arise as a result of unusual occurrences such as a midair collision, bomb explosion or other major malfunction. In these situations the flight crew may be required to accomplish multiple NNCs, selected elements of several different NNCs applied as necessary to fit the situation, or be faced with little or no specific guidance except their own judgment and experience."
Judgement and experience might lead one to decide that there is little risk in continuing to fly and reduce weight due to the significant risk that will be encountered on landing. The other engine is almost certainly not going to fail.
Last edited by tcasblue; 17th Feb 2020 at 03:51.
Join Date: Jan 2020
Location: 900m
Posts: 0
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Decisions and Criticisms in this Case
Tyre failure on TO often causes collateral damage. Apart from the fairly obvious popping or failed engine there can be damage to structure and flying surfaces.
Within the wheel well, apart from the gear itself, there are systems, position sensors and components which are also vulnerable.
Assessing the aircraft status takes time. Planning a suitable landing strategy takes time too. Which AP/RW? Any hydraulic leak? Paired tyre OK? Airborne inspection? Weight reduction?
Gear locked indicator? Foam? Arm the spoilers? Wind? Prepare the cabin? Do available checklists fit the case or would it be better to modify items? Public address, Company, ATC are also neccessary and take time.
Whatever you decide, you can be sure of criticism afterwards. Take your time to assess and sort it all out and you can expect complaints, that you should have got down sooner.
Rush to get it down and fold a leg or ground loop and apart from a crash, you will get the know-alls telling you you should have waited. Raise the gear and the engineering experts will criticise you, Leave it down and the performance experts will be after you. In this age of the smartphone and blog you will get criticised on line too - possibly with video "evidence".
Facit: You are the boss and you and your crew decide what is best and execute it as well as you can. If it all works out and no-one is harmed, the decision was a good one and blast the critics.
If it doesn't work out and you've done your best, it's still what we are paid for. Having been in a similar situation I sympathise with the crew and congratulate them on a good outcome.
Within the wheel well, apart from the gear itself, there are systems, position sensors and components which are also vulnerable.
Assessing the aircraft status takes time. Planning a suitable landing strategy takes time too. Which AP/RW? Any hydraulic leak? Paired tyre OK? Airborne inspection? Weight reduction?
Gear locked indicator? Foam? Arm the spoilers? Wind? Prepare the cabin? Do available checklists fit the case or would it be better to modify items? Public address, Company, ATC are also neccessary and take time.
Whatever you decide, you can be sure of criticism afterwards. Take your time to assess and sort it all out and you can expect complaints, that you should have got down sooner.
Rush to get it down and fold a leg or ground loop and apart from a crash, you will get the know-alls telling you you should have waited. Raise the gear and the engineering experts will criticise you, Leave it down and the performance experts will be after you. In this age of the smartphone and blog you will get criticised on line too - possibly with video "evidence".
Facit: You are the boss and you and your crew decide what is best and execute it as well as you can. If it all works out and no-one is harmed, the decision was a good one and blast the critics.
If it doesn't work out and you've done your best, it's still what we are paid for. Having been in a similar situation I sympathise with the crew and congratulate them on a good outcome.
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: Within AM radio broadcast range of downtown Chicago
Age: 71
Posts: 838
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Decisions, criticisms . . . and algorithms (?)
Post just above by Twitter sketches out a situation in which lots of factors must be assessed and then acted upon - and I'm sure this SLF will be corrected if such understanding is not correct.
But some algorithm purveyor will replicate the airmanship, judgment and experience, and (sorry, resorting to abstraction) overriding concern for safety of passengers and crew - and deliver an autonomous system that will produce successfully safe outcomes just as reliably, if not more so. Right?....I mean, I read that on the internet, so . . .
But some algorithm purveyor will replicate the airmanship, judgment and experience, and (sorry, resorting to abstraction) overriding concern for safety of passengers and crew - and deliver an autonomous system that will produce successfully safe outcomes just as reliably, if not more so. Right?....I mean, I read that on the internet, so . . .
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: Sandy Surroundings!
Posts: 183
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I suggest that both you and the retired captains are not analyzing things properly. I don't have a 767 FCTM but the 747 one likely has the same statement....."Boeing airplanes are designed so that the landing gear and remaining tire(s) have adequate strength to accommodate a flat nose gear tire or main gear tire. When the pilot is aware of a flat tire prior to landing, use normal approach and flare techniques, avoid landing overweight and use the center of the runway..
Why do you think that Boeing says this? Only three out of four tires are available on that bogie. The aircraft is overweight and it will have a higher touchdown speed. There is a significant chance that there could be more tires lost. How will that affect directional control and stopping capability. Even if the remaining tires are not affected, how will braking be? And, there is no reverse from one engine in this case. Don't you think that it would be higher risk to land overweight with both deceleration devices(brakes and reverse) degraded.
There seems to be this panic mindset that one has to land ASAP(airbus term)/at the nearest suitable airport because that is what the manual says. But this airplane was flying just fine. Why not burn off the fuel.
During the time that they were above their MLW, no airport in the world was suitable unless there was another overriding factor(which there was not) because the rest of the tires could easily blow out leading to significant directional issues or exacerbating deceleration issues. Once they were down to MLW, Madrid became their nearest suitable airport.
In fact based on their subsequent actions, it is a damn good thing they burned the extra fuel. Why? Because of the subsequent decision to accept a tailwind landing on a relatively short runway instead of landing into wind on the runway with the much longer LDA. Listen to the end of the ATC tape, they state that their brakes are very hot. Not good if hydraulic fluid is leaking, a distinct possibility in this incident, and evidence that they could have had an increased likelihood of an overrun
Finally from the FCTM, in part....
"Situations Beyond the Scope of Non-Normal Checklists It is rare to encounter in-flight events which are beyond the scope of the Boeing recommended NNCs. These events can arise as a result of unusual occurrences such as a midair collision, bomb explosion or other major malfunction. In these situations the flight crew may be required to accomplish multiple NNCs, selected elements of several different NNCs applied as necessary to fit the situation, or be faced with little or no specific guidance except their own judgment and experience."
Judgement and experience might lead one to decide that there is little risk in continuing to fly and reduce weight due to the significant risk that will be encountered on landing. The other engine is almost certainly not going to fail.
Why do you think that Boeing says this? Only three out of four tires are available on that bogie. The aircraft is overweight and it will have a higher touchdown speed. There is a significant chance that there could be more tires lost. How will that affect directional control and stopping capability. Even if the remaining tires are not affected, how will braking be? And, there is no reverse from one engine in this case. Don't you think that it would be higher risk to land overweight with both deceleration devices(brakes and reverse) degraded.
There seems to be this panic mindset that one has to land ASAP(airbus term)/at the nearest suitable airport because that is what the manual says. But this airplane was flying just fine. Why not burn off the fuel.
During the time that they were above their MLW, no airport in the world was suitable unless there was another overriding factor(which there was not) because the rest of the tires could easily blow out leading to significant directional issues or exacerbating deceleration issues. Once they were down to MLW, Madrid became their nearest suitable airport.
In fact based on their subsequent actions, it is a damn good thing they burned the extra fuel. Why? Because of the subsequent decision to accept a tailwind landing on a relatively short runway instead of landing into wind on the runway with the much longer LDA. Listen to the end of the ATC tape, they state that their brakes are very hot. Not good if hydraulic fluid is leaking, a distinct possibility in this incident, and evidence that they could have had an increased likelihood of an overrun
Finally from the FCTM, in part....
"Situations Beyond the Scope of Non-Normal Checklists It is rare to encounter in-flight events which are beyond the scope of the Boeing recommended NNCs. These events can arise as a result of unusual occurrences such as a midair collision, bomb explosion or other major malfunction. In these situations the flight crew may be required to accomplish multiple NNCs, selected elements of several different NNCs applied as necessary to fit the situation, or be faced with little or no specific guidance except their own judgment and experience."
Judgement and experience might lead one to decide that there is little risk in continuing to fly and reduce weight due to the significant risk that will be encountered on landing. The other engine is almost certainly not going to fail.
The crew was definitely aware that they had an Engine failure, and that should have been the priority. The possibility of tire damage, which was only confirmed hours later by sending up a fighter aircraft, seems to me to have became the focus of the crew.
I still maintain that "hanging" around for hours on a single engine is not the best option available to the crew. If it was purely a tire problem, with 2 engines turning, then they can stay airborne as long as they want, think about it, contact whoever they wanted to, and figured out how to intercept a radial.
If SE was not a problem as you stated, why didn't the crew fly for 4 hours towards destination and then land - if this is indeed the safest option. Twin with an Engine failure should land at nearest suitable airport in terms of time, and 4 hours sounds way excessive.....
We see the ETOPS argument being used more and more during EFATO and in the cruise. Whilst the aircraft is certified for 180 minutes ETOPS it gives you NO guarantee that the operating engine will last at least that long...
Any reason for not landing on the longest runway available, as the FCTM points out?
