NYT: How Boeing’s Responsibility in a Deadly Crash ‘Got Buried’
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I don't think anyone is arguing that the Turkish Airlines crew wasn't largely responsible for the AMS crash. The point is simply that Boeing also had some responsibility and worked hard, apparently along with US regulators, to keep references to that out of the investigative reports.
its oldnRetired here! Maybe we share a long and happy career somewhere back there when you pulled, the houses got smaller, but if you pulled too hard they got bigger again!
What alarms me here is that there are people here, and especially that long Dutch report that do seek to remove a lot of the responsibility onto a Rad Alt failure and away from a failure of the crew to monitor IAS and apply power manually the moment it fell
below V Ref. Never mind ignoring several blindingly obvious stall warnings culminating in stick shake and I imagine airframe buffet.
And so if I were Boeing I too would fight hard, not to
dissemble or “ keep references out” but to let the truth be known. That’s not the same thing. Boeing do seem to suffer from, what many here seem to see as an old fashioned delusion , probably not shared by Airbus ,
that pilots need to be well trained and maintain a standard of airmanship.
And so we now sit at that jumping off point. Will the two Max crashes re-energise training programs as well as seeing MCAS and other technical improvements.
or will we say MCAS fixed. It was the only cause. Job done.
Until the next one, and the next
Chris, #110, 'who is paying' - re request for Dr Dekker to publish similar reports on other accidents.
Why do we frame safety benefit with money first; cost benefit, a tradeoff between competing resources.
The request to Dr Dekker for other materials could enable a comparison with different situations, more recent technology, or alternative influences, with possibly different conclusions.
Other reports would provide a larger baseline from his point of view, from which we might consider the many other analyses of these accidents with their alternative conclusions (also the range of views in this thread).
Even so, or without more reports, we are required to think about these issues for ourselves, with biased views, without a baseline or measure by which we could provide reasoned argument; but then we don't - it costs too much in mental effort.
'Falling off my perch' into the real world, the issue of balancing commerce with safety is a threat which must be managed. The industry has put great effort into managing safety at the sharp end, but in a very safe industry the effects of commercial influence is increasingly important. If the balance is changing, then what are the disturbances - man, machine, or money; what are damping factors, or the mechanism of maintaining balance.
Did Boeing ask 'who is paying' as priority in their their designs, or in response to accidents like AMS; if so then the 737 Max has answered, but this does not immediately provide a better question.
If education is about learning to ask better questions opposed to stating answers, then Boeing could have learnt from their pilots advice 'the question is not can it be done, but should it be done.'
(Boeing Shelves NMA Link to Boeing background document.)
There are many contributions to safety @ Papers | Sidney Dekker but none specific to this issue.
Why do we frame safety benefit with money first; cost benefit, a tradeoff between competing resources.
The request to Dr Dekker for other materials could enable a comparison with different situations, more recent technology, or alternative influences, with possibly different conclusions.
Other reports would provide a larger baseline from his point of view, from which we might consider the many other analyses of these accidents with their alternative conclusions (also the range of views in this thread).
Even so, or without more reports, we are required to think about these issues for ourselves, with biased views, without a baseline or measure by which we could provide reasoned argument; but then we don't - it costs too much in mental effort.
'Falling off my perch' into the real world, the issue of balancing commerce with safety is a threat which must be managed. The industry has put great effort into managing safety at the sharp end, but in a very safe industry the effects of commercial influence is increasingly important. If the balance is changing, then what are the disturbances - man, machine, or money; what are damping factors, or the mechanism of maintaining balance.
Did Boeing ask 'who is paying' as priority in their their designs, or in response to accidents like AMS; if so then the 737 Max has answered, but this does not immediately provide a better question.
If education is about learning to ask better questions opposed to stating answers, then Boeing could have learnt from their pilots advice 'the question is not can it be done, but should it be done.'
(Boeing Shelves NMA Link to Boeing background document.)
There are many contributions to safety @ Papers | Sidney Dekker but none specific to this issue.
What alarms me here is that there are people here, and especially that long Dutch report that do seek to remove a lot of the responsibility onto a Rad Alt failure and away from a failure of the crew to monitor IAS and apply power manually the moment it fell
below V Ref. Never mind ignoring several blindingly obvious stall warnings culminating in stick shake and I imagine airframe buffet.
below V Ref. Never mind ignoring several blindingly obvious stall warnings culminating in stick shake and I imagine airframe buffet.
I certainly regard good airmanship as valuable, and share with you considerable disquiet at the failure of the crew to monitor IAS. Automation should be a supplement to airmanship, not a replacement. Putting pilots in the invidious position of needing to understand the 'state' of the automation better than the aircraft understands itself really should not be allowed; yet pilots are expected to diagnose subtle failures in automation in the absence of full information, under time pressure. It is no wonder that some don't succeed. Pilots are human, and putting humans into safety-critical control loops with incomplete or inaccurate information will result in failures. Helpful automation should reduce the numbers of such failures.
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I certainly regard good airmanship as valuable, and share with [retired guy] considerable disquiet at the failure of the crew to monitor IAS. Automation should be a supplement to airmanship, not a replacement. Putting pilots in the invidious position of needing to understand the 'state' of the automation better than the aircraft understands itself really should not be allowed; yet pilots are expected to diagnose subtle failures in automation in the absence of full information, under time pressure. It is no wonder that some don't succeed. Pilots are human, and putting humans into safety-critical control loops with incomplete or inaccurate information will result in failures. Helpful automation should reduce the numbers of such failures.
Radio-altimeter displaying -8
By the way, if anyone is wondering why a radio-altimeter might display -8 as a legitimate reading on some aircraft types, this web-page gives some background:
https://www.flightdatacommunity.com/...io-altimeters/
https://www.flightdatacommunity.com/...io-altimeters/
Remember, they noticed that the left RA reading was bogus, but they didn't think it mattered.
This may be the third B accident where a single failed sensor resulted in an evil system response.
With A, there's two cases of multiple failed sensors resulting in accidents: AF447 and a test flight that fell into the Med when the good AoA sensor was outvoted by two bad ones.
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because they thought they had bypassed the failed RA by switching FCCs.
This may be the third B accident where a single failed sensor resulted in an evil system response.
With A, there's two cases of multiple failed sensors resulting in accidents: AF447 and a test flight that fell into the Med when the good AoA sensor was outvoted by two bad ones.
This may be the third B accident where a single failed sensor resulted in an evil system response.
With A, there's two cases of multiple failed sensors resulting in accidents: AF447 and a test flight that fell into the Med when the good AoA sensor was outvoted by two bad ones.
I don't think AF 447 went into The Atlantic because of multiple sensor failures. That was easily overcome through flying the plane in the correct manner - I think?
The tech failure was a catalyst or start of a chain of events, but not the cause.
Thats what seems to be the general consensus but I may be wrong.
I get your point is you are saying that several invalid inputs can confuse a computer I agree, as in this case, but here we go again, isn't that why we have pilots. Good luck to Airbus with their latest auto takeoff.
Cheers
R Guy
Hi RG,
In AF447 all the pitots got clogged at some point which looks like a multiple sensor failure to me.
Caveat: haven't read the report recently.
In AF447 all the pitots got clogged at some point which looks like a multiple sensor failure to me.
Caveat: haven't read the report recently.
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had the pilots done absolutely nothing then the plane would have continued flying level and straight. It was the action from the pilots that actually brought it down. And even after the aircraft got deeply stalled, if the pilots had let go of the side stick the aircraft would have unstalled itself and regained controlled level flight.
So the AF447 has very significant differences compared to the B737 single sensor cases we are discussing. In all those cases the aircraft wanted to crash itself and the pilots needed to actively intervene in order to avoid the crashes, something they sadly did not succeed in.
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Posters berating flight crew reactions in the Max MCAS accidents really have literally no idea what they faced. Furthermore, I bet they have never flown the 737 NG/Max, and are current on modern complex jets. Armchair flight simmers need not interject and insult the abilities of those that perished.
The complexity of systems on modern EFIS jets, not only improves safety in some circumstances, but at times increases the complexity of failures to the point of being detrimental when such systems react to incorrect sensors. This was not a simple single failure necessitating manual flight and simple manual trim. Far far from, and how foolish of any professional pilot to consider this as such. This was a grace situation that enabled as little as 10 seconds to respond before entering an inevitable irrecoverable situation.
The crew were quite obviously fighting against many numerous simultaneous conflicting and confusing warnings and events. In brief, airspeed unreliable, altitude unreliable, stick shaker stall warning, master cautions, stabiliser trim motion and noise masked by stick shaker noise, aircraft out of trim, nose attitude dropping, and manual trim not working sufficiently. To say they would be slightly overloaded is an understatement.
These simultaneous events were untrained, not in the manual, and not foreseen. Before the pprune aviation gods berate these crews, just consider the reality of what these crews faced. You have no reason to comment berating these crews unless you have been in their exact situation, not forewarned, and have flown the 737 NG/Max.
The answer is to fix the systems, make them more reliable, train the crews properly in sims, insist on the very highest standards achievable, and for the industry to start to again support crew to maintain and practice manual flying skills as necessary in the right circumstances.
The complexity of systems on modern EFIS jets, not only improves safety in some circumstances, but at times increases the complexity of failures to the point of being detrimental when such systems react to incorrect sensors. This was not a simple single failure necessitating manual flight and simple manual trim. Far far from, and how foolish of any professional pilot to consider this as such. This was a grace situation that enabled as little as 10 seconds to respond before entering an inevitable irrecoverable situation.
The crew were quite obviously fighting against many numerous simultaneous conflicting and confusing warnings and events. In brief, airspeed unreliable, altitude unreliable, stick shaker stall warning, master cautions, stabiliser trim motion and noise masked by stick shaker noise, aircraft out of trim, nose attitude dropping, and manual trim not working sufficiently. To say they would be slightly overloaded is an understatement.
These simultaneous events were untrained, not in the manual, and not foreseen. Before the pprune aviation gods berate these crews, just consider the reality of what these crews faced. You have no reason to comment berating these crews unless you have been in their exact situation, not forewarned, and have flown the 737 NG/Max.
The answer is to fix the systems, make them more reliable, train the crews properly in sims, insist on the very highest standards achievable, and for the industry to start to again support crew to maintain and practice manual flying skills as necessary in the right circumstances.
This is the healthy reaction - doesn’t mean one has to instruct the world about the perceived or imagined failings of others.
Last edited by Twitter; 29th Jan 2020 at 04:29.
Posters berating flight crew reactions in the Max MCAS accidents really have literally no idea what they faced. Furthermore, I bet they have never flown the 737 NG/Max, and are current on modern complex jets. Armchair flight simmers need not interject and insult the abilities of those that perished.
The complexity of systems on modern EFIS jets, not only improves safety in some circumstances, but at times increases the complexity of failures to the point of being detrimental when such systems react to incorrect sensors. This was not a simple single failure necessitating manual flight and simple manual trim. Far far from, and how foolish of any professional pilot to consider this as such. This was a grace situation that enabled as little as 10 seconds to respond before entering an inevitable irrecoverable situation.
The crew were quite obviously fighting against many numerous simultaneous conflicting and confusing warnings and events. In brief, airspeed unreliable, altitude unreliable, stick shaker stall warning, master cautions, stabiliser trim motion and noise masked by stick shaker noise, aircraft out of trim, nose attitude dropping, and manual trim not working sufficiently. To say they would be slightly overloaded is an understatement.
These simultaneous events were untrained, not in the manual, and not foreseen. Before the pprune aviation gods berate these crews, just consider the reality of what these crews faced. You have no reason to comment berating these crews unless you have been in their exact situation, not forewarned, and have flown the 737 NG/Max.
The answer is to fix the systems, make them more reliable, train the crews properly in sims, insist on the very highest standards achievable, and for the industry to start to again support crew to maintain and practice manual flying skills as necessary in the right circumstances.
The complexity of systems on modern EFIS jets, not only improves safety in some circumstances, but at times increases the complexity of failures to the point of being detrimental when such systems react to incorrect sensors. This was not a simple single failure necessitating manual flight and simple manual trim. Far far from, and how foolish of any professional pilot to consider this as such. This was a grace situation that enabled as little as 10 seconds to respond before entering an inevitable irrecoverable situation.
The crew were quite obviously fighting against many numerous simultaneous conflicting and confusing warnings and events. In brief, airspeed unreliable, altitude unreliable, stick shaker stall warning, master cautions, stabiliser trim motion and noise masked by stick shaker noise, aircraft out of trim, nose attitude dropping, and manual trim not working sufficiently. To say they would be slightly overloaded is an understatement.
These simultaneous events were untrained, not in the manual, and not foreseen. Before the pprune aviation gods berate these crews, just consider the reality of what these crews faced. You have no reason to comment berating these crews unless you have been in their exact situation, not forewarned, and have flown the 737 NG/Max.
The answer is to fix the systems, make them more reliable, train the crews properly in sims, insist on the very highest standards achievable, and for the industry to start to again support crew to maintain and practice manual flying skills as necessary in the right circumstances.
Hindsight is 20/20, foresight is most often myopic.
As K said:
1500 years ago, everybody "knew" that the earth was the center of the universe. 500 years ago, everybody "knew" that the earth was flat. And 15 minutes ago, you "knew" that humans were alone on this planet. Imagine what you'll "know" tomorrow.
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Cap'n Biggles Sir,
Your excellent post about the need for the industry to give pilots the chance to hone their skills in everyday operations is very much to the point. When the automatics start doing something that is not as intended, we need not only better annunciation, but even more important, to have pilots who are sufficiently confident and well-practiced in their handling skills that they can immediately detect a departure from the intended flight path/configuration/speeds/altitudes/etc using the primary flight instruments, and then be able and confidently to handfly until the problem has been sorted.
From what I read, these days at a distance, current airline SOPs actively discourage the development and maintenance of these skills.
Your excellent post about the need for the industry to give pilots the chance to hone their skills in everyday operations is very much to the point. When the automatics start doing something that is not as intended, we need not only better annunciation, but even more important, to have pilots who are sufficiently confident and well-practiced in their handling skills that they can immediately detect a departure from the intended flight path/configuration/speeds/altitudes/etc using the primary flight instruments, and then be able and confidently to handfly until the problem has been sorted.
From what I read, these days at a distance, current airline SOPs actively discourage the development and maintenance of these skills.
To me this means there should be indications (read status screens constantly on display) of what the automation is doing. Anything that automagically moves a control surface should be shown here. Especially AP functions should be shown, trim angle indication, autothrottle amount, rudder angle, you name the essentials. Furthermore, when the automatics have suddenly determined they will disconnect (as computers do, they just reach a criteria and pow!) this display should show the positions of all the essential control surfaces and engine power that the pilot will have to contend with. In other words, I object to the automatics doing things i know nothing about and then suddenly disconnecting and leaving essential things in unknown conditions for me to figure out within 10 seconds or so, or I die. I especially object to manufacturers who don't document automatic "features", when they occur, their effect, criticality and failure modes. I object to some of the automatics doing things without any indication, such as changing the thrust without moving the throttle levers or changing then not showing the trim amount. I object to reliance on one sensor for almost any of the automatics functions, but more importantly I object if the aircraft doesn't indicate when a sensor is not agreeing to its partner. There can be more. I don't want to use capitals, so manufacturers please hear me. Give me a chance to understand what is going on - why isn't it normal to provide all this indication of what your aeroplane systems are doing so that its obvious what it stopped doing when something goes wrong (as it always will).
Please give us pilots the complete picture of what's going on .. and when your automatic systems give us .. what's NOT going on!.
Hi Rather Be Flying
I don't think AF 447 went into The Atlantic because of multiple sensor failures. That was easily overcome through flying the plane in the correct manner - I think?
The tech failure was a catalyst or start of a chain of events, but not the cause.
Thats what seems to be the general consensus but I may be wrong.
I get your point is you are saying that several invalid inputs can confuse a computer I agree, as in this case, but here we go again, isn't that why we have pilots. Good luck to Airbus with their latest auto takeoff.
Cheers
R Guy
I don't think AF 447 went into The Atlantic because of multiple sensor failures. That was easily overcome through flying the plane in the correct manner - I think?
The tech failure was a catalyst or start of a chain of events, but not the cause.
Thats what seems to be the general consensus but I may be wrong.
I get your point is you are saying that several invalid inputs can confuse a computer I agree, as in this case, but here we go again, isn't that why we have pilots. Good luck to Airbus with their latest auto takeoff.
Cheers
R Guy
The sensors cleared, the back stick didn't.
If anyone can think of a plane other than an Ercoupe that you can hold full back stick all day, then that might be worth a beer. For all that though, assuming that the pilots had reason to live another day, there is a reason that a trained pilot thought that holding full back stick was a good idea, and releasing that as commanded by the captain when he got back was not accomplished. In the end, the pilot was human, and in a critical, high stress event, the pear shape ended up proving Newtons law of apples.
With no particular party intended, an observation of operational safety
We sit back in out comfortable chairs, and remark on the worst seconds of the worst day that these guys had, and remonstrate that a human had human frailties. We also contend that we would have done differently, and maybe we would, or maybe we would also be human. Will be glad never to have to find out that case in a tube filled with valuables.
Sure there is an appropriate passage in some well read tome that speaks to judgements, yes, I seem to recall that was written somewhere.
PS: Actually, I have experienced that type of problem, I assure you that being in command of an aircraft that you have 447 lives other than your own interested in your actions, and knowing that there is nothing you are able to do to alter the outcome at that very moment concentrates the mind. If it never happens again, then I would be a happy little camper. In my case, the situation had no causation from my actions, I can only imagine what it would be like to have an inkling that you have a bad day, and that you may have had input into that condition. That is a terrifying thought all of its own.
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New revelations highlight Boeing’s criminal negligence
https://www.marxist.com/capitalism-k...negligence.htm
...
...
Boeing, the FAA and the NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board) try to wash their hands of this by simply saying that the system involved in the earlier accident differed significantly from the one blamed in the MAX crashes. In our view, this is a huge cop-out that ignores the essence of the problem: a design flaw as a result of insufficient redundancy, leading to unpredictable behaviour not explained in the manuals nor trained for in the simulator.
This latest revelation is slow to trickle through because of the technical and specialist nature of the matter. Regardless, the credibility of Boeing as “a company you can trust” has plummeted to historical lows all over the world. Trust tends to be a one-way street and once it has been broken, it is very hard to restore.
Does this mean that Boeing will go bust? Unlikely. Its lobbyists have far too much power to keep this latest mismanaged design on the ground forever, technical issues or not. Boeing is the only major US commercial aircraft maker and is too integrated into the military-industrial complex of US imperialism. As the largest exporter in the United States, it has become a behemoth that is too big to fail.
Paradoxically for a country famed for espousing free market values, the “land of the free” has produced in Boeing a company that is heavily dependent on the largesse of the public sector. The “America First” mantra of Donald Trump has greatly benefited Boeing with lucrative government contracts and the protection of its de facto domestic monopoly from competitors like Airbus. Despite the recent losses and scandals, its planned acquisition of Brazilian aircraft manufacturer Embraer also seems to be going ahead.
Apart from benefiting greatly from public loan guarantees provided by the federal Export-Import Bank (nicknamed “Bank of Boeing”), Boeing is notorious for its exploitation of the tax code and for years has gotten away with paying a negative tax rate on its income. The company is now the country’s second-largest recipient of federal funding after Lockheed Martin, another company in the service of the US war machine. This means it is more dependent on the public purse than a number of federal agencies.
Within the aviation industry, with its massive infrastructural needs, the state has always played a big role. Perversely, after deregulation in the 1980s, Boeing was allowed to effectively become a public entity with private profits. It gladly accepted the money and the safety net from the American public. In return, it has made private shareholders and upper management fabulously rich, while producing aircraft that put the public at risk. The laws of capitalism have a logic of their own and after decades of “ripping up the rules” and cutting corners in search of profit, the chickens are coming home to roost.
Paradoxically for a country famed for espousing free market values, the “land of the free” has produced in Boeing a company that is heavily dependent on the largesse of the public sector. The “America First” mantra of Donald Trump has greatly benefited Boeing with lucrative government contracts and the protection of its de facto domestic monopoly from competitors like Airbus. Despite the recent losses and scandals, its planned acquisition of Brazilian aircraft manufacturer Embraer also seems to be going ahead.
Apart from benefiting greatly from public loan guarantees provided by the federal Export-Import Bank (nicknamed “Bank of Boeing”), Boeing is notorious for its exploitation of the tax code and for years has gotten away with paying a negative tax rate on its income. The company is now the country’s second-largest recipient of federal funding after Lockheed Martin, another company in the service of the US war machine. This means it is more dependent on the public purse than a number of federal agencies.
Within the aviation industry, with its massive infrastructural needs, the state has always played a big role. Perversely, after deregulation in the 1980s, Boeing was allowed to effectively become a public entity with private profits. It gladly accepted the money and the safety net from the American public. In return, it has made private shareholders and upper management fabulously rich, while producing aircraft that put the public at risk. The laws of capitalism have a logic of their own and after decades of “ripping up the rules” and cutting corners in search of profit, the chickens are coming home to roost.
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A commentary from a well known city analyst. It's just another view folks. Only the Pope claims to speak "ex cathedra" (and only then not very often!).Announcing a 4th Quarter loss per share of $2.33 and full year loss per share of $3.47 along with expectations that the cost of the 737 MAX crisis that has rocked the Chicago based company over the past ten months is now anticipated to grow to $18.6 billion surely make this one if not THE worst day in terms of financial reporting in the 104 year history of the Chicago based company. By the same token it may also be regarded as being a very good day for Boeing and the investment community as both results statement, approach and subsequent interviews show a welcome return of clarity, transparency and honesty. For this alone Boeing is deserving of applause.
However one chooses to paint them, with full year revenue falling 24% to $76.6 billion and the company reporting a $1,975 million loss from operations combined with negative operating cash outflow of $2,446 million compared to a previous year positive cash flow of $15,322, suffice to say that these are an appalling set of numbers the like of which investors will hope never to see again.
Do FY19 results mark the end of the Boeing 737 MAX crisis – no they certainly don’t and the prospect of further bad news ahead cannot be ruled out. Will the 737 MAX fly again? Boeing believes so and that the downside risk of this is 10%. I for one believe that to be right and that 737 MAX will certainly fly again but clearly, there is more work to do before regulators will allow that to occur. Indeed, this isn’t just a story of Boeing achieving recertification of the 737 MAX sometime this year but also one of rebuilding its long and valued reputation for safety. I am no doubt that Boeing will achieve what it has set out to do but no-one should imagine that achieving that goal will not have been very hard earned.
Despite the seemingly appalling set of results presented by Boeing senior management today dig down into the message that is writ large throughout these results and you find a company that is taking a very different approach to its investor messaging. Humbled as the company has certainly been throughout this crisis, Boeing is providing a new insight that has clarity, transparency and honesty in abundance. This a new Boeing and it is one that investors should welcome despite the many problems that still lie ahead.
Boeing’s annual statement has the hand of its new Chairman, Dave Calhoun writ large across every piece of detail and information provided. Open, honest, transparent and full of clarity – there is to my mind a very visible and marked change in the attitude and approach being taken - one that is not only extremely welcome but long overdue.
Simplification and openness have been called for many times in the past and Boeing has responded by focussing on what really matters, not only in respect of openness in its messaging but importantly, in how that messaging relates across the wider company into the priorities of safety, quality, integrity and delivering on its programs and promises made.
Boeing will not only survive this but in my view will once again prosper. Maybe that is still a long way away but I take the view that the company remains fundamentally strong.
Not much talked about today but despite the massive problems that have hit the narrow bodied 737 MAX, Boeing’s widebody commercial aircraft segment is still doing very well. So too is Boeing Defense and its other activities including Space.
True, there are still some very muddied 737 MAX waters to clear a way through and there are almost bound to be more shocks ahead, but cut through the mountain of problems that Boeing is now working hard and facing up to resolve and one can clearly see that Dave Calhoun has already taken Boeing by the scruff of the neck and demanded radical change. He has in my view been absolutely right to demand significant change and there is much work to do to restore Boeing back to where it needs to be. This includes airline customers that have suffered as 737 MAX planes remain grounded and passengers alike. But the good news is that there can surely be no accusations from this results statement of lack of clarity, transparency, openness and honesty.
Another example of change of approach and that marks a departure from the past is that the media and analyst community have been given two separate call opportunities with CEO Dave Calhoun and CFO Greg Smith. Mr. Calhoun has also done his first TV interview as Chairman of Boeing with CNBC Squawk Box.
In the CNBC interview Mr. Calhoun confirmed that CEO Dennis Muilenburg had offered to give up any 2019 bonus and that he will not take any further short or long-term bonus or equity until the 737 Max is flying again. He said that Mr. Muilenburg “had done everything right” adding that he (Muilenburg) has set up the 737 MAX for return to service” and that Muilenburg has led a program to rewrite the MCAS related conditions that had led to the two tragic accidents. “Muilenburg” he said “remains the right man to get the 737 MAX back int the air” and that “he had the full confidence of the Boeing Board”. Mr. Calhoun also said that “we can and will improve safety” and that [Boeing engineering] process needed to change.
In respect of the 737 MAX future Mr. Calhoun said that getting the 737 MAX back in the air will be a “long process” adding that the regulators will decide when that occurs but he made very clear that he believed Dennis Muilenburg was the man to do it. The CNBC interview was a huge and important test for the new Boeing chairman and having listened to it in full I believe that he came through it very well.
However one chooses to paint them, with full year revenue falling 24% to $76.6 billion and the company reporting a $1,975 million loss from operations combined with negative operating cash outflow of $2,446 million compared to a previous year positive cash flow of $15,322, suffice to say that these are an appalling set of numbers the like of which investors will hope never to see again.
Do FY19 results mark the end of the Boeing 737 MAX crisis – no they certainly don’t and the prospect of further bad news ahead cannot be ruled out. Will the 737 MAX fly again? Boeing believes so and that the downside risk of this is 10%. I for one believe that to be right and that 737 MAX will certainly fly again but clearly, there is more work to do before regulators will allow that to occur. Indeed, this isn’t just a story of Boeing achieving recertification of the 737 MAX sometime this year but also one of rebuilding its long and valued reputation for safety. I am no doubt that Boeing will achieve what it has set out to do but no-one should imagine that achieving that goal will not have been very hard earned.
Despite the seemingly appalling set of results presented by Boeing senior management today dig down into the message that is writ large throughout these results and you find a company that is taking a very different approach to its investor messaging. Humbled as the company has certainly been throughout this crisis, Boeing is providing a new insight that has clarity, transparency and honesty in abundance. This a new Boeing and it is one that investors should welcome despite the many problems that still lie ahead.
Boeing’s annual statement has the hand of its new Chairman, Dave Calhoun writ large across every piece of detail and information provided. Open, honest, transparent and full of clarity – there is to my mind a very visible and marked change in the attitude and approach being taken - one that is not only extremely welcome but long overdue.
Simplification and openness have been called for many times in the past and Boeing has responded by focussing on what really matters, not only in respect of openness in its messaging but importantly, in how that messaging relates across the wider company into the priorities of safety, quality, integrity and delivering on its programs and promises made.
Boeing will not only survive this but in my view will once again prosper. Maybe that is still a long way away but I take the view that the company remains fundamentally strong.
Not much talked about today but despite the massive problems that have hit the narrow bodied 737 MAX, Boeing’s widebody commercial aircraft segment is still doing very well. So too is Boeing Defense and its other activities including Space.
True, there are still some very muddied 737 MAX waters to clear a way through and there are almost bound to be more shocks ahead, but cut through the mountain of problems that Boeing is now working hard and facing up to resolve and one can clearly see that Dave Calhoun has already taken Boeing by the scruff of the neck and demanded radical change. He has in my view been absolutely right to demand significant change and there is much work to do to restore Boeing back to where it needs to be. This includes airline customers that have suffered as 737 MAX planes remain grounded and passengers alike. But the good news is that there can surely be no accusations from this results statement of lack of clarity, transparency, openness and honesty.
Another example of change of approach and that marks a departure from the past is that the media and analyst community have been given two separate call opportunities with CEO Dave Calhoun and CFO Greg Smith. Mr. Calhoun has also done his first TV interview as Chairman of Boeing with CNBC Squawk Box.
In the CNBC interview Mr. Calhoun confirmed that CEO Dennis Muilenburg had offered to give up any 2019 bonus and that he will not take any further short or long-term bonus or equity until the 737 Max is flying again. He said that Mr. Muilenburg “had done everything right” adding that he (Muilenburg) has set up the 737 MAX for return to service” and that Muilenburg has led a program to rewrite the MCAS related conditions that had led to the two tragic accidents. “Muilenburg” he said “remains the right man to get the 737 MAX back int the air” and that “he had the full confidence of the Boeing Board”. Mr. Calhoun also said that “we can and will improve safety” and that [Boeing engineering] process needed to change.
In respect of the 737 MAX future Mr. Calhoun said that getting the 737 MAX back in the air will be a “long process” adding that the regulators will decide when that occurs but he made very clear that he believed Dennis Muilenburg was the man to do it. The CNBC interview was a huge and important test for the new Boeing chairman and having listened to it in full I believe that he came through it very well.
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Bergerie, I wholeheartedly agree.
To me this means there should be indications (read status screens constantly on display) of what the automation is doing. Anything that automagically moves a control surface should be shown here. Especially AP functions should be shown, trim angle indication, autothrottle amount, rudder angle, you name the essentials. Furthermore, when the automatics have suddenly determined they will disconnect (as computers do, they just reach a criteria and pow!) this display should show the positions of all the essential control surfaces and engine power that the pilot will have to contend with. In other words, I object to the automatics doing things i know nothing about and then suddenly disconnecting and leaving essential things in unknown conditions for me to figure out within 10 seconds or so, or I die. I especially object to manufacturers who don't document automatic "features", when they occur, their effect, criticality and failure modes. I object to some of the automatics doing things without any indication, such as changing the thrust without moving the throttle levers or changing then not showing the trim amount. I object to reliance on one sensor for almost any of the automatics functions, but more importantly I object if the aircraft doesn't indicate when a sensor is not agreeing to its partner. There can be more. I don't want to use capitals, so manufacturers please hear me. Give me a chance to understand what is going on - why isn't it normal to provide all this indication of what your aeroplane systems are doing so that its obvious what it stopped doing when something goes wrong (as it always will).
Please give us pilots the complete picture of what's going on .. and when your automatic systems give us .. what's NOT going on!.
To me this means there should be indications (read status screens constantly on display) of what the automation is doing. Anything that automagically moves a control surface should be shown here. Especially AP functions should be shown, trim angle indication, autothrottle amount, rudder angle, you name the essentials. Furthermore, when the automatics have suddenly determined they will disconnect (as computers do, they just reach a criteria and pow!) this display should show the positions of all the essential control surfaces and engine power that the pilot will have to contend with. In other words, I object to the automatics doing things i know nothing about and then suddenly disconnecting and leaving essential things in unknown conditions for me to figure out within 10 seconds or so, or I die. I especially object to manufacturers who don't document automatic "features", when they occur, their effect, criticality and failure modes. I object to some of the automatics doing things without any indication, such as changing the thrust without moving the throttle levers or changing then not showing the trim amount. I object to reliance on one sensor for almost any of the automatics functions, but more importantly I object if the aircraft doesn't indicate when a sensor is not agreeing to its partner. There can be more. I don't want to use capitals, so manufacturers please hear me. Give me a chance to understand what is going on - why isn't it normal to provide all this indication of what your aeroplane systems are doing so that its obvious what it stopped doing when something goes wrong (as it always will).
Please give us pilots the complete picture of what's going on .. and when your automatic systems give us .. what's NOT going on!.
I think that some recent crashes didn't need any in depth knowledge of the systems other than "pull and the houses get bigger as long as you manually apply the power". Really. When things go wrong very low down, you just need to fly the plane if you know how. I am concerned that too much presentation of things like surface positions etc just lead to delays in flying the plane.
I remember the first pilots in our airline going on the then new A320. To a man they said - "but there is nothing in the manuals about how this all works". And "it is badly translated from French so that it is hard to understand".
The reply was of course "you don't need to understand it, and if you tried there would not be time in a critical situation to start trying to work it all out". You see it is all computerised.
I seem to remember that the fallback was "you can always fly it I direct law and then it becomes just a plane". To which the pilots said " but we won't have the practice to do that".
That was then.
So, this is all a long time ago when the A320 was quite new. What I would be interested to know is, has anything changed since those first few weeks?
Does the current training on the Airbus go into any depth or is it still largely on a need to know basis?
I speak as someone who has only flown down the back on Airbus and my only thought was "who could allow a plane to be sold with a pack of barking dogs in the hold, and think that was ok!
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R Guy
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I'd say the main difference is Boeing slapped on a piece of dodgy software on a conventional design going back to the 60s, and they were found out -- whereas Airbus started from scratch, as Boeing should have done.
When the A350 was nearing EIS I read that Airbus were changing their training syllabus such that the initial training would be about gaining familiarity with flying the aircraft in direct law before later moving on to flying in normal law. I believe, but can't be certain, that the plan was that eventually the training for other aircraft would move to a similar method. No idea as to how detailed the training is into aircraft systems.
No I dont.
Perhaps I have an early onset of something but I have no memory of a STS on our very early -300s, which even had round instruments, and absolutely no memory of anything about it in the sim. Mach trim yes STS no. This worries me a little as the technicalities of my aircraft of all types were always of deep interest. No recall of ever seeing uncommanded trim movement, either.
Our - 300 “course”. Was very simple really just the FMS and autopilot operation, the rest we pretty much made up in the belief -300 airframe was pretty much as a - 200 with some tweaks.
My FO on my first -300 trip is coming on Friday, I will discuss his knowledge of the STS.
Just looked at my Boeing training notes. Runaway stab was practised on 7 sorties, manual trim operation alone on 2 and no discussion or even mention of the Yo Yo procedure, never heard of it on my time on the 73.
Intersting to see my ppl now shows my former types include all 737s up upto 900, never even sat in one !
Perhaps I have an early onset of something but I have no memory of a STS on our very early -300s, which even had round instruments, and absolutely no memory of anything about it in the sim. Mach trim yes STS no. This worries me a little as the technicalities of my aircraft of all types were always of deep interest. No recall of ever seeing uncommanded trim movement, either.
Our - 300 “course”. Was very simple really just the FMS and autopilot operation, the rest we pretty much made up in the belief -300 airframe was pretty much as a - 200 with some tweaks.
My FO on my first -300 trip is coming on Friday, I will discuss his knowledge of the STS.
Just looked at my Boeing training notes. Runaway stab was practised on 7 sorties, manual trim operation alone on 2 and no discussion or even mention of the Yo Yo procedure, never heard of it on my time on the 73.
Intersting to see my ppl now shows my former types include all 737s up upto 900, never even sat in one !
I will raise the issue with another old colleague soon but I am minded to think the STS was not fitted to our very early -300s ( the first) or like the MCAS, was not mentioned in the manuals.
Really curious about this, its not my nature to have been unknowing about a flight control system on a type which I flew and trained others.
Of course, at our age we could have an early onset !!
I can't possibly say it better than this. I'm pretty sure everyone agrees that the Turkish crew was "guilty" of multiple serious errors. However, that doesn't change the fact that the manufacturer had failed to let crews know that the left RA was feeding the autothrottle even when the right FCC was active -- a very significant hole in the cheese, all by itself. Remember, they noticed that the left RA reading was bogus, but they didn't think it mattered.
We were confronted with a blocked static port at cruising altitude (probably had something to do with excessive rain ingestion on the ground during storm conditions earlier that flight): we noticed a steadily increasing difference in altitude indications, which then exceeded the threshold for the Altitude Disagree flag to appear. Thus, we had to descend to a flight level below RVSM airspace. Starting the descent it became immediately apparent that the left-hand indicated altitude remained constant, even though the aircraft was very obviously descending. This, in turn, caused an erroneous overspeed annunciation on the left-hand PFD, plus the associated aural distraction of the clacker. But no immediate concerns with regard to flight-path control, as we already had autopilot B engaged and LVL CHG appeared to work flawlessly, with the throttle closed during descent - as one would expect. Then the surprise: no automatic throttle-up when levelling off at the new lower cruising altitude. The autothrottle speed control left the throttle closed as it was, relying on the erroneous left-hand airspeed value that was already indicating deep into the barberpole.
Boeing will probably argue that using a single source airspeed here is perfectly acceptible and completely safe. After all, my "superiour western piloting skills" obviously saved the day - we didn't stall the aircraft.
Still, it would have been nice if the system had just disengaged the autothrottle automatically with the associated warnings...
Last edited by xetroV; 3rd Feb 2020 at 13:37.