NYT: How Boeing’s Responsibility in a Deadly Crash ‘Got Buried’
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Weil 737 is easy, whenever the sh... hits the fan follow the SOPs:
A/P if engaged... disengage
A/T if engaged... disengage
That means TAKE CONTROL AND MAUALY FLY the aircraft.
Thats what we teach at our company, be able and willing to handfly the aircraft... anywhere...anytime!
That also means, the PF allways has his hands on the yoke and throttles/spedbrakes below 10.000ft
(exept CM1 between V1 and 400‘)
A/P if engaged... disengage
A/T if engaged... disengage
That means TAKE CONTROL AND MAUALY FLY the aircraft.
Thats what we teach at our company, be able and willing to handfly the aircraft... anywhere...anytime!
That also means, the PF allways has his hands on the yoke and throttles/spedbrakes below 10.000ft
(exept CM1 between V1 and 400‘)
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Weil 737 is easy, whenever the sh... hits the fan follow the SOPs:
A/P if engaged... disengage
A/T if engaged... disengage
That means TAKE CONTROL AND MAUALY FLY the aircraft.
Thats what we teach at our company, be able and willing to handfly the aircraft... anywhere...anytime!
That also means, the PF allways has his hands on the yoke and throttles/spedbrakes below 10.000ft
(exept CM1 between V1 and 400‘)
A/P if engaged... disengage
A/T if engaged... disengage
That means TAKE CONTROL AND MAUALY FLY the aircraft.
Thats what we teach at our company, be able and willing to handfly the aircraft... anywhere...anytime!
That also means, the PF allways has his hands on the yoke and throttles/spedbrakes below 10.000ft
(exept CM1 between V1 and 400‘)
Join Date: Sep 2007
Location: Europe
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Boeing will probably argue that using a single source airspeed here is perfectly acceptible and completely safe. After all, my "superiour western piloting skills" obviously saved the day - we didn't stall the aircraft. 
Still, it would have been nice if the system had just disengaged the autothrottle automatically with the associated warnings...
Still, it would have been nice if the system had just disengaged the autothrottle automatically with the associated warnings...
Weil 737 is easy, whenever the sh... hits the fan follow the SOPs:
A/P if engaged... disengage
A/T if engaged... disengage
That means TAKE CONTROL AND MAUALY FLY the aircraft.
Thats what we teach at our company, be able and willing to handfly the aircraft... anywhere...anytime!
That also means, the PF allways has his hands on the yoke and throttles/spedbrakes below 10.000ft
(exept CM1 between V1 and 400‘)
A/P if engaged... disengage
A/T if engaged... disengage
That means TAKE CONTROL AND MAUALY FLY the aircraft.
Thats what we teach at our company, be able and willing to handfly the aircraft... anywhere...anytime!
That also means, the PF allways has his hands on the yoke and throttles/spedbrakes below 10.000ft
(exept CM1 between V1 and 400‘)
Like I said earlier,
If the automatics fail or are giving confusing info., , disconnect and go back to basics and just FLY the damned thing !
My worst case scenario, like a de Crispigny, but with only two pilots:
Crossing the Atlantic in a 76 on a filthy night, 300 pax behind me sleeping soundly, 3 am, body temp. Low, engine blows taking a lot of electrics and automatics with it.
Wx at enroutes, I have never operated into before, on limits.
I was NOT then going to refresh my hand flying skills,
I was determined I would have the flying skills to make a non precision approach and hit the 1000 foot spot.
Only achievable, in my opinion as an ex RAF refresher QFI, with regular hand flying practice.
Ready for incoming !
Boeing refuses to cooperate
Re invitation for Boeing to attend Dutch parliament. # 82
NYT: How Boeing’s Responsibility in a Deadly Crash ‘Got Buried’
Latest position via NYT
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/06/b...ml?partner=msn
Both NTSB and Boeing decline to attend:
NTSB hides behind Dutch investigators and Annex 13 - https://www.tweedekamer.nl/downloads...ari%202020.doc
Boeing hides behind NTSB, Dutch investigation, Annex 13, …, the American team in 2009 had been led by the N.T.S.B. and “we will follow the lead of the N.T.S.B.”
https://www.tweedekamer.nl/downloads...ari%202020.pdf
NYT: How Boeing’s Responsibility in a Deadly Crash ‘Got Buried’
Latest position via NYT
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/06/b...ml?partner=msn
Both NTSB and Boeing decline to attend:
NTSB hides behind Dutch investigators and Annex 13 - https://www.tweedekamer.nl/downloads...ari%202020.doc
Boeing hides behind NTSB, Dutch investigation, Annex 13, …, the American team in 2009 had been led by the N.T.S.B. and “we will follow the lead of the N.T.S.B.”
https://www.tweedekamer.nl/downloads...ari%202020.pdf
Last edited by alf5071h; 8th Feb 2020 at 06:41.
The joint NTSB & Boeing approach might lower NTSBs reputation; trust in an independent investigation.
The FAA wisely keep their head down, after all they did certificate the particular radio altitude and alerting system.
The FAA wisely keep their head down, after all they did certificate the particular radio altitude and alerting system.
It just doesn't make sense that an autothrottle stubbornly continues to use erroneous sensor inputs when the autopilot still works fine on a correct set of data. And it sure is a sign of sloppy engineering that a flight control system does not degrade gracefully and unambiguously (e.g. by disengaging the autothrottle, coupled with the usual aural and visual cues) if an unacceptable discrepancy between two measurements is sensed (in our case IAS, in the Turkish case Radio Altitude and in the MAX case AoA). Well, actually that's the problem here: these systems didn't sense the discrepancy to begin with, because the system designers deliberatly chose to rely on one sensor only, even though multiple sensors were available.
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.On another thread there was recently a comment, that VW commited fraud, whereas BA "just" misjudged the human handling capabilities of a tech defect.
This thread is nicely shows that there is culture of trying to get away with the cheapest solution, trying to hide it and upon beeing caught just updating the books and check lists, at max adding some alert to an already overloaded deprecated alerting system.
No wonder they thought they could get away with it one more time.
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I may have missed this in the mass of reporting lately about things “Max, but I’ve not recently read any more about EASA’s previous statement made a couple of months ago concerning their “insistence” they will fly the Max “bare airframe” before blessing this type to return to European skies. This mention of “bare airframe” performance does (it not?) go to the basic issue of what Schizoid characteristics the ship demonstrates in certain high speed power/attitude combinations, and which, if encountered by your “average” line pilot, just might be beyond their “average” ability to safely fly out of. Here in the U.S. the discussion about MCAS always devolves into “making the airplane safe by fixing the software.” This is the direction in which I believe Boeing Corporate purposely and successfully has directed the conversation since the “real fix,” the aerodynamic “flaw” fix, is impossibly expensive. Does anyone know a more recent update from EASA?
radken, assuming that 'the bare airframe' refers to flying the Max without MCAS - predicted to be rare situations, then the piloting task is to manage the small parts of the flight envelope with reduced stability margin, and presumably all flight conditions with manual trim.
The latter, no trim, situation might not apply if the revised design and system switching enables reinstating the trim - note reported difficulties in following procedures after the last public sim evaluations.
The notion of an 'average pilot' is misleading; the acceptability for flight is a judgement based on agreed certification requirements - but words can be interpret differently. This might be at the root of the FAA's problem with other regulators - the FAA interpreted standards (failure case) in comparison with other worldly interpretations. Perhaps similar to abilities as imagined vs ability in reality - false interpretation of accidents occurring in different parts of the world equating to piloting standards, and not differentiating normal, abnormal operations, nor MCAS failure after training.
This thread is about AMS and Rad Alt failure and alerting, similar issues as with MCAS. These problem issues are in the assumptions and interpretation of the wording of regulations and piloting capability. The AMS accident indicated that the FAA / Boeing viewpoint did not have sufficient safety margin in real situations (Dekker report); thus if this design thinking was continued in the MAX, most likely, then the MAX failure case may also lack sufficient safety margin.
The latter, no trim, situation might not apply if the revised design and system switching enables reinstating the trim - note reported difficulties in following procedures after the last public sim evaluations.
The notion of an 'average pilot' is misleading; the acceptability for flight is a judgement based on agreed certification requirements - but words can be interpret differently. This might be at the root of the FAA's problem with other regulators - the FAA interpreted standards (failure case) in comparison with other worldly interpretations. Perhaps similar to abilities as imagined vs ability in reality - false interpretation of accidents occurring in different parts of the world equating to piloting standards, and not differentiating normal, abnormal operations, nor MCAS failure after training.
This thread is about AMS and Rad Alt failure and alerting, similar issues as with MCAS. These problem issues are in the assumptions and interpretation of the wording of regulations and piloting capability. The AMS accident indicated that the FAA / Boeing viewpoint did not have sufficient safety margin in real situations (Dekker report); thus if this design thinking was continued in the MAX, most likely, then the MAX failure case may also lack sufficient safety margin.
Latest report on MAX from AWST 12 Feb
https://aviationweek.com/shownews/si...ax-ungrounding
Discussion continues in 'Boeing and FAA oversight' thread.
https://aviationweek.com/shownews/si...ax-ungrounding
Discussion continues in 'Boeing and FAA oversight' thread.
