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NYT: How Boeing’s Responsibility in a Deadly Crash ‘Got Buried’

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NYT: How Boeing’s Responsibility in a Deadly Crash ‘Got Buried’

Old 30th Jan 2020, 16:25
  #141 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by retired guy View Post
Does the current training on the Airbus go into any depth or is it still largely on a need to know basis?
When the A350 was nearing EIS I read that Airbus were changing their training syllabus such that the initial training would be about gaining familiarity with flying the aircraft in direct law before later moving on to flying in normal law. I believe, but can't be certain, that the plan was that eventually the training for other aircraft would move to a similar method. No idea as to how detailed the training is into aircraft systems.
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Old 3rd Feb 2020, 08:17
  #142 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Oct 2007
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Originally Posted by RetiredBA/BY View Post
No I dont.

Perhaps I have an early onset of something but I have no memory of a STS on our very early -300s, which even had round instruments, and absolutely no memory of anything about it in the sim. Mach trim yes STS no. This worries me a little as the technicalities of my aircraft of all types were always of deep interest. No recall of ever seeing uncommanded trim movement, either.

Our - 300 “course”. Was very simple really just the FMS and autopilot operation, the rest we pretty much made up in the belief -300 airframe was pretty much as a - 200 with some tweaks.

My FO on my first -300 trip is coming on Friday, I will discuss his knowledge of the STS.

Just looked at my Boeing training notes. Runaway stab was practised on 7 sorties, manual trim operation alone on 2 and no discussion or even mention of the Yo Yo procedure, never heard of it on my time on the 73.

Intersting to see my ppl now shows my former types include all 737s up upto 900, never even sat in one !
Raised the issue of the speed trim system with my good friend, shortly after our first trip on the 300 together he gained his command. He was a very sharp guy but cannot recall a SPEED TRIM system Mach trim yes, but STS No, but jt was many years ago !

I will raise the issue with another old colleague soon but I am minded to think the STS was not fitted to our very early -300s ( the first) or like the MCAS, was not mentioned in the manuals.

Really curious about this, its not my nature to have been unknowing about a flight control system on a type which I flew and trained others.

Of course, at our age we could have an early onset !!
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Old 3rd Feb 2020, 13:26
  #143 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by OldnGrounded View Post
I can't possibly say it better than this. I'm pretty sure everyone agrees that the Turkish crew was "guilty" of multiple serious errors. However, that doesn't change the fact that the manufacturer had failed to let crews know that the left RA was feeding the autothrottle even when the right FCC was active -- a very significant hole in the cheese, all by itself. Remember, they noticed that the left RA reading was bogus, but they didn't think it mattered.
Talking about cheese: did you know that the NG's autothrottle also uses the left airspeed / Mach reference, even when the right FCC is active? I discovered that by accident during an actual unreliable airspeed event (I'm actually not sure if this information was mentioned somewhere in the FCOM at that time - if it had, the "discovered" in this sentence should be replaced by "re-discovered", but the end result was the same regardless).

We were confronted with a blocked static port at cruising altitude (probably had something to do with excessive rain ingestion on the ground during storm conditions earlier that flight): we noticed a steadily increasing difference in altitude indications, which then exceeded the threshold for the Altitude Disagree flag to appear. Thus, we had to descend to a flight level below RVSM airspace. Starting the descent it became immediately apparent that the left-hand indicated altitude remained constant, even though the aircraft was very obviously descending. This, in turn, caused an erroneous overspeed annunciation on the left-hand PFD, plus the associated aural distraction of the clacker. But no immediate concerns with regard to flight-path control, as we already had autopilot B engaged and LVL CHG appeared to work flawlessly, with the throttle closed during descent - as one would expect. Then the surprise: no automatic throttle-up when levelling off at the new lower cruising altitude. The autothrottle speed control left the throttle closed as it was, relying on the erroneous left-hand airspeed value that was already indicating deep into the barberpole.

Boeing will probably argue that using a single source airspeed here is perfectly acceptible and completely safe. After all, my "superiour western piloting skills" obviously saved the day - we didn't stall the aircraft.

Still, it would have been nice if the system had just disengaged the autothrottle automatically with the associated warnings...

Last edited by xetroV; 3rd Feb 2020 at 13:37.
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Old 4th Feb 2020, 08:14
  #144 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Sep 2007
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Weil 737 is easy, whenever the sh... hits the fan follow the SOPs:

A/P if engaged... disengage
A/T if engaged... disengage

That means TAKE CONTROL AND MAUALY FLY the aircraft.

Thats what we teach at our company, be able and willing to handfly the aircraft... anywhere​​​​...anytime!

That also means, the PF allways has his hands on the yoke and throttles/spedbrakes below 10.000ft
(exept CM1 between V1 and 400‘)
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Old 4th Feb 2020, 08:17
  #145 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by KRH270/12 View Post
Weil 737 is easy, whenever the sh... hits the fan follow the SOPs:

A/P if engaged... disengage
A/T if engaged... disengage

That means TAKE CONTROL AND MAUALY FLY the aircraft.

Thats what we teach at our company, be able and willing to handfly the aircraft... anywhere​​​​...anytime!

That also means, the PF allways has his hands on the yoke and throttles/spedbrakes below 10.000ft
(exept CM1 between V1 and 400‘)
There‘s an original idea. Now where have I read that before?
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Old 4th Feb 2020, 08:22
  #146 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Twitter View Post
There‘s an original idea. Now where have I read that before?
Well, its and old concept, long forgotten by many, but its never outdated...

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Old 5th Feb 2020, 05:50
  #147 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by xetroV View Post
Boeing will probably argue that using a single source airspeed here is perfectly acceptible and completely safe. After all, my "superiour western piloting skills" obviously saved the day - we didn't stall the aircraft.

Still, it would have been nice if the system had just disengaged the autothrottle automatically with the associated warnings...
I would say that you were luckily not distracted by ATC and landing checklists. And lucky having sufficient altitude to correct the automation induced problem.
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Old 5th Feb 2020, 18:38
  #148 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by KRH270/12 View Post
Weil 737 is easy, whenever the sh... hits the fan follow the SOPs:

A/P if engaged... disengage
A/T if engaged... disengage

That means TAKE CONTROL AND MAUALY FLY the aircraft.

Thats what we teach at our company, be able and willing to handfly the aircraft... anywhere​​​​...anytime!

That also means, the PF allways has his hands on the yoke and throttles/spedbrakes below 10.000ft
(exept CM1 between V1 and 400‘)

Like I said earlier,

If the automatics fail or are giving confusing info., , disconnect and go back to basics and just FLY the damned thing !

My worst case scenario, like a de Crispigny, but with only two pilots:

Crossing the Atlantic in a 76 on a filthy night, 300 pax behind me sleeping soundly, 3 am, body temp. Low, engine blows taking a lot of electrics and automatics with it.

Wx at enroutes, I have never operated into before, on limits.

I was NOT then going to refresh my hand flying skills,

I was determined I would have the flying skills to make a non precision approach and hit the 1000 foot spot.

Only achievable, in my opinion as an ex RAF refresher QFI, with regular hand flying practice.

Ready for incoming !
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Old 5th Feb 2020, 23:45
  #149 (permalink)  
 
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RetiredBA/BY, this any help re STS?

https://aviation.stackexchange.com/q...the-boeing-737
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Old 7th Feb 2020, 21:54
  #150 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2003
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Boeing refuses to cooperate

Re invitation for Boeing to attend Dutch parliament. # 82
NYT: How Boeing’s Responsibility in a Deadly Crash ‘Got Buried’

Latest position via NYT
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/06/b...ml?partner=msn

Both NTSB and Boeing decline to attend:
NTSB hides behind Dutch investigators and Annex 13 - https://www.tweedekamer.nl/downloads...ari%202020.doc

Boeing hides behind NTSB, Dutch investigation, Annex 13, …, the American team in 2009 had been led by the N.T.S.B. and “we will follow the lead of the N.T.S.B.”
https://www.tweedekamer.nl/downloads...ari%202020.pdf


Last edited by alf5071h; 8th Feb 2020 at 06:41.
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Old 8th Feb 2020, 06:49
  #151 (permalink)  
 
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The joint NTSB & Boeing approach might lower NTSBs reputation; trust in an independent investigation.

The FAA wisely keep their head down, after all they did certificate the particular radio altitude and alerting system.
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Old 9th Feb 2020, 09:31
  #152 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by MathFox View Post
I would say that you were luckily not distracted by ATC and landing checklists. And lucky having sufficient altitude to correct the automation induced problem.
I fully agree - that was more or less the gist of my slightly sarcastic comment there. And even without those distractions my response was reactive, rather than pro-active, as I was clearly surprised by the system behaviour.

It just doesn't make sense that an autothrottle stubbornly continues to use erroneous sensor inputs when the autopilot still works fine on a correct set of data. And it sure is a sign of sloppy engineering that a flight control system does not degrade gracefully and unambiguously (e.g. by disengaging the autothrottle, coupled with the usual aural and visual cues) if an unacceptable discrepancy between two measurements is sensed (in our case IAS, in the Turkish case Radio Altitude and in the MAX case AoA). Well, actually that's the problem here: these systems didn't sense the discrepancy to begin with, because the system designers deliberatly chose to rely on one sensor only, even though multiple sensors were available.
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Old 9th Feb 2020, 11:35
  #153 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by xetroV View Post
Well, actually that's the problem here: these systems didn't sense the discrepancy to begin with, because the system designers deliberatly chose to rely on one sensor only, even though multiple sensors were available.
See, no redundancy, no problem .
On another thread there was recently a comment, that VW commited fraud, whereas BA "just" misjudged the human handling capabilities of a tech defect.
This thread is nicely shows that there is culture of trying to get away with the cheapest solution, trying to hide it and upon beeing caught just updating the books and check lists, at max adding some alert to an already overloaded deprecated alerting system.
No wonder they thought they could get away with it one more time.
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Old 12th Feb 2020, 06:49
  #154 (permalink)  
 
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I may have missed this in the mass of reporting lately about things “Max, but I’ve not recently read any more about EASA’s previous statement made a couple of months ago concerning their “insistence” they will fly the Max “bare airframe” before blessing this type to return to European skies. This mention of “bare airframe” performance does (it not?) go to the basic issue of what Schizoid characteristics the ship demonstrates in certain high speed power/attitude combinations, and which, if encountered by your “average” line pilot, just might be beyond their “average” ability to safely fly out of. Here in the U.S. the discussion about MCAS always devolves into “making the airplane safe by fixing the software.” This is the direction in which I believe Boeing Corporate purposely and successfully has directed the conversation since the “real fix,” the aerodynamic “flaw” fix, is impossibly expensive. Does anyone know a more recent update from EASA?
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Old 12th Feb 2020, 08:04
  #155 (permalink)  
 
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radken, assuming that 'the bare airframe' refers to flying the Max without MCAS - predicted to be rare situations, then the piloting task is to manage the small parts of the flight envelope with reduced stability margin, and presumably all flight conditions with manual trim.
The latter, no trim, situation might not apply if the revised design and system switching enables reinstating the trim - note reported difficulties in following procedures after the last public sim evaluations.

The notion of an 'average pilot' is misleading; the acceptability for flight is a judgement based on agreed certification requirements - but words can be interpret differently. This might be at the root of the FAA's problem with other regulators - the FAA interpreted standards (failure case) in comparison with other worldly interpretations. Perhaps similar to abilities as imagined vs ability in reality - false interpretation of accidents occurring in different parts of the world equating to piloting standards, and not differentiating normal, abnormal operations, nor MCAS failure after training.

This thread is about AMS and Rad Alt failure and alerting, similar issues as with MCAS. These problem issues are in the assumptions and interpretation of the wording of regulations and piloting capability. The AMS accident indicated that the FAA / Boeing viewpoint did not have sufficient safety margin in real situations (Dekker report); thus if this design thinking was continued in the MAX, most likely, then the MAX failure case may also lack sufficient safety margin.
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Old 12th Feb 2020, 11:37
  #156 (permalink)  
 
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Interesting debate here on PPRuNe, truly getting to the bottom of route cause of these accidents. There is a need for aircraft not to fail in a critical way unnoticed. Multiple sensors should be used for failures that could result in critical consequences to enable clear system warnings to crew, and for the system to monitor itself and give proper warning to crew as it deactivates. Whether that be radio altitude, airspeed, altitude, angle of attack, trim, autopilot, the list goes on. This all just points to the requirements for new aircraft to have enhanced EICAS, enhanced system warnings and checklists. I dare say, we would not be here discussing this if the NG/Max was not approved based on historic approval rules. We will not get away from such issues until the modern systems are introduced. You can mitigate these failures with properly trained crew, well practised manual skills, but you will never totally escape such consequences as designed into these inadequate designs. Lowest cost, clearly isn't sufficient and ends up costing dearly in the end. In this case both lives and billions of dollars. Do you think we will ever truly learn to stop cutting corners and costs?
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Old 12th Feb 2020, 12:32
  #157 (permalink)  
 
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Latest report on MAX from AWST 12 Feb
https://aviationweek.com/shownews/si...ax-ungrounding

Discussion continues in 'Boeing and FAA oversight' thread.

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