Nordwind severe hard landing Antalya
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Slight thread drift, but..... I would be very surprised if that is a write off.
Here a few other examples of aircraft that have received extensive repairs to return them to service. Only coincidence that these two aircraft belong to the same airline:
A380:
https://australianaviation.com.au/20...y-bird-walton/
B744:
https://www.slideshare.net/Art37/qantas-repair
Here a few other examples of aircraft that have received extensive repairs to return them to service. Only coincidence that these two aircraft belong to the same airline:
A380:
https://australianaviation.com.au/20...y-bird-walton/
B744:
https://www.slideshare.net/Art37/qantas-repair
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Here a few other examples of aircraft that have received extensive repairs to return them to service. Only coincidence that these two aircraft belong to the same airline:
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Inquiry alleges tampering of hard-landing A321 cockpit recorder
Here it is the final report in english.
The report concludes the probable causes of the accident were:
The accident of the Airbus A321-231 VQ-BRS occurred in the morning twilight under visual meteorologic conditions as result of erroneous actions by the pilot in command pushing the sidestick fully forward while correcting deviations of the flight path during "shallow flare", which resulted in the aircraft intensively rotating into a dive and a hard landing on the nose gear.
Contributing factors were:
- the crews untimely execution of the go around/balked landing when the airspeed dropped significantly below the target values and the criteria for stabilized approach were no longer fullfilled.
- absence of skills of the flight crew to flare in accordance with the procedures stipulated in the manual.
https://mak-iac.org/upload/iblock/cd...ort_vq-brs.pdf
The report concludes the probable causes of the accident were:
The accident of the Airbus A321-231 VQ-BRS occurred in the morning twilight under visual meteorologic conditions as result of erroneous actions by the pilot in command pushing the sidestick fully forward while correcting deviations of the flight path during "shallow flare", which resulted in the aircraft intensively rotating into a dive and a hard landing on the nose gear.
Contributing factors were:
- the crews untimely execution of the go around/balked landing when the airspeed dropped significantly below the target values and the criteria for stabilized approach were no longer fullfilled.
- absence of skills of the flight crew to flare in accordance with the procedures stipulated in the manual.
https://mak-iac.org/upload/iblock/cd...ort_vq-brs.pdf
I can only conclude you didn't read the report's conclusions...d'uh oh indeed.
The airline only notified the Russian Interstate Aviation Committee on January 14, four days after the accident. Investigators believes that after the accident both the voice recorder (CVR) as well as the flight data recorder (FDR) were removed by RMS Technic in Antalya. The voice recorder was fitted to a second Airbus A321 (VP-BHN) flying the return service to Moscow. After arrival in Moscow, it was removed by another maintenance firm and transported back to RMS Technic in Antalya where the recorder was refitted to the original damaged A321, before the inquiry team arrived.
The investigation is ongoing.
Probable Cause:
Conclusion
The accident involving the AIRBUS A321-231 with registration VQ-BRS occurred in the early twilight hours, under visual meteorological conditions, as a result of erroneous actions by the Captain involving full backward movement of the control stick while attempting to correct deviations during the alignment phase (shallow flare), which involved establishing the aircraft's pitch attitude for landing at a significant altitude without reducing the vertical descent rate. This led to an intensive nose-up rotation, followed by a hard landing with the nose landing gear ahead of the main landing gear.
The most probable contributing factors are as follows:
- Delayed execution of the flight crew's procedure for going around (or a discontinued landing), as specified in the operational documentation (QRH, FCOM, FCTM), during instrument speed reduction significantly below the specified values and non-compliance of the current flight parameters with the stabilized approach criteria at altitudes lower than the stabilization height (1000 ft), including right before the alignment phase.
- The absence of stable skills in the Commander for executing the alignment procedure as outlined in the operational documentation, as well as the failure of the airline's instructor staff, including during the introduction program, to identify this factor.
- Insufficient theoretical knowledge of the Commander about the peculiarities of performing the approach and landing with a reduced level of automation (autopilot and autothrust disengaged), using the specified "MANAGED" speed mode and "GROUND SPEED MINI" function.
- Overestimation by the Commander of their professional skills and unwarranted reduction of the level of automation during the approach and landing phase under conditions of rapidly changing headwind component values with altitude.
- Lack of specific instructions in the airline's operational documentation regarding the possibility and conditions of reducing the level of automation for training of flight crew members undergoing the introduction program (approaches without AP and A/THR).
- Increased psychoemotional tension for the Commander during the final phase of the flight and, consequently, loss of situational awareness, resulting in dominance of glide path control without comprehensive evaluation of all flight parameters, primarily instrument speed.
- Imperfections in the preparation system related to human factors and crew resource management (CRM), as the Commander was unable to adequately assess the impact of automation disengagement on cognitive functions (perception, attention, memory, thinking), manage their emotions, and establish optimal crew interaction.
- Lack of a positive flight safety culture in the airline and, as a result, the low personal flight safety culture of the Commander, evident in:
* Creating an overly relaxed (non-professional) atmosphere during the flight and violating the principle of a sterile cockpit and cockpit and cabin crew interaction when performing the approach and landing.
* Prioritizing landing on the first attempt (at the expense of safe flight completion) and, consequently, failing to execute a timely go-around.
- Individual psychological characteristics of the pilots (for the Commander - excessive and unstable self-assessment, high need for dominance and recognition; for the First Officer - excitable and unstable response type with high activity and ambition, a strong need for dominance and self-assertion) that, in a stressful situation without adequate CRM, could hinder proper crew interaction.
The investigation revealed systemic shortcomings in identifying danger factors and controlling risk level, as well as the ineffectiveness of the flight safety management system within the airline, and the absence of control over the preparedness level of crew members from the management of the airline.
The investigation is ongoing.
Probable Cause:
Conclusion
The accident involving the AIRBUS A321-231 with registration VQ-BRS occurred in the early twilight hours, under visual meteorological conditions, as a result of erroneous actions by the Captain involving full backward movement of the control stick while attempting to correct deviations during the alignment phase (shallow flare), which involved establishing the aircraft's pitch attitude for landing at a significant altitude without reducing the vertical descent rate. This led to an intensive nose-up rotation, followed by a hard landing with the nose landing gear ahead of the main landing gear.
The most probable contributing factors are as follows:
- Delayed execution of the flight crew's procedure for going around (or a discontinued landing), as specified in the operational documentation (QRH, FCOM, FCTM), during instrument speed reduction significantly below the specified values and non-compliance of the current flight parameters with the stabilized approach criteria at altitudes lower than the stabilization height (1000 ft), including right before the alignment phase.
- The absence of stable skills in the Commander for executing the alignment procedure as outlined in the operational documentation, as well as the failure of the airline's instructor staff, including during the introduction program, to identify this factor.
- Insufficient theoretical knowledge of the Commander about the peculiarities of performing the approach and landing with a reduced level of automation (autopilot and autothrust disengaged), using the specified "MANAGED" speed mode and "GROUND SPEED MINI" function.
- Overestimation by the Commander of their professional skills and unwarranted reduction of the level of automation during the approach and landing phase under conditions of rapidly changing headwind component values with altitude.
- Lack of specific instructions in the airline's operational documentation regarding the possibility and conditions of reducing the level of automation for training of flight crew members undergoing the introduction program (approaches without AP and A/THR).
- Increased psychoemotional tension for the Commander during the final phase of the flight and, consequently, loss of situational awareness, resulting in dominance of glide path control without comprehensive evaluation of all flight parameters, primarily instrument speed.
- Imperfections in the preparation system related to human factors and crew resource management (CRM), as the Commander was unable to adequately assess the impact of automation disengagement on cognitive functions (perception, attention, memory, thinking), manage their emotions, and establish optimal crew interaction.
- Lack of a positive flight safety culture in the airline and, as a result, the low personal flight safety culture of the Commander, evident in:
* Creating an overly relaxed (non-professional) atmosphere during the flight and violating the principle of a sterile cockpit and cockpit and cabin crew interaction when performing the approach and landing.
* Prioritizing landing on the first attempt (at the expense of safe flight completion) and, consequently, failing to execute a timely go-around.
- Individual psychological characteristics of the pilots (for the Commander - excessive and unstable self-assessment, high need for dominance and recognition; for the First Officer - excitable and unstable response type with high activity and ambition, a strong need for dominance and self-assertion) that, in a stressful situation without adequate CRM, could hinder proper crew interaction.
The investigation revealed systemic shortcomings in identifying danger factors and controlling risk level, as well as the ineffectiveness of the flight safety management system within the airline, and the absence of control over the preparedness level of crew members from the management of the airline.
I wonder if this is the result of landing with too much thrust. It seems to be quite prevalent, and I wonder if this is a poor habit carried over from flying turbo props.
Some pilots seem to forget that in a jet, idle is still producing a significant amount of thrust. In my jet, enough to overcome rolling friction almost at max TO weight. And that is ground idle, never mind the higher approach idle spool speed.
Some tell-tale signs a pilot is landing with excessive thrust are autospoilers not deploying and landing flat or on the nose wheel. If the thrust levers are too far forward then systems for stopping are past the threshold for deployment.
Also, any excess airspeed carried for wind should be bled off before touchdown to prevent a situation where you are forcing the plane to stop flying too early.
Would be interesting to see a video of the landing. I would not be surprised to see a porpoise situation from forcing the jet on too early which developed into a massive bounce with the ensuing GA.
Being an empty repo, maybe there was even crew on the jump seat videoing the event.
Some pilots seem to forget that in a jet, idle is still producing a significant amount of thrust. In my jet, enough to overcome rolling friction almost at max TO weight. And that is ground idle, never mind the higher approach idle spool speed.
Some tell-tale signs a pilot is landing with excessive thrust are autospoilers not deploying and landing flat or on the nose wheel. If the thrust levers are too far forward then systems for stopping are past the threshold for deployment.
Also, any excess airspeed carried for wind should be bled off before touchdown to prevent a situation where you are forcing the plane to stop flying too early.
Would be interesting to see a video of the landing. I would not be surprised to see a porpoise situation from forcing the jet on too early which developed into a massive bounce with the ensuing GA.
Being an empty repo, maybe there was even crew on the jump seat videoing the event.
Agree, pending a last moment sink / loss of airspeed touchdown should always be made with thrust at idle
Do not agree with bleeding off extra airspeed for wind correction before touchdown, that’s what it’s there for
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Absolutely - I remember Boeing actually discussing this in the FCTM, they mention that some of the steady wind additive “may” be bled off in the flare but the gust correction is meant to remain. I love the ‘bus but my world I miss Boeing’s manuals with discussion of such things.
This is a classic unstable approach. They started high and fast decelerating all the way down and failed to add power as the aircraft got slow in the flare.
During the intercept the captain disconnected autopilot and autothrust in sequence. The aircraft established on the localizer at 1500 feet and 163 KIAS, 5.4nm before the runway still at 1500 feet the gear and full flaps were configured for landing. 3nm before the runway the aircraft descended through 1035 feet AGL at 145 KIAS, the approach was considered fully stabilized. At 100 feet AGL the speed began to decrease below Vapp while the aircraft remained slightly above the glide path. At 70 feet AGL the IAS reduced to 115 knots at 700 fpm rate of descent, the aircraft crossed the runway threshold at 30 feet AGL and 113 KIAS, descending through 20 feet AGL the pitch had increased to 5.5 degrees nose up at 109 KIAS with the speed trending to further reduction, when the captain provided large nose down inputs resulting in the nose lowering at up to 9 degrees/second. Almost simultanerously the thrust levers were pushed into the TOGA position. 2 seconds later the aircraft touched down with the nose gear first resulting in a vertical acceleration of +2.64G
During the intercept the captain disconnected autopilot and autothrust in sequence. The aircraft established on the localizer at 1500 feet and 163 KIAS, 5.4nm before the runway still at 1500 feet the gear and full flaps were configured for landing. 3nm before the runway the aircraft descended through 1035 feet AGL at 145 KIAS, the approach was considered fully stabilized. At 100 feet AGL the speed began to decrease below Vapp while the aircraft remained slightly above the glide path. At 70 feet AGL the IAS reduced to 115 knots at 700 fpm rate of descent, the aircraft crossed the runway threshold at 30 feet AGL and 113 KIAS, descending through 20 feet AGL the pitch had increased to 5.5 degrees nose up at 109 KIAS with the speed trending to further reduction, when the captain provided large nose down inputs resulting in the nose lowering at up to 9 degrees/second. Almost simultanerously the thrust levers were pushed into the TOGA position. 2 seconds later the aircraft touched down with the nose gear first resulting in a vertical acceleration of +2.64G
Here it is the final report in english.
The report concludes the probable causes of the accident were:
The accident of the Airbus A321-231 VQ-BRS occurred in the morning twilight under visual meteorologic conditions as result of erroneous actions by the pilot in command pushing the sidestick fully forward while correcting deviations of the flight path during "shallow flare", which resulted in the aircraft intensively rotating into a dive and a hard landing on the nose gear.
Contributing factors were:
- the crews untimely execution of the go around/balked landing when the airspeed dropped significantly below the target values and the criteria for stabilized approach were no longer fullfilled.
- absence of skills of the flight crew to flare in accordance with the procedures stipulated in the manual.
https://mak-iac.org/upload/iblock/cd...ort_vq-brs.pdf
The report concludes the probable causes of the accident were:
The accident of the Airbus A321-231 VQ-BRS occurred in the morning twilight under visual meteorologic conditions as result of erroneous actions by the pilot in command pushing the sidestick fully forward while correcting deviations of the flight path during "shallow flare", which resulted in the aircraft intensively rotating into a dive and a hard landing on the nose gear.
Contributing factors were:
- the crews untimely execution of the go around/balked landing when the airspeed dropped significantly below the target values and the criteria for stabilized approach were no longer fullfilled.
- absence of skills of the flight crew to flare in accordance with the procedures stipulated in the manual.
https://mak-iac.org/upload/iblock/cd...ort_vq-brs.pdf
...the PIC served in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation from 1999 to 2009. He was flying IL-76 aircraft as a co-pilot. In 2009, he was dismissed to the reserve. Total flight experience in military service was 513 FH
So, he was flying about one hour per week on average (50hours/year) during his 10 years in armed forces. Maybe a bit more, as first year or two he was probably not flying at all. That is really low number. Ex-military pilots, any comment?
This was probably a positioning flight with crew only, and I suspect that what happened here was a Captain showing off to the crew who were sitting in the cockpit for the landing, or being goaded into a fully manual approach, but screwing it up through lack of practice or ability, and/or forgetting that he had taken out the auto-thrust as well as the auto-pilot.
The aircraft got slower and slower, and the wings lost lift, so he gradually raised the nose to maintain the RoD.
At a very late stage he at last checked the IAS and realised an imminent stall, or there was an actual stall, so he pushed the nose down and selected TOGA thrust, with predictable results.
The report's conclusions says that the Airbus safety parameters such as Ground speed mini were not followed, and I suspect that this Captain was one of (too) many pilots who don't understand Airbus ground speed mini. He probably disregarded the IAS increases that it would have been commanding with the moderate strength and gusty wind on the approach, and did not increase thrust to follow the moving IAS bug, leaving him with absolutely no speed safety margin.
And then the company tried to cover up the crew's actions by transferring the CVR to another A321 to record a normal flight, before putting it back in the accident aircraft !!!!!!!!
It beggars belief.
.
The aircraft got slower and slower, and the wings lost lift, so he gradually raised the nose to maintain the RoD.
At a very late stage he at last checked the IAS and realised an imminent stall, or there was an actual stall, so he pushed the nose down and selected TOGA thrust, with predictable results.
The report's conclusions says that the Airbus safety parameters such as Ground speed mini were not followed, and I suspect that this Captain was one of (too) many pilots who don't understand Airbus ground speed mini. He probably disregarded the IAS increases that it would have been commanding with the moderate strength and gusty wind on the approach, and did not increase thrust to follow the moving IAS bug, leaving him with absolutely no speed safety margin.
And then the company tried to cover up the crew's actions by transferring the CVR to another A321 to record a normal flight, before putting it back in the accident aircraft !!!!!!!!
It beggars belief.
.
Last edited by Uplinker; 12th Mar 2024 at 11:01. Reason: repeated word
