Boeing, and FAA oversight

[568]

Originally Posted by OldnGrounded

Oh, yeah, you're right about staying on-topic. I misunderstood your intent.

OAG,

No problem young Sir and I do enjoy your responses to posts.

[568]

Originally Posted by Twitter

Well, they’ll have plenty of time to change the wiring, while they dismantle the tanks and remove the FOD. In fact they have had plenty of time to put in some alternatives to MCAS, which were derided when proposed on pprune a year back - due to the unacceptable delay incurred...

Maybe the OEM would call a newly modded MAX "Maximus quaestio"!

[BDAttitude]

https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...by-mid-summer/
More software glitches due to FCC architecture change.
Reading the tea leaves with regard to wiring bundles.
Preparing for further delay.

[OldnGrounded]

Originally Posted by BDAttitude

https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...by-mid-summer/
More software glitches due to FCC architecture change.
Reading the tea leaves with regard to wiring bundles.
Preparing for further delay.

Remember when they were confidently predicting return to service in December? We thought they meant December 2019.

[Spooky 2]

Originally Posted by DieselOx

So, in an effort to not require sim training, they are talking about setting up ideal conditions for elevator jammed demo. Then, they are content to send pilots out on the MAX, knowing full well that if the holes in the cheese line up, and the not ideal conditions occur, the plane will likely crash.

Unbelievable.

I believe sim training is part of the corrective action needed to return the MAX to service.

[Dave Therhino]

Originally Posted by BDAttitude

https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...by-mid-summer/
More software glitches due to FCC architecture change.
Reading the tea leaves with regard to wiring bundles.
Preparing for further delay.

I suspect you are correct. Given the fact that the trim command wire separation issue is a potentially catastrophic single failure issue, given the FAA's past AD's on hot shorts within wire bundles indicate the FAA often doesn't accept arguments that such hot shorts are "extremely improbable," and finally because it's the stab trim system involved, I suspect the FAA will require not only the undelivered airplanes to be changed, but also the delivered airplanes. How much delay it causes would likely be driven by how long Boeing argues about fixing it.

[DieselOx]

Originally Posted by Spooky 2

I believe sim training is part of the corrective action needed to return the MAX to service.

Context. My comment was in relation to the released emails/ texts late last year, and about the conversations therein, years before. At the time of those conversations, they were still in the no sim required mode.

Interesting that B only agreed/suggested sim training just prior to or as those messages were released. Sounds like an admission that they should have from the get go.

[OldnGrounded]

Originally Posted by DieselOx

Interesting that B only agreed/suggested sim training just prior to or as those messages were released. Sounds like an admission that they should have from the get go.

Yes, and think how much cheaper it would have been to require/provide the training and absorb the $1 million per aircraft penalty in the SWA contract, compared to what's been happening for the past year -- and isn't over yet.

[Twitter]

Originally Posted by OldnGrounded

Yes, and think how much cheaper it would have been to require/provide the training and absorb the $1 million per aircraft penalty in the SWA contract, compared to what's been happening for the past year -- and isn't over yet.

On the other hand, in the light of what Boeing apparently had not considered in terms of single AoA input failure, I doubt whether the training at that time would have covered the accident scenario adequately. It for sure will now.

[OldnGrounded]

Originally Posted by Twitter

On the other hand, in the light of what Boeing apparently had not considered in terms of single AoA input failure, I doubt whether the training at that time would have covered the accident scenario adequately. It for sure will now.

I agree that training in the context of MCAS 1.0 would likely have been inadequate -- because the presence of that MCAS was a wholly-unacceptable risk all by itself. Still, training would have made it more likely that the issues with the system would be discovered before a couple of airplanes full of humans flew themselves into holes in the ground.

[USMCProbe]

The FAA lacks the depth of knowledge and experience to properly oversee Boeing's aircraft development, or the operations of a very complex major airline. They designate "Designees" among management at Boeing, airlines, and other suppliers etc to be their expert in the field. While this seems a bit in-bred (and it is), this basic relationship has taken a system with many fatal accidents a year, to zero fatal accidents most years, despite flying 10-100 times more flights per year. For the most part, it has functioned spectacularly well. We can thank our current level of aviation safety to this system.

But sometimes it appears, the system goes off the rails. Boeing has made some catastrophic engineering and production decisions over the last 10-15 years. Their FAA Designees have, at a minimum, lacked sufficient oversight and reporting to the FAA. More than likely, they have allowed the "in-breeding" to corrupt their decision making, and perhaps motivations.

The FAA, at the upper levels, have allowed this to pass. That might be a generous characterization, and the reality might be much worse. I really don't see anything going on in the public domain that makes me think they are fixing the system.

I think at this point they need outside assistance to investigate their institutional disfunction. They have been living in it for so long, it is their "normal".

I have a reasonable amount of time in the 737 classic and NG, and got my hours' worth of CBT time for the MAX, but never flew it. I thought the MAX was an abortion before I ever heard of MCAS, or knew of Boeings' problems with it.

I always wondered if they subjected the MAX to a full certification, circa 2017, if it would pass. Lots of things have changed in 50 years, including the physical ability, experience, and training of the pilots qualified to fly it.

[DaveReidUK]

Originally Posted by USMCProbe

I always wondered if they subjected the MAX to a full certification, circa 2017, if it would pass.

That was never an option.

[BDAttitude]

FAA playing tough with regard to the engine cowling issue (polished down conductive layer during rework, that is). I had already forgotten about that one.
https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...-all-737-maxs/

So we're having
- Elevator control forces
- Unable to recover from gross mistrim
- training requirements
- wire separation
- engine cowling
- FOD
- FCC Power on self test
- FCC elevator split indication
- MCAS MEL status

What did I forget?

[Twitter]

Originally Posted by BDAttitude

FAA playing tough with regard to the engine cowling issue (polished down conductive layer during rework, that is). I had already forgotten about that one.
https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...-all-737-maxs/

So we're having
- Elevator control forces
- Unable to recover from gross mistrim
- training requirements
- wire separation
- engine cowling
- FOD
- FCC Power on self test
- FCC elevator split indication
- MCAS MEL status

What did I forget?

Pickle forkners

[Pilot DAR]

Transport Canada has said they are going to be much more involved;

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/boe...ests-1.5476130

Though national authorities generally credit each other's certification work in large part, Transport Canada is exercising the right to increase their involvement in this case. When Transport Canada involves itself in its own delegate's work, it's referred to as surveillance, which is part of the TC mandate for their service to the public. When they involve themselves in another authority's certification program, it's not surveillance, is an indication in a gap in confidence in that authority's certification process.

During this testing, the FAA and Boeing will know to present their very best certification process - which we would hope that the FAA and Boeing are doing all the time!

It would be interesting in this context to hear how EASA will involve itself in return to service certification testing.....

[OldnGrounded]

Originally Posted by Pilot DAR

When they involve themselves in another authority's certification program, it's not surveillance, is an indication in a gap in confidence in that authority's certification process.

Is that gap in confidence exhibited in your informal contacts, DAR?

[Takwis]

Originally Posted by USMCProbe

The FAA lacks the depth of knowledge and experience to properly oversee Boeing's aircraft development...

So does Boeing, apparently.

I thought the MAX was an abortion before I ever heard of MCAS, or knew of Boeings' problems with it.

So did I. The name was a dead giveaway.

So we're having
- Elevator control forces
- Unable to recover from gross mistrim
- training requirements
- wire separation
- engine cowling (fit/conductive layer)
- FOD
- FCC Power on self test
- FCC elevator split indication
- MCAS MEL status

-Pickle Forkners

-Rudder cable vulnerability.
-Cowling disintegration from a thrown blade.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Inasmuch as there can be nothing "perfect" about the number three hundred forty-six (346) - that is, total fatalities - what replaces "perfect storm"? (Please remember, this is a "family" news....oh nvm).

I was going to hit the Amen button on USMCProbe's post but it seems to have automated away.

[OldnGrounded]

From the proposed AD on the fairing panels published yesterday:

The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 737-8 and 737-9 airplanes. This proposed AD was prompted by a report that certain exterior fairing panels on the top of the engine nacelle and strut (the thumbnail fairing and mid strut fairing panels) may not have the quality of electrical bonding necessary to ensure adequate shielding of the underlying wiring from the electromagnetic effects of lightning strikes or high intensity radiated fields (HIRF), which could potentially lead to a dual engine power loss event from a critical lightning or HIRF exposure event.

This proposed AD would require a detailed inspection of the thumbnail fairing panels and mid strut fairing panels for excessive rework of the metallic (aluminum foil) inner surface layer, replacement of any excessively reworked panels, and modification of the thumbnail fairing assembly to ensure adequate bonding. The FAA is proposing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

Full NPRM Here

[ST Dog]

Originally Posted by USMCProbe

I always wondered if they subjected the MAX to a full certification, circa 2017, if it would pass. Lots of things have changed in 50 years, including the physical ability, experience, and training of the pilots qualified to fly it.

No, but then the NG wouldn't have passed full cert when it was introduced never mind today.