Boeing, and FAA oversight
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So only Mr. Grizzle has former DOT ties, and none are political appointees.
Also, effectively, they are all political appointees, although, if you re-read what I wrote, you'll see that I speculated that the political ideology of high-level political appointees in the DOT (e.g., Elaine Chao, Secretary of Transportation and wife of Mitch McConnell) drove the formation and mission of the committee. It's really quite likely; these are people who believe government regulation is to be avoided whenever possible and minimized when it can't be avoided.
If you prefer reading the original report to mass media summaries, it can be found here. https://www.transportation.gov/brief...ons-aircraft-0
Last edited by OldnGrounded; 17th Jan 2020 at 01:45.
The report said that aviation safety experts it interviewed agreed that the FAA's decision to certify the Max as an update to previous generation 737s rather than a new type of aircraft didn't affect the Max's safety
"Each said a new TC (aircraft type certificate) would not have produced more rigorous scrutiny of the 737 Max 8 and would not have produced a safer airplane," the report said.
Is not it a new requirement for better not confusing cockpit warnings that would have been required on new Aircraft Type Certificates?
Is it not true that changes in compliance standards (the grandfathering was used for) are higher standards more safety intended + safer aircraft or were they introduced for fun?
"Each said a new TC (aircraft type certificate) would not have produced more rigorous scrutiny of the 737 Max 8 and would not have produced a safer airplane," the report said.
Is not it a new requirement for better not confusing cockpit warnings that would have been required on new Aircraft Type Certificates?
Is it not true that changes in compliance standards (the grandfathering was used for) are higher standards more safety intended + safer aircraft or were they introduced for fun?
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Is it not true that changes in compliance standards (the grandfathering was used for) are higher standards more safety intended + safer aircraft or were they introduced for fun?
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A lot of talk about the global aviation community in this report. Hmm. More “blame the pilots” as far as I can read.
We western pilots have been known to wreck perfectly good airplanes as well.
<—— that’s how I feel after reading that report.
We western pilots have been known to wreck perfectly good airplanes as well.
<—— that’s how I feel after reading that report.
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retired guy, thanks 
Your analogy of control being behind the glass is very apt for automation - our fear of ‘being out of control’ of a technical entity.
However, because the issues arising from the 737 Max accidents are overwhelmingly human, we need to have a key behind the glass for unlocking human thought - thinking for appropriate behaviours. Unfortunately thinking does not involve just one ‘key’; in fact so many it is impossible to describe all aspects, nor provide a conclusive solution.
In this instance we have to consider the issue differently, to seek consensus opposed to a solution, a range of possible interventions - small changes so as not to upset the delicate balance of safety due to unforeseen effects, and to manage the resultant uncertainty - when is an aircraft, pilot, organisation, situation, safe enough.
The regulatory side of the divide shows promise with the introduction of the world-wide group. The current situation requires a consensus to allow the Max to return to service. Future regulation could be based on a group of like minded people - their regulations (FAR/CS 25) reaching agreement for certification, similar to current processes but not necessarily requiring a leader for best practice - FAA would be a participant in a world process.
The Boeing side is more difficult to judge. Fix Max and put it behind them, then consider what next. Boeing’s philosophy for human-machine differs from Airbus, but neither should be judged better or not. The important aspect is how each philosophy is applied; Boeing piecemeal across several types, some retrospectively; Airbus, prospectively, consistently across all types. What should Boeing do?
Being aware of the hazards of large changes, a clean-sheet aircraft will take time. Developing existing aircraft also requires a marketplace, which depends on trust, confidence, etc.
Boeing’s difficulty is not necessarily good for the industry; excellence thrives on competition. Airbus recognises this - risk of letting standards slip, complacency, not having to think too much about the immediate future.
Recent news suggest that Boeing will take a short term view of discounting the market for Max. This might challenge world competitive agreements, but that could be easier to manage than a new product line with the FAA. Time to heal the FAA, customer, supplier, relationships, which could be further eased with a world view of regulation; not Boeing vs the FAA, but Boeing with the regulatory authorities and other manufacturers.
Your analogy of control being behind the glass is very apt for automation - our fear of ‘being out of control’ of a technical entity.
However, because the issues arising from the 737 Max accidents are overwhelmingly human, we need to have a key behind the glass for unlocking human thought - thinking for appropriate behaviours. Unfortunately thinking does not involve just one ‘key’; in fact so many it is impossible to describe all aspects, nor provide a conclusive solution.
In this instance we have to consider the issue differently, to seek consensus opposed to a solution, a range of possible interventions - small changes so as not to upset the delicate balance of safety due to unforeseen effects, and to manage the resultant uncertainty - when is an aircraft, pilot, organisation, situation, safe enough.
The regulatory side of the divide shows promise with the introduction of the world-wide group. The current situation requires a consensus to allow the Max to return to service. Future regulation could be based on a group of like minded people - their regulations (FAR/CS 25) reaching agreement for certification, similar to current processes but not necessarily requiring a leader for best practice - FAA would be a participant in a world process.
The Boeing side is more difficult to judge. Fix Max and put it behind them, then consider what next. Boeing’s philosophy for human-machine differs from Airbus, but neither should be judged better or not. The important aspect is how each philosophy is applied; Boeing piecemeal across several types, some retrospectively; Airbus, prospectively, consistently across all types. What should Boeing do?
Being aware of the hazards of large changes, a clean-sheet aircraft will take time. Developing existing aircraft also requires a marketplace, which depends on trust, confidence, etc.
Boeing’s difficulty is not necessarily good for the industry; excellence thrives on competition. Airbus recognises this - risk of letting standards slip, complacency, not having to think too much about the immediate future.
Recent news suggest that Boeing will take a short term view of discounting the market for Max. This might challenge world competitive agreements, but that could be easier to manage than a new product line with the FAA. Time to heal the FAA, customer, supplier, relationships, which could be further eased with a world view of regulation; not Boeing vs the FAA, but Boeing with the regulatory authorities and other manufacturers.
agree with al of that. It’s a multi disciplinary approach that is required to see where this Industry is headed.
My concern is that it takes years to change some things. And we’ve been dumbing down training for a decade now. Train “just enough”.
R Guy
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in the last ten years out of all major accidents, only one was “western”- AF447. Two were Malaysian , missile and suicide. Then of course Germanwings. Western yes, but bizarre suicide. Two were the MAX , definitely not “western “ by location. 90%were in places that most people couldn’t place on a globe, with airlines that most of us have never heard of, and in what is politely called ‘developing ‘ world.
So I’m not sure what your point is but if you fly on “western airlines” and I won’t define that because there are plenty of “eastern airlines”:with excellent flight safety, QANTAS being a great example, you are historically much safer.
The threat is this. The world needs 500,000 pilots over next 25 years, mainly in the developing world and many are startups. No DNA on how to operate a safe airline. That is a massive challenge. There are two schools of thought
1/ train them to cope with the full spectrum of degraded airplane non normal situations including multiple failures sometimes escalating.rapidly out of control. Ie when computers fail, it’s easy for the pilots to fall back on basic flying skills and airmanship.
or
2/ Automate the problem -out so it can’t happen, and the pilots are there to conduct routine mundane tasks. So they don’t need to be extraordinarily skillful or even moderately so. Even better, set up your own flight academy to generate a constant flow of pilots. It’s a bit like marking your own homework though!
Interesting thread this! Thanks for raising this valid point.
R Guy
I'm guessing cargo aircraft accidents don't count as major accidents?
Atlas Air 3591 and UPS 1354 springs to mind as perfectly good aircraft being crashed in the last 10 years.
Atlas Air 3591 and UPS 1354 springs to mind as perfectly good aircraft being crashed in the last 10 years.
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It would appear, that regardless of 'Western' or not, crew failures revolve around the same human factors everywhere.
This is not to say that aircrew training isn't to be improved in some areas, but Western operators are not immune from inadequate training or crew performance, as recent runway excursions, AF447 and those cargo mishaps seem to show.
This is not to say that aircrew training isn't to be improved in some areas, but Western operators are not immune from inadequate training or crew performance, as recent runway excursions, AF447 and those cargo mishaps seem to show.
retired guy, #168, we think alike.
However, take care in not slipping into the ‘ditch of solutions’ - training for the front line operators.The industry trains for the perceived threat, with today’s equipment.
Who trains the trainers, who oversees that - how.
Who trains the regulators, designers, managements, governments; how to improve HF application, the human perspective in their decision making.
Who asks the questions.
Takes time - yes, but also time to change viewpoint, our thinking, in a highly reliable industry in the aftermath of an accident.
- - - -
Re ‘appropriate and effective’ certification process - new / grandfather. An important question is who created the processes, checked them, learnt from evaluation and use.
Even with adequate oversight, human judgement is the final arbiter, but that is more with hindsight than foresight.
Social media forums thrive on hindsight, foresight is just ‘uninteresting’ opinion. Alternatively with ‘facts’ interpreted after the event, they, and with debatable comparisons of others’ opinion, can be rejudged - but to what point.
The required ‘process’ is to consider what can be learnt, and what can be done which might effect the future. We cannot change the past, even with debated hindsight; but we can consider what might be changed now so that this might influence and improve behaviour - everyone, so that future operations will remain safe.
However, take care in not slipping into the ‘ditch of solutions’ - training for the front line operators.The industry trains for the perceived threat, with today’s equipment.
Who trains the trainers, who oversees that - how.
Who trains the regulators, designers, managements, governments; how to improve HF application, the human perspective in their decision making.
Who asks the questions.
Takes time - yes, but also time to change viewpoint, our thinking, in a highly reliable industry in the aftermath of an accident.
- - - -
Re ‘appropriate and effective’ certification process - new / grandfather. An important question is who created the processes, checked them, learnt from evaluation and use.
Even with adequate oversight, human judgement is the final arbiter, but that is more with hindsight than foresight.
Social media forums thrive on hindsight, foresight is just ‘uninteresting’ opinion. Alternatively with ‘facts’ interpreted after the event, they, and with debatable comparisons of others’ opinion, can be rejudged - but to what point.
The required ‘process’ is to consider what can be learnt, and what can be done which might effect the future. We cannot change the past, even with debated hindsight; but we can consider what might be changed now so that this might influence and improve behaviour - everyone, so that future operations will remain safe.
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retired guy, #168, we think alike.
However, take care in not slipping into the ‘ditch of solutions’ - training for the front line operators.The industry trains for the perceived threat, with today’s equipment.
Who trains the trainers, who oversees that - how.
Who trains the regulators, designers, managements, governments; how to improve HF application, the human perspective in their decision making.
Who asks the questions.
Takes time - yes, but also time to change viewpoint, our thinking, in a highly reliable industry in the aftermath of an accident.
- - - -
Re ‘appropriate and effective’ certification process - new / grandfather. An important question is who created the processes, checked them, learnt from evaluation and use.
Even with adequate oversight, human judgement is the final arbiter, but that is more with hindsight than foresight.
Social media forums thrive on hindsight, foresight is just ‘uninteresting’ opinion. Alternatively with ‘facts’ interpreted after the event, they, and with debatable comparisons of others’ opinion, can be rejudged - but to what point.
The required ‘process’ is to consider what can be learnt, and what can be done which might effect the future. We cannot change the past, even with debated hindsight; but we can consider what might be changed now so that this might influence and improve behaviour - everyone, so that future operations will remain safe.
However, take care in not slipping into the ‘ditch of solutions’ - training for the front line operators.The industry trains for the perceived threat, with today’s equipment.
Who trains the trainers, who oversees that - how.
Who trains the regulators, designers, managements, governments; how to improve HF application, the human perspective in their decision making.
Who asks the questions.
Takes time - yes, but also time to change viewpoint, our thinking, in a highly reliable industry in the aftermath of an accident.
- - - -
Re ‘appropriate and effective’ certification process - new / grandfather. An important question is who created the processes, checked them, learnt from evaluation and use.
Even with adequate oversight, human judgement is the final arbiter, but that is more with hindsight than foresight.
Social media forums thrive on hindsight, foresight is just ‘uninteresting’ opinion. Alternatively with ‘facts’ interpreted after the event, they, and with debatable comparisons of others’ opinion, can be rejudged - but to what point.
The required ‘process’ is to consider what can be learnt, and what can be done which might effect the future. We cannot change the past, even with debated hindsight; but we can consider what might be changed now so that this might influence and improve behaviour - everyone, so that future operations will remain safe.
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It is a fact that cargo flights are often badly or not reported unless they hit a block of flats in Amsterdam and take out lots of people on the ground.
So yes I did exclude cargo flights and I also exclude military ones since most of my listeners are not likely to be in an F15 any time soon.
But that is why this forum is good. You don't get away with anything inaccurate or murky so thanks for bringing it up. Hope that clarifies matters
Cheers
R Guy
The list below is all major crashes on passengers planes with multiple fatalities in the last ten years sorted in the left two columns by region and the right two by airline.
It is interesting how most of them are in less well know places or with airlines that I have never heard of (my ignorance) and that I would be very unlikely to fly on in the normal course of events. The yellow ones are the exceptions. Lionair AF 447, Germanwings, the two Malaysians and Ethiopian.
If I have left out any please let me know folks because I keep updating this list.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1977_D...eing_707_crash
Last edited by retired guy; 17th Jan 2020 at 14:32. Reason: typo
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737 MAX MCAS
This was for the Ethiopia crash thread, now closed, so I'm posting it here:
Originally Posted by Gegenbeispiel
Quote:
Originally Posted by SLFstu
Hi
Thanks for noting why avionics logic can look/behave counter-intuitively.
I guess it was because in my previous job type there was the need to PRACTICALLY explain all observed actions.
Mind you, if Boeing ever did add some sort of MCAS ACTIVE annunciation then in the case I pointed out it would be a tad misleading if power to the trim motor is set to CUTOUT.
But in the overall scheme of things with this accident - 6 minutes until death - I was nitpicking about the minutest trivia.
Stay safe.
Stew
You're welcome, and thanks.
IMO, any MCAS activation is a very big deal. Boeing was wrong to try to hide MCAS from the crew.
The proper way, IMO, to annunciate MCAS ACTIVE would be as a master warning or master caution, with its own text on the warning panel. The signal for for that would be something like (((FCC1_SELECTED and FCC1_MCAS_ACTIVE) or (FCC2_SELECTED and FCC2_MCAS_ACTIVE)) and ELECTRIC_STAB_TRIM_ENABLED ) , probably implemented as hardware discrete logic. That would be an expensive modification. All the best. Arthur
PS do you mind if I put this msg exchange on the thread? I think I should.
Originally Posted by Gegenbeispiel
Quote:
Originally Posted by SLFstu
Hi
Thanks for noting why avionics logic can look/behave counter-intuitively.
I guess it was because in my previous job type there was the need to PRACTICALLY explain all observed actions.
Mind you, if Boeing ever did add some sort of MCAS ACTIVE annunciation then in the case I pointed out it would be a tad misleading if power to the trim motor is set to CUTOUT.
But in the overall scheme of things with this accident - 6 minutes until death - I was nitpicking about the minutest trivia.
Stay safe.
Stew
You're welcome, and thanks.
IMO, any MCAS activation is a very big deal. Boeing was wrong to try to hide MCAS from the crew.
The proper way, IMO, to annunciate MCAS ACTIVE would be as a master warning or master caution, with its own text on the warning panel. The signal for for that would be something like (((FCC1_SELECTED and FCC1_MCAS_ACTIVE) or (FCC2_SELECTED and FCC2_MCAS_ACTIVE)) and ELECTRIC_STAB_TRIM_ENABLED ) , probably implemented as hardware discrete logic. That would be an expensive modification. All the best. Arthur
PS do you mind if I put this msg exchange on the thread? I think I should.
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The fundamental issue Gegenbeispiel is that any warning would violate or jeopardise the common type endorsement without simulator training with previous 737 family members. Boeing had contracted to accept a $1 million dollar penalty if simulator training was required for some 250++ jets with one operator. It also enhanced the sales pitch with other operators.
Subsequent revelations (Forkner chats logs) have revealed Boeing actively "Jedi Mind Tricked" Lionair into not requiring simulator for their own crews as Boeing were concerned other operators would be influenced to do this for their own crews, leaving the perception for potential purchasers that it was best practice to require training. This would increase the costs, and thus reduce the attractiveness of the 737-MAX relative to the Airbus A32x Neo family.
It was mentioned at one point the cost was about $2000 (assumed USD) per pilot was the cost if a training simulator was required.
Subsequent revelations (Forkner chats logs) have revealed Boeing actively "Jedi Mind Tricked" Lionair into not requiring simulator for their own crews as Boeing were concerned other operators would be influenced to do this for their own crews, leaving the perception for potential purchasers that it was best practice to require training. This would increase the costs, and thus reduce the attractiveness of the 737-MAX relative to the Airbus A32x Neo family.
It was mentioned at one point the cost was about $2000 (assumed USD) per pilot was the cost if a training simulator was required.
The fundamental issue Gegenbeispiel is that any warning would violate or jeopardise the common type endorsement without simulator training with previous 737 family members. Boeing had contracted to accept a $1 million dollar penalty if simulator training was required for some 250++ jets with one operator. It also enhanced the sales pitch with other operators.
Subsequent revelations (Forkner chats logs) have revealed Boeing actively "Jedi Mind Tricked" Lionair into not requiring simulator for their own crews as Boeing were concerned other operators would be influenced to do this for their own crews, leaving the perception for potential purchasers that it was best practice to require training. This would increase the costs, and thus reduce the attractiveness of the 737-MAX relative to the Airbus A32x Neo family.
It was mentioned at one point the cost was about $2000 (assumed USD) per pilot was the cost if a training simulator was required.
Subsequent revelations (Forkner chats logs) have revealed Boeing actively "Jedi Mind Tricked" Lionair into not requiring simulator for their own crews as Boeing were concerned other operators would be influenced to do this for their own crews, leaving the perception for potential purchasers that it was best practice to require training. This would increase the costs, and thus reduce the attractiveness of the 737-MAX relative to the Airbus A32x Neo family.
It was mentioned at one point the cost was about $2000 (assumed USD) per pilot was the cost if a training simulator was required.
The emails had some redacted stuff but that was mostly redacted.
Relatives of a man killed in one of two crashes involving a Boeing 737 Max have condemned a report into the disasters.
The expert panel behind the report concluded the system used to certify the aircraft as safe was "effective".
But the family of Joseph Waithaka has described the report as "an extremely appalling and disappointing attempt to defend a flawed system".
The expert panel behind the report concluded the system used to certify the aircraft as safe was "effective".
But the family of Joseph Waithaka has described the report as "an extremely appalling and disappointing attempt to defend a flawed system".
Have to agree with the family.
An alternative interpretation of the report is that the use of either process could result in a flawed outcome; same outcome, no difference, equally deficient.
The effectiveness of either process was only as good as the bounding system allowed, and apparently no one questioned the overall organisational system - FAA or Boeing.
Similarly the report could suffer flaws or influences of the larger system; who holds the responsibility for overseeing the totality of the regulatory system: - the highest levels of the governing administration, throughout and to each and every individual in that system.
The report was downwards focussed; whereas looking upwards might have provided a better balance in the findings.
“...no matter how hard they try, humans can never be expected to out perform the system which bounds and constrains them. Organisational flaws will, sooner or later, defeat individual human performance.”
Gary Parata of Air Nelson
“Responsibility lies with those who could act but do not, it lies with those who could learn but do not, and for those who evaluate it can add to their capacity to make interventions which might make all our lives the safer.”
Phillip Capper – ‘Systems safety in the wake of the cave creek disaster.’
The effectiveness of either process was only as good as the bounding system allowed, and apparently no one questioned the overall organisational system - FAA or Boeing.
Similarly the report could suffer flaws or influences of the larger system; who holds the responsibility for overseeing the totality of the regulatory system: - the highest levels of the governing administration, throughout and to each and every individual in that system.
The report was downwards focussed; whereas looking upwards might have provided a better balance in the findings.
“...no matter how hard they try, humans can never be expected to out perform the system which bounds and constrains them. Organisational flaws will, sooner or later, defeat individual human performance.”
Gary Parata of Air Nelson
“Responsibility lies with those who could act but do not, it lies with those who could learn but do not, and for those who evaluate it can add to their capacity to make interventions which might make all our lives the safer.”
Phillip Capper – ‘Systems safety in the wake of the cave creek disaster.’
Last edited by alf5071h; 18th Jan 2020 at 08:56.
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I know I can rent a local 737 sim for something like 1000 per hour- maybe less pro rata for four.
First you have the cost of the sim at say 12million. Then the building rent etc. utilization. Is it generating income from third parties? But the cost that scares airlines is the time off flying the line involved and impact on rosters. And the need for more training pilots- it’s a big overhead. In a LCC it’s not uncommon for pilots to have to travel a whole day from home base to a sim in day UK . Say Poland to UK? Three flights?
For a one hour Max refresher that would be the same. And then Hotac overnight. For some airlines that’s a cost too - not all!
Two days gone. And annual duty hours affected maybe. Oh dear. And FTL or roster agreement might mean he now can’t fly next day. Is the cost of this training worth it? A thousand times yes.
I would add a whole day annually onto every pilot if I were running the train set. ( Any finance guy reading this, and maybe others, will be saying “thank God the idiot is too old) One day devoted to flying in degraded modes. No autopilots. Multiple failures. Failures that are ambiguous. Raw data. Visual approaches. The works and no pilot would join who hadnt been been trained in those skills at flight school. Somewhere like Oxford or Jerez or equivalent.
Capt G Khan over and out
aka R Guy
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Yes our hearts go out to the families.
r Guy