Ukrainian Aircraft down in Iran
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Fortissimo, thank you.
As a pilot, who regularly flies past conflict areas I have to fight with “ management “ over what is considered a safe routing.
As a Captain I never waiver in my battle, but some do.
Why should I have to fight management to provide safe passage for my trusting passengers? Safety always has to be the top priority when flying a defenceless civilian aircraft near these areas.
At the moment missing Iran by 15 nm is what is considered acceptable by my employer.
As dodging missiles wasn’t part of my training, how much distance would be considered prudent. Obviously tension rise and fall.
But assuming, tensions are at a maximum, what would be a sensible min distance to the border of Iran or certain sensitive parts of Iran.
Open to any thoughts, but the more simple the better.
Does anyone with knowledge in this area have a good rule of thumb?
Thank you to all that posted details at personal risk. Let’s hope things change and we learn from this terrible event.
rgds
As a Captain I never waiver in my battle, but some do.
Why should I have to fight management to provide safe passage for my trusting passengers? Safety always has to be the top priority when flying a defenceless civilian aircraft near these areas.
At the moment missing Iran by 15 nm is what is considered acceptable by my employer.
As dodging missiles wasn’t part of my training, how much distance would be considered prudent. Obviously tension rise and fall.
But assuming, tensions are at a maximum, what would be a sensible min distance to the border of Iran or certain sensitive parts of Iran.
Open to any thoughts, but the more simple the better.
Does anyone with knowledge in this area have a good rule of thumb?
Thank you to all that posted details at personal risk. Let’s hope things change and we learn from this terrible event.
rgds
Salute!
Good question and good basic common sense, Brain.
The 15 n.m. distance might be great if tracking parallel to the coast or known defense facilities or..... But heading straight in is asking for trouble ( that was the Vincennes delimma). Some of these SAM systems can reach out and touch you at much further ranges than 15 n.m. if you are at medium or high altitude at 0.8M or slower. In this tragedy case, the "target" was heading straight for the missile battery and associated "research" or military site.
The fog of war and poor integrated air defense comm was a definite player.
Gums sends...
Good question and good basic common sense, Brain.
The 15 n.m. distance might be great if tracking parallel to the coast or known defense facilities or..... But heading straight in is asking for trouble ( that was the Vincennes delimma). Some of these SAM systems can reach out and touch you at much further ranges than 15 n.m. if you are at medium or high altitude at 0.8M or slower. In this tragedy case, the "target" was heading straight for the missile battery and associated "research" or military site.
The fog of war and poor integrated air defense comm was a definite player.
Gums sends...
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Many articles in the Ukrainian press today report that Iran is ignoring the requests by the Ukrainian authorities. In particular Polina Chizh (Полина Чиж), representative of Ukraine's Attorney general's Office, stated that they sent 2 official requests to Iran (on January 8th and on January 15th), asking to have access to the flight recorders, and to let their (i.e. Ukrainian) experts decrypt them, but that they "didn't receive any answer". The Office also offered to decrypt the flight recorders in Ukraine, and unofficially agreed to have an Iranian expert inspect the Ukranian laboratory yesterday (January 15th) to get final approval, but the much-awaited Iranian expert never arrived (Polina Chizh: "Now they say, that their expert, as it was promised, today - January 15th, is not coming").
Interesting detail: in the second official request to the Iranian authorities the Office asks also to 'gain access' to the passangers' seats (I remember someone on Pprune noticing that they weren't visible in the crash site pictures).
Interesting detail: in the second official request to the Iranian authorities the Office asks also to 'gain access' to the passangers' seats (I remember someone on Pprune noticing that they weren't visible in the crash site pictures).
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Canada, other countries issue demands for Iran, including compensation for victims - National | Globalnews.ca
https://globalnews.ca/news/6419180/i...ting-minister/
Globalnews Canada reporting om meeting Thursdsy in London, convened by Canada, with Ukraine, Sweden, Afghanistan and U.K.
Interesting reference to ICAO at the end.
As stated in a previous post, even if Annex 13 process can be seen only as a roadmap in these circumstances, it still has significant usefulness in that capacity - note the reporting about CVR and FDR in this article.
https://globalnews.ca/news/6419180/i...ting-minister/
Globalnews Canada reporting om meeting Thursdsy in London, convened by Canada, with Ukraine, Sweden, Afghanistan and U.K.
Interesting reference to ICAO at the end.
As stated in a previous post, even if Annex 13 process can be seen only as a roadmap in these circumstances, it still has significant usefulness in that capacity - note the reporting about CVR and FDR in this article.
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Yesterday (all articles about it appeared today) the “Kiev Scientific Research Inst. of Forensic Expertise of the Min. of Justice of Ukraine” released a video in which the head of the Ukranian investigative committee (a certain Ruvin) gives us a glimpse of how the investigation in Iran unfolded.
On the first day the Ukrainian investigators arrived (January 9t:), the Iranian officials “gave us the possibility to look at the remains of the airplane. They said that they were in a hangar. Turns out the hangar, when we arrived there at the end of the day, is just a heap of airplane rubble, that they had gathered together by bulldozer. But they (i.e. the Iranian officials) work only until 4pm”… so the Ukrainians must stop working.
On the second day a part of the investigators goes to the crash site (others go to see the flight recorders and try to access the recording of the conversations between ATC and pilots). Ruvin comments: “At the crash site we saw a lot of unknown people - Iranians that were collecting remains, things, debris. Some were collecting metallic wrecks for scrapping, some (took things) as a souvenir”.
As regards the airplane remains, Ruvin says that the investigators wondered “Where is the lower part of the airplane, where is the cockpit? Because we could not see them.” After they sorted out the remains, they noticed that the lower part of the plane “was completely missing, and that also the cockpit was missing. Only the cockpit was brought us later, a little piece of the frontal part… The seats were still missing. Not a single seat. Where they kept the plane remains (i.e. in “the hangar”), we didn’t find any”
Ruvin adds that later on -at the crash site- the Ukrainian investigators found “fragments” of 4 seats, and collected them.
He says the investigators looked for the passengers’ mobiles and tablets. They found some, and also some cards, and document bags, and on them they saw the signs of shrapnel impact. Those signs were found also on the plane remains
When it was clear what happened (it was already night//Ruvin doesn’t say “what” happened), the Ukrainians told the Iranians. At that point “a lot of cars came”, with representatives of the Iranian government. “They looked, asked to cover (everything) with plastic sheets and (also asked) not to film with mobile phone and said “We’ll deal with it tomorrow”. On the following day Iranian authorities admitted that the airplane had been shot down.
Full article with video link (in Ukrainian) gordonua .com / news/localnews/irancy-zabirali-na-pamyat-i-kak-metallolom-veshchi-s-mesta-katastrofy-samoleta-mau-chlen-ukrainskoy-gruppy-1483152.html
On the first day the Ukrainian investigators arrived (January 9t:), the Iranian officials “gave us the possibility to look at the remains of the airplane. They said that they were in a hangar. Turns out the hangar, when we arrived there at the end of the day, is just a heap of airplane rubble, that they had gathered together by bulldozer. But they (i.e. the Iranian officials) work only until 4pm”… so the Ukrainians must stop working.
On the second day a part of the investigators goes to the crash site (others go to see the flight recorders and try to access the recording of the conversations between ATC and pilots). Ruvin comments: “At the crash site we saw a lot of unknown people - Iranians that were collecting remains, things, debris. Some were collecting metallic wrecks for scrapping, some (took things) as a souvenir”.
As regards the airplane remains, Ruvin says that the investigators wondered “Where is the lower part of the airplane, where is the cockpit? Because we could not see them.” After they sorted out the remains, they noticed that the lower part of the plane “was completely missing, and that also the cockpit was missing. Only the cockpit was brought us later, a little piece of the frontal part… The seats were still missing. Not a single seat. Where they kept the plane remains (i.e. in “the hangar”), we didn’t find any”
Ruvin adds that later on -at the crash site- the Ukrainian investigators found “fragments” of 4 seats, and collected them.
He says the investigators looked for the passengers’ mobiles and tablets. They found some, and also some cards, and document bags, and on them they saw the signs of shrapnel impact. Those signs were found also on the plane remains
When it was clear what happened (it was already night//Ruvin doesn’t say “what” happened), the Ukrainians told the Iranians. At that point “a lot of cars came”, with representatives of the Iranian government. “They looked, asked to cover (everything) with plastic sheets and (also asked) not to film with mobile phone and said “We’ll deal with it tomorrow”. On the following day Iranian authorities admitted that the airplane had been shot down.
Full article with video link (in Ukrainian) gordonua .com / news/localnews/irancy-zabirali-na-pamyat-i-kak-metallolom-veshchi-s-mesta-katastrofy-samoleta-mau-chlen-ukrainskoy-gruppy-1483152.html
As a pilot, who regularly flies past conflict areas I have to fight with “ management “ over what is considered a safe routing.
As a Captain I never waiver in my battle, but some do.
Why should I have to fight management to provide safe passage for my trusting passengers? Safety always has to be the top priority when flying a defenceless civilian aircraft near these areas.
At the moment missing Iran by 15 nm is what is considered acceptable by my employer.
As dodging missiles wasn’t part of my training, how much distance would be considered prudent. Obviously tension rise and fall.
But assuming, tensions are at a maximum, what would be a sensible min distance to the border of Iran or certain sensitive parts of Iran.
Open to any thoughts, but the more simple the better.
Does anyone with knowledge in this area have a good rule of thumb?
Thank you to all that posted details at personal risk. Let’s hope things change and we learn from this terrible event.
rgds
As a Captain I never waiver in my battle, but some do.
Why should I have to fight management to provide safe passage for my trusting passengers? Safety always has to be the top priority when flying a defenceless civilian aircraft near these areas.
At the moment missing Iran by 15 nm is what is considered acceptable by my employer.
As dodging missiles wasn’t part of my training, how much distance would be considered prudent. Obviously tension rise and fall.
But assuming, tensions are at a maximum, what would be a sensible min distance to the border of Iran or certain sensitive parts of Iran.
Open to any thoughts, but the more simple the better.
Does anyone with knowledge in this area have a good rule of thumb?
Thank you to all that posted details at personal risk. Let’s hope things change and we learn from this terrible event.
rgds
https://militarywatchmagazine.com/ar...why-it-matters
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Many thanks, Mr Optimistic
So as per Gums’ post if your main “ risk “ is inadvertent shoot down, then don’t fly towards known sensitive areas. Inside 15 miles you’re extreme at risk, if directly flying towards missile batteries etc. As seen. The operator has seconds to decide if he wants to live.
But as per Optimistic’s post. If you believe you are the intended target, then the range of the missile becomes the main factor. So maybe 250 miles.
So all I have to do, is ascertain if I’m an intended target.
This brings me onto the two or three accidental shoot down of airliners, at 100 mile plus ranges in the past.
Can I forget these, as they were just training accidents?
But as per Optimistic’s post. If you believe you are the intended target, then the range of the missile becomes the main factor. So maybe 250 miles.
So all I have to do, is ascertain if I’m an intended target.
This brings me onto the two or three accidental shoot down of airliners, at 100 mile plus ranges in the past.
Can I forget these, as they were just training accidents?
Last edited by Turkey Brain; 18th Jan 2020 at 10:15. Reason: understaning the problem
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So as per Gums’ post if your main “ risk “ is inadvertent shoot down, then don’t fly towards known sensitive areas. Inside 15 miles you’re extreme at risk, if directly flying towards missile batteries etc. As seen. The operator has seconds to decide if he wants to live.
But as per Optimistic’s post. If you believe you are the intended target, then the range of the missile becomes the main factor. So maybe 250 miles.
So all I have to do, is ascertain if I’m an intended target.
This brings me onto the two or three accidental shoot down of airliners, at 100 mile plus ranges in the past.
Can I forget these, as they were just training accidents?
But as per Optimistic’s post. If you believe you are the intended target, then the range of the missile becomes the main factor. So maybe 250 miles.
So all I have to do, is ascertain if I’m an intended target.
This brings me onto the two or three accidental shoot down of airliners, at 100 mile plus ranges in the past.
Can I forget these, as they were just training accidents?
Considering some SAM systems can accurately hit an aircraft from a hundred miles away or more, I wouldn't want to be anywhere near a conflict zone in a defenceless airliner.
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Now being reported by SRF Swiss News, that the Iranians will attempt to download fdr data themselves, 24hrs after having agreed to send the recorders to Ukraine...
After the missile strike(s) there won’t be much, if any data to be had but it is important to establish the state of the aircraft before that, in order to debunk or confirm any reasons being put out by the Iranian authorities for the downing.
Watch this space.
After the missile strike(s) there won’t be much, if any data to be had but it is important to establish the state of the aircraft before that, in order to debunk or confirm any reasons being put out by the Iranian authorities for the downing.
Watch this space.
Last edited by Twitter; 19th Jan 2020 at 16:55.
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Now being reported by SRF Swiss News, that the Iranians will attempt to download fdr data themselves, 24hrs after having agreed to send the recorders to Ukraine...
After the missile strike(s) there won’t be much, if any data to be had, but it is important to establish the state of the aircraft before that, in order to debunk or confirm any reasons being put out by the Iranian authorities for the downing.
Watch this space.
After the missile strike(s) there won’t be much, if any data to be had, but it is important to establish the state of the aircraft before that, in order to debunk or confirm any reasons being put out by the Iranian authorities for the downing.
Watch this space.
not good news. Doubt they have expertise and could easily lose the entire data storage.
Yes, the recorders can confirm or deny missile theory - there won’t be any data post strike, but that will prove it was an explosion. It also looks like they’ve gone back into “not our fault” mode. Their problem would seem to be that nobody or everybody is in charge of things. Clerics. Army. Government. Revolutionary Guards etc
Thanks for that update
R Guy
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From an ATC perspective according what I saw so far .
The aircraft was on a flight plan but actually departed 1h late , this is not unusual , Tech problem was reported in another site , even that the tech problem was not (or could not be) fixed and a/c departed with item not signed, ( Twitter) , the flights plans are all passed to air defense / military, together with the transponder code the aircraft will have on departure.
Normal VHF contact with Khomeini TWR , normal departure, following SID with normal rate of climb for a 737 ( FR24) . transfer of control and frequency to Mehrabad APP/ACC ( located on the other Tehran airport in city ) positive contact . The Mehrabad centre is a joint cicil military unit using the same data processing system , so the flight was correlated and know to the military at the center on departure . . The aircraft was then cleared to climb to FL260 ( Iranian CAA) . 5 min after taking off . aircraft disappear from Radar ( Iranian CAA) would indicate Mehrabad APP/ACC worked on secondary only. Aircraft was called by ATC , no answer (Iranian CAA)
Now , If the aircraft Transponder was jammed by outside forces ( e.g. USA) the aircraft would indeed have disappeared from radar displays but then the VHF would have stilled worked, and the crew able to answer the controller calling them after the SSR loss.
If the VHF was jammed from outside( possible and relatively easy to do ) it would have affected everyone else on that frequency, but there is report that another aircraft on the frequency reported to ATC seeing an explosion ( Ukraine and Iranian CAA).
Therefore one can assume that the moment the transmissions stopped was the moment the first missile hit . Therefore the contents of the CVR/FDR will be of no real use as they most likely stopped at the same time .
The thing that is unclear to me , again from an ATC view, is that normally once an aircraft is positively correlated as civil one by the military system, this info is passed to air defense which automatically correlate the associated primary track on their system , and keeps this until it cross their State boundary if it is an international flight . Same for an incoming flight to the country.
Now, If we believe some twitter messages from Iran dissidents posted after the event, where it was suggested that a massive cyber attack was taking place on Iranian air defense communications that morning. That could perhaps explain why the data was not transmitted. But as this in unverified it is pure speculation from my side .
The aircraft was on a flight plan but actually departed 1h late , this is not unusual , Tech problem was reported in another site , even that the tech problem was not (or could not be) fixed and a/c departed with item not signed, ( Twitter) , the flights plans are all passed to air defense / military, together with the transponder code the aircraft will have on departure.
Normal VHF contact with Khomeini TWR , normal departure, following SID with normal rate of climb for a 737 ( FR24) . transfer of control and frequency to Mehrabad APP/ACC ( located on the other Tehran airport in city ) positive contact . The Mehrabad centre is a joint cicil military unit using the same data processing system , so the flight was correlated and know to the military at the center on departure . . The aircraft was then cleared to climb to FL260 ( Iranian CAA) . 5 min after taking off . aircraft disappear from Radar ( Iranian CAA) would indicate Mehrabad APP/ACC worked on secondary only. Aircraft was called by ATC , no answer (Iranian CAA)
Now , If the aircraft Transponder was jammed by outside forces ( e.g. USA) the aircraft would indeed have disappeared from radar displays but then the VHF would have stilled worked, and the crew able to answer the controller calling them after the SSR loss.
If the VHF was jammed from outside( possible and relatively easy to do ) it would have affected everyone else on that frequency, but there is report that another aircraft on the frequency reported to ATC seeing an explosion ( Ukraine and Iranian CAA).
Therefore one can assume that the moment the transmissions stopped was the moment the first missile hit . Therefore the contents of the CVR/FDR will be of no real use as they most likely stopped at the same time .
The thing that is unclear to me , again from an ATC view, is that normally once an aircraft is positively correlated as civil one by the military system, this info is passed to air defense which automatically correlate the associated primary track on their system , and keeps this until it cross their State boundary if it is an international flight . Same for an incoming flight to the country.
Now, If we believe some twitter messages from Iran dissidents posted after the event, where it was suggested that a massive cyber attack was taking place on Iranian air defense communications that morning. That could perhaps explain why the data was not transmitted. But as this in unverified it is pure speculation from my side .
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On this purpose, news agency Interfax-Ukraine, in a yesteray's article, stated that Iranian authorities (specifically Hassan Rezaifer) had previously explicitly declared that they didn't have the technology to process the flight recorders (article says 'as it was a contemporary Boeing').
Canadian minister Champagne (yesterday's video available on line) invited again Iran to give the flight recorders either to France or to Ukraine, and (reasonably worried) added that Iran has to "choose its path... either they go to a path of transparency, accountability, and taking full responsibility..."
A side note for ATC Watcher: Danilov (Ukranian authority) stated in that same article I quoted earlier, dated January 11th, that there were conversations with the ATC, but that they "ceased immediately" (due to the missile strike, says Danilov).
Judging by subsequent statements by Ruvin (he said that on Januery 10th that a part of the Ukr. investigators tried to get access to ATC recordings in Teheran), it's possible that they really got access to them (and that's why Danilov says "conversations ceased immediately")
Exact words: Danilov "We consider this (the missile attack) a proven fact. For this reason those comunications (in Russian they call them 'negotiations", i.e. with the ATC), that our pilots had to carry out, ceased immediately".
Canadian minister Champagne (yesterday's video available on line) invited again Iran to give the flight recorders either to France or to Ukraine, and (reasonably worried) added that Iran has to "choose its path... either they go to a path of transparency, accountability, and taking full responsibility..."
A side note for ATC Watcher: Danilov (Ukranian authority) stated in that same article I quoted earlier, dated January 11th, that there were conversations with the ATC, but that they "ceased immediately" (due to the missile strike, says Danilov).
Judging by subsequent statements by Ruvin (he said that on Januery 10th that a part of the Ukr. investigators tried to get access to ATC recordings in Teheran), it's possible that they really got access to them (and that's why Danilov says "conversations ceased immediately")
Exact words: Danilov "We consider this (the missile attack) a proven fact. For this reason those comunications (in Russian they call them 'negotiations", i.e. with the ATC), that our pilots had to carry out, ceased immediately".
Can't they (Iran) download the recorders and provide copies eventually to some parties. That way multiple interpretations may be made and released to the media to serve different audiences
Administrator
Quick mod note: for those of you pursuing Pilip Giraldi's theory on radar shennanigans, the thread has been moved to here.
I'd be surprised if they can download them at all. The recorders from the last major accident in Iran, in 2018, went to the BEA in France to be read.
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Ukraine themselves are of course no strangers to own-goal shootdowns, having been on both sides of the equation, which now can also be said of Iran as well.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siberi...es_Flight_1812
Personally, I don't understand why everybody seems so trigger happy.
Edmund
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From an ATC perspective according what I saw so far .
The aircraft was on a flight plan but actually departed 1h late , this is not unusual , Tech problem was reported in another site , even that the tech problem was not (or could not be) fixed and a/c departed with item not signed, ( Twitter) ,
The aircraft was on a flight plan but actually departed 1h late , this is not unusual , Tech problem was reported in another site , even that the tech problem was not (or could not be) fixed and a/c departed with item not signed, ( Twitter) ,
Update on the Flight website:
.Flight : Two anti-aircraft missiles fired from north towards UIA 737: inquiry
Iranian investigators have disclosed that two missiles from a Tor-M1 anti-aircraft system were fired before the loss of Ukraine International Airlines Boeing 737-800 shortly after departure from Tehran
It has detailed the preparations for the flight to Kiev, stating that the aircraft was replenished with 9,510kg of fuel. But a load sheet calculation showed the maximum weight for the aircraft needed to be 72.5t, and that 82 items in the baggage hold – equating to 2,094kg of the overall 6,794kg of baggage – were offloaded in order to meet the criteria, bringing the 737’s weight down such that it was 32kg below the maximum. This offloading resulted in a delay to the departure. The flight, parked on stand 116R, had been scheduled for 05:15 but the aircraft’s doors were not closed until 05:49. The inquiry says 167 passengers had boarded, with one no-show. Shortly afterwards the aircraft was cleared for pushback and it eventually took off at 06:12 from runway 29R.