Boeing to Recommend Sim Training for MAX Pilots
Join Date: Feb 2015
Location: usa
Age: 37
Posts: 41
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I'm just an interested passenger who flies quite a lot (including some rather pleasant flights on Turkish's 737 MAXen, as it happens).
There's thousands of pilots in 737 fleets whose employers would like them to also fly the MAX, and only 34 simulators.
If those 34 simulators were deemed suitable to the task, then you probably need more of them. Cloning physical simulators not simple, but it's "just" a matter of throwing a lot of money at a production line, and Boeing will be very happy to help throw that money.
And after you've got the simulator hardware you'll need certified instructors and certified simulator maintenance people, but I suspect that's also not beyond the reach of "spend a lot of money".
But isn't the fidelity of the simulators already the topic of some debate? Isn't there, for example, concern that the simulator does not replicate the forces required to operate the trim controls? Which might have been glossed over in the past, but is now rather more serious. That's not a software fix, I would guess, but requires motors and actuators and stuff, modelling the forces of an aircraft that has yet to be flown in its final configuration.
And isn't that fidelity the crux of the emails from the Boeing technical pilot that have exercised Congress and regulators?
If that's the case the problem isn't that there are only 34 simulators. The problem is that there are zero simulators, and getting the first one certified by all the relevant parties is not going to be a trivial task. Who wants to be the regulator that signs off a simulator and a simulator programme of instruction as being "good enough"? Will European regulators accept simulators that the FAA accept, on the FAA's say so? Aren't regulators going to want sight of a lot of test flights of the definitive version of MCAS/etc in the MAX in order to calibrate and verify the simulator? What are the forces required to trim the aircraft in the scenarios we're interested in? How long to agree it all?
(Could someone clarify whether "we recommend you have a 737 MAX simulator session before flying the 737 MAX in revenue service" is equivalent to "the 737 MAX is a distinct type-rating"? I suspect the answer is "no", but how much additional training does there need to be, and how compulsory does it need to be, before it constitutes a separate type-rating?)
There's thousands of pilots in 737 fleets whose employers would like them to also fly the MAX, and only 34 simulators.
If those 34 simulators were deemed suitable to the task, then you probably need more of them. Cloning physical simulators not simple, but it's "just" a matter of throwing a lot of money at a production line, and Boeing will be very happy to help throw that money.
And after you've got the simulator hardware you'll need certified instructors and certified simulator maintenance people, but I suspect that's also not beyond the reach of "spend a lot of money".
But isn't the fidelity of the simulators already the topic of some debate? Isn't there, for example, concern that the simulator does not replicate the forces required to operate the trim controls? Which might have been glossed over in the past, but is now rather more serious. That's not a software fix, I would guess, but requires motors and actuators and stuff, modelling the forces of an aircraft that has yet to be flown in its final configuration.
And isn't that fidelity the crux of the emails from the Boeing technical pilot that have exercised Congress and regulators?
If that's the case the problem isn't that there are only 34 simulators. The problem is that there are zero simulators, and getting the first one certified by all the relevant parties is not going to be a trivial task. Who wants to be the regulator that signs off a simulator and a simulator programme of instruction as being "good enough"? Will European regulators accept simulators that the FAA accept, on the FAA's say so? Aren't regulators going to want sight of a lot of test flights of the definitive version of MCAS/etc in the MAX in order to calibrate and verify the simulator? What are the forces required to trim the aircraft in the scenarios we're interested in? How long to agree it all?
(Could someone clarify whether "we recommend you have a 737 MAX simulator session before flying the 737 MAX in revenue service" is equivalent to "the 737 MAX is a distinct type-rating"? I suspect the answer is "no", but how much additional training does there need to be, and how compulsory does it need to be, before it constitutes a separate type-rating?)
Join Date: Sep 2019
Location: leftcoast
Posts: 2
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The flight deck differences between the NG and the MAX are minor enough that a new s/w load should be adequate to allow an NG simulator to be used as a MAX simulator.
Such multiple use simulators are already common - they simply select whatever aircraft version is wanted when booting up the simulator.
Such multiple use simulators are already common - they simply select whatever aircraft version is wanted when booting up the simulator.
And properly modify the trim wheel per aero forces as a function of AOA, stab deflection, altitude, and speed- which then brings up the game played with NG simulators . . .
No manufacture is going to produce large numbers of the simulators required without certainty that the MAX will fly again or a guarantee of payment if it doesn't. Given the lead time required to make the sim, deliver, install and certify it along with training the instructors needed, work needs to start immediately.
A greater number of simulators will be required to avoid a bottle neck if the MAX flies again than will be required if operations return to normal. Even if the simulators are running 24/7 they will only be able to support a phased return to flying, but that shouldn't be a problem as long as they can match the pace of aircraft deliveries and engineering work.
The logistics involved in returning the MAX to service, if it ever happens would require someone with the level of skill required to plan the invasion of a foreign country.
A greater number of simulators will be required to avoid a bottle neck if the MAX flies again than will be required if operations return to normal. Even if the simulators are running 24/7 they will only be able to support a phased return to flying, but that shouldn't be a problem as long as they can match the pace of aircraft deliveries and engineering work.
The logistics involved in returning the MAX to service, if it ever happens would require someone with the level of skill required to plan the invasion of a foreign country.
We're way past the point where it's an either/or selection. The MAX is not going to fly again until a long list of people agree that MCAS has been fixed (hardware, software, whatever) and pilots have received training as agreed appropriate by the various stakeholders.
If special training is really needed, there is still a problem which needs fixing. Why do commercial pilots not receive special training on what to do when an aileron falls off? Because everyone has total confidence that it won't happen, that's why. Now apply that thought to the MCAS system.
Here's Boeing;
Boeing has developed an MCAS software update to provide additional layers of protection if the AOA sensors provide erroneous data. The software was put through hundreds of hours of analysis, laboratory testing, verification in a simulator and two test flights, including an in-flight certification test with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) representatives on board as observers.
The additional layers of protection include:
The additional layers of protection include:
- Flight control system will now compare inputs from both AOA sensors. If the sensors disagree by 5.5 degrees or more with the flaps retracted, MCAS will not activate. An indicator on the flight deck display will alert the pilots.
- If MCAS is activated in non-normal conditions, it will only provide one input for each elevated AOA event. There are no known or envisioned failure conditions where MCAS will provide multiple inputs.
- MCAS can never command more stabilizer input than can be counteracted by the flight crew pulling back on the column. The pilots will continue to always have the ability to override MCAS and manually control the airplane.
But there are also unknown unknowns - the ones we don't know we don't know.
Here's a random question. If there is a sensor disagreement =>5.5 degrees MCAS will not operate. OK, but if the crew can, without MCAS, manage safely the pitch-up condition in which MCAS would operate if the AOA sensors agree, what exactly is MCAS there for?
Last edited by old,not bold; 8th Jan 2020 at 00:11.
Join Date: Feb 2015
Location: usa
Age: 37
Posts: 41
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
My point is that if the software/hardware has been properly fixed, repeat properly, there would be no need for special training on how to manage it if and when it goes wrong. The special training should not need to be part of the solution. If there is no longer a problem, what is it for?
If special training is really needed, there is still a problem which needs fixing. Why do commercial pilots not receive special training on what to do when an aileron falls off? Because everyone has total confidence that it won't happen, that's why. Now apply that thought to the MCAS system.
If special training is really needed, there is still a problem which needs fixing. Why do commercial pilots not receive special training on what to do when an aileron falls off? Because everyone has total confidence that it won't happen, that's why. Now apply that thought to the MCAS system.
Seems to me the lack of MAX Simulators is not a problem that is going to go away soon so airlines will now have to have a segregated pool of 737MAX pilots. Those pilots will get the extra training and only fly the MAX with maybe a bit of fill in 737NG work while most of the current NG pilots at the big airlines won't see the MAX for a long time if ever. The airline bean counters are not going to happy about that
On another note I was in YVR the other day and a WestJet 737Max was parked on the South ramp. I noticed that the tail logo was 737-8, seems to me it used to say 737 Max.....
On another note I was in YVR the other day and a WestJet 737Max was parked on the South ramp. I noticed that the tail logo was 737-8, seems to me it used to say 737 Max.....
Join Date: Apr 2015
Location: Under the radar, over the rainbow
Posts: 788
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
My point is that if the software/hardware has been properly fixed, repeat properly, there would be no need for special training on how to manage it if and when it goes wrong. The special training should not need to be part of the solution. If there is no longer a problem, what is it for?
Here's a random question. If there is a sensor disagreement =>5.5 degrees MCAS will not operate. OK, but if the crew can, without MCAS, manage safely the pitch-up condition in which MCAS would operate if the AOA sensors agree, what exactly is MCAS there for?
Last edited by OldnGrounded; 8th Jan 2020 at 00:32. Reason: Typo
You might think of it as a belt-and-suspenders (braces) approach or you might think of it as a gigantic, multi-entity CYA operation -- but it ain't gonna happen any other way.
Join Date: May 2015
Location: Northwest BC
Posts: 13
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
If simulator training is required to deal with MCAS potential failures and Mcas was put in place to deal with potential pitch ups re:engine placement, why not remove Mcas now and just train for the potential pitch up possibilities?
fog
fog
Join Date: Feb 2015
Location: usa
Age: 37
Posts: 41
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I guess the most meaningful answer is that it just doesn't matter how necessary the training might be, if the question were being considered under other circumstances. In the context of the events since October, 2018, no one is going to take the risk of letting the MAX return to service without an approved fix and training. You might think of it as a belt-and-suspenders (braces) approach or you might think of it as a gigantic, multi-entity CYA operation -- but it ain't gonna happen any other way.
The official answer, I'm sure, is the same as before: MCAS is just there to make the stick force gradient compliant with the regs. Lots of folks would like to see the results of bare airframe testing to help them decide whether they believe that.
The official answer, I'm sure, is the same as before: MCAS is just there to make the stick force gradient compliant with the regs. Lots of folks would like to see the results of bare airframe testing to help them decide whether they believe that.
Join Date: Apr 2015
Location: Under the radar, over the rainbow
Posts: 788
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Join Date: Apr 2015
Location: Under the radar, over the rainbow
Posts: 788
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Join Date: Feb 2015
Location: usa
Age: 37
Posts: 41
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Lol. Ok.
So they jet can't fly without it but it was originally designed to? You can't be serious. This is all about same type approval. You don't migrate into hybrid FBW for any other reason.
The jet does not need MCAS except in the high kinetic realm.
if you are correct the MAX is done. And I'll celebrate with you.
So they jet can't fly without it but it was originally designed to? You can't be serious. This is all about same type approval. You don't migrate into hybrid FBW for any other reason.
The jet does not need MCAS except in the high kinetic realm.
if you are correct the MAX is done. And I'll celebrate with you.
Join Date: Mar 2015
Location: Washington state
Posts: 209
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
That is just words on paper, which can be changed. Only very slight weasel wording required, perhaps "unless the aircraft is equipped with <something that can be easily added to the MAX>". Electrical codes are full of this sort of exception, in my opinion. I can tell you for sure that NIST standards are. 
What is ironic about this whole debacle is that the rule that MCAS was designed for is intended to prevent stalls which are commonly trained for, and the implementation introduced the possibility of a runaway trim sort of behavior which seems to be an esoteric sort of failure that is so rare that it wasn't deemed worth doing much training on. It seems like sim training on how to avoid the part of the envelope where the force gradient gets wonky, followed by how to recover from the stall if the worst case happens. The second part should be a cakewalk to a professional jet pilot, right? You don't even get an interview if you can't do that, I assume.
What is ironic about this whole debacle is that the rule that MCAS was designed for is intended to prevent stalls which are commonly trained for, and the implementation introduced the possibility of a runaway trim sort of behavior which seems to be an esoteric sort of failure that is so rare that it wasn't deemed worth doing much training on. It seems like sim training on how to avoid the part of the envelope where the force gradient gets wonky, followed by how to recover from the stall if the worst case happens. The second part should be a cakewalk to a professional jet pilot, right? You don't even get an interview if you can't do that, I assume.
Join Date: Apr 2015
Location: Under the radar, over the rainbow
Posts: 788
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Lol. Ok.
So they jet can't fly without it but it was originally designed to? You can't be serious. This is all about same type approval. You don't migrate into hybrid FBW for any other reason.
The jet does not need MCAS except in the high kinetic realm.
if you are correct the MAX is done. And I'll celebrate with you.
So they jet can't fly without it but it was originally designed to? You can't be serious. This is all about same type approval. You don't migrate into hybrid FBW for any other reason.
The jet does not need MCAS except in the high kinetic realm.
if you are correct the MAX is done. And I'll celebrate with you.
Now, there are some who wonder whether MCAS is really an anti-stall system . . .
Join Date: Apr 2015
Location: Under the radar, over the rainbow
Posts: 788
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
That is just words on paper, which can be changed. Only very slight weasel wording required, perhaps "unless the aircraft is equipped with <something that can be easily added to the MAX>". Electrical codes are full of this sort of exception, in my opinion. I can tell you for sure that NIST standards are.
What is ironic about this whole debacle is that the rule that MCAS was designed for is intended to prevent stalls which are commonly trained for, and the implementation introduced the possibility of a runaway trim sort of behavior which seems to be an esoteric sort of failure that is so rare that it wasn't deemed worth doing much training on. It seems like sim training on how to avoid the part of the envelope where the force gradient gets wonky, followed by how to recover from the stall if the worst case happens. The second part should be a cakewalk to a professional jet pilot, right? You don't even get an interview if you can't do that, I assume.
What is ironic about this whole debacle is that the rule that MCAS was designed for is intended to prevent stalls which are commonly trained for, and the implementation introduced the possibility of a runaway trim sort of behavior which seems to be an esoteric sort of failure that is so rare that it wasn't deemed worth doing much training on. It seems like sim training on how to avoid the part of the envelope where the force gradient gets wonky, followed by how to recover from the stall if the worst case happens. The second part should be a cakewalk to a professional jet pilot, right? You don't even get an interview if you can't do that, I assume.
At best, it would have required an exemption to the regulation, which is all but unheard of for flight controls regulation.
N4790P
)
Join Date: Mar 2015
Location: Washington state
Posts: 209
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
If it was part of the right solution, it would not take 20 years to come up with a regulatory fix. It is in nobody's interest (except perhaps China's) to have this fleet remain grounded for a long time, assuming that it is basically a safe aircraft. It would help if the political situation were more normal, but aside from that everybody knows what is going on and what doc fixes are required for this "one time situation". That is much easier to process than regulations/specifications that are supposed to guide several decades of future development.
At least there is acknowledgement of a need for training. that has only taken a little while to permeate through granite like opposition.
An A330 sim changes to an A340, the differences between the NG and MAX for a sim are less, but the displays would be a pain. Making a combi might make sense over time, but in the short term, it is a complication on making Max sims for the masses. QTG data would be interesting to look at, as it would need to show on/off for MCAS presumably. That would answer a lot of interesting questions.
An A330 sim changes to an A340, the differences between the NG and MAX for a sim are less, but the displays would be a pain. Making a combi might make sense over time, but in the short term, it is a complication on making Max sims for the masses. QTG data would be interesting to look at, as it would need to show on/off for MCAS presumably. That would answer a lot of interesting questions.
