Boeing stays firmly on course... to the bottom

[UltraFan]

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/bo...135973.article

Boeing and the US FAA have clashed over a safety modification for Boeing 727s, with the regulator rejecting three attempts by the airframer to have the proposal withdrawn.

Boeing claims the fleet exposure is continuing to decline as a result of ageing and retirements, and that the FAA’s proposals will generate unnecessary costs and will not advance air safety.

The FAA counters that it is obliged to inform about aircraft affected by safety issues, regardless of where they are operated, adding that its determination of the unsafe condition was “not driven” by a fleet risk assessment.

I don't know and, honestly, don't care which of the two unscrupulous organizations are right in this particular case. What amazes me is that, even in the middle of the MAX disaster, Boeing still has the audacity, or, rather, insolence, to juxtapose safety against costs. What ELSE do they need to finally start saving what's left of their reputation?

[The Ancient Geek]

Hmmm - there cant be many 727s with aux tanks still flying and the've not blown yet in many years of service.
Sounds like a storm in a teacup.

[etudiant]

Seems that both organizations are posturing, trying to establish new post Max ground rules. Clearly the FAA would prefer to see its word as law, something Boeing would rather not be the case.

[ATC Watcher]

Boeing points out that 272 aircraft were built with the auxiliary tanks but only six were operated under FAA jurisdiction when the modification was originally proposed.

Does Boeing implies that since the risk extremely low in the USA or in the 6 US registered 727s, it is OK for the others since they are operated outside the US?

[ivor toolbox]

Originally Posted by ATC Watcher

Does Boeing implies that since the risk extremely low in the USA or in the 6 US registered 727s, it is OK for the others since they are operated outside the US?

You said it. I expect Boeing don't want the costs involved in developing a compliant solution to the problem, and would rather it just went away

Ttfn

[lomapaseo]

It's not that it is unsafe today when it was considered safe yesterday. It's just that now years later it looks unsafe in the new eyes of the regulator even though no associated faults have been demonstrated in its limited service life.

Obviously there are many previously certified products out there from all manufacturers that may fit this interpretation, so the issue needs adjudication in fairness. IMO the issue should be treated under continued airworthiness of a certified product where the good experience trumps the what-ifs.

at this time I'm not predicting the outcome but I am disappointed in the suggestions of previous posters that nobody is to be trusted


.

[Dave Therhino]

If you want to see Boeing's comments and see how the FAA actually responded, here's the link to the AD publication. The discussion of the Boeing comments is at the beginning.

http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Gu...2019-23-04.pdf

[Australopithecus]

Reading those comments, and thinking of the issue of a long term latent in-tank fault, I was wondering then why the master MEL could not be revised to require electrical isolation of the in-tank components in the event of an unserviceable condition? Would that not address the issue of a latent fault setting the stage for the then unlikely adjacent ground path fault?

On the other hand: 727. Now wonder why I even care?

[Dave Therhino]

That AD is one of a series of ADs proposed in 2016 for the same design architecture concern on multiple Airbus and Boeing models. The issue is with latent (undiscovered) failures in the wiring inside the tank combined with a hot short to FQIS wiring outside the tank from co-routed power wiring. Not all FQIS in-tank issues result in flight deck effects that trigger troubleshooting. My understanding is that Boeing is considering revising the MEL to do just what you suggest, but that only helps if you know you have a fault.

[Water pilot]

The plane is unsafe, according to the FAA. It is also uneconomical to operate. I'm not sure what Boeing is balking at, it is a relatively small cost to engineer a fix and come up with a cost for it, at which point the few remaining operators will scrap the already uneconomical plane. I would note that the chances of an electrical fault with old wiring that has possibly been exposed to fuel is rather more likely than in a newer aircraft. It may feel like a pointless exercise, but so was estimate that the insurance company had an auto rebuilder generate for my wrecked car, to prove that it was a total loss.

There are millions of tons of products that have been scrapped because they can't meet modern safety requirements and that is a good thing. The world evolves.

I'm not sure why there is a thumbs down above, apologies for a technical error.

[robdean]

This seems to have caused no incidents yet in long service, but on the other hand, given an identified risk, the FAA can hardly be expected to default to waiting until people die before they act.

Originally Posted by Dave Therhino

If you want to see Boeing's comments and see how the FAA actually responded, here's the link to the AD publication. The discussion of the Boeing comments is at the beginning.

http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Gu...2019-23-04.pdf

❝Boeing reported that its system safety assessment determined that the FQIS on the Model 727 airplane does not have an unsafe condition. The FAA disagrees (...) Boeing did not provide specific details about the type of assessment that was performed (total fleet risk, average risk per flight hour, peak individual flight risk, etc.).❞

It seems from the above that a factor here is not just Boeing being cheap about implementation, but being cheap about the case they make to contest implementation, & the FAA insisting that the latter, at least, is not good enough.

[megan]

Todays paper, behind paywall, has an article stating Boeing is using the argument that the MAX accidents are reason to further automate aircraft, because the automated systems overpowered the pilots. Calhoun is quoted as saying in November, "We are going to have to ultimately almost - almost - make these planes fly on their own".

[ATC Watcher]

Originally Posted by megan

Todays paper, behind paywall, has an article stating Boeing is using the argument that the MAX accidents are reason to further automate aircraft, because the automated systems overpowered the pilots. Calhoun is quoted as saying in November, "We are going to have to ultimately almost - almost - make these planes fly on their own".

I fail to understand the logic of that statement in relation with the Max /MCAS. In the Max would have been autonomous , taking the Lion air case, the accident would have occurred a day earlier on the first flight , but not prevented it.

[Kit Sanbumps KG]

Originally Posted by UltraFan

to juxtapose safety against costs

That is what all of us involved in aviation do, every time we fly. There is nothing remarkable about it.

In terms of 'What could the FAA or Boeing best do with the next hour of their time?', this matter wouldn't be on the agenda. Old aircraft like the 727 are much more crash-prone for a million reasons, and addressing a minor issue like this one is, if one does the maths, a pointless waste of time.

[Easy Street]

Originally Posted by ATC Watcher

I fail to understand the logic of that statement in relation with the Max /MCAS. In the Max would have been autonomous , taking the Lion air case, the accident would have occurred a day earlier on the first flight , but not prevented it.

Well, if you don’t have any pilots, you don’t need to worry about stick force gradient (which is where MCAS came in), and with direct control of power and attitude the computers could be programmed to avoid the envelope corners which cause the problem. I’m not saying I agree with the premise, or that the 737 is equipped with sufficient air data sensors to implement in this case, but there is at least some logic there.

[MechEngr]

Seems like the FAA can issue an AD telling operators to deactivate the tanks.They could even ground all the affected aircraft until the deactivation is confirmed. Done. All of the operating aircraft are now safe.

If users care to sue Boeing for some compensation then that sets the economic incentive to generate a solution. If that is not enough incentive, then it will moot the issue of creating a fix.

[Hot 'n' High]

Originally Posted by Kit Sanbumps KG

...... In terms of 'What could the FAA or Boeing best do with the next hour of their time?', this matter wouldn't be on the agenda. Old aircraft like the 727 are much more crash-prone for a million reasons, and addressing a minor issue like this one is, if one does the maths, a pointless waste of time.

Not arguing either way on the point you made Kit, just a more general observation really. When did this first come to light? Reading Page 2 of the AD, it states ".... At the time of the unsafe condition determination [which seems to imply the discovery of the general issue with the FQIS] in April 2003, Boeing acknowledged that the Model 727 body-mounted auxiliary fuel tanks are high-flammability fuel tanks" but I think the actual 727 analysis was completed in 2016 - "The NPRM published in the Federal Register on September 23, 2016 (81 FR65579). The NPRM was prompted by the FAA's analysis of the Model 727 fuel system review conducted by the manufacturer.". Now an AD in early 2020 despite the Boeing request to withdraw the NPRM.

A case of someone being asked to see what other potential skeletons relating to Boeing products there are hidden in the FAA files - maybe the FAA checking in their 6 o'clock?

[Harley Quinn]

Isn't this issue similar to what is thought to have brought TWA800 down? As a layperson I wouldn't be surprised to learn this system was similar to that in the ill-fated 747.

[MechEngr]

Originally Posted by Harley Quinn

Isn't this issue similar to what is thought to have brought TWA800 down? As a layperson I wouldn't be surprised to learn this system was similar to that in the ill-fated 747.

It could be; however TWA 800 had the misfortune of the crew pumping the fuel out of the suspect tank, thereby admitting a large amount of air which created an explosive mixture. As long as that rapid emptying isn't done then the situation should not repeat. Notwithstanding, the ignition source should not have been available on TWA 800.

However this is not much different than automobiles which mostly use a submerged electric pump with an electric fuel level sensor in the gasoline tanks and it generally doesn't cause a problem as the fuel vapor pressure is high enough to exclude the oxygen rich air.

[fergusd]

Originally Posted by megan

Todays paper, behind paywall, has an article stating Boeing is using the argument that the MAX accidents are reason to further automate aircraft, because the automated systems overpowered the pilots. Calhoun is quoted as saying in November, "We are going to have to ultimately almost - almost - make these planes fly on their own".

Why wouldn't you, if you could ? . . . properly designed (and there's the catch) automated systems don't make mistakes, don't get tired, don't drink or take drugs, don't have only 200 hours experience and have never actually flown an aircraft. don't have any of the other aspects of normal human life that effect performance, kids, wives, money issues, they don't need trained, they are 100% capable every day, week, year . . . so if you can make them, they will probably be safer, and they could be proven to be safer mathematically . . .

Boeings human/hybrid approach is demonstrably problematic.