Atlas Air 3591 NTSB Public Docket Opened
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Really? So he was hired for his ability on merit? I think the record clearly indicates otherwise.
From earlier in this thread:
As I mused here earlier:
The FO's family has sued claiming that the plane and his Atlas training did not prevent the crash.
https://www.businessinsider.com/amaz...ots-sue-2019-9
Anyway, I expect that the NTSB will be mystified as to why such a horrible training record was repeatedly overlooked by multiple employers. And, until a freighter hits a city, there will be 'no significant loss of life' in these mishaps with good aircraft and poor pilots.
From earlier in this thread:
The FO, given his egregious history of abysmal flying capacity and ineptitude (which I will paste below), had a documented track record of overreacting in unreasonable, irrational ways to 'stalling' states of aircraft by pushing the nose forward past any remotely reasonable degree of 'recovery'. He was documented to freak the F out when startled in precisely THESE type of situations, as has been documented. He should have never been in the seat that fateful day, and didn't deserve to [be].
Training Incompetency and Failures
Past Training Notes (directly quoted from the NTSB Docket)
The quote that stands out the most to me in this second Mesa instructor interview is, "When asked if Conrad would get startled in the simulator, he said that during one stall recovery, Conrad pitched down about 40 degrees for recovery, then a pitch up about 20 degrees. His flight path was all over the place."
Training Incompetency and Failures
- 6/27/11 - Resigned from CommutAir for failing DHC-8 initial
- 8/13/12 - Resigned from Air Wisconsin for failing CRJ initial
- 4/22/14 - Failed EMB-145 Oral at Trans State Airlines
- 5/11/14 - Failed EMB-145 Type Rating at Trans States Airlines
- 5/17 - Failed EMB-175 Upgrade Attempt at Mesa Airlines
- 5/17 - Nearly failed FO Requal after failing upgrade attempt at Mesa Airlines
- 7/27/17 - Failed B-767 Oral at Atlas Air
- 8/1/17 - Unsat Judgement/Situational Awareness during FBS-1 at Atlas Air
- 8/5/17 - Failed DBS-5 at Atlas Air
- 8/11/17 - Almost Failed FFSI-1 at Atlas Air
- 8/31/17 - "Regression of Situational Awareness" during FFSI-3 at Atlas Air
- 9/22/17 - Failed B-767 Type Rating for "Very Low Situational Awareness", incomplete procedures, and exceeding limitations at Atlas Air
Past Training Notes (directly quoted from the NTSB Docket)
- Air Wisconsin CRJ Initial Failure - "They were conducting the emergency procedure cabin altitude ... where they are at FL350 or so, and he gives the students a cabin altitude message requiring an emergency descent to 10,000 feet" ... "Conrad then goes to descend the simulator. He was not sure of Conrad's background, but instead of descending on the autopilot, Conrad disengaged the autopilot and abruptly pitched down well below horizon. They got stick shaker and overspeed alert together. He was not sure if it was an extreme nose down, but remembered that it was abrupt input on the controls"
- Mesa Airlines ERJ-175 Upgrade Failure (Instructor 1) - "He had previously failed simulator lesson 2 with different instructor, and he had requested a different instructor. She was conducting his retraining for lesson 2. She said his performance was a "train wreck" and he performed very poorly in this lesson. In the briefing room he did well, and explained things well. However, in the simulator and something he wasn't expecting happened he got extremely flustered and could not respond appropriately to the situation." ... "When asked about her comment in her notes about Conrad's "lack of understanding of how unsafe he was," she said he was making very frantic mistakes, lots and lots of mistakes, and did a lot of things wrong but did not recognize this was a problem. He thought he was a good pilot never had any problems and thought he should be a captain. he could not evaluate himself and see that he did not have the right stuff."
- Mesa Airlines ERJ-175 Upgrade Failure (Instructor 2) - "He first met Conrad Aska during a recurrent checking event in March 2016. That session went ok and nothing stood out. He did have some trouble with the stall series. The problems were with his attitude control, and he had a hard time getting the airplane back to level flight" ... "He said when Conrad would make a mistake in training he had an excuse for everything"
The quote that stands out the most to me in this second Mesa instructor interview is, "When asked if Conrad would get startled in the simulator, he said that during one stall recovery, Conrad pitched down about 40 degrees for recovery, then a pitch up about 20 degrees. His flight path was all over the place."
Will the NTSB address these multiple training failures with a call for higher employment standards for transport category pilots? Or will they call for even more remedial training for those folks who can't do the job?
Similarly, is an occasional crash just the price we pay for overlooking a horrible training record in an effort to embrace a broader workplace recruitment demographic?
Things seemed to tighten up around the training building at many places after the Colgan crash for those 'frequent flyers' in the sims who never passed their checkrides without a lot of additional instruction. 709 rides were given by the FAA and a few of the legacy problem children quietly negotiated non-contractual early retirements and cash settlements in lieu of company provided training to get their tickets back.
The 1996 Pilot Records Improvement Act (PRIA) was intended to flag imposters and folks with training issues prior to hiring. Unfortunately, the current custom seems to be to offer a pilot being terminated for cause a chance to resign to avoid further litigation. The union and in many cases gender and ethnic advocacy groups cut a deal with the company and nothing adverse shows up on the PRIA record.
Similarly, is an occasional crash just the price we pay for overlooking a horrible training record in an effort to embrace a broader workplace recruitment demographic?
Things seemed to tighten up around the training building at many places after the Colgan crash for those 'frequent flyers' in the sims who never passed their checkrides without a lot of additional instruction. 709 rides were given by the FAA and a few of the legacy problem children quietly negotiated non-contractual early retirements and cash settlements in lieu of company provided training to get their tickets back.
The 1996 Pilot Records Improvement Act (PRIA) was intended to flag imposters and folks with training issues prior to hiring. Unfortunately, the current custom seems to be to offer a pilot being terminated for cause a chance to resign to avoid further litigation. The union and in many cases gender and ethnic advocacy groups cut a deal with the company and nothing adverse shows up on the PRIA record.
The surviving family of Aska, who died at 44, claims in a new lawsuit that negligence from Atlas Air and Amazon, as well as Florida-based companies F&E Aircraft Maintenance and Flightstar Aircraft Services, "directly and proximately caused the death" of the pilot. The family is suing the four companies in a lawsuit filed on Sept. 19 in the 11th Circuit Court for the State of Florida.
Atlas Air, which is contracted to fly Amazon Air's planes along with air cargo company ATSG, employed Aska. The company, according to the federal suit, "owed a duty to the decedent to maintain and use the subject aircraft with the highest degree of care, including a nondelegable duty to ensure its airworthiness, and to exercise the highest degree of care to prevent injury of any kind."
The airline also failed to ensure pilots were well-trained or well-rested, the suit states. The lawsuit claims that Amazon also played a role in those actions.
Atlas Air, which is contracted to fly Amazon Air's planes along with air cargo company ATSG, employed Aska. The company, according to the federal suit, "owed a duty to the decedent to maintain and use the subject aircraft with the highest degree of care, including a nondelegable duty to ensure its airworthiness, and to exercise the highest degree of care to prevent injury of any kind."
The airline also failed to ensure pilots were well-trained or well-rested, the suit states. The lawsuit claims that Amazon also played a role in those actions.
Anyway, I expect that the NTSB will be mystified as to why such a horrible training record was repeatedly overlooked by multiple employers. And, until a freighter hits a city, there will be 'no significant loss of life' in these mishaps with good aircraft and poor pilots.
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Funny how this hasn't turned into multiple thread-pages of rambling about how in a Boeing the captain cold see the yoke move or how he could guide with tactile feedback.
I guess we call all agree on there being too many people flying airliners these days, who have no business sitting at the pointy end of those vehicles.
Hopefully the covid-standdown can do something to purge the bad apples.
I guess we call all agree on there being too many people flying airliners these days, who have no business sitting at the pointy end of those vehicles.
Hopefully the covid-standdown can do something to purge the bad apples.
Nope!
It will purge the expensive apples and the cheaper ones will be retained regardless of how good they are!
So it will, in fact, result in a higher percentage of bad apples amongst what's left.
Plus they'll be out of practice and under more stress than normal.
But I'm sure that it will all be fine!
It will purge the expensive apples and the cheaper ones will be retained regardless of how good they are!
So it will, in fact, result in a higher percentage of bad apples amongst what's left.
Plus they'll be out of practice and under more stress than normal.
But I'm sure that it will all be fine!
de minimus non curat lex
The UK equivalent would be to say that they owed a “Duty of Care” to him, and given his appalling airline training record ( treat him as ‘Egg shells’ ) his prospects of a career as as airline pilot should have been brought to an end. By whom and when...? Hindsight is a wonderful thing.
Using the US legal logic, I would have thought the family lawyers would also take aim at the flight school(s) who allowed him to progress and achieve his CPL/IR.
Perhaps even at the FAA and the examiner as well for licence issue?
His flight school training records will be very revealing; of that I am certain.
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Agree. On the other hand, if the family is in financial trouble since then, I accept them seeking for a good settlement, and then ...
... Amazon is the most wealthy party in this constellation. A Flight School seems to be less "attactive".
... I would have thought the family lawyers would also take aim at the flight school(s) who allowed him to progress and achieve his CPL/IR.
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Surely if anybody is to sue it would be the captain’s family?
He was entirely failed by the company in that they provided him with a colleague who’s poor skill (that was assessed as being adequate by somebody in Atlas) actually killed him. Don’t we all trust that the person sitting beside us is of a certain standard? Don’t companies have a duty of care to provide us with colleagues who meet set requirements? Was the captain a line training captain in which case some requirements were waived? I found no mention of this.
He was entirely failed by the company in that they provided him with a colleague who’s poor skill (that was assessed as being adequate by somebody in Atlas) actually killed him. Don’t we all trust that the person sitting beside us is of a certain standard? Don’t companies have a duty of care to provide us with colleagues who meet set requirements? Was the captain a line training captain in which case some requirements were waived? I found no mention of this.
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Nope!
It will purge the expensive apples and the cheaper ones will be retained regardless of how good they are!
So it will, in fact, result in a higher percentage of bad apples amongst what's left.
Plus they'll be out of practice and under more stress than normal.
But I'm sure that it will all be fine!
It will purge the expensive apples and the cheaper ones will be retained regardless of how good they are!
So it will, in fact, result in a higher percentage of bad apples amongst what's left.
Plus they'll be out of practice and under more stress than normal.
But I'm sure that it will all be fine!
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parkfell, certainly there are odd and even inexplicable (sometimes) things about the law courts and overall legal system, in the U.S. Still, I'd want to read the complaint in this case (assuming it's been filed) before trying to say anything useful with regard to the most significant question in the largest context relevant here: what claims and what plan of attack is best calculated to reach into, or at least toward, the deep pocket (Amazon)? Of course serving the client's interests is the central question but that's just the root; there are lots of branches.
As a side note, ordinarily in litigation the discovery process is dull, drab and boring. But once in a while really juicy, even captivating stuff is known to be "out there"....a 'train wreck', I read somewhere? Hmm, could that be tied to the Railway Labor Act, which governs airline labor relations?
As a side note, ordinarily in litigation the discovery process is dull, drab and boring. But once in a while really juicy, even captivating stuff is known to be "out there"....a 'train wreck', I read somewhere? Hmm, could that be tied to the Railway Labor Act, which governs airline labor relations?
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I'm just an slf so do you mind if I interject to ask a question to see if I've followed this right?
The theory is that GA was commanded accidentally and somatogravic illusion caused the PF to interpret the forward acceleration as upward acceleration causing him to respond by pitching the a/c down. And the PM didn't rescue that error in time.
Is that roughly it?
Thanks
The theory is that GA was commanded accidentally and somatogravic illusion caused the PF to interpret the forward acceleration as upward acceleration causing him to respond by pitching the a/c down. And the PM didn't rescue that error in time.
Is that roughly it?
Thanks
If the F/O had been perfectly competent but had had a seizure or other such rapid onset medical issue, the Capt would have had to take control, so why not in this case?
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Though without hitting the law books to see if my recollection suffers from a gap, I do not recall any case law precedent for one pilot's surviving family members suing based on a theory of failure to provide a competent second pilot. Maybe such a precedent does exist (I'm doubtful).
This is equivocal because it indulges patience of qualified posters enough to be a lawyer on this forum in the first place. So without something more definite to work from, no comment on possible legal theories for such putative claims.
This is equivocal because it indulges patience of qualified posters enough to be a lawyer on this forum in the first place. So without something more definite to work from, no comment on possible legal theories for such putative claims.
Drain Bamaged
Uplinker
Assuming the Captain would have recovered relatively quickly the onset, then what?
What about the F/O, given another life extension under the cover of "More training!?"
Or finally fired?
I know, insight is a wonderful thing.
Assuming the Captain would have recovered relatively quickly the onset, then what?
What about the F/O, given another life extension under the cover of "More training!?"
Or finally fired?
I know, insight is a wonderful thing.
de minimus non curat lex
Without putting too fine a point on it, Aska was less than honest when disclosing his “track record”.
Why might that be? I don’t think you need to have a particularly high IQ to work that one out.
So based on ‘incomplete information’ a decision was taken to hire him.
Q: had full and complete disclosure occurred, would he have been hired?
Clearly this omission must be regarded as at least a chink in the armour of the family’s case?
Despite his shortcomings and repeat / additional training he did complete the course as prescribed by the FAA, the Regulatory body. So by definition, his training was regarded as adequate by the Regulator otherwise he would not have been permitted to operate.
As tragic as it was on that fateful day, he had been adequately trained.
As to why he took that particular course of action is something the psychologists will need to ponder.
If any family needs to feel aggrieved, it is that of the Captain and the other crew on board.
I presume that company “death in service” benefit exists.
As someone who has attended two Fatal Accident Inquiries in Scotland, (The rest of the UK have Inquests) as a witness (aircraft crashes) and a subsequent High Court action, the law, conducted by non aviators, can be an interesting process to observe.
Why might that be? I don’t think you need to have a particularly high IQ to work that one out.
So based on ‘incomplete information’ a decision was taken to hire him.
Q: had full and complete disclosure occurred, would he have been hired?
Clearly this omission must be regarded as at least a chink in the armour of the family’s case?
Despite his shortcomings and repeat / additional training he did complete the course as prescribed by the FAA, the Regulatory body. So by definition, his training was regarded as adequate by the Regulator otherwise he would not have been permitted to operate.
As tragic as it was on that fateful day, he had been adequately trained.
As to why he took that particular course of action is something the psychologists will need to ponder.
If any family needs to feel aggrieved, it is that of the Captain and the other crew on board.
I presume that company “death in service” benefit exists.
As someone who has attended two Fatal Accident Inquiries in Scotland, (The rest of the UK have Inquests) as a witness (aircraft crashes) and a subsequent High Court action, the law, conducted by non aviators, can be an interesting process to observe.
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Uplinker
The captain was talking to ATC at this point, perhaps writing something down? Looking at his chart? (There appears to be minor confusion about whether they are on HDG or LNAV), could have been looking at navaids to adjust? Anyhow after the FO does yank the controls forward, the captain does respond by pulling up - but the FO countered throughout, right until the end when yelling from the jumpseat appeared to make him stop.
There is always startle factor etc, however that does not justify the fact that the causal factor of this incident was an incompetent pilot nosediving an aircraft to the ground. If I were the captain’s family I would want answers anyway.
The captain was talking to ATC at this point, perhaps writing something down? Looking at his chart? (There appears to be minor confusion about whether they are on HDG or LNAV), could have been looking at navaids to adjust? Anyhow after the FO does yank the controls forward, the captain does respond by pulling up - but the FO countered throughout, right until the end when yelling from the jumpseat appeared to make him stop.
There is always startle factor etc, however that does not justify the fact that the causal factor of this incident was an incompetent pilot nosediving an aircraft to the ground. If I were the captain’s family I would want answers anyway.
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I have been a trial attorney in Texas for 40 years this year. I know nothing about flying but for what I’ve learned from the good pilots here. But I do know the courtroom. This is how it will go down: The estates of the three deceased will sue the other estates. All estates will sue Atlas, Amazon and Boeing, and probably a host of others. It’s all about insurance. The case will never go to trial, and it won’t be a decision made by Atlas, Amazon or Boeing, et al. The insurers will settle it out of court and probably during court ordered mediation. Ninety-three percent, if not more, of cases settle out of court now. Arguments will be made back and forth by the lawyers as to culpability and percentages of negligence, but it will boil down to dollars and who you have hired as your attorney. And this city (Houston) has a plethora of tort attorneys that you wouldn’t want your worst enemy to meet in a courtroom. Trust me on this.
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A320LGW
I’ll accept that the CA may have been distracted by something else, but he wouldn’t have been writing for very long. Isn’t this the accident where the pushover was well into the negative g’s?
If I’m not mistaken, and it is, the CA would have noticed immediately. The question is, why did it take him so long to realise the pitch and the control column position were inappropriate?
I’ll accept that the CA may have been distracted by something else, but he wouldn’t have been writing for very long. Isn’t this the accident where the pushover was well into the negative g’s?
If I’m not mistaken, and it is, the CA would have noticed immediately. The question is, why did it take him so long to realise the pitch and the control column position were inappropriate?
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I suppose this from the report may partially explain why:
“The captain was busy setting up the approach and communicating with ATC causing him to detect the airplane status with delay. Although the first officer's motions caught the attention of the captain the captain did not intervene. Delays are normal due to startle effect and surprise, the captain pulled on the control column but did not announce a control transfer.“
“The captain was busy setting up the approach and communicating with ATC causing him to detect the airplane status with delay. Although the first officer's motions caught the attention of the captain the captain did not intervene. Delays are normal due to startle effect and surprise, the captain pulled on the control column but did not announce a control transfer.“
A320LGW "If I were the captain’s family I would want answers anyway."
Fair enough. I am not exclusively blaming the Captain, it seems that both pilots were culpable. However, the Captain was the PM, and he was........the captain. So he had two reasons to be monitoring his F/O, and Capt appeared to react slowly in this case, (though it is not very clear to me).
When reading a chart or inputting data, I still glance at the PFD every 10 seconds or so - either mine or his; whichever is closest to my eye-line at the time, and it is rarely out of my peripheral vision. (As we do by checking a car rear-view mirror every 10s or so when driving). In addition, if there was a sudden pitch change, or a sudden change in engine thrust while my eyes were down, I would instantly look up to see what was happening. Ditto if I was making a radio call.
I am curious though, how it is known that the F/O was pushing the yoke and the Captain was pulling? The two are mechanically joined with a shear pin, so would move together until the pin broke, (as happened I believe). Are there force sensors on each yoke to record who was pushing or pulling, and if so how do they work when the shear pin is in?
It also seems to say in the report that the Captain accidentally pressed the TOGA switch. How is it known who pressed the switch?
Fair enough. I am not exclusively blaming the Captain, it seems that both pilots were culpable. However, the Captain was the PM, and he was........the captain. So he had two reasons to be monitoring his F/O, and Capt appeared to react slowly in this case, (though it is not very clear to me).
When reading a chart or inputting data, I still glance at the PFD every 10 seconds or so - either mine or his; whichever is closest to my eye-line at the time, and it is rarely out of my peripheral vision. (As we do by checking a car rear-view mirror every 10s or so when driving). In addition, if there was a sudden pitch change, or a sudden change in engine thrust while my eyes were down, I would instantly look up to see what was happening. Ditto if I was making a radio call.
I am curious though, how it is known that the F/O was pushing the yoke and the Captain was pulling? The two are mechanically joined with a shear pin, so would move together until the pin broke, (as happened I believe). Are there force sensors on each yoke to record who was pushing or pulling, and if so how do they work when the shear pin is in?
It also seems to say in the report that the Captain accidentally pressed the TOGA switch. How is it known who pressed the switch?
Last edited by Uplinker; 22nd Jul 2020 at 08:43.