Atlas Air 3591 NTSB Public Docket Opened
Wow, things went from perfect day to total loss in just 32 seconds 
If I interpret this correctly (and add the Bert Botta quote to the equation), the captain realized what just happened but he couldn't do anything about it (no comms -> shear pin -> no control), and by the time FO got the hang of it, it was inevitably too late.
Actually: based on Bert Botta quote above, there was nothing they could've done anyway at the point captain grabbed the controls, due to lack of altitude.
If I interpret this correctly (and add the Bert Botta quote to the equation), the captain realized what just happened but he couldn't do anything about it (no comms -> shear pin -> no control), and by the time FO got the hang of it, it was inevitably too late.
Actually: based on Bert Botta quote above, there was nothing they could've done anyway at the point captain grabbed the controls, due to lack of altitude.
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Just a GA pilot here, but if the two yokes were going opposite ways, why does the captains yoke shear pin break and why not the shear pin on the first officer's yoke? Would it not make sense to assume that the captain is most likely more experienced and more apt to be making the proper (or desired) inputs over the first officer (except when training)?
Just as in this case, if the first officer makes an incorrect control movement that requires opposite correction by the captain, would it not make more sense for the system to lock out the first officer's yoke and leave control with the captain?
Just as in this case, if the first officer makes an incorrect control movement that requires opposite correction by the captain, would it not make more sense for the system to lock out the first officer's yoke and leave control with the captain?
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Just a GA pilot here, but if the two yokes were going opposite ways, why does the captains yoke shear pin break and why not the shear pin on the first officer's yoke? Would it not make sense to assume that the captain is most likely more experienced and more apt to be making the proper (or desired) inputs over the first officer (except when training)?
Just as in this case, if the first officer makes an incorrect control movement that requires opposite correction by the captain, would it not make more sense for the system to lock out the first officer's yoke and leave control with the captain?
Just as in this case, if the first officer makes an incorrect control movement that requires opposite correction by the captain, would it not make more sense for the system to lock out the first officer's yoke and leave control with the captain?
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To add to that, the Captain is not always more experienced (although, it is a general rule of thumb). In addition, the failure may be on the captain’s side.
Also, occasionally the PIC will be in the right seat.
Also, occasionally the PIC will be in the right seat.
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Given all that information now, and the fact that the FO had poor training records and washouts at Atlas and also with previous employers, what exactly is the point of the FO‘s family suing Amazon?
There seems to be no indication of any aircraft malfunction, caused by negligence and sloppy maintenance.
There seems to be no indication of any aircraft malfunction, caused by negligence and sloppy maintenance.
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Wait, why was GA mode activated?
And because of the acceleration perceived as a pitch up the FO pushed the nose down?
Why did the FO think the AC was stalling? Was this before or after the activation of GA?
confused here..
And because of the acceleration perceived as a pitch up the FO pushed the nose down?
Why did the FO think the AC was stalling? Was this before or after the activation of GA?
confused here..
Wait, why was GA mode activated? By accident apparently?
And because of the acceleration perceived as a pitch up the FO pushed the nose down? Apparently, yes
Why did the FO think the AC was stalling? Was this before or after the activation of GA? After, based on the combined timeline of CVR transcript and FDR data.
And because of the acceleration perceived as a pitch up the FO pushed the nose down? Apparently, yes
Why did the FO think the AC was stalling? Was this before or after the activation of GA? After, based on the combined timeline of CVR transcript and FDR data.
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I’m also confused about the “stall” comment. The maximum pitch recorded after GA was annunciated was 5 deg ANU. His training records, and comments from prior trainers are interesting to read.
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STOP saying the yoke “shear pin” broke. For the love of god, the system doesn’t have a yoke shear pin, the system has shear rivets at the PCUs that power the elevator, and a force breakout mechanism between the two yokes. Nothing on this airplane broke. The entire control system worked how it was designed. There is a breakout mechanism between the two yokes, not a shear pin. It’s to mitigate a control jam. When a certain amount of opposite force is applied by fo or capt, you get an elevator split.
Additionally, only captains side column position is recorded on this bird. These older cargo planes only have to record 34 parameters. If you want to “see” what the fo was doing with his controls you would have to back it out from the amount of elevator split.
stop repeating this pilot rumor nonsense that a non existent shear pin broke and the jump seater hit the ceiling. None of this is in any of the factual reports released.
Additionally, only captains side column position is recorded on this bird. These older cargo planes only have to record 34 parameters. If you want to “see” what the fo was doing with his controls you would have to back it out from the amount of elevator split.
stop repeating this pilot rumor nonsense that a non existent shear pin broke and the jump seater hit the ceiling. None of this is in any of the factual reports released.
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Just a GA pilot here, but if the two yokes were going opposite ways, why does the captains yoke shear pin break and why not the shear pin on the first officer's yoke? Would it not make sense to assume that the captain is most likely more experienced and more apt to be making the proper (or desired) inputs over the first officer (except when training)?
Just as in this case, if the first officer makes an incorrect control movement that requires opposite correction by the captain, would it not make more sense for the system to lock out the first officer's yoke and leave control with the captain?
Just as in this case, if the first officer makes an incorrect control movement that requires opposite correction by the captain, would it not make more sense for the system to lock out the first officer's yoke and leave control with the captain?
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when the shear pin breaks the control columns operate the elevators of there respective sides, so in this instance the FO’s elevator would have been deflected down whist the Capt who was pulling back would have deflected his upwards, once the fo realize what was actually happening he then was able to pull nose up on his!
From my earlier post on a closed thread:
Here's a description of the B-763 control column operation with one side jammed from page 12 of the MS990 NTSB accident report:
The captains and first officers control columns have authority to command full travel of the elevators under most flight conditions and normally work together as one system. However, the two sides of the system can be commanded independently because of override mechanisms at the control columns and aft quadrant. Therefore, if one side of the system becomes immobilized, control column inputs on the operational side can cause full travel of the nonfailed elevator. In addition, in many cases, control column inputs on the operational side can also result in nearly full travel of the elevator on the failed side through the override mechanisms. The elevator PCAs are installed with compressible links located between each bellcrank assembly and PCA input control rod to provide a means of isolating a jammed PCA, thus allowing the pilots to retain control of that elevator surface through its two remaining (unjammed) PCAs
From the Performance Report in the recently released docket:
Figure 7 shows an elevator split between the left and right sides of the airplane: the left elevator is associated with the captain in the left seat, and the right elevator is associated with the first officer in the right seat. The elevator deflections are similar until about 1238:46. At that time, the first officer is heard asking a question about airspeed on the CVR, and the elevators begin to split: the captain begins to pull from 2˚ to 8˚ more ANU elevator than the first officer. The split continues until about 1238:56, about one second after the airplane would have broken out of the reported 3,500 ft cloud layer. Both the captain and the first officer subsequently commanded ANU elevator until impact. (The normal load factor recorded by the FDR in Figure 6 is greater than 4g right before impact.)
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An article from Air Cargo News:
https://www.aircargonews.net/airline...mystery-click/
Atlas 767 crash: Go-around mode activated after mystery ‘click’
20 / 12 / 2019
By David Kaminski-Morrow - Flight Global
Investigators probing the fatal Atlas Air Boeing 767-300 freighter crash near Houston have been trying to ascertain whether a sound captured on the cockpit-voice recorder signifies the activation of the go-around switch immediately before the accident sequence.
The aircraft, which was flying on behalf of Amazon Air, suddenly entered a steep nose-down attitude and dived into Trinity Bay from around 6,000ft while preparing for an approach to Houston on February 23.
National Transportation Safety Board investigators have released detailed information on the cockpit-voice and flight-data recordings, as well as a spectral analysis of certain sounds in the cockpit.
Cockpit conversation indicates that the flight was progressing normally, with a call to start extending the flaps heard some 60s before the impact.
But just under 30s after this “flaps 1” call, and shortly after the jet encountered moderate turbulence, the recorder picks up the sound of a click, the origin of which has been of particular interest to the inquiry.
The time alignment of the click, it says, matched flight-data recorder information showing activation of the go-around mode.
Spectral analysis has been conducted to try to establish the likely source of the sound. Although the recording quality was poor, investigators have used filtering and detailed comparison with the double-click of a 767 go-around button being pushed and released to try to identify the noise.
The inquiry says the mysterious click on the cockpit recorder “shares a similar characteristic” to the go-around button activation, and that it “could potentially be associated” with the release portion of the double-click.
“However, it cannot be conclusively determined if it is the same sound due to the degraded quality of the [recording] at the time of the sound detection,” it stated.
Accompanying documentation, however, suggests the inquiry is convinced that a go-around switch on the throttle levers was triggered. The accident sequence developed rapidly afterwards.
Simultaneously with the click, the autoflight system entered go-around mode – which had been armed when the flaps were deployed – and the engine thrust began advancing to the go-around setting.
Flight-data recorder information shows the aircraft started pitching up and entered a shallow climb.
The 767’s control column moved to a forward deflection, with the pitch decreasing and the aircraft accelerating rapidly from 240kt.
Caution alarms began to sound, just 9s after the go-around mode engaged. The inquiry says the control column remained deflected forward for 10s and the aircraft transitioned from a shallow climb to a steep descent.
Five seconds after the alarm commenced, one of the pilots exclaimed, “Whoa”, and shortly afterwards, in an elevated voice: “Where’s my speed, my speed”. Three seconds later, a voice loudly declared: “We’re stalling.”
Flight-data recordings reveal that, during these remarks, the thrust levers were brought to idle for about 2s and then were advanced again to their previous power setting. The aircraft’s pitch rapidly declined and the jet experienced negative g-forces for nearly 11s.
Investigators have disclosed that the recording shows the right and left elevators were split – by 2° to 7° – for some 10s beginning around the point of the “we’re stalling” remark.
The aircraft continued to dive through 2,000ft altitude at which point the flight-data recorder showed the control column being moved full aft until the end of the recording.
Although pitch recovered from 50° nose-down to 16° nose-down, the dive could not be arrested in time and the aircraft struck the water at over 430kt. None of the three occupants survived.
Investigators have yet to draw conclusions over the circumstances and contributing factors to the accident.
Meanwhile, Atlas Air and Amazon.com Services are among the companies named in a lawsuit filed by the brother of one of the pilots, Elliott Aska, killed in the tragic B767 freighter accident earlier this year.
20 / 12 / 2019
By David Kaminski-Morrow - Flight Global
Investigators probing the fatal Atlas Air Boeing 767-300 freighter crash near Houston have been trying to ascertain whether a sound captured on the cockpit-voice recorder signifies the activation of the go-around switch immediately before the accident sequence.
The aircraft, which was flying on behalf of Amazon Air, suddenly entered a steep nose-down attitude and dived into Trinity Bay from around 6,000ft while preparing for an approach to Houston on February 23.
National Transportation Safety Board investigators have released detailed information on the cockpit-voice and flight-data recordings, as well as a spectral analysis of certain sounds in the cockpit.
Cockpit conversation indicates that the flight was progressing normally, with a call to start extending the flaps heard some 60s before the impact.
But just under 30s after this “flaps 1” call, and shortly after the jet encountered moderate turbulence, the recorder picks up the sound of a click, the origin of which has been of particular interest to the inquiry.
The time alignment of the click, it says, matched flight-data recorder information showing activation of the go-around mode.
Spectral analysis has been conducted to try to establish the likely source of the sound. Although the recording quality was poor, investigators have used filtering and detailed comparison with the double-click of a 767 go-around button being pushed and released to try to identify the noise.
The inquiry says the mysterious click on the cockpit recorder “shares a similar characteristic” to the go-around button activation, and that it “could potentially be associated” with the release portion of the double-click.
“However, it cannot be conclusively determined if it is the same sound due to the degraded quality of the [recording] at the time of the sound detection,” it stated.
Accompanying documentation, however, suggests the inquiry is convinced that a go-around switch on the throttle levers was triggered. The accident sequence developed rapidly afterwards.
Simultaneously with the click, the autoflight system entered go-around mode – which had been armed when the flaps were deployed – and the engine thrust began advancing to the go-around setting.
Flight-data recorder information shows the aircraft started pitching up and entered a shallow climb.
The 767’s control column moved to a forward deflection, with the pitch decreasing and the aircraft accelerating rapidly from 240kt.
Caution alarms began to sound, just 9s after the go-around mode engaged. The inquiry says the control column remained deflected forward for 10s and the aircraft transitioned from a shallow climb to a steep descent.
Five seconds after the alarm commenced, one of the pilots exclaimed, “Whoa”, and shortly afterwards, in an elevated voice: “Where’s my speed, my speed”. Three seconds later, a voice loudly declared: “We’re stalling.”
Flight-data recordings reveal that, during these remarks, the thrust levers were brought to idle for about 2s and then were advanced again to their previous power setting. The aircraft’s pitch rapidly declined and the jet experienced negative g-forces for nearly 11s.
Investigators have disclosed that the recording shows the right and left elevators were split – by 2° to 7° – for some 10s beginning around the point of the “we’re stalling” remark.
The aircraft continued to dive through 2,000ft altitude at which point the flight-data recorder showed the control column being moved full aft until the end of the recording.
Although pitch recovered from 50° nose-down to 16° nose-down, the dive could not be arrested in time and the aircraft struck the water at over 430kt. None of the three occupants survived.
Investigators have yet to draw conclusions over the circumstances and contributing factors to the accident.
Meanwhile, Atlas Air and Amazon.com Services are among the companies named in a lawsuit filed by the brother of one of the pilots, Elliott Aska, killed in the tragic B767 freighter accident earlier this year.
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I liken this to AA587, where excessive rudder inputs were used, resulting in the vertical stabiliser tearing off. In a swept wing aircraft, an agg.ressive rudder input will result in a sharp roll, which could be mistaken for a stall and wing-drop. And the cure for a wing drp stall, is an agg,ressive opposite rudder input, which simply drops the other wing. And so you get a rudder-reversal, because of another misperception of a stall.
And AF447 is not dissimilar to these two incidents. And all caused by first officers, who seem to lack basic training in light aircraft.
It seems clear to me that ALL first officers should complete a two week gliding course, perhaps after their first year of commercial flying, where they can learn basic stick and rudder skills, and to correctly identify a stall and instinctively react to it. In the 21st century, we should not have first officers who...
Think that zero g at high speed is a stall.
Think that a wing drop at high speed is a stall.
Think that pulling 20 degrees of pitch at 35,000 ft is NOT a stall.
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