Atlas Air 3591 NTSB Public Docket Opened
Technical aspects which I may have missed in previous posts.
In the 767, to what extent does the autopilot / auto trim respond to pilot override with stick input.
Will the auto trim oppose inappropriate pilot stick input and trim in the opposite direction.
What is the auto trim datum in GA mode - speed.
Was the ATH engaged, Did the thrust increase with GA selection.
What thrust change, if any, might be seen if GA mode is selected but the ATH not engaged.
Does the FDR record stick position directly, or is this inferred fom the elevator psition.
In the 767, to what extent does the autopilot / auto trim respond to pilot override with stick input.
Will the auto trim oppose inappropriate pilot stick input and trim in the opposite direction.
What is the auto trim datum in GA mode - speed.
Was the ATH engaged, Did the thrust increase with GA selection.
What thrust change, if any, might be seen if GA mode is selected but the ATH not engaged.
Does the FDR record stick position directly, or is this inferred fom the elevator psition.
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Unfortunately what they will never 'report' is that this was a diversity hire, not one on merit.
Will all operators commit to hiring solely based on merit or do we need another incident of this type and more pain with the potential loss of hundreds of lives? I personally don't give a rat's backside about the ethnic background of the person sat next to me, though I care for everything that they were hired on merit and ability.
Will all operators commit to hiring solely based on merit or do we need another incident of this type and more pain with the potential loss of hundreds of lives? I personally don't give a rat's backside about the ethnic background of the person sat next to me, though I care for everything that they were hired on merit and ability.
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Looked at part of the hearing.
1. They almost ruled out a repetitive issue with PF display. Furthermore Artificial Horizon was unaffected, and apart from speed tape, F/O could still use conventional speed gauge or stby instruments. IF that happened again it could further irritate IMHO, but looks like it didn't happen.
2. The EFIS momentarily switched to alternate was not recorded on the FDR. I had assumed such looking at the recording resolution of this parameter
3. Yes, there's not much left to defend the First Officer
4. The Cpt contributed with late and lonely action
5. I was not aware of FAA missing deadlines by congress. The hearing contained somehow harsh critics for FAA taking decades to complete safety improvements like Pilot Records Database.
6. The same will happen regarding Image Recorders/CCTV?
Let's still not forget, this is "only" Cargo Operations. Lower count of potential victims.
And having this very Pilot been rejected on Cargo Airlines, he would possibly continue with crop dusters. Even lower count of potential victims like cows in a barn. Still ...
1. They almost ruled out a repetitive issue with PF display. Furthermore Artificial Horizon was unaffected, and apart from speed tape, F/O could still use conventional speed gauge or stby instruments. IF that happened again it could further irritate IMHO, but looks like it didn't happen.
2. The EFIS momentarily switched to alternate was not recorded on the FDR. I had assumed such looking at the recording resolution of this parameter
3. Yes, there's not much left to defend the First Officer
4. The Cpt contributed with late and lonely action
5. I was not aware of FAA missing deadlines by congress. The hearing contained somehow harsh critics for FAA taking decades to complete safety improvements like Pilot Records Database.
6. The same will happen regarding Image Recorders/CCTV?
Let's still not forget, this is "only" Cargo Operations. Lower count of potential victims.
And having this very Pilot been rejected on Cargo Airlines, he would possibly continue with crop dusters. Even lower count of potential victims like cows in a barn. Still ...
Last edited by Ray_Y; 17th Jul 2020 at 07:44. Reason: typo
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As with some other U.S. freighter mishaps, the pilot flying in the Atlas Air 3591 crash had an abysmal training history.
Aska, who was 44, joined Atlas Air in 2017 from the regional airline Mesa, where he had failed to win promotion to captain an Embraer 175 regional jet after being given an unsatisfactory rating in two flight simulator sessions.
Two Mesa captains who evaluated Aska told NTSB that he would get flustered when he encountered unexpected situations in training. Capt. Leigh Lawless said he would “make frantic mistakes,” and would “start pushing a lot of buttons without thinking about what he was pushing.”
Aska failed to finish training at two other U.S. airlines. He left Air Wisconsin after four months of training to be a first officer of a Bombardier CRJ regional jet. The NTSB says he cited personal reasons.
In 2011, he resigned after a month at CommutAir due to “lack of progress in training” to become first officer of a De Havilland Canada Dash 8 regional turboprop, the report says.
Aska failed to list his stints at Air Wisconsin and CommutAir on his employment application, and according to Atlas Air’s director of training, the airline was not aware of it. With that information “we would not have offered him a position,” the NTSB quotes the executive as saying.
After the 2009 Colgan Air crash, Congress required the Federal Aviation Administration to set up a clearinghouse including FAA and employer records on pilots to aid carriers in vetting them, but it has yet to complete the process.
After joining Atlas Air in July 2017, Aska’s training to pilot a 767 did not go smoothly. He was required to undergo 4.5 hours of remedial instruction before he could take an oral exam, and then he was held back for four additional hours of remedial training on a fixed-base simulator before he was allowed to proceed to training on a full-flight simulator, which has motion systems to better replicate the feel of flying.
After two sessions, a fellow student he was paired with complained that Aska was holding him back, and his instructors decided to restart his full flight simulator training from the beginning.
He failed his practical 767 type rating examination, the NTSB says, “due to unsatisfactory performance in crew resource management, threat and error management, non-precision approaches, steep turns and judgment.”
After remedial training he passed, but an NTSB operational factors report questions why Atlas Air didn’t put him in an FAA-mandated, six-month proficiency watch program for remedial training and tracking. Atlas Air’s fleet captain for the 747 and 767 told NTSB investigators that he chalked up the pilot’s poor performance to nervousness, and considering the gaps in his training and family issues he was experiencing, decided to just keep an eye on his performance.
Two Mesa captains who evaluated Aska told NTSB that he would get flustered when he encountered unexpected situations in training. Capt. Leigh Lawless said he would “make frantic mistakes,” and would “start pushing a lot of buttons without thinking about what he was pushing.”
Aska failed to finish training at two other U.S. airlines. He left Air Wisconsin after four months of training to be a first officer of a Bombardier CRJ regional jet. The NTSB says he cited personal reasons.
In 2011, he resigned after a month at CommutAir due to “lack of progress in training” to become first officer of a De Havilland Canada Dash 8 regional turboprop, the report says.
Aska failed to list his stints at Air Wisconsin and CommutAir on his employment application, and according to Atlas Air’s director of training, the airline was not aware of it. With that information “we would not have offered him a position,” the NTSB quotes the executive as saying.
After the 2009 Colgan Air crash, Congress required the Federal Aviation Administration to set up a clearinghouse including FAA and employer records on pilots to aid carriers in vetting them, but it has yet to complete the process.
After joining Atlas Air in July 2017, Aska’s training to pilot a 767 did not go smoothly. He was required to undergo 4.5 hours of remedial instruction before he could take an oral exam, and then he was held back for four additional hours of remedial training on a fixed-base simulator before he was allowed to proceed to training on a full-flight simulator, which has motion systems to better replicate the feel of flying.
After two sessions, a fellow student he was paired with complained that Aska was holding him back, and his instructors decided to restart his full flight simulator training from the beginning.
He failed his practical 767 type rating examination, the NTSB says, “due to unsatisfactory performance in crew resource management, threat and error management, non-precision approaches, steep turns and judgment.”
After remedial training he passed, but an NTSB operational factors report questions why Atlas Air didn’t put him in an FAA-mandated, six-month proficiency watch program for remedial training and tracking. Atlas Air’s fleet captain for the 747 and 767 told NTSB investigators that he chalked up the pilot’s poor performance to nervousness, and considering the gaps in his training and family issues he was experiencing, decided to just keep an eye on his performance.
Hi Bubba,
And I can think of a few (as I’m sure any of us with a training background can) with “issues” who were not diversity hires and somehow “made it” to the line. Nevertheless, the record above points to a particularly egregious lack of the requisite skill sets.
Cheers.
And I can think of a few (as I’m sure any of us with a training background can) with “issues” who were not diversity hires and somehow “made it” to the line. Nevertheless, the record above points to a particularly egregious lack of the requisite skill sets.
Cheers.
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This thread is about the Atlas 767 crash, what relevance does the Colgan air crash have? Whether the colgan captain was hired on diversity or not does not take away from the fact that this guy was, all avenues that allow people who are not up to the job into the job must be closed and 'diversity' points is one of those avenues, this whataboutery solves nothing.
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Airbubba
The bit about the partner complaining about their progress being held back due to the pilot in question struck a chord with me, I have had this exact same experience. I complained and was told there was nothing that could be done (my partner was literally landing nosewheel into the grass and we were spending whole sessions repositioning at 3 mile finals). It's incredible what can be accepted. Any hope of doing important stuff in preparation for the skills test went out the window, in the name of CRM ... we couldn't even fly straight without being in a nosedive of some sort, it got so bad the instructor had to lean over to her side and put his hand over her's (airbus) and control the sidestick with her. The writing was on the wall but was not accepted, is this turning into an issue across the board?
The bit about the partner complaining about their progress being held back due to the pilot in question struck a chord with me, I have had this exact same experience. I complained and was told there was nothing that could be done (my partner was literally landing nosewheel into the grass and we were spending whole sessions repositioning at 3 mile finals). It's incredible what can be accepted. Any hope of doing important stuff in preparation for the skills test went out the window, in the name of CRM ... we couldn't even fly straight without being in a nosedive of some sort, it got so bad the instructor had to lean over to her side and put his hand over her's (airbus) and control the sidestick with her. The writing was on the wall but was not accepted, is this turning into an issue across the board?
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The Colgan crash was similar to this in that a pilot with a checkered background was able to progress by concealing that background. That eventually lead to a crash. I don’t recall that being summed up to the fact that he was a diversity hire. Why’s that the assumption here?
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The bit about the partner complaining about their progress being held back due to the pilot in question struck a chord with me, I have had this exact same experience. I complained and was told there was nothing that could be done (my partner was literally landing nosewheel into the grass and we were spending whole sessions repositioning at 3 mile finals). It's incredible what can be accepted.
'Just do your job and don't worry.' the instructor briefed me when I arrived at the training building. It was back in the days where almost every engine failure on takeoff in the sim was the classic V1 cut. As expected, she went off the side of the runway, then cartwheeled and next rolled inverted on the first three tries. She finally got a very wobbly climb out and I prompted her slightly on the gear and flaps. The maneuver was deemed complete. I did some approaches, a V1 cut and a reject and her PNF stuff was fine. The session was complete, they thanked me for the sim support and said I didn't need to stick around for the debrief.
A couple of decades later I flew a trip with another FO who had been recently paired with the same captain for AQP training. She had her customary performance issues and busted the ride as usual. However, this time with crew concept, the FO was busted as well for not taking command of the sim when she couldn't keep it upright.
The pilot flying in the UPS 1394 BHM A306 crash had a similar training history revealed in the docket documents. He took several attempts to upgrade to captain, some documented and perhaps some not according to the 'incomplete' training records. He had been hired by UPS after flunking out of initial training at TWA.
The FedEx 647 crash at MEM and the FedEx MEM 705 hijacking uncovered similar cases of pilots with unusually bad training and employment records hired to fly large freighters.
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What makes you think he would not have been hired at Atlas, and what gives you reason to believe the GTI FO was a diversity hire? Was it mentioned at any point in the documentation? If I've missed it, would you be kind enough to correct my oversight?
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The Colgan pilot flying had a history of training failures.
Just a hunch I suppose.
I've interviewed at Atlas. I found them an extremely professional and diligent group. HR and Technical folks were very well tuned in, and they certainly were not so desperate pilots that, in my opinion they lowered their guard in any meaningful way. Less than half the qualified applicants that day got offers. they turned away a ME 777 CA and several experienced 121 skippers.
Their reputation is that they won't hire anyone with any training failures.
Their reputation is that they won't hire anyone with any training failures.
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Heck of a hunch. FYI the quote "Their reputation is that they won't hire anyone with any training failures" was from Dec 2019. The crash occurred in February 2019. I know people at GTI who are senior and junior to the FO in question who've had training failures. Your hunch doesn't seem to be correct in this case.
de minimus non curat lex
Coming late into this discussion......
Clearly he wasn’t up to it in multi crew flying, but were his basic flight training records for CPL / IR ever revealed?
It is invariably the case that his ability in flying light aircraft translates directly into more complex multi crew operations.
Within the first 20 hours of ab initial training, his flight instructors would know with certainty that he lacked the aptitude.
They will be reading the accident report with a certain sense of “if only we had terminated the training, he simply wasn’t up to it”.
Citing personal / private / family issues is often the standard excuse for failure to perform.
Clearly it doesn’t help ( if true?)
Harsh as it may be, resolve these issues, and then return once a clear focused mind is achievable.
The clue will lie in the ab initio training files. I would put money on it.
Clearly he wasn’t up to it in multi crew flying, but were his basic flight training records for CPL / IR ever revealed?
It is invariably the case that his ability in flying light aircraft translates directly into more complex multi crew operations.
Within the first 20 hours of ab initial training, his flight instructors would know with certainty that he lacked the aptitude.
They will be reading the accident report with a certain sense of “if only we had terminated the training, he simply wasn’t up to it”.
Citing personal / private / family issues is often the standard excuse for failure to perform.
Clearly it doesn’t help ( if true?)
Harsh as it may be, resolve these issues, and then return once a clear focused mind is achievable.
The clue will lie in the ab initio training files. I would put money on it.
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I tend to agree with you parkfell but I don’t recall seeing anything about prior history. The other question I have is why it took the CA so long to realise what was happening.
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I do feel for the captain in this instance, he probably had no idea what the FO was capable of and trusted his skills as a professional who was certified to occupy that seat and manage the aircraft whilst he saw to some of his PNF duties, this given trust came back to bit him in the worst way.
Last edited by A320LGW; 19th Jul 2020 at 13:04.
