MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures Mk II
ICAO Annex 13 is clear - only the party leading an investigation (here, the Ethiopian AIB) is authorised to release information, and it decides what will be released when, not the operator, manufacturer or any of the other parties affiliated to the investigation.
With one week left of the year Boeing has not submitted it's final fix for the MAX to the FAA for final certification.
It is now known, that Boeing have only been giving the FAA "selections" of what is required for the FAA to evaluate the aircraft for certification.
Boeing still have no idea of what is now required to get the aircraft flying - The Full Monty is required and with zero concessions, exceptions or exclusions.
Denis on your pay surly you can understand this? You and the FAA got caught with your pants down, why are you shy now?
Only one party seems embarrassed and Denis's Board is not that party.
It is now known, that Boeing have only been giving the FAA "selections" of what is required for the FAA to evaluate the aircraft for certification.
Boeing still have no idea of what is now required to get the aircraft flying - The Full Monty is required and with zero concessions, exceptions or exclusions.
Denis on your pay surly you can understand this? You and the FAA got caught with your pants down, why are you shy now?
Only one party seems embarrassed and Denis's Board is not that party.
gums, … > fdr, # 180. 
… even if flight test data was available publicly, it would be open to misinterpretation or adaptation to support whatever view was chosen.
At best we should limit ourselves to principles, which with well-argued supposition might provide greater insight to the current problems plaguing return to service, and perhaps learn from this some of the outstanding lessons relating to human performance; manage, design, manufacture, regulate, use.
Technically, stability can be viewed from many perspectives - ‘a slice of stale bread, the edges curled up’ - (MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures Mk II ).
Understanding humans is more difficult; we have yet to learn that curled up bread is difficult to push into the toaster, and that the principle of starting with stale bread does not give good toast.
But then again what is ‘good’ toast; good stability, a good aircraft, pilot, manager, CEO. We might start by stating our assumptions, add (understand) supportive regulatory materials, and heed advice to defer judgements to expertise. … But what is expertise, who is an expert, … …
… anyone for burnt toast.
… even if flight test data was available publicly, it would be open to misinterpretation or adaptation to support whatever view was chosen.
At best we should limit ourselves to principles, which with well-argued supposition might provide greater insight to the current problems plaguing return to service, and perhaps learn from this some of the outstanding lessons relating to human performance; manage, design, manufacture, regulate, use.
Technically, stability can be viewed from many perspectives - ‘a slice of stale bread, the edges curled up’ - (MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures Mk II ).
Understanding humans is more difficult; we have yet to learn that curled up bread is difficult to push into the toaster, and that the principle of starting with stale bread does not give good toast.
But then again what is ‘good’ toast; good stability, a good aircraft, pilot, manager, CEO. We might start by stating our assumptions, add (understand) supportive regulatory materials, and heed advice to defer judgements to expertise. … But what is expertise, who is an expert, … …
… anyone for burnt toast.
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In my limited GA certification experience, even at a preliminary meeting, we had to delve deep into the technical and reglementary aspects of our project and had to defend each point with the corresponding expert.
Makes you think as if Boeing had no idea what certification was about...
That is the heart of Boeing problems, nobody really knows how to correctly present information to FAA for certification any more!
Be interesting to see when the 737 NOT Max flies again, fingers crossed for the paying customers of whatever airlines.
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Lots of "young" engineers around me, most are incapable of correctly index versions of their documents, let alone put a date in a memo....
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It seems to me that if EASA, or one of the other international regulators, allow the MAX to be un-grounded/certified for flight within their airspace and a MAX subsequently crashes due to a MCAS related problem, the heads of the international regulators will be 'on the block' as well as those of the FAA regulators. In these circumstances, if I was an EASA regulator I would want to see for myself how the MAX performs at high AoA, without MCAS, before clearing the aircraft for flight within my jurisdiction. I would not be prepared to accept at face value any assurances given by the FAA or Boeing, if my job or reputation was on the line.
There are currently a number of 737-8 MAX aircraft located within EASA territory (TUI have 6). Could EASA regulators get their hands on one of these, take it to a test facility (e.g. Boscombe Down) and conduct their own 'bare airframe' tests to ensure there are no nasty surprises as far as MAX pitch stability is concerned? With a bit of temporary re-wiring of flap position input, it should be possible to fool the MAX computer into thinking the flap is down (when in fact the wings are 'clean') thereby disabling MCAS. This would allow the test pilots to explore the MAX flight envelope at high AoA in a 'bare airframe' configuration.
Surely, such due diligence is not too much to ask for from EASA to ensure the lives of European passengers are not exposed to undue risk. I'm not suggesting that EASA should conduct comprehensive re-certification flight tests, only an exploration of those aspects of the MAX flight characteristics which led to the introduction of MCAS.
There are currently a number of 737-8 MAX aircraft located within EASA territory (TUI have 6). Could EASA regulators get their hands on one of these, take it to a test facility (e.g. Boscombe Down) and conduct their own 'bare airframe' tests to ensure there are no nasty surprises as far as MAX pitch stability is concerned? With a bit of temporary re-wiring of flap position input, it should be possible to fool the MAX computer into thinking the flap is down (when in fact the wings are 'clean') thereby disabling MCAS. This would allow the test pilots to explore the MAX flight envelope at high AoA in a 'bare airframe' configuration.
Surely, such due diligence is not too much to ask for from EASA to ensure the lives of European passengers are not exposed to undue risk. I'm not suggesting that EASA should conduct comprehensive re-certification flight tests, only an exploration of those aspects of the MAX flight characteristics which led to the introduction of MCAS.
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Could EASA regulators get their hands on one of these, take it to a test facility (e.g. Boscombe Down) and conduct their own 'bare airframe' tests to ensure there are no nasty surprises as far as MAX pitch stability is concerned? With a bit of temporary re-wiring of flap position input, it should be possible to fool the MAX computer into thinking the flap is down (when in fact the wings are 'clean') thereby disabling MCAS. This would allow the test pilots to explore the MAX flight envelope at high AoA in a 'bare airframe' configuration.
Not sure using a revenue airplane for flight testing might be authorized, though. Better leave Boeing do the rewiring and first test flights and foot the bill ;-)
Also a test flight facility on the continent might prove more adequate, since Boscombe Down will no longer be in the EU in 38 days from now...
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PPT is no substitute for hard technical facts. My aging memory tells me that the NASA seniors relied extensively on ppt when trying to decide of the foam strike on the Columbia was of any concern. =left"A Washington Post article (August 30, 2005) on PowerPoint’s influence on Space Shuttle disasters stated;
“Exhibit A in Tufte’s analysis is a PowerPoint slide presented to NASA senior managers in January 2003, while the space shuttle Columbia was in the air and the agency was weighing the risk posed by tile damage on the shuttle wings. Key information was so buried and condensed in the rigid PowerPoint format as to be useless.”“It is easy to understand how a senior manager might read this PowerPoint slide and not realize that it addresses a life-threatening situation,” the Columbia Accident Investigation Board concluded, citing Tufte’s work.
“Exhibit A in Tufte’s analysis is a PowerPoint slide presented to NASA senior managers in January 2003, while the space shuttle Columbia was in the air and the agency was weighing the risk posed by tile damage on the shuttle wings. Key information was so buried and condensed in the rigid PowerPoint format as to be useless.”“It is easy to understand how a senior manager might read this PowerPoint slide and not realize that it addresses a life-threatening situation,” the Columbia Accident Investigation Board concluded, citing Tufte’s work.
Salute!
Thanks for the input, PEI
OTOH, we see many raw data flight data recorder traces and have had super analysis amongst us, especially on the Tech Log. So seeing the data is not without precedent here, although the masses that read the New York Slime would not have a clue ( as they do not about many things)
My point and maybe Stri and FDR and Edmund , et al be that the plane may be just fine at idle thrust versus high thrust or even cruise settings. How bad is the linearity? And I do not believe "Peter" has the actual plots from flight test data, Finally, the change to the amount of stab movement, etc after the initial implementation is, or should be, of interest to all of us.
And "all of us" includes old farts like me that are now only SLF. As a SLF I once got a free bottle of champaign from the Western airline crew ( back a long time ago before being absorbed) for commenting to nearby SLF that the crack maintenance folks were repairing a hydraulic leak on the left main gear brakes. We had to delay about a half hour, and the nearby SLF were getting restless, heh heh. Crew told me that my commentary helped calm down the SLF and made things easier for all.
I may only be a knowledeable piece of SLF nowadays, and it scares me more than the average piece sitting next to me when I see what this MCAS debacle has wrot.
Gums sends, and Merry Christmas to all!!!!
Thanks for the input, PEI
OTOH, we see many raw data flight data recorder traces and have had super analysis amongst us, especially on the Tech Log. So seeing the data is not without precedent here, although the masses that read the New York Slime would not have a clue ( as they do not about many things)
My point and maybe Stri and FDR and Edmund , et al be that the plane may be just fine at idle thrust versus high thrust or even cruise settings. How bad is the linearity? And I do not believe "Peter" has the actual plots from flight test data, Finally, the change to the amount of stab movement, etc after the initial implementation is, or should be, of interest to all of us.
And "all of us" includes old farts like me that are now only SLF. As a SLF I once got a free bottle of champaign from the Western airline crew ( back a long time ago before being absorbed) for commenting to nearby SLF that the crack maintenance folks were repairing a hydraulic leak on the left main gear brakes. We had to delay about a half hour, and the nearby SLF were getting restless, heh heh. Crew told me that my commentary helped calm down the SLF and made things easier for all.
I may only be a knowledeable piece of SLF nowadays, and it scares me more than the average piece sitting next to me when I see what this MCAS debacle has wrot.
Gums sends, and Merry Christmas to all!!!!
Yo gums, whilst your alternative approach would be feasible, Pprune analysis is irrelevant in judging and approving the Max to fly again - just satisfying our need to understand or learn, each of us differently.
‘We’ don’t certificate aircraft; we trust someone else to do that, which in this instance that trust has been strained. It is doubtful that self-Pprune assessment would improve that trust because trust depends on more than data, it involves process, time, and unquantifiable human attributes of ability, reliability, integrity, etc.
FDR accident analysis is an evaluation of what occurred, judged against what was expected for an aircraft with known, ‘certificated’ characteristics.
Flight test analysis requires detailed and a larger range of data, it involves judgement of something new against requirements.
The certification arguments for MCAS were flawed, but the principles were proven in flight test, certification, and subsequently commercial operations. MCAS worked as designed; however history shows that the supporting design was not fail safe, nor in that sense, were the interpretations, judgements, and approvals in the regulatory process; both systemic failures.
The basic unaided Max does not meet requirements, but arguably the aircraft can be flown without MCAS as an abnormal operation - not for commercial use excepting continued safe flight and landing. If this was not so then the ‘bent tin and rivets’ would be visible by now.
What appears to be of continuing concern is the transition from normal MCAS aided flight to abnormal unaided flight. Again, arguably, this is does not involve inhibiting MCAS - automatic fail safe, but the issues associated with the cause of the shutdown and crew interaction - managing consequences, distractions, ambiguities. These are uniquely certification judgements, and not quantifiable with data.
There may also be other issues not considered in the original certification - ‘because it’s the same as the NG’, which the Max is not - the realisation and acceptance of this by the ‘trusting’ authorities - let’s look again.
The aerodynamic differences could challenge the assumptions made for managing trim runaway, or adverse MCAS influence or manual trim use during upset conditions - speculation, but consider issues arising from recent NG accidents.
Then there is training, required experience, same type rating, etc, just as significant as aerodynamic design and system reliability.
Happy Christmas; but don’t expect any Max test data in your stocking.
‘We’ don’t certificate aircraft; we trust someone else to do that, which in this instance that trust has been strained. It is doubtful that self-Pprune assessment would improve that trust because trust depends on more than data, it involves process, time, and unquantifiable human attributes of ability, reliability, integrity, etc.
FDR accident analysis is an evaluation of what occurred, judged against what was expected for an aircraft with known, ‘certificated’ characteristics.
Flight test analysis requires detailed and a larger range of data, it involves judgement of something new against requirements.
The certification arguments for MCAS were flawed, but the principles were proven in flight test, certification, and subsequently commercial operations. MCAS worked as designed; however history shows that the supporting design was not fail safe, nor in that sense, were the interpretations, judgements, and approvals in the regulatory process; both systemic failures.
The basic unaided Max does not meet requirements, but arguably the aircraft can be flown without MCAS as an abnormal operation - not for commercial use excepting continued safe flight and landing. If this was not so then the ‘bent tin and rivets’ would be visible by now.
What appears to be of continuing concern is the transition from normal MCAS aided flight to abnormal unaided flight. Again, arguably, this is does not involve inhibiting MCAS - automatic fail safe, but the issues associated with the cause of the shutdown and crew interaction - managing consequences, distractions, ambiguities. These are uniquely certification judgements, and not quantifiable with data.
There may also be other issues not considered in the original certification - ‘because it’s the same as the NG’, which the Max is not - the realisation and acceptance of this by the ‘trusting’ authorities - let’s look again.
The aerodynamic differences could challenge the assumptions made for managing trim runaway, or adverse MCAS influence or manual trim use during upset conditions - speculation, but consider issues arising from recent NG accidents.
Then there is training, required experience, same type rating, etc, just as significant as aerodynamic design and system reliability.
Happy Christmas; but don’t expect any Max test data in your stocking.
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Whether or not test data on, e.g., stability can be withheld from the public as proprietary is not a settled question. I very much doubt that, in the long run, the answer will be that it can. The public interest in that data will very likely be seen by the courts as outweighing any proprietary interest.
And Boeing and the FAA should probably consider that, whatever the data may demonstrate, waiting to divulge it until forced to do so can only magnify the damage to the company and regulator.
And Boeing and the FAA should probably consider that, whatever the data may demonstrate, waiting to divulge it until forced to do so can only magnify the damage to the company and regulator.
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Clever rewiring idea. Could be used as a band-aid to allow the airplane to permanently fly sans MCAS.
Not sure using a revenue airplane for flight testing might be authorized, though. Better leave Boeing do the rewiring and first test flights and foot the bill ;-)
Not sure using a revenue airplane for flight testing might be authorized, though. Better leave Boeing do the rewiring and first test flights and foot the bill ;-)
Once the 'fix" has been installed, there will be flight testing of each revenue aircraft, especially by the Airline Chief...details unknown at this time.
Whether or not test data on, e.g., stability can be withheld from the public as proprietary is not a settled question. I very much doubt that, in the long run, the answer will be that it can.
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The FAA will retain authority to issue airworthiness certificates and export certificates of airworthiness for all new 737 MAX airplanes manufactured since the grounding.
December 11, 2019
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Information on aerodynamic stability of the aircraft is very different in kind from those. Think about it this way:
An automobile manufacturer could properly treat information about the details of its traction control or antilock braking systems as proprietary, but there's no way it could get away with refusing to release test track data on stopping distance or rollover characteristics -- certainly not in the context of lawsuits in the wake of crashes raising questions about those characteristics.
Edit: And nothing could prevent interested third parties from conducting independent testing and releasing the results, so attempting to keep them secret in the midst of controversy could only further damage corporate credibility and public image.
An automobile manufacturer could properly treat information about the details of its traction control or antilock braking systems as proprietary, but there's no way it could get away with refusing to release test track data on stopping distance or rollover characteristics -- certainly not in the context of lawsuits in the wake of crashes raising questions about those characteristics.
Edit: And nothing could prevent interested third parties from conducting independent testing and releasing the results, so attempting to keep them secret in the midst of controversy could only further damage corporate credibility and public image.
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Cleanup on Aisle Four
Golly NOW Boeing will supply some long delayed documents ??
More ‘troubling’ internal Boeing documents on 737 MAX set for release
Dec. 23, 2019 at 2:18 pm Updated Dec. 23, 2019 at 2:24 pm
By Dominic Gates
and Steve Miletich
Boeing has informed the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that its internal investigation into development of the 737 MAX has turned up more “troubling communications” that the company’s lawyers say it needs to disclose, according to a person familiar with the details.
Though the implication is that the documents contain damaging information, Boeing has not yet sent them to the FAA or to the Congressional committees that are investigating the MAX crashes.
“The FAA is aware of the documents and is waiting for Boeing to turn them over,” said the person.
Boeing is expected to release the documents as early as today. The timing of such a move, so close to the holidays and on the same day as the sacking of CEO Dennis Muilenburg, might be intended to get the bad news out there all at once with less press coverage.
Several sources suggest the documents include further messages from Mark Forkner, the 737 Chief Technical Pilot during the development of the MAX. Forkner’s job was to test the MAX flight control systems in a simulator and to determine the information and training that pilots would need to fly the airplane.
It was Forkner who sent an email to an FAA official in March, 2016, asking that information about the MAX’s new flight control software—known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS)—be omitted from the pilot manuals and not mentioned in pilot training.
In October, a 2016 instant message exchange between Forkner and another Boeing pilot was released in which Forkner stated that he had “basically lied to the regulators (unknowingly).”
In that loose conversation, during which Forkner was drinking vodka, he said MCAS had “run rampant” during simulator testing in 2016. Boeing said later he was referring to the simulator software being defective rather than MCAS itself.
And in a separate 2016 email to an FAA official, Forkner joked that he was “doing a bunch of traveling … jedi-mind tricking (foreign) regulators into accepting the training that I got accepted by FAA.”
These revelations produced outrage and were the subject of intense questioning of Muilenburg when he appeared before Congress in late October.
More ‘troubling’ internal Boeing documents on 737 MAX set for release
Dec. 23, 2019 at 2:18 pm Updated Dec. 23, 2019 at 2:24 pm
By Dominic Gates
and Steve Miletich
Boeing has informed the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that its internal investigation into development of the 737 MAX has turned up more “troubling communications” that the company’s lawyers say it needs to disclose, according to a person familiar with the details.
Though the implication is that the documents contain damaging information, Boeing has not yet sent them to the FAA or to the Congressional committees that are investigating the MAX crashes.
“The FAA is aware of the documents and is waiting for Boeing to turn them over,” said the person.
Boeing is expected to release the documents as early as today. The timing of such a move, so close to the holidays and on the same day as the sacking of CEO Dennis Muilenburg, might be intended to get the bad news out there all at once with less press coverage.
Several sources suggest the documents include further messages from Mark Forkner, the 737 Chief Technical Pilot during the development of the MAX. Forkner’s job was to test the MAX flight control systems in a simulator and to determine the information and training that pilots would need to fly the airplane.
It was Forkner who sent an email to an FAA official in March, 2016, asking that information about the MAX’s new flight control software—known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS)—be omitted from the pilot manuals and not mentioned in pilot training.
In October, a 2016 instant message exchange between Forkner and another Boeing pilot was released in which Forkner stated that he had “basically lied to the regulators (unknowingly).”
In that loose conversation, during which Forkner was drinking vodka, he said MCAS had “run rampant” during simulator testing in 2016. Boeing said later he was referring to the simulator software being defective rather than MCAS itself.
And in a separate 2016 email to an FAA official, Forkner joked that he was “doing a bunch of traveling … jedi-mind tricking (foreign) regulators into accepting the training that I got accepted by FAA.”
These revelations produced outrage and were the subject of intense questioning of Muilenburg when he appeared before Congress in late October.
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Latest update on the Seattle Times site says they have been sent to FAA today:
Boeing has sent the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) documents that were discovered by its internal investigation into development of the 737 MAX and that include “troubling communications” that the company’s lawyers say it needs to disclose, according to a person familiar with the details.
The documents include further messages from Mark Forkner, the Boeing pilot whose 2016 instant message exchange with a colleague caused outrage when it was released in October.Boeing will also send the documents, which are understood to contain damaging information, to the Congressional committees that are investigating the MAX crashes.
The timing of the disclosure, so close to the holidays and on the same day as the sacking of CEO Dennis Muilenburg, might be intended to get the bad news out there all at once with less press coverage.
The documents include further messages from Mark Forkner, the Boeing pilot whose 2016 instant message exchange with a colleague caused outrage when it was released in October.Boeing will also send the documents, which are understood to contain damaging information, to the Congressional committees that are investigating the MAX crashes.
The timing of the disclosure, so close to the holidays and on the same day as the sacking of CEO Dennis Muilenburg, might be intended to get the bad news out there all at once with less press coverage.
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AFTER all this time, they "FIND" documents that show troubling and further communications with Forkner?????
You can do a word search for "Forkner" and find them all????
what sort of software do the run there??? (oh...never mind)
Isnt lying to Congress an offense?
You can do a word search for "Forkner" and find them all????
what sort of software do the run there??? (oh...never mind)
Isnt lying to Congress an offense?
