FAA urges ICAO to address erosion of 'manual' piloting skills
As yet we have not seen the FAAs submission. It is reported as:-
“The FAA's concerns turn on the theory that many pilots lost or never attained adequate manual flying skills because they have come to rely on increasingly complex automated systems designed largely to prevent pilot error in the first place, according to a paper outlining the FAA's recommendations.”
This is an unsubstantiated ‘theory ’. A theory should trigger research, but none has been referenced.
“But technological reliance has left some pilots unprepared for emergencies …
When automation systems do not work as intended or do not work well in the operational situation, pilots without sufficient manual flight control experience and proper training may be reluctant or may not be adequately skilled to take control of the aircraft,"
The FAA fails to provide evidence of experience and training shortfall - thus ‘supposition’.
EASAs position:- “Pilot training requirements are not meant to compensate for non-acceptable design on the compliance and safety standpoint.”
Whilst ICAO and member nations might note the FAAs concerns, the international industry must not resort to safety measures based on supposition.
What if the FAA’s theory is incorrect? more rules, unnecessary training, without safety improvement.
Research into loss of manual flying skills suggests that degraded cognitive skills, situation appreciation, is of greater concern,
There is scant evidence of difficulties arising from manual flight in normal operation, but there has been many problems in abnormal situations originated by technology failure. Thus safety focus should be on the origin of abnormal situations; avoid or simplify the systems and situations which pilots are required to understand - fix the machine not the man.
AF447 and 737 Max involved sensor / system malfunction. Airbus changed the sensor, improved the system, and provided an independent back-up speed display; ‘belt and braces’.
Boeing / FAA, their pants down, promote unproven theory !
EASA’s position
https://www.easa.europa.eu/newsroom-...-clarification
“The FAA's concerns turn on the theory that many pilots lost or never attained adequate manual flying skills because they have come to rely on increasingly complex automated systems designed largely to prevent pilot error in the first place, according to a paper outlining the FAA's recommendations.”
This is an unsubstantiated ‘theory ’. A theory should trigger research, but none has been referenced.
“But technological reliance has left some pilots unprepared for emergencies …
When automation systems do not work as intended or do not work well in the operational situation, pilots without sufficient manual flight control experience and proper training may be reluctant or may not be adequately skilled to take control of the aircraft,"
The FAA fails to provide evidence of experience and training shortfall - thus ‘supposition’.
EASAs position:- “Pilot training requirements are not meant to compensate for non-acceptable design on the compliance and safety standpoint.”
Whilst ICAO and member nations might note the FAAs concerns, the international industry must not resort to safety measures based on supposition.
What if the FAA’s theory is incorrect? more rules, unnecessary training, without safety improvement.
Research into loss of manual flying skills suggests that degraded cognitive skills, situation appreciation, is of greater concern,
There is scant evidence of difficulties arising from manual flight in normal operation, but there has been many problems in abnormal situations originated by technology failure. Thus safety focus should be on the origin of abnormal situations; avoid or simplify the systems and situations which pilots are required to understand - fix the machine not the man.
AF447 and 737 Max involved sensor / system malfunction. Airbus changed the sensor, improved the system, and provided an independent back-up speed display; ‘belt and braces’.
Boeing / FAA, their pants down, promote unproven theory !
EASA’s position
https://www.easa.europa.eu/newsroom-...-clarification
In my view this is beyond the FAA's ability to respond let alone lead.
The way to address this is for all the aircraft manufacturers to lead as a group by calling in all the stakeholders (who can add) and the output just might be for the regulators to embrace (that's where they come in)
The problem we sometimes see in our industry is that all the stakeholders (designers, regulator multi groups, operators and pilots) don't act as one in understanding the issues and then responding as one under a incompasing rule.
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Manual flying skills have been on the radar at the FAA for several years. Airlines have been adding this training for a couple of years now.
Note the date: https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/121.423
Note the date: https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/121.423
https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/safo/all_safos/media/2017/SAFO17007.pdf
http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviat...ne_safety/safo
A SAFO contains important safety information and may include recommended action. SAFO content should be especially valuable to air carriers in meeting their statutory duty to provide service with the highest possible degree of safety in the public interest. Besides the specific action recommended in a SAFO, an alternative action may be as effective in addressing the safety issue named in the SAFO.
Subject: Manual Flight Operations Proficiency
Purpose: This SAFO encourages the development of training and line-operations policies which will ensure that proficiency in manual flight operations is developed and maintained for air carrier pilots.
Tomaski, #40, the skills required for awareness - understanding, do not involve a motor function.
Without previous experience aiding appropriate understanding there is little opportunity to identify the correct action.
Many of the situations erroneously related ‘loss of manual flight skills’ have not been experienced or even known of, thus the cognitive task is very demanding and often requires a change of ‘view’ (reframing**).
The required focus on the ‘machine’ does not imply more new technology, but a review of how current systems have been accepted - certification assumptions, particularly in the context of the overall operational environment.
** recent research on startle and surprise. https://pure.tudelft.nl/portal/files...on_startle.pdf
Apart from the relative importance of surprise over startle, there is an important discussion on the need and difficulty of changing ‘frame’ - thinking for situation awareness. Many problems arise from the generation of background knowledge in training and due to operational constraints, e.g SOP culture, expected SOP for every situation, and repeated situational training by rote without considering alternative context.
Not more training, reconsidered training with respect to new systems - the machine, together with modern operations.
It would be possible to review and change these aspects of the ‘situational machine’ right now, if only we choose think about them and not be distracted by calls for more manual flight.
Also Boeing Board to Call for Safety Changes After 737 Max Crashes
Without previous experience aiding appropriate understanding there is little opportunity to identify the correct action.
Many of the situations erroneously related ‘loss of manual flight skills’ have not been experienced or even known of, thus the cognitive task is very demanding and often requires a change of ‘view’ (reframing**).
The required focus on the ‘machine’ does not imply more new technology, but a review of how current systems have been accepted - certification assumptions, particularly in the context of the overall operational environment.
** recent research on startle and surprise. https://pure.tudelft.nl/portal/files...on_startle.pdf
Apart from the relative importance of surprise over startle, there is an important discussion on the need and difficulty of changing ‘frame’ - thinking for situation awareness. Many problems arise from the generation of background knowledge in training and due to operational constraints, e.g SOP culture, expected SOP for every situation, and repeated situational training by rote without considering alternative context.
Not more training, reconsidered training with respect to new systems - the machine, together with modern operations.
It would be possible to review and change these aspects of the ‘situational machine’ right now, if only we choose think about them and not be distracted by calls for more manual flight.
Also Boeing Board to Call for Safety Changes After 737 Max Crashes
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I do not disagree, however the mental processing required to exercise those awareness skills can compete for cognitive resources with the mental processing required to execute a motor function if that motor function does not yet reside in procedural memory. This is easily demonstrated by attempting to accomplish a still-developing psychomotor skill (juggling perhaps?) and simultaneously engaging in another cognitive task such as conversation, solving an moderately easy math problem, or the like. There is only so much working memory available, and the more that is used for one task is the less available for another.
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Have there been a lot of unexpected pitch down events on Boeing, Douglas, McDonnell-Douglas, and Airbus planes where proficient crews recognized the problem and saved the day? Yes including several Airbus incidents designed with pilots of lesser capabilities in mind. QF72, QF71, and LH1829 come to mind as 2 of the most publicized. Have the MAX crashes which involved numerous fatalities instead of only injuries brought the issue into focus and pressured organizations such as the FAA and EASA to take action? Of course, it would be serious neglect not to have done so. If QF72 had crashed with a loaded A330 have resulted in grounding the A330?
Should the MAX have more AOA sensors? Where do you stop? 3 hasn't been enough for Airbus. Is 5 enough, 7, 9? We need more Bryce McCormicks, Alfred Haynes, and the like.
Should the MAX have more AOA sensors? Where do you stop? 3 hasn't been enough for Airbus. Is 5 enough, 7, 9? We need more Bryce McCormicks, Alfred Haynes, and the like.
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Having long since reluctantly accepted that automation dependency has resulted in lack of skill of some of its pilots to fly an ordinary visual circuit, at least one Australian 737 operator now has the SOP requirement to have final landing flap down and all landing checks completed, while the aircraft is still on the downwind leg of the circuit. This is supposed to ensure the aircraft is stabilised by 1000 ft with all landing checklists completed. In the simulator it was noted pilots were having difficulty coping with manual visual flying and stabilisation requirements.
it’s not too long ago when to pass the initial type rating at a well known UK airline, you did not have to be Chuck Yeager. But, you did have to hand fly a single engine approach at night with no flight directors, on a 737 for real - not a sim - to a landing. Usually best of three at least. So no luck involved. In the sim you had to fly a manual trim landing using only the wheels. And a manual reversion landing. To name but three of about forty demanding routines.
That was just part of the base training then before zero flight time sims. I was a base trainer then and never had to fail a single cadet. They could all do it really well. They had to, to pass. These guys are now captains and they carry that training with them for life. The point is that such skills are quite achievable, but no longer required or demanded. I have said since this thread started that the lack of basic flying skills will be a major factor in the final reports. The MCAS will be a factor of course, but not the cause. MCAS is now fixed- has been for a long time and is stalled out in the certification issues that have arisen. But the elephant in the room is the lack of training to enable an “average” pilot to cope with (multiple) automation failures which will never go away. Put another way, the skill level of the average pilot has to improve. An MCAS style event can be fixed relatively easily as in this case. Conversely, Pilot training is a mammoth task both in retraining perhaps thousands of current newer pilots, and in the future training requirements. Guess which one the industry would rather tackle? Much easier to blame a daft MCAS design and hang the whole thing on Boeing. But it’s not just Boeing. There have been several truly shocking pilot error events like AF447 and Turkish at AMS- you all know them. Caused by inability to comprehend what the plane is actually doing.
If I were head of training in an airline with 737s, (or any type really) I would be right now insisting on extra sim time and extra time on LPC/OPC twice yearly training to raise the bar significantly. And have my pilots ready for the MAX when it returns, as it surely will, some time soon. It won’t be called “MAX” I don’t suppose though.
And passengers would know that the guys on this airline are up to the task.
Y
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I'm happy to say I fly a 727 and get quite a lot of hand flying, just a few weeks ago had to do a hand-flown VOR approach almost down to minimums. I still don't understand the fixation of the requirement of 500 hours glass cockpit to get a job on a glass cockpit plane. It's a most ridiculous requirement. It should be the other way round, 500 hours of steam to get a job on a steam driven airplane.
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It is my understanding that in the US airlines there is no "fast-track" in terms of training of pilots when it comes to operate a 737. Certainly they have far more experience than "some of the world's airline pilots" when it is time to fly a 737.
Have to then say that don't understand the reason as to why was the MAX grounded in the US ??? The experience being there, the aircraft being safe on manual flight, and the US being big enough country to justify the MAX use within its frontiers, have to say that I don't get it why the MAX was grounded in the US ...
Have to then say that don't understand the reason as to why was the MAX grounded in the US ??? The experience being there, the aircraft being safe on manual flight, and the US being big enough country to justify the MAX use within its frontiers, have to say that I don't get it why the MAX was grounded in the US ...
Does Concorde report ring a bell? A lecture at the RAE a few nights ago told a very different story from the commonly held view of what caused the fatal, final crash.
I’m quite sure that if USA had permitted the Max to stay flying, and Boeing had fixed right away the three glaring shortcomings of MCAS which they could have done in early summer, there would have been no recurrences whatsoever. I feel that once all,pilots in the US knew the cause of the two crashes, the pilots would have been all over it.
We kept flying after the three rudder hardcover crashes in the nineties because we trained pilots what to do if it happened, before the actual cause and remedies were found and implemented. And that was a nightmare where the cause was very obscure.
Since that’s not what happened it’s in the realm of conjecture but if only Indonesia and Ethiopia had banned the Max, it would still be flying. I would have had no trouble at all flying down the back of an unmodified Max back in the Spring, and still wouldn’t provided the guys up front had the proper experience and training.
Yes, there is a split on this forum since the start on whether it’s a training issue, a software/hardware issue, or somewhere in between. I’m really looking forward to a final factual report on the two crashes after which we will know the truth. If it emerges.
Cheers
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y
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So I can see why many outfits want pilots who have previous experience with (and are comfortable with) glass cockpits.
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The latest trend seems to be “you shouldn’t/can’t try to fix the pilots. It’s all too difficult. Engineer out the faults and the pilots won’t have to put down their cup of tea. “
I can think of many situations where a combination of seemingly simple faults, when combined make operating the plane extremely demanding to fly. Guess that’s why we need competent pilots. And no software engineer can “ automate-out” all conceivable fault combinations.
Double engine failure is a good example where, assuming the APU starts, you are stil left with an extremely demanding situation which requires you to revert to basic airmanship and flying skills. Even with no APU, a 737 can still do it. Uniquely, because it’s really a 707 with a glass cockpit and flies like a Cessna. Seen it on the sim. Accomplished successfully maybe a hundred or more times over the years. But the guys at the sharp end have to know what to do and have the multitasking skills to implement them.
So when the dust settles I will still fly happily with airlines that cut the mustard. And avoid the others. Always have and most smart passengers too. There are over one hundred airlines that are not permitted to operate in the EU, yet they are all “approved and licensed” by their own national authorities. Wonder why the EU does this? Don’t think it’s racism though.
Y
I can think of many situations where a combination of seemingly simple faults, when combined make operating the plane extremely demanding to fly. Guess that’s why we need competent pilots. And no software engineer can “ automate-out” all conceivable fault combinations.
Double engine failure is a good example where, assuming the APU starts, you are stil left with an extremely demanding situation which requires you to revert to basic airmanship and flying skills. Even with no APU, a 737 can still do it. Uniquely, because it’s really a 707 with a glass cockpit and flies like a Cessna. Seen it on the sim. Accomplished successfully maybe a hundred or more times over the years. But the guys at the sharp end have to know what to do and have the multitasking skills to implement them.
So when the dust settles I will still fly happily with airlines that cut the mustard. And avoid the others. Always have and most smart passengers too. There are over one hundred airlines that are not permitted to operate in the EU, yet they are all “approved and licensed” by their own national authorities. Wonder why the EU does this? Don’t think it’s racism though.
Y
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The latest trend seems to be “you shouldn’t/can’t try to fix the pilots. It’s all too difficult. Engineer out the faults and the pilots won’t have to put down their cup of tea. “
I can think of many situations where a combination of seemingly simple faults, when combined make operating the plane extremely demanding to fly. Guess that’s why we need competent pilots. And no software engineer can “ automate-out” all conceivable fault combinations.
Double engine failure is a good example where, assuming the APU starts, you are stil left with an extremely demanding situation which requires you to revert to basic airmanship and flying skills. Even with no APU, a 737 can still do it. Uniquely, because it’s really a 707 with a glass cockpit and flies like a Cessna. Seen it on the sim. Accomplished successfully maybe a hundred or more times over the years. But the guys at the sharp end have to know what to do and have the multitasking skills to implement them.
So when the dust settles I will still fly happily with airlines that cut the mustard. And avoid the others. Always have and most smart passengers too. There are over one hundred airlines that are not permitted to operate in the EU, yet they are all “approved and licensed” by their own national authorities. Wonder why the EU does this? Don’t think it’s racism though.
Y
I can think of many situations where a combination of seemingly simple faults, when combined make operating the plane extremely demanding to fly. Guess that’s why we need competent pilots. And no software engineer can “ automate-out” all conceivable fault combinations.
Double engine failure is a good example where, assuming the APU starts, you are stil left with an extremely demanding situation which requires you to revert to basic airmanship and flying skills. Even with no APU, a 737 can still do it. Uniquely, because it’s really a 707 with a glass cockpit and flies like a Cessna. Seen it on the sim. Accomplished successfully maybe a hundred or more times over the years. But the guys at the sharp end have to know what to do and have the multitasking skills to implement them.
So when the dust settles I will still fly happily with airlines that cut the mustard. And avoid the others. Always have and most smart passengers too. There are over one hundred airlines that are not permitted to operate in the EU, yet they are all “approved and licensed” by their own national authorities. Wonder why the EU does this? Don’t think it’s racism though.
Y
Everyone wants to blame the manufactures... but we’ve had a lot of perfectly good airplanes crash. And others where a simple defect brought it down... and others, like a taped over static port, that require solid pilots to earn their money. Any yet others where the pilots feathered the wrong engine on departure during an engine failure.
LH used to start their pilots in gliders and they developed stick and rudder skills. Now there is a fast track to the airline job, but unlike the military, the pilots don’t fly anywhere near the edge of the envelope. There has clearly been a reduction in flying skills. To the point that pilots sit in the seat and watch the accident without taking proper steps. I’m not talking test pilot skills.
Yes... there are defects that need to be fixed. An early A-320 accident made them change the idle thrust settings on approach. The MD-11 has to add LSAS for pitch problems. Boeing will have to fix the 737 Max... but the fact is, there are a lot more accidents due to pilot error that shouldn’t happen.
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I'm happy to say I fly a 727 and get quite a lot of hand flying, just a few weeks ago had to do a hand-flown VOR approach almost down to minimums. I still don't understand the fixation of the requirement of 500 hours glass cockpit to get a job on a glass cockpit plane. It's a most ridiculous requirement. It should be the other way round, 500 hours of steam to get a job on a steam driven airplane.
Steam Powered Aircraft Flies
Really. Believe it or not, a successful aircraft flew using a steam engine for power. Built by Travel Air Manufacturing Co. and modified by Besler Steam Laundry to promote their business, the aircraft first flew on April 12th, 1933 over Oakland, California.
The original Travel Air 2000 was known as the 'Wichita Fokker' because of it's role in numerous Hollywood movies about WWI. It was designed by Lloyd Stearman, and built by his partners Walter Beech and Clyde Cessna. In fact, over half the aircraft built between 1924 and 1930 were produced by their company.
https://www.wowreally.blog/2007/01/s...aft-flies.html
de minimus non curat lex
If you are going to attempt to improve manual flying skills, you start at the very beginning during the SE phase at the ATOs. The critical ability is accurate trimming. Without this basic skill, you are wasting your time. The six round dials are needed to ensure that the basic scan technique is learnt.
You build on these skills when the student moves onto twin engine phase. You need to ask what style of instruments are best to build on what has been achieved. Again the ability to TRIM accurately is a vital ingredient. Reduces the workload and increases the situational awareness (the ‘seesaw’ analogy ~thanks Chris Brown).
From there, the MCC phase needs manual flying preferably at the very start of the course, and a RAW DATA ILS from base leg at minimum clean speed during every alternate exercise. Power / Pitch couple: the new aspect to practice.
The type rating course then needs to consolidate these skills. A review of the OPC/LPC is probably needed.
On the nice days line flying, pilots must be encouraged to keep these skills ‘on the boil’. Keep the practice going and the skills will be retained. The less you do, the less you want to do. A basic lack of confidence will develop. A gentle spiralling down process will take place and you will end up where we are now.
Bottom line: good training and continuous practice.
You build on these skills when the student moves onto twin engine phase. You need to ask what style of instruments are best to build on what has been achieved. Again the ability to TRIM accurately is a vital ingredient. Reduces the workload and increases the situational awareness (the ‘seesaw’ analogy ~thanks Chris Brown).
From there, the MCC phase needs manual flying preferably at the very start of the course, and a RAW DATA ILS from base leg at minimum clean speed during every alternate exercise. Power / Pitch couple: the new aspect to practice.
The type rating course then needs to consolidate these skills. A review of the OPC/LPC is probably needed.
On the nice days line flying, pilots must be encouraged to keep these skills ‘on the boil’. Keep the practice going and the skills will be retained. The less you do, the less you want to do. A basic lack of confidence will develop. A gentle spiralling down process will take place and you will end up where we are now.
Bottom line: good training and continuous practice.
Last edited by parkfell; 1st Oct 2019 at 08:33.
Folks,
Looks like us "old fogies" were correct all the way along.
Re. Multi Crew Licenses (MPL) some courses are well done, with good pilots coming out the end.
Some MPL courses are terrible, and ignore much of what we know, both from an academic and practical sense, where proper manual flying skills are never developed --- the basic muscle memories are absent, in my experience this type of MPL course comes from "entrepreneurial" "service providers" , they don't know what they don't know.
Bottom line: Proper manual flying skills are critical, they must be developed and maintained, get the accountants out of the Ops Manuals and SOPs.
Tootle pip!!
Looks like us "old fogies" were correct all the way along.
Re. Multi Crew Licenses (MPL) some courses are well done, with good pilots coming out the end.
Some MPL courses are terrible, and ignore much of what we know, both from an academic and practical sense, where proper manual flying skills are never developed --- the basic muscle memories are absent, in my experience this type of MPL course comes from "entrepreneurial" "service providers" , they don't know what they don't know.
Bottom line: Proper manual flying skills are critical, they must be developed and maintained, get the accountants out of the Ops Manuals and SOPs.
Tootle pip!!
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There’s not much that can be done to improve training.
There are practical and economic realities it has to fit into.
What can be improved dramatically is the outdated thinking associated with cockpit ergonomics, human factors and infrastructure.
All of that is achievable with current technology and fresh thinking.
There are practical and economic realities it has to fit into.
What can be improved dramatically is the outdated thinking associated with cockpit ergonomics, human factors and infrastructure.
All of that is achievable with current technology and fresh thinking.
There’s not much that can be done to improve training.
That change alone will force managements to think twice when pilots inevitably fail to keep within instrument rating tolerances during manual instrument flying. Only then will pure instrument flying skills gradually improve. After all, isn't that what we are trying to achieve?
de minimus non curat lex
A closer scrutiny of basic training for the CPL/IR would consider the wisdom of approving certain light GA twins for training.
I would suggest that CAE (Oxford) have now recognised (again) that the Piper ac family is an appropriate basic trainer.
One of the fundamental skills a junior birdman must learn is accurate TRIMMING which is critical to attitude flying, thereby reducing the workload and increasing the situational awareness.
Without that, raw data flying is somewhat difficult. This skill needs to be practiced on a regular basis if accurate flying is going to be achieved.
Airlines needs to recognise the importance of getting the basics right. In the ideal world your most experience FIs would carry out the first 20 hours of flying training. Get the basics right. Attitude & Trim control.
At least MPL students require MPL qualified FIs. Usually the more experienced staff.
I would suggest that CAE (Oxford) have now recognised (again) that the Piper ac family is an appropriate basic trainer.
One of the fundamental skills a junior birdman must learn is accurate TRIMMING which is critical to attitude flying, thereby reducing the workload and increasing the situational awareness.
Without that, raw data flying is somewhat difficult. This skill needs to be practiced on a regular basis if accurate flying is going to be achieved.
Airlines needs to recognise the importance of getting the basics right. In the ideal world your most experience FIs would carry out the first 20 hours of flying training. Get the basics right. Attitude & Trim control.
At least MPL students require MPL qualified FIs. Usually the more experienced staff.
de minimus non curat lex
My first “airliner” was a Shorts 360-300. On my first OPC conducted at PIK by a retired BA pilot, he ‘criticised’ me for flying the ILS using raw data only. No FD.
Six months later, I thought it best to humour Pete A by using the FD ( Smiths). The FD was less than accurate, and attempting to follow it produced a less than ideal approach profile. Half way through the approach, I announced I was turning the bloody thing OFF as it was sh_te. An improved profile then occurred !
LSAS was part of the MD-11 original design. It was not added to fix any problem but was included because of the design requirement to cruise close to the aft CG limit with a smaller stab than the DC-10. It is true that LSAS control laws were revised after the aircraft went into service.