FAA urges ICAO to address erosion of 'manual' piloting skills
cessnaxplt;
as noted by iceman, the topic of flight crew training arises from the Max issue.
As we age, we look back with nostalgia at what we used to do, and reflect on what the youth is doing today. The "obvious" observation of lack of flying skills may be true, it may also be the way we look at the world from our own vantage point.
Going down memory lane gives lots of examples of crews driving tin into the water, ground, short long, nowhere near, "how on earth did they get to that point?" sort of events. many of those were due to the state of the art at the time, but many were not. CXP raises AS214, and I must confess, that one still irritates me. (6 hours after the bingle, I was called up by the CEO of a major and asked if their fleet could have done the same thing and the answer was an emphatic yes, it was a surprise that the paint was owned by Asiana. The CEO didn't miss a beat when advised that I had made 5 reports to that effect in the period of being involved in their program).
AFR was a shambles, no doubt, but it was an event with cognitive overload rearing it's head. Normally, it is reasonable to state that if the action you are taking isn' working, then in the absence of infinite time to act, it may be worthwhile altering your tactics. The Max adds a caveat condition to that; make sure that what you are doing isn't working in part at least. For AFR447, holding full aft SSC precluded any recovery occurring. In almost all cases (Max excepted) the aircraft will naturally recover from an uncontrolled flight condition by the crew getting off the controls, and that is good up to the condition of departure from controlled flight post stall. The exception is where the flight control system is compromised, or a TR is deployed, or components have departed the aircraft, in which case, good luck, you are now a TP.
Looking back in time, and just looking at one data base, in no particular order but covering a time frame from 2012 back to 1967, a random selection of events in which pilot performance, flying skills, head skills, team skills, and often basic IF flight competency occurred are listed. "New boss, same as old boss". We broke planes in a similar manner to today way back when. I avoided events where technology advances would have made a change, adherence to procedures used to be more critical than today, but the slips and errors still occurred, and people got hurt.
The industry could do with improved flying skills, it always could, but that is not a panacea for poor procedure designs, congestion and overloaded ATC, commercial pressure on crews, and bad system designs. Collectively we have accepted as good a lot of designs that in reflection were pretty daggy. We then fight over the relative merits of an Airbus v Boeing, when both have their own dark baggage in their DNA. That is true up to the 380, whether the 350 is better is unknown at this point. Nature cannot be fooled as Feynman stated.
The random selection below comes out of the U.S. databases, so any assumption that it only happens in 3rd world, $h1TolE banana republics may not have that much traction. The MD11 is interesting. The cure for a plane that crews had a high prevalence of PIOs, (or APC, etc... MIL-HDBK-1797A) was to fi the crews by augmented training, which had variable results, planes kept being parked awkwardly on turf, often enough unusable other than as chicken coops, and occasionally not even as that. It is a reminder that fixing pilots may sound cheaper than fixing the dynamics, but in the end it all ends in tears, human performance is a variable that has imponderable inputs that amaze and awe anyone trying to harden safety performance.
AAR-12-01 757 off piste Jackson Hole WY
AAR-11-02 ATR drives into ground on appr
AAR-07-06 SWA 737 overrun Midway...
AAR-04-04 A300-605 tail fell off
AAR-04-02 Tallahassee FL, B727 FEDEX,
AAB-02-04 Burbank off SWA B737...
AAR-01-02 MD82 Little Rock into the approach lites, far end
AAR-05-01 Diesel X hard landing...
AAR-00-02 FDX14 Mega death 2.0 Newark, NJ,
Mega death 2.0 Narita FDX80
Mega death 2.0 Chep Lap Kok, CAL 642 (mandarin)
Mega death 2.0 Riyadh, SA LHC 8460
(12 other hard landing/PIO nasties on the MD11, the pilot was occasionally out of sync with the aircraft. Once is bad luck, 2 times is untidy, 3 times.... Enhanced pilot training to make up for the deficiency of the aircraft, as the pilots were "...not good enough..." Why not fix the fundamental problem).
AAR-67-AG Delta DC-8 training
AAR-69-01 UAL B727 config warning "The takeoff warning horn sounded shortly after commencing takeoff from runway 09R. The takeoff was continued as the crew tried to figure out what caused the warning. The horn ceased prior to reaching rotate speed. The stickshaker came on and thrust was added..."
AAR-70-02 JAL DC8-62 "The flight descended in a constant, uninterrupted rate of descent from this time until about 6 seconds before water impact at..."
AAR-69-08 PANAM DC8 Anchorage "The stickshaker sounded shortly after VR (154 kts). The aircraft rotated climbed slowly. The right wing contacted the snow covered ground 94 feet left of the extended centerline at a distance of 2760 feet from the runway. The aircraft rolled inverted and broke up."
AAR-70-08 TWA 707 "At the decision height, a missed approach was announced. The captain advanced power on engines 1, 2, and 3, and called for "25 Flaps," "Takeoff Power," "Up Gear." However, neither the flaps nor the landing gear moved from their previous positions. The aircraft was accelerated to 130 knots and a missed-approach climb was instituted.
Approximately 16 t o 18 seconds after the start of the missed-approach procedure, one of the observer pilots commented, "Oh! Oh! Your hydraulic system's zeroed." At 300 feet agl and an airspeed of 127 knots all hydraulic pumps were shutdown, but power on the no. 4 engine was not restored. Directional control was lost and the aircraft struck the ground"
AAR-70-06 B727 UAL "with the no. 3 generator inoperative. This was allowed because according to the Minimum Equipment List, the aircraft is airworthy with only two generators operable provided certain procedures are followed and electrical loads are monitored during flight. Flight 266 was scheduled to depart the gate at 17:55, but was delayed until 18:07 because of the inclement weather and loading problems. The flight commenced its takeoff roll on runway 24 at approximately 18:17. At 18:18:30 the sound of an engine fire warning bell was heard in the cockpit. The crew reported a no. 1 engine fire warning and stated that they wanted to return to the airport. Shortly after shutdown of the no. 1 engine, electrical power from the remaining generator (no. 2) was lost. Following loss of all generator power, the standby electrical system either was not activated or failed to function. Electrical power at a voltage level of approximately 50 volts was restored approximately a minute and a half after loss of the no. 2 generator. The duration of this power restoration was just 9 to 15 seconds. The Boeing descended until it struck the sea". ("CHECK ESSENTIAL...")
AAR-70-19 B747 operated by Boeing. "premature touchdown of the aircraft during a visual approach to a relatively short runway, induced by the pilot's not establishing a glidepath which would assure runway threshold passage with an adequate safety under somewhat unusual environmental and psychological conditions."
AAR-71-15 DAL DC9-32 "the pilot’s misjudgment of altitude due to the absence of sufficient lights in the approach area, misleading information produced by deceptive sloping terrain, and that the pilot did not position the aircraft on the ILS glide slope while he was establishing the final approach profile"
AAR-72-09 UAL B737-200 "The termination of the take-off, after the No.1 engine failed, at a speed above V2 at a height of approximately 50 feet, with insufficient runway remaining to effect a safe landing. The captain's decision and his action to terminate the take-off were based on the erroneous judgment that both engines had failed."
AAR-72-10 Flying Tigers DC-8 Naha JP "The aircraft struck the water approximately 2,200 feet short of the runway threshold lights."
AAR-72-04 NE AIRLINES DC9 "While on a VOR final approach to Martha's Vineyard in instrument flight conditions, the aircraft struck the water, received minor damage but remained airborne."
AAR-72-18 Western B720 Ontario Calif; "The failure of the aircraft rudder hydraulic actuator support fitting. The failure of the fitting resulted in the inapparent loss of left rudder control which, under the conditions of the flight, precluded the pilots’ ability to maintain directional control during a simulated engine-out missed-approach. The existing weather conditions degraded external visual cues, thereby hampering rapid assessment of aircraft performance by the flight check captain".
AAR-72-17 PANAM B747 'Clipper Young 'Merica" San Francisco, Calif, performance for wrong runway... out into the approach lights. (crew done good post whoopsie, and got a very sick plane back in mainly one piece).
P.S.:
Do I think that there is merit in some advanced handling such as aerobatics, tailwheel aircraft etc... even UA handling? Absolutely, but it is no cure for bad design. (i've had the pleasure to teach that in jets, small aerobats and heavy ex mil radials etc... The best aircraft to do it in for the money? A tiny little Bolkow 108 or an Airtourer T5, cheap and you can throw away the instruments and listen to the aircraft talk to the pilot in some comfort. A Pitts adds a bit too much activity for the student).
Crews need to be comfortable under pressure which comes from familiarity, and if that is missing in the MPL system, then that can be addressed, it is not that much of an imposition to give enough intro that the student is not cowered by being out of normal flight attitude and speeds. There is merit in going out in the pattern occasionally and flopping around doing visual circuits, it is a weakness in both the knees of some of the crews and the system. (AZ214 etc... and historical precedents).
as noted by iceman, the topic of flight crew training arises from the Max issue.
As we age, we look back with nostalgia at what we used to do, and reflect on what the youth is doing today. The "obvious" observation of lack of flying skills may be true, it may also be the way we look at the world from our own vantage point.
Going down memory lane gives lots of examples of crews driving tin into the water, ground, short long, nowhere near, "how on earth did they get to that point?" sort of events. many of those were due to the state of the art at the time, but many were not. CXP raises AS214, and I must confess, that one still irritates me. (6 hours after the bingle, I was called up by the CEO of a major and asked if their fleet could have done the same thing and the answer was an emphatic yes, it was a surprise that the paint was owned by Asiana. The CEO didn't miss a beat when advised that I had made 5 reports to that effect in the period of being involved in their program).
AFR was a shambles, no doubt, but it was an event with cognitive overload rearing it's head. Normally, it is reasonable to state that if the action you are taking isn' working, then in the absence of infinite time to act, it may be worthwhile altering your tactics. The Max adds a caveat condition to that; make sure that what you are doing isn't working in part at least. For AFR447, holding full aft SSC precluded any recovery occurring. In almost all cases (Max excepted) the aircraft will naturally recover from an uncontrolled flight condition by the crew getting off the controls, and that is good up to the condition of departure from controlled flight post stall. The exception is where the flight control system is compromised, or a TR is deployed, or components have departed the aircraft, in which case, good luck, you are now a TP.
Looking back in time, and just looking at one data base, in no particular order but covering a time frame from 2012 back to 1967, a random selection of events in which pilot performance, flying skills, head skills, team skills, and often basic IF flight competency occurred are listed. "New boss, same as old boss". We broke planes in a similar manner to today way back when. I avoided events where technology advances would have made a change, adherence to procedures used to be more critical than today, but the slips and errors still occurred, and people got hurt.
The industry could do with improved flying skills, it always could, but that is not a panacea for poor procedure designs, congestion and overloaded ATC, commercial pressure on crews, and bad system designs. Collectively we have accepted as good a lot of designs that in reflection were pretty daggy. We then fight over the relative merits of an Airbus v Boeing, when both have their own dark baggage in their DNA. That is true up to the 380, whether the 350 is better is unknown at this point. Nature cannot be fooled as Feynman stated.
The random selection below comes out of the U.S. databases, so any assumption that it only happens in 3rd world, $h1TolE banana republics may not have that much traction. The MD11 is interesting. The cure for a plane that crews had a high prevalence of PIOs, (or APC, etc... MIL-HDBK-1797A) was to fi the crews by augmented training, which had variable results, planes kept being parked awkwardly on turf, often enough unusable other than as chicken coops, and occasionally not even as that. It is a reminder that fixing pilots may sound cheaper than fixing the dynamics, but in the end it all ends in tears, human performance is a variable that has imponderable inputs that amaze and awe anyone trying to harden safety performance.
AAR-12-01 757 off piste Jackson Hole WY
AAR-11-02 ATR drives into ground on appr
AAR-07-06 SWA 737 overrun Midway...
AAR-04-04 A300-605 tail fell off
AAR-04-02 Tallahassee FL, B727 FEDEX,
AAB-02-04 Burbank off SWA B737...
AAR-01-02 MD82 Little Rock into the approach lites, far end
AAR-05-01 Diesel X hard landing...
AAR-00-02 FDX14 Mega death 2.0 Newark, NJ,
Mega death 2.0 Narita FDX80
Mega death 2.0 Chep Lap Kok, CAL 642 (mandarin)
Mega death 2.0 Riyadh, SA LHC 8460
(12 other hard landing/PIO nasties on the MD11, the pilot was occasionally out of sync with the aircraft. Once is bad luck, 2 times is untidy, 3 times.... Enhanced pilot training to make up for the deficiency of the aircraft, as the pilots were "...not good enough..." Why not fix the fundamental problem).
AAR-67-AG Delta DC-8 training
AAR-69-01 UAL B727 config warning "The takeoff warning horn sounded shortly after commencing takeoff from runway 09R. The takeoff was continued as the crew tried to figure out what caused the warning. The horn ceased prior to reaching rotate speed. The stickshaker came on and thrust was added..."
AAR-70-02 JAL DC8-62 "The flight descended in a constant, uninterrupted rate of descent from this time until about 6 seconds before water impact at..."
AAR-69-08 PANAM DC8 Anchorage "The stickshaker sounded shortly after VR (154 kts). The aircraft rotated climbed slowly. The right wing contacted the snow covered ground 94 feet left of the extended centerline at a distance of 2760 feet from the runway. The aircraft rolled inverted and broke up."
AAR-70-08 TWA 707 "At the decision height, a missed approach was announced. The captain advanced power on engines 1, 2, and 3, and called for "25 Flaps," "Takeoff Power," "Up Gear." However, neither the flaps nor the landing gear moved from their previous positions. The aircraft was accelerated to 130 knots and a missed-approach climb was instituted.
Approximately 16 t o 18 seconds after the start of the missed-approach procedure, one of the observer pilots commented, "Oh! Oh! Your hydraulic system's zeroed." At 300 feet agl and an airspeed of 127 knots all hydraulic pumps were shutdown, but power on the no. 4 engine was not restored. Directional control was lost and the aircraft struck the ground"
AAR-70-06 B727 UAL "with the no. 3 generator inoperative. This was allowed because according to the Minimum Equipment List, the aircraft is airworthy with only two generators operable provided certain procedures are followed and electrical loads are monitored during flight. Flight 266 was scheduled to depart the gate at 17:55, but was delayed until 18:07 because of the inclement weather and loading problems. The flight commenced its takeoff roll on runway 24 at approximately 18:17. At 18:18:30 the sound of an engine fire warning bell was heard in the cockpit. The crew reported a no. 1 engine fire warning and stated that they wanted to return to the airport. Shortly after shutdown of the no. 1 engine, electrical power from the remaining generator (no. 2) was lost. Following loss of all generator power, the standby electrical system either was not activated or failed to function. Electrical power at a voltage level of approximately 50 volts was restored approximately a minute and a half after loss of the no. 2 generator. The duration of this power restoration was just 9 to 15 seconds. The Boeing descended until it struck the sea". ("CHECK ESSENTIAL...")
AAR-70-19 B747 operated by Boeing. "premature touchdown of the aircraft during a visual approach to a relatively short runway, induced by the pilot's not establishing a glidepath which would assure runway threshold passage with an adequate safety under somewhat unusual environmental and psychological conditions."
AAR-71-15 DAL DC9-32 "the pilot’s misjudgment of altitude due to the absence of sufficient lights in the approach area, misleading information produced by deceptive sloping terrain, and that the pilot did not position the aircraft on the ILS glide slope while he was establishing the final approach profile"
AAR-72-09 UAL B737-200 "The termination of the take-off, after the No.1 engine failed, at a speed above V2 at a height of approximately 50 feet, with insufficient runway remaining to effect a safe landing. The captain's decision and his action to terminate the take-off were based on the erroneous judgment that both engines had failed."
AAR-72-10 Flying Tigers DC-8 Naha JP "The aircraft struck the water approximately 2,200 feet short of the runway threshold lights."
AAR-72-04 NE AIRLINES DC9 "While on a VOR final approach to Martha's Vineyard in instrument flight conditions, the aircraft struck the water, received minor damage but remained airborne."
AAR-72-18 Western B720 Ontario Calif; "The failure of the aircraft rudder hydraulic actuator support fitting. The failure of the fitting resulted in the inapparent loss of left rudder control which, under the conditions of the flight, precluded the pilots’ ability to maintain directional control during a simulated engine-out missed-approach. The existing weather conditions degraded external visual cues, thereby hampering rapid assessment of aircraft performance by the flight check captain".
AAR-72-17 PANAM B747 'Clipper Young 'Merica" San Francisco, Calif, performance for wrong runway... out into the approach lights. (crew done good post whoopsie, and got a very sick plane back in mainly one piece).
P.S.:
Do I think that there is merit in some advanced handling such as aerobatics, tailwheel aircraft etc... even UA handling? Absolutely, but it is no cure for bad design. (i've had the pleasure to teach that in jets, small aerobats and heavy ex mil radials etc... The best aircraft to do it in for the money? A tiny little Bolkow 108 or an Airtourer T5, cheap and you can throw away the instruments and listen to the aircraft talk to the pilot in some comfort. A Pitts adds a bit too much activity for the student).
Crews need to be comfortable under pressure which comes from familiarity, and if that is missing in the MPL system, then that can be addressed, it is not that much of an imposition to give enough intro that the student is not cowered by being out of normal flight attitude and speeds. There is merit in going out in the pattern occasionally and flopping around doing visual circuits, it is a weakness in both the knees of some of the crews and the system. (AZ214 etc... and historical precedents).
its not not just some smaller well publicised Airlines that lack pilot manual handing skills.
The only time a BA pilot manually controls their aircraft on routine route operations, is usually below 1000 ft when established on an Instrument Approach. Even that is not strictly manual, as SOPs dictate no manual speed control, continual Autothrottle until touchdown. (All types except the B744)
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https://www.flightglobal.com/news/ar...piloti-461057/
FAA urges ICAO to address erosion of 'manual' piloting skills
The US Federal Aviation Administration is set to urge ICAO to address pilot training deficiencies that may leave some of the world's airline pilots unprepared to manually fly aircraft when automated systems fail.
"As the use of automation increases in aircraft design, it is important to consider how ICAO standards and guidance should evolve to ensure that pilot training programmes align with technological advancements," it adds.
The FAA and its partners will also urge ICAO to recommend that states take steps themselves to ensure their pilots have adequate manual flight training.
AUTOMATION AND PILOT ERROR
The Max accidents also raised concern about a fast-track ICAO commercial pilot licence standard known as the "multicrew pilot licence". That licence requires no minimum cockpit hours, but holders must have 240h of simulator or cockpit time and a private pilot licence.
Ethiopian was among airlines to adopt the licence standard.
The 737 Max crashes are only the latest accidents to raise questions about pilot training and automation. Others include the 2013 crash of Asiana flight 214 at San Francisco and the 2009 crash of Air France flight 447 into the Atlantic Ocean.
FAA urges ICAO to address erosion of 'manual' piloting skills
The US Federal Aviation Administration is set to urge ICAO to address pilot training deficiencies that may leave some of the world's airline pilots unprepared to manually fly aircraft when automated systems fail.
"As the use of automation increases in aircraft design, it is important to consider how ICAO standards and guidance should evolve to ensure that pilot training programmes align with technological advancements," it adds.
The FAA and its partners will also urge ICAO to recommend that states take steps themselves to ensure their pilots have adequate manual flight training.
AUTOMATION AND PILOT ERROR
The Max accidents also raised concern about a fast-track ICAO commercial pilot licence standard known as the "multicrew pilot licence". That licence requires no minimum cockpit hours, but holders must have 240h of simulator or cockpit time and a private pilot licence.
Ethiopian was among airlines to adopt the licence standard.
The 737 Max crashes are only the latest accidents to raise questions about pilot training and automation. Others include the 2013 crash of Asiana flight 214 at San Francisco and the 2009 crash of Air France flight 447 into the Atlantic Ocean.
Have to then say that don't understand the reason as to why was the MAX grounded in the US ??? The experience being there, the aircraft being safe on manual flight, and the US being big enough country to justify the MAX use within its frontiers, have to say that I don't get it why the MAX was grounded in the US ...
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This thread has renewed the ongoing discussion about erosion of hand-flying skills (which discussion will always be with us), but I think the most interesting point is what the release of the "FAA urges ICAO" story suggests about the current posture at the FAA. To me, it appears stubbornly defensive with a strong tendency toward denialism and a disinclination to engage in introspection. Not encouraging of trust.
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A question from the cheap seats...
Full motion sims for modern airliners are no doubt incredibly expensive to buy & operate, & a very scarce resource. Is there any merit in filling a warehouse sized space with user-operated full motion sims for a far simpler type of aircraft without all the complex systems of an airliner or bizjet or the ability to simulate complex failures that a simulator used for training & testing crew on those planes would require, & just provide a realistic sandbox for people to play in, then let airline pilots put hours in regularly in those sims, possibly requiring them to complete some objective test of hand-flying skill once in a while...?
My mind keeps imagining a B57/Canberra sim, but after an imaginary low budget glass cockpit upgrade & with irrelevant instruments deleted entirely. Something like that, anyway, so that pilots who spend entire careers pushing button A & then watching the aircraft systems do everything except taxi them to the gate at the other end know what to do when the automation goes tilt...
Full motion sims for modern airliners are no doubt incredibly expensive to buy & operate, & a very scarce resource. Is there any merit in filling a warehouse sized space with user-operated full motion sims for a far simpler type of aircraft without all the complex systems of an airliner or bizjet or the ability to simulate complex failures that a simulator used for training & testing crew on those planes would require, & just provide a realistic sandbox for people to play in, then let airline pilots put hours in regularly in those sims, possibly requiring them to complete some objective test of hand-flying skill once in a while...?
My mind keeps imagining a B57/Canberra sim, but after an imaginary low budget glass cockpit upgrade & with irrelevant instruments deleted entirely. Something like that, anyway, so that pilots who spend entire careers pushing button A & then watching the aircraft systems do everything except taxi them to the gate at the other end know what to do when the automation goes tilt...
The US industry does care about equal relationships when it come to competing with other worldwide companies and their regulator.So collectively "we" do care and will ensure that the FAA is equally respected. Already there has been much soul searching by various committees and sufficient changes and updates are expected to be undertaken to ensure improvement to practice
Perchance soulsearching introspection uncovered some quite embarrassing facts which convinced FAA that situation is so bad it would gain nothing by coming out clean?
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A full motion sim consists of four main components. A sawed off cockpit section (with full working instrumentation) of an actual airplane, the hydraulic platform supporting the cockpit section to create the 3d sensation, the display unit to provide the visual sensation through the cockpit windows, and the processing unit to run the software powering the visuals and the motion. The only difference between aircraft models is the physical cockpit section and the software, which makes very little difference in the final cost. A 172 and 380 full motion sim will both be in the same price range.
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Dont forget, it is Boeing that is insisting on no further training.
What is Boeing's baseline of training or experience for this statement or requirement/lack of?
ummm, if nothing else, the shear size of the sim, as well as the flight deck design differences/flight computers and electronics....
A 172 FM sim same as an A380. FM sim...sure...
damn.
C172 FM sim.....
What is Boeing's baseline of training or experience for this statement or requirement/lack of?
A 172 and 380 full motion sim will both be in the same price range.
A 172 FM sim same as an A380. FM sim...sure...
damn.
C172 FM sim.....
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I rembember the master of "meritocracy" going down that road.. Still the CAA took his Aoc and Ato away
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A full motion sim consists of four main components. A sawed off cockpit section (with full working instrumentation) of an actual airplane, the hydraulic platform supporting the cockpit section to create the 3d sensation, the display unit to provide the visual sensation through the cockpit windows, and the processing unit to run the software powering the visuals and the motion. The only difference between aircraft models is the physical cockpit section and the software, which makes very little difference in the final cost. A 172 and 380 full motion sim will both be in the same price range.
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Any game manufacturer might come up with a decent 3D seat sim and software, to offer pilots lots of hand flying for far less $$$ than the full blown multi k$$$ of the industry.
And they are good at replicating cockpit and aircraft behavior.
The manufacturers have been trying to design the pilot out of the cockpit for a while so that they could sell them to operators who didn't want to pay for all that pesky training. What wasn't forseen was the reduction in engineering standards and testing requirements, demanded by the Executives, that would expose flaws in the aircraft before they were released to line operations. Boeing with the FAA's help are in a bare knuckle fight for survival and will deflect as much liability from themselves by fare means or foul.
The FAA has addressed this issue for at least the last 10 years and has required increased emphasis on hand flying and flying with reduced levels of automation.
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its not not just some smaller well publicised Airlines that lack pilot manual handing skills.
The only time a BA pilot manually controls their aircraft on routine route operations, is usually below 1000 ft when established on an Instrument Approach. Even that is not strictly manual, as SOPs dictate no manual speed control, continual Autothrottle until touchdown. (All types except the B744)
One might ask the same question of the Runaway Trim procedure
The FAA's … theory …
As yet we have not seen the FAAs submission. It is reported as:-
“The FAA's concerns turn on the theory that many pilots lost or never attained adequate manual flying skills because they have come to rely on increasingly complex automated systems designed largely to prevent pilot error in the first place, according to a paper outlining the FAA's recommendations.”
This is an unsubstantiated ‘theory ’. A theory should trigger research, but none has been referenced.
“But technological reliance has left some pilots unprepared for emergencies …
When automation systems do not work as intended or do not work well in the operational situation, pilots without sufficient manual flight control experience and proper training may be reluctant or may not be adequately skilled to take control of the aircraft,"
The FAA fails to provide evidence of experience and training shortfall - thus ‘supposition’.
EASAs position:- “Pilot training requirements are not meant to compensate for non-acceptable design on the compliance and safety standpoint.”
Whilst ICAO and member nations might note the FAAs concerns, the international industry must not resort to safety measures based on supposition.
What if the FAA’s theory is incorrect? more rules, unnecessary training, without safety improvement.
Research into loss of manual flying skills suggests that degraded cognitive skills, situation appreciation, is of greater concern,
There is scant evidence of difficulties arising from manual flight in normal operation, but there has been many problems in abnormal situations originated by technology failure. Thus safety focus should be on the origin of abnormal situations; avoid or simplify the systems and situations which pilots are required to understand - fix the machine not the man.
AF447 and 737 Max involved sensor / system malfunction. Airbus changed the sensor, improved the system, and provided an independent back-up speed display; ‘belt and braces’.
Boeing / FAA, their pants down, promote unproven theory !
EASA’s position
https://www.easa.europa.eu/newsroom-...-clarification
“The FAA's concerns turn on the theory that many pilots lost or never attained adequate manual flying skills because they have come to rely on increasingly complex automated systems designed largely to prevent pilot error in the first place, according to a paper outlining the FAA's recommendations.”
This is an unsubstantiated ‘theory ’. A theory should trigger research, but none has been referenced.
“But technological reliance has left some pilots unprepared for emergencies …
When automation systems do not work as intended or do not work well in the operational situation, pilots without sufficient manual flight control experience and proper training may be reluctant or may not be adequately skilled to take control of the aircraft,"
The FAA fails to provide evidence of experience and training shortfall - thus ‘supposition’.
EASAs position:- “Pilot training requirements are not meant to compensate for non-acceptable design on the compliance and safety standpoint.”
Whilst ICAO and member nations might note the FAAs concerns, the international industry must not resort to safety measures based on supposition.
What if the FAA’s theory is incorrect? more rules, unnecessary training, without safety improvement.
Research into loss of manual flying skills suggests that degraded cognitive skills, situation appreciation, is of greater concern,
There is scant evidence of difficulties arising from manual flight in normal operation, but there has been many problems in abnormal situations originated by technology failure. Thus safety focus should be on the origin of abnormal situations; avoid or simplify the systems and situations which pilots are required to understand - fix the machine not the man.
AF447 and 737 Max involved sensor / system malfunction. Airbus changed the sensor, improved the system, and provided an independent back-up speed display; ‘belt and braces’.
Boeing / FAA, their pants down, promote unproven theory !
EASA’s position
https://www.easa.europa.eu/newsroom-...-clarification
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Manual flying skills have been on the radar at the FAA for several years. Airlines have been adding this training for a couple of years now.
Note the date: https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/121.423
Note the date: https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/121.423
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Research into loss of manual flying skills suggests that degraded cognitive skills, situation appreciation, is of greater concern,
There is scant evidence of difficulties arising from manual flight in normal operation, but there has been many problems in abnormal situations originated by technology failure. Thus safety focus should be on the origin of abnormal situations; avoid or simplify the systems and situations which pilots are required to understand - fix the machine not the man.
To the degree that a pilot practices a certain psychomotor task repetitively, whether we are talking about basic flying skills or immediate action items (i.e. "memory" procedures, stall and/or windshear recoveries, etc.), then those tasks will draw more on procedural memory and less on working memory thus freeing cognitive resources to direct toward situational awareness or other higher cognitive tasks.
In regards to the "fix the machine" as opposed to the person, until such time that technology has advanced to the point that pilots are no longer necessary, it will have to be some of both. Neither human nor machine has been perfected, and seeing as machines are created by humans, I suspect it will be awhile until we have a flawless machine.