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FAA urges ICAO to address erosion of 'manual' piloting skills

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FAA urges ICAO to address erosion of 'manual' piloting skills

Old 27th Sep 2019, 18:51
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FAA urges ICAO to address erosion of 'manual' piloting skills

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/ar...piloti-461057/​​​​​​

FAA urges ICAO to address erosion of 'manual' piloting skills


The US Federal Aviation Administration is set to urge ICAO to address pilot training deficiencies that may leave some of the world's airline pilots unprepared to manually fly aircraft when automated systems fail.

Representatives from the agency will bring up their concerns about training shortcomings and a related concept called "automation dependency" during ICAO's 40th assembly, occurring now in Montreal.

The meeting kicks off as the aviation industry continues grappling with pilot training and automation questions that have simmered for years but became salient following several accidents, including but not limited to recent crashes of two Boeing 737 Max.

Those particular crashes spurred criticism of a Boeing flight control system that contributed to the accidents, but also raised questions about the pilots' response.

The FAA's concerns turn on the theory that many pilots lost or never attained adequate manual flying skills because they have come to rely on increasingly complex automated systems designed largely to prevent pilot error in the first place, according to a paper outlining the FAA's recommendations.

But technological reliance has left some pilots unprepared for emergencies, it says.

"When automation systems do not work as intended or do not work well in the operational situation, pilots without sufficient manual flight control experience and proper training may be reluctant or may not be adequately skilled to take control of the aircraft," says the paper, available from ICAO.

"As the use of automation increases in aircraft design, it is important to consider how ICAO standards and guidance should evolve to ensure that pilot training programmes align with technological advancements," it adds.

The paper's key points will be presented to ICAO's technical commission by the FAA and representatives of Canada, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago, the paper says.

The FAA has not said the date its representatives will present their concerns.

The agency will ask ICAO to "identify the scope of automation dependency", identify standards related to manual flying, assess airlines' training programmes and review the need for new standards, says the paper.

The FAA and its partners will also urge ICAO to recommend that states take steps themselves to ensure their pilots have adequate manual flight training.

AUTOMATION AND PILOT ERROR

The FAA's concerns cut deep into a pilot training controversy swirling around and within the aviation industry. Safety experts have long warned of an erosion of manual flying skills, with some expert noting many commercial pilots rely on autopilots from a moment after take-off to a moment before landing.

The issue became charged following crashes of a Lion Air 737 Max in October 2018 and that of an Ethiopian Airlines 737 Max in March.

Regulators grounded the Max following those crashes; investigators have said a new flight control system called MCAS played a leading role.

But the crashes spurred discussion about whether those pilots had sufficient training to address the emergency, and whether they might, with better training, have recovered from MCAS-inspired dives.

Suggestions they might have has occurred in hushed tones, reflecting the overall emotionally-charged nature not only of the crashes, but also of pilot error discussions.

The Max accidents also raised concern about a fast-track ICAO commercial pilot licence standard known as the "multicrew pilot licence". That licence requires no minimum cockpit hours, but holders must have 240h of simulator or cockpit time and a private pilot licence.

Ethiopian was among airlines to adopt the licence standard.

The 737 Max crashes are only the latest accidents to raise questions about pilot training and automation. Others include the 2013 crash of Asiana flight 214 at San Francisco and the 2009 crash of Air France flight 447 into the Atlantic Ocean.
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Old 27th Sep 2019, 19:50
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I find it funny that the FAA is now only getting on to this problem while pointing to the two 737 MAX crashes. It sounds more to me like the FAA is trying to protect its a$$ and trying to shift the blame away from Boeing. Just more political BS.
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Old 27th Sep 2019, 20:22
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Quite agree. Too much ass-covering instead of admitting that the MPL introduction has reduced the flying experience required, for non-normal ops, far too much.

Only now are we seeing the first of the MPL candidates, getting commands, and flying with others who have almost no significant hand-flying experience.
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Old 27th Sep 2019, 20:50
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Concur.

The problem in these events were related to inadequate certification, that led to the pilots needing to have extraordinary skill in order to cope with the ***** $@ndw1Ch they were offered by the manufacturer and regulator.

The rules require a design that can be managed by an average pilot.... not Chuck Yeagers. Changing training does not give a free pass for bad design.

Have manual skills degraded? Possibly, but that is a direct result of what the system has elected to focus on in order to ensure that other problems were cured.
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Old 27th Sep 2019, 20:57
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But can substitute hand flying training for iPad training - and still insist that is fine!
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Old 27th Sep 2019, 20:58
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Lets not forget that some airlines actually require Pilots to go Automated at every opportunity and the decision to hand fly when possible (eg on fully visual approaches) is taken away from them.

​​​​
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Old 27th Sep 2019, 21:48
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I'm sure the timing is entirely coincidental and that the same is true of the recent Langewiesche op-ed.

Seriously, do you think the FAA doesn't know how this must look to much of the world?
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Old 28th Sep 2019, 00:04
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If the FAA were serious about this, all they would have to do, is announce that airlines, whose SOPs forbid hand flying, would not be allowed in US airspace, after a certain date.
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Old 28th Sep 2019, 00:08
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Originally Posted by fdr
Concur.

The problem in these events were related to inadequate certification, that led to the pilots needing to have extraordinary skill in order to cope with the ***** $@ndw1Ch they were offered by the manufacturer and regulator.

The rules require a design that can be managed by an average pilot.... not Chuck Yeagers. Changing training does not give a free pass for bad design.

Have manual skills degraded? Possibly, but that is a direct result of what the system has elected to focus on in order to ensure that other problems were cured.
Air France? Asiana? Chuck Yeager? Please....
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Old 28th Sep 2019, 00:28
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IMO it's not some new FAA issue unless my company has added training outside of the FAA requirements. I was under the impression that some of the new training stuff is because of FAA requirements. I forget the changes but I think they've added crosswind landings, VFR arrivals, low altitude go-arounds, etc. Due to additional requirements it's become unusual to have excess simulator time at the end of the training period. This might be company added events and maybe were not mandated by the FAA.
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Old 28th Sep 2019, 01:54
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cessnaxpilot

fdr was not referring to those accidents as you well know or should, he was referring to the 737 MAX accidents.
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Old 28th Sep 2019, 02:17
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Having long since reluctantly accepted that automation dependency has resulted in lack of skill of some of its pilots to fly an ordinary visual circuit, at least one Australian 737 operator now has the SOP requirement to have final landing flap down and all landing checks completed, while the aircraft is still on the downwind leg of the circuit. This is supposed to ensure the aircraft is stabilised by 1000 ft with all landing checklists completed. In the simulator it was noted pilots were having difficulty coping with manual visual flying and stabilisation requirements.
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Old 28th Sep 2019, 03:07
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Originally Posted by iceman50
cessnaxpilot

fdr was not referring to those accidents as you well know or should, he was referring to the 737 MAX accidents.
Point taken. But I do think we’re seeing a change in technology that has diminished the required flying skills when everything is working as designed. The real question is... where are we when things go wrong? That was my point. If everything is hooked up and working, great! Airbus and Boeing seem to have incidents in equal proportions... and most often it’s attributed to pilot error. Until we remove the pilots, we better train them to fly when things don’t go as planned.
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Old 28th Sep 2019, 03:21
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Not that I’m a fan of the FAA but domestically they have been pushing hand flying for more than a few years now.
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Old 28th Sep 2019, 04:18
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Many older farts on here have called out this misery for a long time now. And here we are, the FAA "discovers" it finally!

May i re-post an earlier one from me:

​​​​​​Training pilots for airlines has changed considerably the last 60 years. It started with mainly ex Air Force trained guys that needed some CRM but certainly no upset training. They were joined by the guys and gals working their way and hours up postal/bush/taxi flying with underpowered single and twins, then via weak regional props up to the main carriers, having acquired a good amount of experience in difficult conditions to be converted to very capable airline captains. Today there are more and more MPL/ab initio?P2F pilots going through ever shorter crash courses from zero to hero onto big twin aisle airliners, especially where there is national pride to propel young locals into cockpits of prestige born carriers in certain regions. Not to mention the fake hours pilots weaseling their way in. Not one of the latter has ever recovered from a spin, flown an Immelmann or wrestled a choking 207 over a mountain range with howling downdrafts at night . A German saying goes what Little Johnny does not learn, Big John will never learn. That is where some latest accident reports point at. As a consequence we see the incorporation of manual handling and upset recovery simulator sessions at almost all serious airlines. It is however a futile fig leaf to cover up the blatant lack of basic skills of most new applicants that can hardly be trained at later stage. If taken seriously it would imply a much more comprehensive syllabus and not only in simulators. But again, that would be too expensive, so everyone works with the bandaid only and continues to pretend it’s a fixing surgery.
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Old 28th Sep 2019, 05:21
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At the risk of receiving a lot of flak, I beg to present a slightly dissenting opinion. Despite the number of recent high profile accidents ultimately attributable to failure of automation combined with the lack of skills to counter it, overall aviation has constantly improved the safety record over the past decades, and the constant reduction of the accident rate can mostly be attributed to automation preventing fatal errors, and strict adherence to SOP's. The accident rate (per flight hours) is a tiny fraction of what it used to be in the fine old days (an older fart myself, I cherish those days but accept that they are gone forever). One only needs to go through the records of the sixties and seventies so see how many accidents happened during trainng for new types, mostly while hand flying. Simulators and automation have all but elminated these types of accidents, and most of the other common causes of the past decades.

One must face the realities that in the post-deregulation world, with accident rates so low as they are, consumers are no longer influenced by safety when chosing the carrier. Even in the dodgier parts of the world, air travel is far safer than any alternate (I did take a domestic flights in Sudan recently, knowing that the overnight bus is far riskier, one crashing into an oncoming truck every week). The commercial pressures require any operator to meet the expected safety standard in the most cost effective way, and automation was a huge boost, permitting crew with less time and experience to operate aircraft as safely (or safer) as crews decades ago with vastly superior training and capabilities. Bluntly put, is any money spent by the industry to expand initial and recurring training to maintain or improve those hand flying skills on a global level beyond what is required today (we are talking billions in training costs) going to prevent further accidents, and if so how many? Would we not be better off by spending the same money on ensuring that current standards are adhered to (regulators in many countries are under staffed and under funded), or infrastructure is improved ? One also needs to consider the possiblity of inadvertantly introducing new risk factors into a system that, based on numbers, appears to work reasonably well.
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Old 28th Sep 2019, 06:07
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andrasz, I proffer the following graph to evidence that much is safer than the sixties and seventies. I expect technology and knowledge, rather than training was a large part of fatality reduction.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motor_...ual_deaths.png
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Old 28th Sep 2019, 06:58
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Originally Posted by Bend alot
I expect technology and knowledge, rather than training was a large part of fatality reduction
Absolutely, we are saying the same thing. The corollary is that when faced with the choice of spending limited resources, by and large spending on improving technology offers better results than spending on improving training for existing technology.
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Old 28th Sep 2019, 07:37
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andrasz,

Why did we switch from flying the real thing a few circuits to using a simulator?

Safety, we kept crashing and killing the crews - it is not better training but it saves lives.

Why did we shift from simulator to computer based?

It is cheaper!

Mandate x hours sim time, per pax seat for each new type. Not because it is needed but because it is safer.
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Old 28th Sep 2019, 08:18
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cessnaxplt;

as noted by iceman, the topic of flight crew training arises from the Max issue.

As we age, we look back with nostalgia at what we used to do, and reflect on what the youth is doing today. The "obvious" observation of lack of flying skills may be true, it may also be the way we look at the world from our own vantage point.

Going down memory lane gives lots of examples of crews driving tin into the water, ground, short long, nowhere near, "how on earth did they get to that point?" sort of events. many of those were due to the state of the art at the time, but many were not. CXP raises AS214, and I must confess, that one still irritates me. (6 hours after the bingle, I was called up by the CEO of a major and asked if their fleet could have done the same thing and the answer was an emphatic yes, it was a surprise that the paint was owned by Asiana. The CEO didn't miss a beat when advised that I had made 5 reports to that effect in the period of being involved in their program).

AFR was a shambles, no doubt, but it was an event with cognitive overload rearing it's head. Normally, it is reasonable to state that if the action you are taking isn' working, then in the absence of infinite time to act, it may be worthwhile altering your tactics. The Max adds a caveat condition to that; make sure that what you are doing isn't working in part at least. For AFR447, holding full aft SSC precluded any recovery occurring. In almost all cases (Max excepted) the aircraft will naturally recover from an uncontrolled flight condition by the crew getting off the controls, and that is good up to the condition of departure from controlled flight post stall. The exception is where the flight control system is compromised, or a TR is deployed, or components have departed the aircraft, in which case, good luck, you are now a TP.

Looking back in time, and just looking at one data base, in no particular order but covering a time frame from 2012 back to 1967, a random selection of events in which pilot performance, flying skills, head skills, team skills, and often basic IF flight competency occurred are listed. "New boss, same as old boss". We broke planes in a similar manner to today way back when. I avoided events where technology advances would have made a change, adherence to procedures used to be more critical than today, but the slips and errors still occurred, and people got hurt.

The industry could do with improved flying skills, it always could, but that is not a panacea for poor procedure designs, congestion and overloaded ATC, commercial pressure on crews, and bad system designs. Collectively we have accepted as good a lot of designs that in reflection were pretty daggy. We then fight over the relative merits of an Airbus v Boeing, when both have their own dark baggage in their DNA. That is true up to the 380, whether the 350 is better is unknown at this point. Nature cannot be fooled as Feynman stated.

The random selection below comes out of the U.S. databases, so any assumption that it only happens in 3rd world, $h1TolE banana republics may not have that much traction. The MD11 is interesting. The cure for a plane that crews had a high prevalence of PIOs, (or APC, etc... MIL-HDBK-1797A) was to fi the crews by augmented training, which had variable results, planes kept being parked awkwardly on turf, often enough unusable other than as chicken coops, and occasionally not even as that. It is a reminder that fixing pilots may sound cheaper than fixing the dynamics, but in the end it all ends in tears, human performance is a variable that has imponderable inputs that amaze and awe anyone trying to harden safety performance.

AAR-12-01 757 off piste Jackson Hole WY

AAR-11-02 ATR drives into ground on appr

AAR-07-06 SWA 737 overrun Midway...

AAR-04-04 A300-605 tail fell off

AAR-04-02 Tallahassee FL, B727 FEDEX,

AAB-02-04 Burbank off SWA B737...

AAR-01-02 MD82 Little Rock into the approach lites, far end

AAR-05-01 Diesel X hard landing...

AAR-00-02 FDX14 Mega death 2.0 Newark, NJ,
Mega death 2.0 Narita FDX80
Mega death 2.0 Chep Lap Kok, CAL 642 (mandarin)
Mega death 2.0 Riyadh, SA LHC 8460
(12 other hard landing/PIO nasties on the MD11, the pilot was occasionally out of sync with the aircraft. Once is bad luck, 2 times is untidy, 3 times.... Enhanced pilot training to make up for the deficiency of the aircraft, as the pilots were "...not good enough..." Why not fix the fundamental problem).

AAR-67-AG Delta DC-8 training

AAR-69-01 UAL B727 config warning "The takeoff warning horn sounded shortly after commencing takeoff from runway 09R. The takeoff was continued as the crew tried to figure out what caused the warning. The horn ceased prior to reaching rotate speed. The stickshaker came on and thrust was added..."

AAR-70-02 JAL DC8-62 "The flight descended in a constant, uninterrupted rate of descent from this time until about 6 seconds before water impact at..."

AAR-69-08 PANAM DC8 Anchorage "The stickshaker sounded shortly after VR (154 kts). The aircraft rotated climbed slowly. The right wing contacted the snow covered ground 94 feet left of the extended centerline at a distance of 2760 feet from the runway. The aircraft rolled inverted and broke up."

AAR-70-08 TWA 707 "At the decision height, a missed approach was announced. The captain advanced power on engines 1, 2, and 3, and called for "25 Flaps," "Takeoff Power," "Up Gear." However, neither the flaps nor the landing gear moved from their previous positions. The aircraft was accelerated to 130 knots and a missed-approach climb was instituted.
Approximately 16 t o 18 seconds after the start of the missed-approach procedure, one of the observer pilots commented, "Oh! Oh! Your hydraulic system's zeroed." At 300 feet agl and an airspeed of 127 knots all hydraulic pumps were shutdown, but power on the no. 4 engine was not restored. Directional control was lost and the aircraft struck the ground"


AAR-70-06 B727 UAL "with the no. 3 generator inoperative. This was allowed because according to the Minimum Equipment List, the aircraft is airworthy with only two generators operable provided certain procedures are followed and electrical loads are monitored during flight. Flight 266 was scheduled to depart the gate at 17:55, but was delayed until 18:07 because of the inclement weather and loading problems. The flight commenced its takeoff roll on runway 24 at approximately 18:17. At 18:18:30 the sound of an engine fire warning bell was heard in the cockpit. The crew reported a no. 1 engine fire warning and stated that they wanted to return to the airport. Shortly after shutdown of the no. 1 engine, electrical power from the remaining generator (no. 2) was lost. Following loss of all generator power, the standby electrical system either was not activated or failed to function. Electrical power at a voltage level of approximately 50 volts was restored approximately a minute and a half after loss of the no. 2 generator. The duration of this power restoration was just 9 to 15 seconds. The Boeing descended until it struck the sea". ("CHECK ESSENTIAL...")

AAR-70-19 B747 operated by Boeing. "premature touchdown of the aircraft during a visual approach to a relatively short runway, induced by the pilot's not establishing a glidepath which would assure runway threshold passage with an adequate safety under somewhat unusual environmental and psychological conditions."

AAR-71-15 DAL DC9-32 "the pilot’s misjudgment of altitude due to the absence of sufficient lights in the approach area, misleading information produced by deceptive sloping terrain, and that the pilot did not position the aircraft on the ILS glide slope while he was establishing the final approach profile"

AAR-72-09 UAL B737-200 "The termination of the take-off, after the No.1 engine failed, at a speed above V2 at a height of approximately 50 feet, with insufficient runway remaining to effect a safe landing. The captain's decision and his action to terminate the take-off were based on the erroneous judgment that both engines had failed."

AAR-72-10 Flying Tigers DC-8 Naha JP "The aircraft struck the water approximately 2,200 feet short of the runway threshold lights."

AAR-72-04 NE AIRLINES DC9 "While on a VOR final approach to Martha's Vineyard in instrument flight conditions, the aircraft struck the water, received minor damage but remained airborne."

AAR-72-18 Western B720 Ontario Calif; "The failure of the aircraft rudder hydraulic actuator support fitting. The failure of the fitting resulted in the inapparent loss of left rudder control which, under the conditions of the flight, precluded the pilots’ ability to maintain directional control during a simulated engine-out missed-approach. The existing weather conditions degraded external visual cues, thereby hampering rapid assessment of aircraft performance by the flight check captain".

AAR-72-17 PANAM B747 'Clipper Young 'Merica" San Francisco, Calif, performance for wrong runway... out into the approach lights. (crew done good post whoopsie, and got a very sick plane back in mainly one piece).



P.S.:

Do I think that there is merit in some advanced handling such as aerobatics, tailwheel aircraft etc... even UA handling? Absolutely, but it is no cure for bad design. (i've had the pleasure to teach that in jets, small aerobats and heavy ex mil radials etc... The best aircraft to do it in for the money? A tiny little Bolkow 108 or an Airtourer T5, cheap and you can throw away the instruments and listen to the aircraft talk to the pilot in some comfort. A Pitts adds a bit too much activity for the student).

Crews need to be comfortable under pressure which comes from familiarity, and if that is missing in the MPL system, then that can be addressed, it is not that much of an imposition to give enough intro that the student is not cowered by being out of normal flight attitude and speeds. There is merit in going out in the pattern occasionally and flopping around doing visual circuits, it is a weakness in both the knees of some of the crews and the system. (AZ214 etc... and historical precedents).

Last edited by fdr; 28th Sep 2019 at 08:42.
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