Door blows out during ground test on Boeing 777X jet
and also to add, the FAA is typically outbid by corporate dollars and perks when it comes to "highly qualified" in new technology in aviation. The FAA is thus placed in a "catch-up" mode regarding equivalent means of compliance and certification. For sure the FAA learns a lot in their review of the "proposed means" of compliance but some bad assumptions still get through especially when it comes to assumptions about human error.
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Hopefully I have engaged my brain now.
So this *was* the ultimate load test, and the airframe gave way at 99% — in what must be a fairly unusual way? Is the object of this test to test the wings alone or the fuselage and wings as a unit? My introduction to the test was the 777 documentary way back and I’ve always assumed only the wings were being tested.
It must be a safe bet that Boeing didn’t expect the fuselage to fail, but is it possible that the failure is an artefact of the test?
So this *was* the ultimate load test, and the airframe gave way at 99% — in what must be a fairly unusual way? Is the object of this test to test the wings alone or the fuselage and wings as a unit? My introduction to the test was the 777 documentary way back and I’ve always assumed only the wings were being tested.
It must be a safe bet that Boeing didn’t expect the fuselage to fail, but is it possible that the failure is an artefact of the test?
It is almost impossible to run an ultimate load test on ' only' the wings or 'only' the fuselage except for some ' partial conditions ".. For example over 60 years ago, the 707 fuselage section was immersed in a large water tank and pressurized hundreds- or thousands of times- this the result of Comet disaster re fatigue of window frames. But when it comes to an ultimate test of factory production assembled wings at least part of the fuselage ( above the wingbox ) is involved. -This since to bend the wings up one has to hold something down and if a way was figured out to simply hold the assembled fuselage ONLY above the wing box, it would then call into question about how various loads were distributed, etc. So it is much more realistic ( not discussing regulations for the moment ) to include the whole fuselage (cockpit- above wingbox- fuselage section aft of wingbox - and tail section including aft pressure bulkhead, etc )
Most of the regulations- requirements - were/are the result of the comet disaster- and no doubt further enhanced by the Electra ' whirl mode' disasters. I'm sure a more qualified person than myself can- could expand on my overview above .
BTW then 767 ultimate load test on wings etc failed due to loads on the aft section and a missing stringer- circumferential near the rear door. result was a approx 10 degree twist of the aft section from normal visible later by the cocked from vertical vertical stabilizer section.
Last edited by Grebe; 1st Dec 2019 at 22:50. Reason: minor corrections
I have formed the notion, from this discussion, that in the good old days the FAA delegated a lot of responsibility to individual Boeing engineers, who reported to the FAA; the engineers had to manage their dual loyalties, but the FAA was in a position to check that. I think that what has happened is that the engineers now report to Boeing managers, which means that the FAA has delegated responsibility not to engineers whom it can choose, but to the Boeing company.
Is this notion accurate? If so, it's troubling, because individuals have ethical standards, but by modern doctrine, a company's responsibility is to its shareholders, not any ethical ideals.
Is this notion accurate? If so, it's troubling, because individuals have ethical standards, but by modern doctrine, a company's responsibility is to its shareholders, not any ethical ideals.
OTOH, as a DER I was clearly retaliated against when I made a finding of non-compliance (which resulted in an AD). Not only was I removed from the team working the issue (replaced by a DER who later had his delegation pulled by the FAA due to unethical behavior
), I went from retention 1 (hardest to layoff) to a retention 3 (easiest to layoff) and didn't get a raise for two years (at a time when raises went out every six months). When I mentioned this episode to my FAA mentor, I was told it wasn't their problem - it was an internal Boeing issue 
ODA isn't perfect, but neither was the old system.
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ODA isn't perfect, but neither was the old system.
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At some point in time we need to be strong enough to recognize this delegation and independent oversight has crossed lines (https://www.barrons.com/articles/boe...tr-51571064129).
We have to implement corrective actions. At this moment this movement is to driven by non US authorities.https://www.businessinsider.nl/boein...onal=true&r=US
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As part of the transition to becoming an ODA, Boeing put in place a number of protections against "undo pressure" - something that didn't exist previously. This included training of management, and most importantly a clearly defined process for reporting incidents of undo pressure. At least in my experience (nearly 30 years, pretty much evenly split between the old DER system and the delegated AR system), I was far better protected as an AR - literally all I had to do was mention that I felt management was approaching 'undo pressure' and they'd immediately back down. In fact, as an AR, I once had my chief engineer tell an engine company to back off when they started pressuring me to approve a flight test result that I was unhappy with.
OTOH, as a DER I was clearly retaliated against when I made a finding of non-compliance (which resulted in an AD). Not only was I removed from the team working the issue (replaced by a DER who later had his delegation pulled by the FAA due to unethical behavior), I went from retention 1 (hardest to layoff) to a retention 3 (easiest to layoff) and didn't get a raise for two years (at a time when raises went out every six months). When I mentioned this episode to my FAA mentor, I was told it wasn't their problem - it was an internal Boeing issue
ODA isn't perfect, but neither was the old system.
OTOH, as a DER I was clearly retaliated against when I made a finding of non-compliance (which resulted in an AD). Not only was I removed from the team working the issue (replaced by a DER who later had his delegation pulled by the FAA due to unethical behavior
), I went from retention 1 (hardest to layoff) to a retention 3 (easiest to layoff) and didn't get a raise for two years (at a time when raises went out every six months). When I mentioned this episode to my FAA mentor, I was told it wasn't their problem - it was an internal Boeing issue ODA isn't perfect, but neither was the old system.
In most organizations the Quality Assurance system has a completely separate management chain and this can often go up to board level to ensure QA is not put under delivery timescales pressures.
Besides, the Boeing management structure is already quite complicated and difficult to understand - adding another management chain might cause it to collapse under it's own weight
Last edited by tdracer; 3rd Dec 2019 at 21:09.
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The problem with that is that the DER/AR job is not 'full time' - it's more of a subset to your normal job responsibilities. That's a big part of why the DER/AR system usually works - the DER/AR is very familiar with the system he/she is certifying because it's what they've been working on, and the certification needs are known and implemented into the design early on rather than some last minute bandaids to meet the regs. This is fundamentally different than how the QA system works (on more than one occasion, I had to explain to a QA person what they were looking at and why it was acceptable - they simply don't have detailed system knowledge). The Boeing ODA is already a separate group - with it's own reporting chain (part of the protections put in place for ARs under the ODA), but the ARs still fall under the normal management system for accessing work quality, performance, etc.
Besides, the Boeing management structure is already quite complicated and difficult to understand - adding another management chain might cause it to collapse under it's own weight
Besides, the Boeing management structure is already quite complicated and difficult to understand - adding another management chain might cause it to collapse under it's own weight
On the organization it becomes 'span of command' and 'unity of control'
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Yes - it still puts the individual in the difficult position of competing aims - so working in a team trying to meet tight deadlines while also insisting on creating 'delays' for specific testing/regression etc. I have been in the position of being an acceptance manager AND tasked with meeting deliverable times - leads to a lot of cognitive dissonance.
On the organization it becomes 'span of command' and 'unity of control'
On the organization it becomes 'span of command' and 'unity of control'
MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
When it comes to safety, management shouldn't be making the decisions. The decisions should be made in a process based environment. This way there is less chance of being over-ruled by a tier level. I don't know where the problem was at Boeing in this case. I've worked with John Hamilton and found him to be a straight shooter.
Last edited by Pugilistic Animus; 8th Mar 2020 at 03:24.
