AF447 - French prosecutors sends AF to court for negligence
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Just let go ! Don't do a thing . Even if the flight path was displaced in alt law it's not going to fall out of the sky . FL 360 @2.5-3 degrees nose up and I'm guessing A330 @80% without QRH
Plastic PPRuNer
I know that I'm wrong and not a pilot and all that, but the image comes to mind of a car with two separate power-steering wheels and no feedback between the two.
Now put up a screen between the drivers so that both can see the road ahead, but not each other.
Set 'em off 'em on a motorway exit and wait for the bang. I doubt whether you'd have to wait more than ten minutes.
Mac (ignorant but not stupid)
Now put up a screen between the drivers so that both can see the road ahead, but not each other.
Set 'em off 'em on a motorway exit and wait for the bang. I doubt whether you'd have to wait more than ten minutes.
Mac (ignorant but not stupid)
If nothing else, the PFD pitch attitude indications (constantly between + 10 to + 17 deg nose up for the first minute or so) should have rang alarm bells for the LHS pilot that this attitude was not sustainable...
Only half a speed-brake
Staying inside your analogy (which is somewhat offset): the backup driver sees a collision coming but fails to realize that is a result of wrong yet deliberate actions of the leading one, and thus the idea of taking over does not enter his mind at all. That's what I alluded to. And my beef is that the mitigation techniques have not been executed far and wide. AF447 and the AirAsia could have been saved with a a small yet decent probability.
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Holding the stick back
[Disclaimer: PP SEL, 200 hr, none in the past 35 years, but intensely followed the original AF447 threads due to interest in the search, and read much of the BEA report when it came out.]
Re: Why did the PF hold the side-stick back? FlightDetent touched on this:
What I recall (perhaps incorrectly) from the original threads is that most AF training (and maybe other organizations) in A330 stalls is with respect to approach/departure stalls at low altitude, in Normal Mode, and that the procedure called for advancing thrust (TOGO?) and pulling back on the stick. With these inputs the plane, in Normal Mode, will recover itself with minimal altitude loss. It is entirely possible that the PF retained only this memory, as FlightDetent suggests. I further recall that the pilots verbally acknowledged the transition to Alternate Law 2 (without verbally confirming the implications, whether or not such confirmation should be expected). Evidently (from memory), Alternate Law 2 removes stall protection, retaining over-stress protection. It seems possible, even likely, that the PF didn't understand that AL2 has no stall protection, or didn't internalize the call-out of AL2.
Over and out.
Re: Why did the PF hold the side-stick back? FlightDetent touched on this:
Over and out.
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auv-ee
with your disclaimer there is a severe limitation in a meaningful dialogue on Airbus laws. What you stated about stall training and recovery in Normal Law is completely erroneous. You cannot practice stall recovery in Normal Law because it simply won't stall.
I am sorry but with that level of ignorance you should be occupying passenger seat and not a pilot's seat. Why did they pull full back stick? Because nobody told them that in cruise in alternate law you never even for your life pull the stick fully back. Even otherwise you shouldn't be pulling on the stick without looking at the PFD.
with your disclaimer there is a severe limitation in a meaningful dialogue on Airbus laws. What you stated about stall training and recovery in Normal Law is completely erroneous. You cannot practice stall recovery in Normal Law because it simply won't stall.
. It seems possible, even likely, that the PF didn't understand that AL2 has no stall protection
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Wry humour which in other circumstances might be amusing but misd-again is correct. It was taught but not on that course. IIRC the PF (the FO) grew up flying taildraggers where that is common (to see ahead apart from anything else).
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(...) The question that has been bothering me most (is) Why the hell would an experienced 58-year-old captain with over 10,000 FH hours logged refuse the FO's suggestion to fly around the storm, point the aircraft right into icing and turbulence, and then simply leave the cockpit and let his less experienced colleagues deal with the fallout of his decision. I just cannot imagine that. You decide to fly into danger - you see it through and make sure you come out on the other side. (...)
And when the CVR was eventually fished up, there certainly were remarks to the effect that here was a guy awoken and rushed to the cockpit, and then obviously over-passive all the way down. For reasons we'll never know he clearly wasn't in good shape, and didn't take charge.
Perhaps the court proceedings will throw more light on this aspect, yea though an entire decade has elapsed.
Last edited by VFR Only Please; 28th Jul 2019 at 12:14.
They were on a shag fest more or less as was reported in a French TV report..completely unprofessional and not fit for the flight.
Rather than resting before the flight they decided that sightseeing was the way to go,
From one who flew the route in the early days with two complete crews.
A disgrace who unfortunately took a lot of innocents with them.
Arrogant attitude amongst some in AF at the time.
Rather than resting before the flight they decided that sightseeing was the way to go,
From one who flew the route in the early days with two complete crews.
A disgrace who unfortunately took a lot of innocents with them.
Arrogant attitude amongst some in AF at the time.
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I am sorry but with that level of ignorance you should be occupying passenger seat and not a pilot's seat.
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There's certain minimum level of handling skill and procedural knowledge that cannot be breached by a professional pilot. But sometimes there remains a serious defficiency and it doesn't get exposed for decades. When it happens all sophisticated methods of the cause finding are applied (as they should be) but because the experience level of the person involved it is never accepted that, that could be the reason.
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At the end of the day, if the PIC had left the pitch alone, thought about things for a few seconds; as with any upset stick fixed is a fair starting point, then.... buzz the Captain out of his rest station maybe?
would we even be talking about it ?
Yes, AF do need serious questions to be answered re: training and pilot experience and competence to sit in that seat on that flight.
in court? Yes I can see where they're coming from on this. So disagree with KingAir.
would we even be talking about it ?
Yes, AF do need serious questions to be answered re: training and pilot experience and competence to sit in that seat on that flight.
in court? Yes I can see where they're coming from on this. So disagree with KingAir.
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In regards to the AA587 A-300 accident, the yaw doublet that led to the vertical fin failure was the result of a number of interrelated issues of which the AAMP training was certainly a part. However, there were also issues related to rudder sensitivity vs airspeed and Vm limitations that were not well documented in the existing manual which contributed to overcontrol/PIO inputs. There was a lot of good information in the AAMP videos, but the section on the use of rudder in large transport aircraft did not have sufficient warnings regarding the dangers.
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In regards to the AA587 A-300 accident, the yaw doublet that led to the vertical fin failure was the result of a number of interrelated issues of which the AAMP training was certainly a part. However, there were also issues related to rudder sensitivity vs airspeed and Vm limitations that were not well documented in the existing manual which contributed to overcontrol/PIO inputs. There was a lot of good information in the AAMP videos, but the section on the use of rudder in large transport aircraft did not have sufficient warnings regarding the dangers.
certainly nothing to do with tail draggers though 😏
It's a shame "STALL STALL" had priorty all the way down.
It masked the "DUAL INPUT" calls
Which MAY have woke them up and reset the thought process, starting with "I have control"
I fly A320s and have suggested this to Airbus with no reply.
It masked the "DUAL INPUT" calls
Which MAY have woke them up and reset the thought process, starting with "I have control"
I fly A320s and have suggested this to Airbus with no reply.