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MAXís Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures

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MAXís Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures

Old 6th Oct 2019, 20:20
  #2921 (permalink)  
 
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This secrecy and and lack of transparency was probably 99% of Boeing's fall from grace, yet they still insist on it.
Just like the 777X they blew up on the test stand....
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Old 6th Oct 2019, 20:30
  #2922 (permalink)  
 
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In the first instance one ought assume corruption.
Corruption is endemic. From regulatory structure, manufacturing, corporate governance, government practice and indeed in the conduct of individual lives.

Integrity has no financial upside, doing the right thing isn't usually profitable.

Two crashes and 346 lives will not undo what society has become.
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Old 6th Oct 2019, 20:51
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Just like the 777X they blew up on the test stand....
source ?? credible source- date place time details??

They did apparently have a rear cargo door blow open- which is a LONG long way from blowup?

Or did I miss the latest end of the world prediction one of tha average 1 per year for the last century ??
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Old 6th Oct 2019, 21:51
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Pilot mike 2899
QUOTE
As I said, how very convenient for yanrair, but how highly inconvenient for the affected crews and their unfortunate passengers. Obviously, yanrair should have been there to help, with the benefit of all their expert knowledge of the future, which presumably would require some extraordinary psychic powers. What an amazing claim.
UNQUOTE
Hi Pilot mike
1\ can you explain how the flight the previous day with the same fault did not crash? Did that crew have psychic powers?
2/ I don’t have any knowledge of the future except that if we don’t train our pilots to be as expert as those in the past we are heading for serious degradation of air safety.
I sense also that in your post you are starting to tackle the man, rather than the ball. So in this case let’s start with this ball - how did the flight the previous day survive?
I too grieve for the unfortunate passengers and crew. However my concern is that unless we can assure that all airlines fly to the same first class standards in future, history will repeat itself.

Last edited by yanrair; 6th Oct 2019 at 21:54. Reason: Typo
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Old 6th Oct 2019, 22:18
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Originally Posted by Rated De
In the first instance one ought assume corruption.
Corruption is endemic. From regulatory structure, manufacturing, corporate governance, government practice and indeed in the conduct of individual lives.

Integrity has no financial upside, doing the right thing isn't usually profitable.

Two crashes and 346 lives will not undo what society has become.
hi there Rated De
my god you are cynical! The biggest driver to make your airplane or airline as safe as it can be should be that this is how to stay in business. Crash twice and as we see itís all over for a long time. I can name several airlines that went out of business on this premise.
An old saying in our airline ď if you think Safety is expensive, try having a crash or two!Ē The touchy-feely part about empathy for our customers etc, comes with the hard nosed business model free of charge. If you make your planes fly safely at whatever cost, itís money well spent and passengers are as safe as can be.
Now some are saying that Boeing are taking chances with that business model deliberately. I would be amazed if that were true. That they might have screwed up the MCAS design is without doubt, but I donít think it was a Machiavellian plot.
Yan
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Old 6th Oct 2019, 22:39
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Originally Posted by yanrair
Pilot mike 2899
QUOTE
As I said, how very convenient for yanrair, but how highly inconvenient for the affected crews and their unfortunate passengers. Obviously, yanrair should have been there to help, with the benefit of all their expert knowledge of the future, which presumably would require some extraordinary psychic powers. What an amazing claim.
UNQUOTE
Hi Pilot mike
1\ can you explain how the flight the previous day with the same fault did not crash? Did that crew have psychic powers?
2/ I donít have any knowledge of the future except that if we donít train our pilots to be as expert as those in the past we are heading for serious degradation of air safety.
I sense also that in your post you are starting to tackle the man, rather than the ball. So in this case letís start with this ball - how did the flight the previous day survive?
I too grieve for the unfortunate passengers and crew. However my concern is that unless we can assure that all airlines fly to the same first class standards in future, history will repeat itself.
Iím all for more training, but letís not kid ourselves. Yesteryear was not all that pretty either. Go take a look at the accident reports from the 70s and 80s and even into the 90s. There were a lot more crews back then flying perfectly good airplanes into the ground on a semi regular basis, then there are today.
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Old 6th Oct 2019, 22:58
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Airlines must not be confident in getting them back in service anytime, Silk air have started moving their from changi to desert storage in australia

If they were willing to leave them sitting with the crazy parking fees for 6 months with recertification being "soon", suddenly to move them into long term storage they must have new info

https://www.flightradar24.com/data/f...i8880#225ab4a1


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Old 6th Oct 2019, 23:04
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Originally Posted by yanrair
Hi there Bendalot
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/artic...-later-crashed
This and many other sources at the time reported that the third pilot did indeed save the day. But it doesn't really matter in the sense that the crew 2 - or 3 depending on which you believe did not crash, with the self same fault that resulted in a crash the next day.
At least thats how I read it. What do you think?
Yan
The third pilot did save the day, but what did he say?
Runaway trim or STS working wrong way or something else.

From your link.

Airline mechanics tried four times to fix related issues on the plane starting Oct. 26, according to the Indonesia preliminary report. After pilots reported issues with incorrect display of speeds and altitude in the two prior flights, workers in Denspasar, Bali, replaced a key sensor that is used by the Boeing plane to drive down its nose if it senses an emergency.

There could have been another MCAS event on this aircraft between 26 Oct and the reported one on the 28 Oct.
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Old 6th Oct 2019, 23:18
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Originally Posted by yanrair
This and many other sources at the time reported that the third pilot did indeed save the day. But it doesn't really matter in the sense that the crew 2 - or 3 depending on which you believe did not crash, with the self same fault that resulted in a crash the next day.
Yan
Actually, it matters. Saying it doesn't matter is like saying it doesn't matter if an aircraft has 2 or 3 FCCs and AOA vanes.
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Old 6th Oct 2019, 23:46
  #2930 (permalink)  
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Originally Posted by rattman
Airlines must not be confident in getting them back in service anytime, Silk air have started moving their from changi to desert storage in australia

If they were willing to leave them sitting with the crazy parking fees for 6 months with recertification being "soon", suddenly to move them into long term storage they must have new info

https://www.flightradar24.com/data/f...i8880#225ab4a1
Maybe they, like the rest of us, are concerned by the recent reports that the software fix has not yet been submitted, and by stories like the recent one citing TCCA:

Transport Canada is closely aligned with the European Union Aviation Safety Agency on return to service demands and has also raised questions over the architecture behind the 737 MAXís angle of attack system.ďWe continue to look for a solution proposed by the manufacturer and the FAA on that area,Ē [Robinson] said.
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Old 7th Oct 2019, 00:02
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Hate to sound like a broken record here, but in terms of the chain of causation it doesn't have to be an either or choice. It is entirely possible to have deficiencies in design, production, regulatory oversight, corporate culture, maintenance, training, or what have you - all at the same time and all making a contribution to the accident. Maybe instead of this endless debate regarding the primacy of one particular causal factor over another, we should rather try to identify ALL the casual factors and agree that all of them need to be addressed.
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Old 7th Oct 2019, 00:19
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Originally Posted by Smythe
Just like the 777X they blew up on the test stand....
Of course that was they were testing for.
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Old 7th Oct 2019, 00:49
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It was so poorly designed that the end result won't fly without a computer program to make extreme flight control inputs to keep it from *increasing AOA too quickly with too little backpressure.
I completely disagree with this sort of doom and gloom assessment.
Winding in forward trim is not "extreme flight control input".
MCAS only acts (by design) in a part of the flight envelope that is rarely entered, not even close most of the time.

The issue was ONE vane sent erroneous data and there was no second vane input to compare it to and stop MCAS activating. That is the actual issue.
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Old 7th Oct 2019, 01:23
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Originally Posted by yanrair


hi there Rated De
my god you are cynical! The biggest driver to make your airplane or airline as safe as it can be should be that this is how to stay in business. Crash twice and as we see itís all over for a long time. I can name several airlines that went out of business on this premise.
An old saying in our airline ď if you think Safety is expensive, try having a crash or two!Ē The touchy-feely part about empathy for our customers etc, comes with the hard nosed business model free of charge. If you make your planes fly safely at whatever cost, itís money well spent and passengers are as safe as can be.
Now some are saying that Boeing are taking chances with that business model deliberately. I would be amazed if that were true. That they might have screwed up the MCAS design is without doubt, but I donít think it was a Machiavellian plot.
Yan
Not cynical nor is it Machiavellian.
Boeing used to build airliners with integrity. There is a school of thought that while they continue to trade on buzzwords welded to that premise, that expeditious (cost driven) process has replaced robust.
Passengers were, and aircraft were, as safe as they could be. Is that the contention that nothing has changed?


Boeing is symptomatic of the atrophy of the robust process, replaced with something far less but remains the same in name.
If robust process were in place the regulatory environment would provide remedy where malfeasance, divergence and negligence driven by something than adherence to robust process is discovered.

Dianne Vaughan captured the denigration, albeit incrementally in robust process, "The Challenger Launch Decision" and the normalisation of deviance; one corner cut, budget fudge at a time.

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Old 7th Oct 2019, 01:28
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Originally Posted by Tomaski
Hate to sound like a broken record here, but in terms of the chain of causation it doesn't have to be an either or choice. It is entirely possible to have deficiencies in design, production, regulatory oversight, corporate culture, maintenance, training, or what have you - all at the same time and all making a contribution to the accident. Maybe instead of this endless debate regarding the primacy of one particular causal factor over another, we should rather try to identify ALL the casual factors and agree that all of them need to be addressed.
Lets start at the start -

U/S AoA on lots of 737 NG's = No problem.
U/S AoA on the MAX = 2 fatal crashes.

Why such a big difference?
Have all AoA failures on NG's only happened to well trained crews?
Would a manual working trim wheel have saved the day?
Is computer based training better than simulator training?
Would simulator training have made a difference?
Would these two MAX's have crashed if they were NG's?

Boeing seem adamant that only a very small amount of training needs to be done to fly the MAX after the NG and that can be done on a computer.
We do not have NG's scattered underground and underwater with current trained crews, even with the manual trim limitations - most seem happy to still allow them (aircraft and crew) to fly.

Something should stand out as to why MAX's crash, and not NG's.

The industry has issues that need to be addressed in general, but the MAX has specific issues that must be addressed. Because the general standards have holes, that were exploited.
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Old 7th Oct 2019, 03:26
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Originally Posted by Icarus2001




The issue was ONE vane sent erroneous data and there was no second vane input to compare it to and stop MCAS activating. That is the actual issue.
How many vane failures have there been in two decades of NG flying? How many crashed because of it? What made a vane failure crash two MAXs in less than half a year? What is different? Wasnít the lack of an AOA comparison...neither had that.

The difference is MCAS.
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Old 7th Oct 2019, 05:29
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Originally Posted by Takwis


How many vane failures have there been in two decades of NG flying? How many crashed because of it? What made a vane failure crash two MAXs in less than half a year? What is different? Wasnít the lack of an AOA comparison...neither had that.

The difference is MCAS.
from this SLF- a.00002 bit of logic

Even without an AOA no compare light- on the NG would as I understand it have only a WTF effect and with maybe a slight bobble nothing much else

But with MCAS - again in my opinion- with that light added to the normal events with fubar AOA- and not knowing of HAL - the results would not have changed. One could argue a change in probability - but the smoking hole would be the same.

Obviously- there is a bit more than just MCAS and disagree ight- overloaded computer- and the 3 second superman response plus the inop manual trim need to be accomodated

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Old 7th Oct 2019, 09:07
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Originally Posted by Grebe
from this SLF- a.00002 bit of logic

Even without an AOA no compare light- on the NG would as I understand it have only a WTF effect and with maybe a slight bobble nothing much else

But with MCAS - again in my opinion- with that light added to the normal events with fubar AOA- and not knowing of HAL - the results would not have changed. One could argue a change in probability - but the smoking hole would be the same.

Obviously- there is a bit more than just MCAS and disagree ight- overloaded computer- and the 3 second superman response plus the inop manual trim need to be accomodated

BaL, Takwis, Grebe; the direction you are heading is towards the light.

Good.

The benefit that retrofitting the warning is going to provide is basically negligible, and an argument could be made that it is just another annunciation adding to the mass of information that the poor dumb schmuck driver has to cope with. Without the knowledge of what the system is, and what it can do if it goes feral, then there is no gain from that alone. For future operations, given the full knowledge of the potential failure mode and effects that may arise, then the annunciation may be of benefit post hoc, for writing up the defect in the tech log.

The crews didn't need an annunciator to stay alive, they needed a competent fault analysis and the knowledge that would have given, or at least the information that the system has been fitted to the aircraft, and had authority in various conditions. Leaving the crew in the dark was unconscionable, and the regulator/OEM/Senate blaming the recently departed for that gross failure of oversight is about on par with what we have come to expect from Ft Fumble.

Keep pushing towards the light, there are other crews out there that may benefit, Washington and Chicago, not so much.
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Old 7th Oct 2019, 12:13
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Originally Posted by fdr

Keep pushing towards the light, there are other crews out there that may benefit, Washington and Chicago, not so much.
All true, but at the same time the spotlight being placed on MCAS shouldn't blind us to some of the other concerns that these accidents have raised.
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Old 7th Oct 2019, 13:10
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Originally Posted by Tomaski
Hate to sound like a broken record here, but in terms of the chain of causation it doesn't have to be an either or choice. It is entirely possible to have deficiencies in design, production, regulatory oversight, corporate culture, maintenance, training, or what have you - all at the same time and all making a contribution to the accident. Maybe instead of this endless debate regarding the primacy of one particular causal factor over another, we should rather try to identify ALL the casual factors and agree that all of them need to be addressed.
Or to put it simply all the holes in the cheese matter

James Reason's Swiss Cheese model of failure causation
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