MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
Psychophysiological entity
In the presentation to the FAA, they show two sets of switches which seem to be the same thing. Items 3 and 5. What are the trim override switches?
Do they simply mean the effective overriding power of the electric trim switches?
Do they simply mean the effective overriding power of the electric trim switches?
Join Date: Dec 2011
Location: Ottawa, Canada
Posts: 28
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I don't think it matters whether FCC(left) and your FCC(right) friend are 8086, 286, 386 or i7 core blah, when you, as one FCC, are called upon to figure out why your data differs from your only other friends data, you cannot tell whether you or they are right and you are screwed. Safely, you can only both shutdown. Now what?
If MCAS was needed for certification in either its initial or later severity of effect, I am at loss to see how airworthiness can be demonstrated without major changes.
But then I am older and not subject to modern economic influences....
If MCAS was needed for certification in either its initial or later severity of effect, I am at loss to see how airworthiness can be demonstrated without major changes.
But then I am older and not subject to modern economic influences....
Join Date: Jun 2019
Location: Tdot
Posts: 48
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
They are different things. Point 3 the stabilizer cutout switches right below the flap lever is quite well known. Point 5, as near as I can discern, relates to the stab trim override switch at the back of the pedestal near the door unlock switch. It will override the control column cutout switches, which can be used (without looking it up) in the event of a jammed control column etc. In that case you may need to trim against the direction the column is in.
Join Date: Mar 2019
Location: On the Ground
Posts: 155
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Boeing Seeking FAA Delivery Approval - But Approval of Training Would Lag Behind
https://gmanfortruth.files.wordpress...04/1-wimpy.gif
Thread Starter
Join Date: Apr 2015
Location: Under the radar, over the rainbow
Posts: 788
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I don't think it matters whether FCC(left) and your FCC(right) friend are 8086, 286, 386 or i7 core blah, when you, as one FCC, are called upon to figure out why your data differs from your only other friends data, you cannot tell whether you or they are right and you are screwed. Safely, you can only both shutdown. Now what?
If MCAS was needed for certification in either its initial or later severity of effect, I am at loss to see how airworthiness can be demonstrated without major changes.
But then I am older and not subject to modern economic influences....
If MCAS was needed for certification in either its initial or later severity of effect, I am at loss to see how airworthiness can be demonstrated without major changes.
But then I am older and not subject to modern economic influences....
Join Date: Mar 2019
Location: On the Ground
Posts: 155
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I am worried, though, that we've got it ´figured out´, but the regulators deciding the MAX´s future are forging ahead, anyway:
https://news.yahoo.com/boeings-max-l...173136459.html
https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/comp...?ocid=00000000
https://abcnews.go.com/Business/wire...-jets-66795153
and worst of all: https://www.businessinsider.com/boei...ulator-2019-11
https://news.yahoo.com/boeings-max-l...173136459.html
https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/comp...?ocid=00000000
https://abcnews.go.com/Business/wire...-jets-66795153
and worst of all: https://www.businessinsider.com/boei...ulator-2019-11
"While the 737 Max previously had two computers doing separate things — one operated flight systems, and one stood by in case the first failed — the redesign has both set to monitor each other. The original setup was relatively antiquated, borrowed from older generations of the 737, and the change is more in line with modern flight design.
IMHO I can no longer see a long term path for sustained MAX production. The sooner they start a clean sheet with modern systems while getting a limping MAX back in the air is their best, and maybe only, option. The MAX can not survive as the malfeasance continues to emerge on an almost daily basis.
By the time this Phoenix-rising happens, the Space, Defense and Services divisions, together with the widebody products and production facilities at Everett & Charleston, will have already been split off and either sold as going concerns or merged into existing industry players.
Under Chapter 11, the old company will shrug and walk away from the B737 and also from all its nasty expensive pension obligations,ensuring that the pain is felt at least as much by its former workforce as by banks and shareholders. A few fairly senior executives will serve as sacrificial goats and may even spend a few years in low-security Federal prisons. The very top guys will of course be thrown theatrically out of 13th-floor windows, and will then float gently down very happily supported by their golden parachutes.
The people who will make a lot of money out of it will be the lawyers, Airbus shareholders, and of course the very top guys from the old Boeing.
Pretty much everyone else will lose their shirts.
Too dystopian you say?
I'm afraid not
Join Date: Oct 2019
Location: Great White North of the 49th
Posts: 77
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
What an uncomfortable chuckle. The absolute injustice you describe is not only possible but highly likely. After lurking on this site for 20 years the first post I made speculated billions would be “vaporized”. When the months wore on and the information trickled out It was painfully obvious this was a monumental industry game changer. The trickle down of this disaster will be felt far and wide. The entire industry will suffer. Hang on people, severe turbulence is around the corner and the ****e heads causing it will largely skate. What a catastrophe.
Last edited by Drc40; 11th Nov 2019 at 04:07. Reason: Typo
Join Date: Sep 2006
Location: Pergatory
Posts: 1
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
If you and anyone here reading truly believe this, then you'll buy plenty of shares in Airbus stock.
I must be missing something, but I would have placed a "Golden Parachute" in the same category as a "Lead Balloon". From a Newtonian Fiziks POV, thye don't assit greatly in stopping squishy soft centered human beign affected by gravity on the rock. I digress...
However, the Boeing Presentation is interesting reading still. On or about 17th December 2018, Boeing didn't comprehend what the MCAS was doing, but was quite happy to report it to the FAA. At that moment in time, a simple review of the trim motion of Lion Air would have shown that the information in the presentation was incorrect.
Except if the crew intervene, which is assumed to occur, and at which point post the reset time of 5 seconds, the MCAS starts off again...
That was the original assumed normal operation of the MCAS if it was triggered, but the MCAS as installed drove the THS exactly the same at flaps up speed or at Warp 7... The dilithium crystals kind of got wonky on that score, and that pretty much guarantees the plane goes off piste into the rough. Now it is entirely possible that there is something else in the code that does something else, but the DFDR readout pretty much suggests that isn't the case.
Really? So why are we still on this topic, "...nothing to see here, move along..."
Are we so sure about that? Seems it is an assumption that was not aligned with the real world
Apparently not.
In the noise surrounding this forum, assumptions of what a competent crew should do has routinely been a point of contention. NASA at least bothered to do an evaluation on the assumptions that abound on what a trained crew will do (or won't do) when confronted with an event without notice. The following politely describes the findings, which a read of the source document is pretty confronting if you believe that any particular training program is fundamentally effective. In this study, the crews involved were trained and from what used to be a 1st world country.
Assuming that your training program will ensure that your crews will respond accurately, in a timely manner and effectively is not supported by this little look at the potential slip between assumed crew response and actual.
However, the Boeing Presentation is interesting reading still. On or about 17th December 2018, Boeing didn't comprehend what the MCAS was doing, but was quite happy to report it to the FAA. At that moment in time, a simple review of the trim motion of Lion Air would have shown that the information in the presentation was incorrect.
Except if the crew intervene, which is assumed to occur, and at which point post the reset time of 5 seconds, the MCAS starts off again...
That was the original assumed normal operation of the MCAS if it was triggered, but the MCAS as installed drove the THS exactly the same at flaps up speed or at Warp 7... The dilithium crystals kind of got wonky on that score, and that pretty much guarantees the plane goes off piste into the rough. Now it is entirely possible that there is something else in the code that does something else, but the DFDR readout pretty much suggests that isn't the case.
Really? So why are we still on this topic, "...nothing to see here, move along..."
Are we so sure about that? Seems it is an assumption that was not aligned with the real world
Apparently not.
In the noise surrounding this forum, assumptions of what a competent crew should do has routinely been a point of contention. NASA at least bothered to do an evaluation on the assumptions that abound on what a trained crew will do (or won't do) when confronted with an event without notice. The following politely describes the findings, which a read of the source document is pretty confronting if you believe that any particular training program is fundamentally effective. In this study, the crews involved were trained and from what used to be a 1st world country.
Assuming that your training program will ensure that your crews will respond accurately, in a timely manner and effectively is not supported by this little look at the potential slip between assumed crew response and actual.
fdr, thank you, as ever, for your input to this thread.
I'm afraid my contribution is only to say that I VERY much enjoyed the wonky dilythium crystals which forced the plane off piste and into the rough. A metaphor which I shall be using soon
I'm afraid my contribution is only to say that I VERY much enjoyed the wonky dilythium crystals which forced the plane off piste and into the rough. A metaphor which I shall be using soon
Keeping Danny in Sandwiches
Join Date: May 1999
Location: UK
Age: 76
Posts: 1,294
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
You've nailed it. Two FCCs can't meaningfully vote on two AoA vanes, no matter how everything is configured. And the task of reconfiguration to get anywhere near an effective solution (maybe toss in a third, synthetic, AoA input) . . . well, how can that not mean an enormous testing and certification burden, followed by significant new training requirements?
Add a third AOA with a different software programme for both and you have solved the issue of how to make a poor aircraft design at least flyable.
I can see a lot of companies cancelling their options on this flying pig.
Join Date: Jul 2009
Location: France
Age: 62
Posts: 98
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Interview with Patrick Ky, hear of EASA a week ago:
...
You indicated that you wanted to have a third sensor.That is one of the possible solutions for the angle-of-attack integrity, if you don’t want [the failure of] one sensor having an impact on the integrity of the flight. With two sensors, the weight on one is 50%. If you have three, a failure of one means you still have two that are good. You can still operate under nominal flight conditions. This is one possibility, but there are others we are looking at with Boeing.
A third sensor would be a major change.Yes a very big change, so they won’t do it.
What are the alternatives?There are a lot of opportunities offered by operational procedures. Angle-of-attack is an important piece of information, but it is not vital for the continuation of the flight. Procedures basically allow the crew to identify the failure, to not use the information anymore and continue the flight. The other possibility is not necessarily a third physical sensor but what we call a synthetic sensor. This is based on a setup of other indicators—speed, location and altitude—and with the help of artificial intelligence you can do much more than in the past. It is an interesting way forward and would need one or two years to be developed.
...
You indicated that you wanted to have a third sensor.That is one of the possible solutions for the angle-of-attack integrity, if you don’t want [the failure of] one sensor having an impact on the integrity of the flight. With two sensors, the weight on one is 50%. If you have three, a failure of one means you still have two that are good. You can still operate under nominal flight conditions. This is one possibility, but there are others we are looking at with Boeing.
A third sensor would be a major change.Yes a very big change, so they won’t do it.
What are the alternatives?There are a lot of opportunities offered by operational procedures. Angle-of-attack is an important piece of information, but it is not vital for the continuation of the flight. Procedures basically allow the crew to identify the failure, to not use the information anymore and continue the flight. The other possibility is not necessarily a third physical sensor but what we call a synthetic sensor. This is based on a setup of other indicators—speed, location and altitude—and with the help of artificial intelligence you can do much more than in the past. It is an interesting way forward and would need one or two years to be developed.
I fear not.
1. The economies offered by the MAX are built into the financial models of airlines
2. Airlines are locked into long term contracts with lease-finance companies, and thence with Boeing, which would take a lot of (expensive) unwinding
3. Airlines are committed to working with Boeing in order to be in the queue for aircraft to replace/refresh existing fleets
4. T.I.N.A.
It's not just Boeing (and their suppliers) who are searching/hoping for a solution. This explains why not even the big ugly brutes of the industry have made noises about looking for alternative supply of airframes. At present EVERYONE is so tied into the model that no-one dare blink. It is POSSIBLE that some audit company, somewhere, will trigger a meltdown by challenging the value of assets on some company's balance sheet but at present the cash MUST keep circulating.
1. The economies offered by the MAX are built into the financial models of airlines
2. Airlines are locked into long term contracts with lease-finance companies, and thence with Boeing, which would take a lot of (expensive) unwinding
3. Airlines are committed to working with Boeing in order to be in the queue for aircraft to replace/refresh existing fleets
4. T.I.N.A.
It's not just Boeing (and their suppliers) who are searching/hoping for a solution. This explains why not even the big ugly brutes of the industry have made noises about looking for alternative supply of airframes. At present EVERYONE is so tied into the model that no-one dare blink. It is POSSIBLE that some audit company, somewhere, will trigger a meltdown by challenging the value of assets on some company's balance sheet but at present the cash MUST keep circulating.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Melbourne
Age: 77
Posts: 14
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Perhaps it is about time for Boeing to seriously consider licencing the MC21 design. It is ready to go, the most modern in the 737 class, and definitely superior to the max . It would keep their factories going and workers employed and give them 4 years to come out with an industry leading game changing replacement to the Max.
Join Date: Apr 2019
Location: EDSP
Posts: 334
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I'm wondering for several months now, what the asset value of undelivered non airworthy aircraft is though. Maybe we shall know as this is going to stretch beyond the ending of a fiscal year.
I'm wondering for several months now, what the asset value of undelivered non airworthy aircraft is though. Maybe we shall know as this is going to stretch beyond the ending of a fiscal year.
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: in the barrel
Posts: 147
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Perhaps it is about time for Boeing to seriously consider licencing the MC21 design. It is ready to go, the most modern in the 737 class, and definitely superior to the max . It would keep their factories going and workers employed and give them 4 years to come out with an industry leading game changing replacement to the Max.
Join Date: Apr 2019
Location: EDSP
Posts: 334
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I find that hard to imagine and hard to rationalize towards the owners of the airline.
On the other hand, if that means going back to the end of the queue ...
Probably each case individually negotiated, consultants and lawyers making a fortune.
So we have now the situation that making beer cans out of it would be appropriate - but it's not gonna happen.
And further delaying the return will not make it any safer either.
On the other hand, if that means going back to the end of the queue ...
Probably each case individually negotiated, consultants and lawyers making a fortune.
So we have now the situation that making beer cans out of it would be appropriate - but it's not gonna happen.
And further delaying the return will not make it any safer either.