Go Back  PPRuNe Forums > Flight Deck Forums > Rumours & News
Reload this Page >

MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures

Rumours & News Reporting Points that may affect our jobs or lives as professional pilots. Also, items that may be of interest to professional pilots.

MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures

Old 2nd Nov 2019, 15:46
  #3701 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2013
Location: Seattle Area
Posts: 263
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Yup. Fugoid versus divergence.
Dave Therhino is offline  
Old 2nd Nov 2019, 15:55
  #3702 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2009
Location: France
Age: 62
Posts: 98
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Originally Posted by Takwis
I think he means "stick free stability", as in you could let go of the stick, and the plane would be stable
Thanks for the explanation, makes sense.
spornrad is offline  
Old 2nd Nov 2019, 16:07
  #3703 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2007
Location: Alabama
Age: 58
Posts: 366
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Originally Posted by Takwis
I think he means "stick free stability", as in you could let go of the stick, and the plane would be stable. I think.


and:

That's a pretty clear confirmation of what we are talking about.
From Lemme article
From AC25-7D:
Probability of artificial stall warning and stall identification systems operating inadvertently: The probability of inadvertent operation of artificial stall warning systems, during critical phases of flight, should not be greater than 10-5 per flight hour. To ensure that inadvertent operation of the stall identification system does not jeopardize safe flight, and to maintain crew confidence in the system, it should be shown that:
  • No single failure will result in inadvertent operation of the stall identification system; and
  • The probability of inadvertent operation from all causes is improbable (not greater than 10-5 per flight hour).
A single failure of an AoA vane causes both MCAS to trigger and Stall Warning to trigger "inadvertently", but it does not cause Speed Trim to trigger (it is based on airspeed). Speed Trim is still single-thread on airspeed malfunction, and from hardware output.
Boeing has previously denied MCAS to be a part of stall identification.

The JATR report was justifiably concerned on the need to protect from a single-point malfunction.

From the JATR Report:
Recommendation R3.7: The FAA should review how compliance was shown for the stall identification system on the B737 MAX with respect to inadvertent operation due to single failures.
Finding F3.7-A: The JATR team considers that system features on the B737 MAX might constitute a stall identification system. This system is vulnerable to inadvertent actuation due to a single failure, which would not meet the accepted guidance contained within AC 25-7C, Chapter 8, Section 228.
Bold added by me.
Am I speculating too much if I say that Boeing denies that MCAS is a stall identification system because otherwise it would have not been approved? A stall identification system cannot be triggered by a single failure, which is the case of MCAS?
Furthermore still from Lemme article

From AC25-7D:
A means to quickly deactivate the stall identification system should be provided and be available to both pilots.
It should be effective at all times and should be capable of preventing the system from making any input to the longitudinal control system.
It should also be capable of canceling any input that has already been applied, from either normal operation or from a failure condition.
MCAS does not fulfill none of the above....
FrequentSLF is offline  
Old 2nd Nov 2019, 16:10
  #3704 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2019
Location: On the Ground
Posts: 155
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
FrequentSLF : Am I speculating too much if I say that Boeing denies that MCAS is a stall identification system because otherwise it would have not been approved?
No, I think their bluster is pretty transparent, and I think you saw right through it.
Takwis is offline  
Old 2nd Nov 2019, 18:39
  #3705 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: dublin
Posts: 2
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Originally Posted by Icarus2001
How ridiculous.

Is flying in an aircraft "safe"?

Is driving a car "safe"?

These are not absolutes.
Quite agree
In aviation we always wrestle with "safe enough". You could maybe build a crash proof environment but the cost would be astronomical and there would be no airlines making money.
Take the example of twin engined ETOPS jets. That is all based on "safe enough" and IFSD rates. Which by the way have been getting much higher recently.
Most pilots I know who have flown the 747 think her the queen of the skies because of the massive redundancy built into her. Lose an engine - carry on. Lose a hydraulic system - carry on and auto land CAT 111. Same with an engine out. Autoland still available - I seem to remember!!
Cheers
Yan
yanrair is offline  
Old 2nd Nov 2019, 19:46
  #3706 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2019
Location: Mass
Posts: 23
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Originally Posted by megan
A couple of articles on the MAX saga.

https://aviationweek.com/commercial-...a1c3dd3c752677
The Aviation Week article doesn't provide a copy of the 2015 e-mail. Natalie Kitroeff posted the Fazio's' PPT slide onTwitter but it is heavily redacted, partially obscured by a big blue circle with a quote pull-out, and generally difficult to read.

1) Has anyone seen a cleaner copy of this e-mail and if so, would you please post it?

2) Any idea why so much stuff was redacted? It doesn't look like they were redacting names, phone numbers and e-mail addresses. Rather, it looks like they redacted substantive comments.

3) I haven't seen any substantive reporting about this e-mail. It is mentioned in NYT, Seattle Times and Aviation Week articles, but just to mention that Muilenburg got hit with it at the House hearing. Has anyone seen any more in-depth reporting on this e-mail? E.g., when did Boeing become aware of the e-mail, who sent and received it, and are they still employed at Boeing, what was the context of the thread?

4) Why has the reaction to this been so much more subdued than the reaction to the Forkner e-mail about the simulator running rampant? There hasn't even been much discussion here. I know there are the optics attached to Forkner's language, but the AoA Disagree issue cuts to the heart of some of the engineering errors.

5) At the time of the e-mail, Boeing believed that it had AoA Disagree functionality built in, as it was in the NG (they didn't discover the bug making it dependent on the optional AoA Indicator until much later). Assuming the FCC processors detect the disagree condition, or that it is input to the FCC, the response to this e-mail couldn't have been "it's too hard for MCAS software to detect AoA disagree." Was the problem that the disagree state was not readily available to the FCC in MCAS 1.0? What other possible reason could there have been not to detect this condition in the MCAS software?

6) Also, focus on vulnerability to a single AoA failure should have provoked some kind of more general discussion of the ability to detect invalid inputs and limits on outputs, which was never added. I continue to be mystified by the failure to do even the most coarse filtering, and this e-mail makes it even worse.
Notanatp is offline  
Old 2nd Nov 2019, 21:24
  #3707 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2014
Location: Harbour Master Place
Posts: 662
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
There was no engineering error with the single channel AoA sensor driving the MCAS. There was an engineering decision made to deliberately avoid use of multiple inputs to the MCAS, for purely commercial & financial reasons. The key PPRuNe search term is "Rick Ludtke", including the quotes.
CurtainTwitcher is offline  
Old 2nd Nov 2019, 21:38
  #3708 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2004
Location: Canada
Age: 63
Posts: 5,170
Received 133 Likes on 60 Posts
It is now apparent that the bottom line on this whole debacle is pretty simple.

If MCAS stayed as first specified then there very likely would have been no crashes as it was not powerful enough to overcome an elevator up input. This in my opinion could even justify it not being included in pilot operational documentation.

However this initial cheap and easy work around to make the airplane conform to the certification requirements did not work.

So at this point Boeing could have

1) Investigate another fix for the issue like for instance, aerodynamic modifications to the engine nacelles to reduce their lift at high AOA, or

2) Revisited a more powerful MCAS solution including a full safety case review which would have driven sensor redundancy, additional pilot documentation, revised emergency checklist procedures etc etc

I think it is unfortunate that everyone at Boeing and the FAA is not totally focused on the root causes that resulted in the above two choices not being actioned

Instead we seem to have a situation where the priority is butt covering for Boeing and the FAA and, grandstanding from other authorities.

i understand that this is an inevitable reality in today’s business and political environment, but it is too bad we are wasting a huge opportunity to reset a broken certification and oversight regime from first principles.
Big Pistons Forever is online now  
Old 3rd Nov 2019, 00:24
  #3709 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: Within AM radio broadcast range of downtown Chicago
Age: 71
Posts: 814
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
The Times They Are A-Changin'

Big Pistons Forever: "wasting a huge opportunity to reset a broken certification and oversight regime from first principles".
If my scorecard is at least mostly correct, the investigatory line-up is: the DoT Inspector General (and a Sec'y of Transp. Advisory panel); the recently headlining Senate amd House committees; the NTSB (report in); the JATR (report in); the DOJ criminal inquiry; and the two Annex 13 processes (KNKT report in).
Plus, the looming discovery onslaught of the liability cases on behalf of the victims.
Plus, what is looking certain to be intensively creative and incisive discovery by SWAPA in its litigation against Boeing (particularly if the case gets removed to federal district court).
With all this activity - and even after allowing for the large dose of well-deserved cynicism and skepticism to be directed at official Washington - the need for change in the certification process, and conceivably the certification standards in the FARs (the aeronautics and piloting authorities may agree or not as to this need beyond just the process), appears quite too loud and clear this time around for large reform not to take place.
The Boeing Board has taken some decisions already, with tea leaves pretty clearly indicating much more ahead.
And ultimately, the place held by ICAO principles (under the Chicago Convention of 1944) and Annexes and SARPs could be revealed as ripe for overhaul. The legality of FAA grounding the Ten in '79 was challenged successfully in the British Caledonian case. But now, particularly - and pointedly - the prima facie validity of a CAA type certification has been pierced by the JATR. And the outputs of other players on the scorecard are likely to widen the piercing.

Notanatp: relating to an email emerging at House hearing...
earlier in the thread I attempted to draw attention to a kind of play-by-play sequence of events (meetings), communications and other information, each constituting a step in the company's total eventual decision process. Some of these will have been internal to the company, some will have involved FAA participation. Your questions as to several types of informational items relating to this one subject email are, indeed, spot on.
(For purposes of especially civil liability, how responsibility gets divided between company/ODA and federal agency could get really interesting, given that appearance if not reality of "regulatory capture" has been noted quite publicly.)
WillowRun 6-3 is offline  
Old 3rd Nov 2019, 02:00
  #3710 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2004
Location: Canada
Age: 63
Posts: 5,170
Received 133 Likes on 60 Posts
Willow Run

I think you made my point for me. With all those agencies and bodies involved the chance for an impartial, fact and evidence driven, engineering focused root cause analysis is IMHO; just about nil

Instead stand by for paralysis by analysis as the vested interests come together to ensure any changes brief well at the press conference but effect no meaningful change......
Big Pistons Forever is online now  
Old 3rd Nov 2019, 14:10
  #3711 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: England
Posts: 980
Likes: 0
Received 3 Likes on 1 Post
Gordon, reflecting on my previous thoughts; training as mitigation without system change would not now provide a satisfactory short term solution (for regulation).
Similarly, restrictive wt / cg, closely associated with stability, would be insufficient given the evolving understanding of the issue - or lack of understanding given the scarcity of public information or proposed solutions.

The runaway trim scenario for the NG is likely to be acceptable with knowledge of the back-stick trim cutout; although there should be more training for recovery from adverse trim conditions and awareness training for the multitude of unassociated alerts (distractions - workload) if other systems are involved.
The Max could similarly be credited with the existing back-stick cutout, but this would depend on the effect of any aerodynamic differences (NT to Max), residual trim force, and ability to use manual trim.

A speculative view is that a hardened version of MCAS will be retained for the high speed stability issues, but for low speed further changes could be anticipated depending on the nature of the problems - stability, stall awareness, stall identification.

A view with hindsight is generally easier. However, as more information surfaces it appears that the knowledge with hindsight was available during the initial certification - foresight, but misjudged / misused. Furthermore, with rejection of the initial modification proposals we might conclude that misjudgement - misuse of that knowledge was still considered to be a short term (but permanent) solution.

Some people had the required knowledge, but not all having an adequate understanding for applying that knowledge, others influenced by commercial priorities or ‘external forces’.
PEI_3721 is offline  
Old 3rd Nov 2019, 15:13
  #3712 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: uk
Posts: 857
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Originally Posted by Notanatp
The Aviation Week article doesn't provide a copy of the 2015 e-mail. Natalie Kitroeff posted the Fazio's' PPT slide onTwitter but it is heavily redacted, partially obscured by a big blue circle with a quote pull-out, and generally difficult to read.

1) Has anyone seen a cleaner copy of this e-mail and if so, would you please post it?

2) Any idea why so much stuff was redacted? It doesn't look like they were redacting names, phone numbers and e-mail addresses. Rather, it looks like they redacted substantive comments.

3) I haven't seen any substantive reporting about this e-mail. It is mentioned in NYT, Seattle Times and Aviation Week articles, but just to mention that Muilenburg got hit with it at the House hearing. Has anyone seen any more in-depth reporting on this e-mail? E.g., when did Boeing become aware of the e-mail, who sent and received it, and are they still employed at Boeing, what was the context of the thread?

4) Why has the reaction to this been so much more subdued than the reaction to the Forkner e-mail about the simulator running rampant? There hasn't even been much discussion here. I know there are the optics attached to Forkner's language, but the AoA Disagree issue cuts to the heart of some of the engineering errors.

5) At the time of the e-mail, Boeing believed that it had AoA Disagree functionality built in, as it was in the NG (they didn't discover the bug making it dependent on the optional AoA Indicator until much later). Assuming the FCC processors detect the disagree condition, or that it is input to the FCC, the response to this e-mail couldn't have been "it's too hard for MCAS software to detect AoA disagree." Was the problem that the disagree state was not readily available to the FCC in MCAS 1.0? What other possible reason could there have been not to detect this condition in the MCAS software?

6) Also, focus on vulnerability to a single AoA failure should have provoked some kind of more general discussion of the ability to detect invalid inputs and limits on outputs, which was never added. I continue to be mystified by the failure to do even the most coarse filtering, and this e-mail makes it even worse.
1,2) Redactions are either those done by Boeing legal team as part of discovery, in which case they'll have the clean copy, and solid legal reasons for the redaction (most likely trade secrets, personal info, irrelevance), or they were done by the House Committee before the hearing possibly to remove swear words or personal info. My bet is on the former, but either way what's behind the black isn't public, anyone who has it won't be posting it.

3,4) The email (or rather the slide of it) is reported other places including Forbes & Daily Mail - various hits on google, but it isn't as sensational or even as damaging as Forkner really, and it is not as relevant, see below. If anything it helps Boeing - "see, our engineers can speak up freely".

5,6) It is critically important, I think, that at the time of the email MCAS was still in original form not the production psycho-dive form. This may also explain the more muted media interest - Forkner was discussing the (lethal) change to MCAS, this email wasn't. In terms of your point 6, this email is evidence of input validation process being carried out, in some depth. In the context of original g-dependent MCAS I doubt the "vulnerable" comment refers to a dive (spiral, maybe?), and may refer to MCAS failing to activate when it should, rather than erroneous activation.

From the fragments we have, my take on the email (quotes in italics) is as follows:

"Stab rapid reversal on PSIM model" (subject line), "stab motor deceleration characteristics" - we are considering effect of rapid MCAS activate/deactivate, on the whole electric system including actuator, my guess is "PSIM" refers to the commonly used circuit simulation software
"notes from a blade out evaluation", "first order lag filter to AOA would reduce the amplitude of the oscillation" - source considered is AOA vane oscillation / flutter, possibly due to vibration after blade-off
"Pilot modes are typically..." - and we are considering possibility of PIO as well
"Are we vulnerable to single AOA..." - in context, can this possible problem be triggered by one AOA vane fluttering, or are there checks on that

I think some of the other slides are more interesting, particularly the original plans for an MCAS (unavailable?) alert, and the MCAS "coordination sheet" with "MCAS shall not interfere with dive recovery" as a requirement (notably, from 2018, after the change). That requirement clearly wasn't met.

In the end, the biggest significance of this email may be that it dates to before MCAS was changed. Surely if there were similar engineering discussions from after the change, they'd have put those up instead. If we therefore conclude that there were no such discussions, then that in itself speaks volumes about the process around the change in MCAS (not the process around the original design). We already know from JATR report that safety assessments and certification documents were not updated to reflect the change to MCAS, it is quite possible there was limited knowledge or discussion of it even within Boeing.
infrequentflyer789 is offline  
Old 3rd Nov 2019, 19:17
  #3713 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: Within AM radio broadcast range of downtown Chicago
Age: 71
Posts: 814
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Originally Posted by Big Pistons Forever
Willow Run

I think you made my point for me. With all those agencies and bodies involved the chance for an impartial, fact and evidence driven, engineering focused root cause analysis is IMHO; just about nil

Instead stand by for paralysis by analysis as the vested interests come together to ensure any changes brief well at the press conference but effect no meaningful change......
It could be a lot easier to buy into the resigned tone or perhaps realistic-pessimism is more accurate as a description, rather than trying to identify positive dynamics and on that basis to advocate for more (or try to advocate).

Still, borrowing from OnG the observation that this type certificate grounding is unprecedented as a crisis (or words to that effect), and because there's so much riding on "what happens next", here's an effort. First, the SWAPA lawsuit, so far, has been noted for the claims for lost income against Boeing, claims not asserted in earlier groundings as far as I recall. Even more telling is how the fact-pleading complaint lays bare Boeing's strident insistence that the MAX is not a new type plus, how this very question was central to the SWAPA contract talks with their airline. I'm going on lawyerly instinct here maybe but look for this litigation to illustrate the old senior partner wisdom, "litigation has a way of focusing the mind." For its deception impacting the CBA situation, Boeing seems destined to be rewarded with a more forceful, uncompromising aviator community than....than what Ferris had to try to stare down at United, let's say.

Also, the status of how the certification process is structured legislatively, recently revamped as reported by the NYT just before the hearings, is like a tailor-made vehicle for the pols and press to keep the pressure on for reform. But that's going to require a longer time than a correction of the flaws in the MAX with respect to MCAS and (without claiming to understand the depth of systems and aeronautics detail) other characteristics (like, manuevering). Perhaps the correction of the systems config of 737 MAX can and should be done in two phases. But the comments that the NG variant could or does exhibit related vulnerabilities...perhaps two phases of system and config correction/upgrade can address this also. Followed by more fundamental restructure of the process and the engineering content in the FARs.

After the group of CAAs of other countries in the JATR put in the work needed to guide meaningful change, to accept a press event as solutions would be to cede aviation leadership - or what's left of it now - to somebody else. Aren't the stakes that high? And as today is a Sunday, I won't go on at length about Herb Kelleher turning over in his resting place, his airline's workhorse like some cheap aluminum can whose airworthiness can just be, like, kicked down the road.

There's no disagreeing that the realistic-pessimism viewpoint is solidly the way things are. But is the industry and its several communities - especially the pilots in their associations and as individuals - going to accept that? If I were a lawyer engaged in major aviation crash litigation work, I'd be braced for arguments that those 346 souls died in vain, or to argue why they did not. Actually, we'd better be able to cover both.

Last edited by WillowRun 6-3; 3rd Nov 2019 at 19:28.
WillowRun 6-3 is offline  
Old 3rd Nov 2019, 19:35
  #3714 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Feb 2016
Location: S.E.Asia
Posts: 1,953
Received 10 Likes on 4 Posts
What are the chances of it being recertified and flying across the world by easter 2020?

The other big question is what is Boeing planning to do with all those airframes if it is not?
Mike Flynn is offline  
Old 3rd Nov 2019, 22:41
  #3715 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Oct 2019
Location: Great White North of the 49th
Posts: 77
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Originally Posted by Mike Flynn
What are the chances of it being recertified and flying across the world by easter 2020?

The other big question is what is Boeing planning to do with all those airframes if it is not?
In my humble opinion, it will fly but it won’t with a software fix. I’m not sure what it will take but I think all the discussion above pretty much dissects and examines what “happened” but little discussion about what “will happen”. I’m feeling that a hardware fix is necessary which could easily put this well over a year since grounding. If Boeing attempts it to fly this pig with software only the disaster will only get bigger.

No, Boeing will need an immense about face. Bean counters and sales/management/MBA types MUST be subject to design and engineering approval. No more features demanded by sales/MBA’s and bean counters. Those egg heads need to be banished to where they belong, in the back room counting beans. Share holder value be damned because if they stay on the current path the shareholders will have nothin left.

Does Boeing have the nads to take this action? I’m doubtful but hopeful better minds will prevail.
Drc40 is offline  
Old 3rd Nov 2019, 22:58
  #3716 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 2011
Location: NEW YORK
Posts: 1,352
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like on 1 Post
Originally Posted by Mike Flynn
What are the chances of it being recertified and flying across the world by easter 2020?

The other big question is what is Boeing planning to do with all those airframes if it is not?
Do not think Boeing actually owns these undelivered airframes.
My impression is that the aircraft are built to order and that substantial progress payments are involved, so that Boeing's production cash flow may actually be positive.
The only glitch is when there is no customer acceptance upon completion, so Boeing does not get the final delivery payment while the aircraft rests at Moses Lake.That amount may be substantial, but probably not ruinous for Boeing even with a year long delivery hold.
The aircraft customers are very much worse off, their progress payments are lying fallow, with no obvious recourse.
That these entities have thus far remained essentially passive, not pressing for a more immediate return to flight solution, suggests that they were as surprised as the FAA by the process failures uncovered by this inquiry. Legal action seems inevitable, no matter how this gets resolved.
etudiant is offline  
Old 4th Nov 2019, 01:24
  #3717 (permalink)  
Psychophysiological entity
 
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: Tweet Rob_Benham Famous author. Well, slightly famous.
Age: 84
Posts: 3,263
Received 24 Likes on 15 Posts
. . .The possibility of a pitch-up tendency during approach to stall was identified for the flaps-up configuration prior to the implementation of MCAS.
Which is very different challenge to simply stopping the elevator load going light.


Another means of effecting the cure perhaps by mechanically operated surfaces on the cowling? Well, to lose that amount of aerodynamic lift could present another issue. Those cowling surfaces are clearly creating substantial lift - which if it wasn't causing a problem, would be a good thing. I wouldn't want to lose that amount of lift suddenly.

From AC25-7D:
Quote:A means to quickly deactivate the stall identification system should be provided and be available to both pilots.
It should be effective at all times and should be capable of preventing the system from making any input to the longitudinal control system.
It should also be capable of canceling any input that has already been applied, from either normal operation or from a failure condition.
This is exactly what I was trying to get over in an earlier post. I felt passionately that recognition should quickly be actionable, but with switches where the four main parameters could be switched back in, in a diagnostic manner. Much like re-connecting suspect bus-bars. Main power to the Jackscrew. Thumb trim. Auto pilot. MCAS.
Loose rivets is online now  
Old 4th Nov 2019, 02:35
  #3718 (permalink)  
Thread Starter
 
Join Date: Apr 2015
Location: Under the radar, over the rainbow
Posts: 778
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Originally Posted by Drc40
Does Boeing have the nads to take this action? I’m doubtful but hopeful better minds will prevail.
If they don't, they'd better grow 'em, because they are facing an actual existential crisis.
OldnGrounded is offline  
Old 4th Nov 2019, 02:42
  #3719 (permalink)  
Thread Starter
 
Join Date: Apr 2015
Location: Under the radar, over the rainbow
Posts: 778
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Quote:. . .The possibility of a pitch-up tendency during approach to stall was identified for the flaps-up configuration prior to the implementation of MCAS.
Originally Posted by Loose rivets
Which is very different challenge to simply stopping the elevator load going light.

Another means of effecting the cure perhaps by mechanically operated surfaces on the cowling? Well, to lose that amount of aerodynamic lift could present another issue. Those cowling surfaces are clearly creating substantial lift - which if it wasn't causing a problem, would be a good thing. I wouldn't want to lose that amount of lift suddenly.

This is exactly what I was trying to get over in an earlier post. I felt passionately that recognition should quickly be actionable, but with switches where the four main parameters could be switched back in, in a diagnostic manner. Much like re-connecting suspect bus-bars. Main power to the Jackscrew. Thumb trim. Auto pilot. MCAS.
Don't you think the bare-airframe testing that JATR recommended is essential and must largely determine the process of "fixing" the MAX? Who's going to want to fly the aircraft while there are unanswered stability questions?
OldnGrounded is offline  
Old 4th Nov 2019, 03:15
  #3720 (permalink)  
568
 
Join Date: Aug 2002
Location: Castletown
Posts: 241
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Originally Posted by OldnGrounded
If they don't, they'd better grow 'em, because they are facing an actual existential crisis.
Sound comments.After hearing the response (s) from Muilenburg at the Congressional hearings, one has to wonder if the Board, senior bean counters and upper Management "types" have a grip on actual reality, after drinking the cool aid for all these years.I really believe that they are all in denial relating to the gravity of the current situation and what needs to be done to start the process of fixing many underlining issues (PR, MAX fix, law suits etc.).
568 is offline  

Thread Tools
Search this Thread

Contact Us - Archive - Advertising - Cookie Policy - Privacy Statement - Terms of Service

Copyright © 2024 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.