MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
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Getting to this level of mega-depo with the Boeing people on the Hill might help the SWAPA in their case - but if I was advising the Hill committee chairmen I'd advise them to get the subpoenas drafted right da*n now - if Boeing so much as breathes "privilege for attorney-client communications" on these particular subject matters - - - straight into United States District Court.
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At Southwest, Mr. Forkner has worked on regulatory and MAX issues, people familiar with the airline said, sometimes shaping discussions between the FAA and Southwest’s management. The Southwest spokeswoman said Mr. Forkner has worked on various projects as part of the flight operations technical team
but hasn’t worked as a leader on the airline’s plans to return the MAX to passenger service.
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"It's gonna be crazy." (OldnGrounded)
I'll add, in a directly pertinent context, only that this situation and its crisis aspects already have been geolocated in Crazytown.
And, in more of an indirect context - and while I'm disagreeing with absolutely nothing in your post - still one wonders how all these legal manuevers get coordinated, and by whom. Why is this set of questions relevant? -- because reform if not more fundamental rewriting (preceded by a broad and official re-thinking) of the certification process in total, is at stake. Because several hundred Boeing aircraft are grounded at operators, in storage after production, or will be, as monthly output continues. And not least but more vaguely, it's only Boeing we're talking about, you know, kinda sorta like maybe of primary national interest.
It's like, and I'm trying for dramatic exaggeration to make the point, it's Dallas against the Packers in the famed ice-bowl game, and Bart Starr goes out of the game at the point of that critical goal-line series. We need a quarterback. It's an exaggeration but...not by much.
I'll add, in a directly pertinent context, only that this situation and its crisis aspects already have been geolocated in Crazytown.
And, in more of an indirect context - and while I'm disagreeing with absolutely nothing in your post - still one wonders how all these legal manuevers get coordinated, and by whom. Why is this set of questions relevant? -- because reform if not more fundamental rewriting (preceded by a broad and official re-thinking) of the certification process in total, is at stake. Because several hundred Boeing aircraft are grounded at operators, in storage after production, or will be, as monthly output continues. And not least but more vaguely, it's only Boeing we're talking about, you know, kinda sorta like maybe of primary national interest.
It's like, and I'm trying for dramatic exaggeration to make the point, it's Dallas against the Packers in the famed ice-bowl game, and Bart Starr goes out of the game at the point of that critical goal-line series. We need a quarterback. It's an exaggeration but...not by much.
Last edited by WillowRun 6-3; 24th Oct 2019 at 21:02.
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Forkner's instant messages were apparently provided to DOJ before the Ethiopian crash. Both his ability and his willingness to use those mind tricks have probably been minimal for some time, now. On the other hand, he may have a lot of knowledge that could be valuable -- to various parties, including SWA and SWAPA.
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"It's gonna be crazy." (OldnGrounded)
I'll add, in a directly pertinent context, only that this situation and its crisis aspects already have been geolocated in Crazytown.
And, in more of an indirect context - and while I'm disagreeing with absolutely nothing in your post - still one wonders how all these legal manuevers get coordinated, and by whom. Why is this set of questions relevant? -- because reform if not more fundamental rewriting (preceded by a broad and official re-thinking) of the certification process in total, is at stake. Because several hundred Boeing aircraft are grounded at operators, in storage after production, or will be, as monthly output continues. And not least but more vaguely, it's only Boeing we're talking about, you know, kinda sorta like maybe of primary national interest.
It's like, and I'm trying for dramatic exaggeration to make the point, it's Dallas against the Packers in tbe famed ice-bowl game, and Bart Starr goes out of the game at the point of that critical goal-line series. We need a quarterback. It's an exaggeration but...not by much.
I'll add, in a directly pertinent context, only that this situation and its crisis aspects already have been geolocated in Crazytown.
And, in more of an indirect context - and while I'm disagreeing with absolutely nothing in your post - still one wonders how all these legal manuevers get coordinated, and by whom. Why is this set of questions relevant? -- because reform if not more fundamental rewriting (preceded by a broad and official re-thinking) of the certification process in total, is at stake. Because several hundred Boeing aircraft are grounded at operators, in storage after production, or will be, as monthly output continues. And not least but more vaguely, it's only Boeing we're talking about, you know, kinda sorta like maybe of primary national interest.
It's like, and I'm trying for dramatic exaggeration to make the point, it's Dallas against the Packers in tbe famed ice-bowl game, and Bart Starr goes out of the game at the point of that critical goal-line series. We need a quarterback. It's an exaggeration but...not by much.
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Seattle Times
https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...-pilot-errors/
Indonesia’s report on Lion Air 737 MAX crash faults Boeing design and FAA certification as well as airline’s maintenance and pilot errors
Oct. 24, 2019 at 4:20 pm Updated Oct. 24, 2019 at 4:22 pm
By Dominic Gates and Lewis Kamb
The final report by air accident investigators into the Lion Air crash of a 737 MAX in Indonesia that killed 189 people a year ago provides a devastating critique of the design and certification of Boeing’s new flight control system on the airplane.
It also apportions blame to Lion Air’s maintenance work and its pilots, as well as a Florida firm that supplied a component, according to an advance copy reviewed by The Seattle Times.
“The design and certification of the MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) did not adequately consider the likelihood of loss of control of the aircraft,” the report states. “A fail-safe design concept and redundant system should have been necessary for the MCAS.”
The report is due to be released Friday in Indonesia, around midnight Thursday in Seattle.
The report found that after Boeing changed the original MCAS design, increasing its authority to move the horizontal tail, or stabilizer, from 0.6 degrees to 2.5 degrees, “the higher limit caused a much greater movement of the stabilizer than was specified in the original safety assessment document.”
After that change, as first reported in the Seattle Times in March, the company’s Stabilizer System Safety Assessment for the Federal Aviation Administration was not updated in time, with the result that the “FAA would not be able to reassess the safety of the design change,” the report states.
It also criticizes a Boeing failure to detect a software error that resulted in a warning light on the MAX not working, as well as Boeing’s failure to provide pilots any information about the flight control system. Both failures contributed to the crew’s inability to understand what was happening, the report said.
“The absence of information about the MCAS in the aircraft manuals and pilot training made it difficult for the flight crew to diagnose problems and apply the corrective procedures.”
The report also found that a critical sensor, a second-hand unit repaired and supplied by a Florida company, was faulty, and it found strong indications that it was not tested during installation by Lion Air maintenance staff.
And though similar faults had occurred on the previous flight of the same airplane, Lion Air’s maintenance staff failed to ground the airplane, says the report.
The previous flight “that experienced multiple malfunctions was classified as serious incident and should have been investigated,” the report states.
The report also faulted the two pilots on Lion Air JT610, particularly the first officer, who was unfamiliar with procedures and had shown himself in training to have problems in handling the aircraft.
The first officer failed to follow a procedure to identify which of the two sides of the aircraft was showing the correct airspeed. If he had, a checklist would have told him he could turn on the autopilot, which would have stopped the nose-down movements of the errant flight control system.
And the report found the crew failed to coordinate their responses to multiple failures and alerts.
After the captain successfully countered the airplane’s nose-down movements more than 20 times, he handed over to the first officer who was under stress and proved unable to maintain control. Shortly after, the plane nose-dived into the Java Sea, killing all on board.
The report concludes with a long series of recommendations for all parties involved.
Among the recommendations for Boeing, it asks for:
Dominic Gates: 206-464-2963 or [email protected]; on Twitter: @dominicgates.
Lewis Kamb: 206-464-2932 or [email protected]; on Twitter: @lewiskamb.
Oct. 24, 2019 at 4:20 pm Updated Oct. 24, 2019 at 4:22 pm
By Dominic Gates and Lewis Kamb
The final report by air accident investigators into the Lion Air crash of a 737 MAX in Indonesia that killed 189 people a year ago provides a devastating critique of the design and certification of Boeing’s new flight control system on the airplane.
It also apportions blame to Lion Air’s maintenance work and its pilots, as well as a Florida firm that supplied a component, according to an advance copy reviewed by The Seattle Times.
“The design and certification of the MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) did not adequately consider the likelihood of loss of control of the aircraft,” the report states. “A fail-safe design concept and redundant system should have been necessary for the MCAS.”
The report is due to be released Friday in Indonesia, around midnight Thursday in Seattle.
The report found that after Boeing changed the original MCAS design, increasing its authority to move the horizontal tail, or stabilizer, from 0.6 degrees to 2.5 degrees, “the higher limit caused a much greater movement of the stabilizer than was specified in the original safety assessment document.”
After that change, as first reported in the Seattle Times in March, the company’s Stabilizer System Safety Assessment for the Federal Aviation Administration was not updated in time, with the result that the “FAA would not be able to reassess the safety of the design change,” the report states.
It also criticizes a Boeing failure to detect a software error that resulted in a warning light on the MAX not working, as well as Boeing’s failure to provide pilots any information about the flight control system. Both failures contributed to the crew’s inability to understand what was happening, the report said.
“The absence of information about the MCAS in the aircraft manuals and pilot training made it difficult for the flight crew to diagnose problems and apply the corrective procedures.”
The report also found that a critical sensor, a second-hand unit repaired and supplied by a Florida company, was faulty, and it found strong indications that it was not tested during installation by Lion Air maintenance staff.
And though similar faults had occurred on the previous flight of the same airplane, Lion Air’s maintenance staff failed to ground the airplane, says the report.
The previous flight “that experienced multiple malfunctions was classified as serious incident and should have been investigated,” the report states.
The report also faulted the two pilots on Lion Air JT610, particularly the first officer, who was unfamiliar with procedures and had shown himself in training to have problems in handling the aircraft.
The first officer failed to follow a procedure to identify which of the two sides of the aircraft was showing the correct airspeed. If he had, a checklist would have told him he could turn on the autopilot, which would have stopped the nose-down movements of the errant flight control system.
And the report found the crew failed to coordinate their responses to multiple failures and alerts.
After the captain successfully countered the airplane’s nose-down movements more than 20 times, he handed over to the first officer who was under stress and proved unable to maintain control. Shortly after, the plane nose-dived into the Java Sea, killing all on board.
The report concludes with a long series of recommendations for all parties involved.
Among the recommendations for Boeing, it asks for:
- A fail-safe re-design of MCAS.
- Adequate information about MCAS to be included in pilot manuals and training
- Closer scrutiny in future of any system capable of taking over primary flight control actions from the pilot.
- Design consideration of the effect of all possible flight deck alerts and indications on pilot recognition and response.
- Larger tolerance in Boeing’s designs to allow operation by a diverse population of pilots.
Dominic Gates: 206-464-2963 or [email protected]; on Twitter: @dominicgates.
Lewis Kamb: 206-464-2932 or [email protected]; on Twitter: @lewiskamb.
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The first officer failed to follow a procedure to identify which of the two sides of the aircraft was showing the correct airspeed. If he had, a checklist would have told him he could turn on the autopilot, which would have stopped the nose-down movements of the errant flight control system.
On a technical note, would the AP engage under those conditions??
In isolation, that sounds like a good argument. In context, that this pilot was experiencing something that should not be happening in the first place, quite literary the plane (trying to) kill him by a non-documented system, this sounds like victim blaming to me. The event was not a simple unreliable speed. It was an unreliable speed with repeatable unexplained nose down trims and the Earth approaching you, fast. And ultimately, if a checklist should have been done but wasn't, isn't that on the captain?
On a technical note, would the AP engage under those conditions??
On a technical note, would the AP engage under those conditions??
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Are we at the point where the MAX is seen as a failed and tarnished product, where Boeing will need to cut its losses, complete the order book and move into the next completely new short haul single aisle aircraft?
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It should be posted on the Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee - Komite Nasional KeselamatanTransportasi (KNKT) - website (AAIC). It was meant to have been made available at 2pm local but it's not up yet.
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...which would have stopped the nose-down movements of the errant flight control system.
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"Indonesia’s devastating final report blames Boeing 737 MAX design, certification in fatal Lion Air crash"
https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...-pilot-errors/
https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...-pilot-errors/
"Indonesia’s devastating final report blames Boeing 737 MAX design, certification in fatal Lion Air crash"
https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...-pilot-errors/
https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...-pilot-errors/
The preliminary report (published a year ago) is here, for anyone who hasn't read it yet.