MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures

[LowObservable]

I believe that the issue has always been that a longer gear - absent telescoping features, which nobody really likes - means moving the gear attach points outwards, and a new center section. At the start of the 737-300 program, that was ruled out: the team had been told to find something to do with the 737, at a point when Seattle was doing the 757 and 767 in parallel. (That wasn't the original intent - the plan was for the 757 to be a mishmash of 727 parts, a new British-funded wing and the RB.211-535 engine.) Even so, widening the gear might also have meant moving the engines outboard, at which time you had a new airplane.

[Lake1952]

Just a guess, but if Boeing can get out of this mess by changes that would require a separate MAX type rating, they would jump at the opportunity. In other words, delete or diminish MCAS, accept the difference in stick forces at high AOA and move on.

[ST Dog]

Originally Posted by OldnGrounded

Yes, I know -- from experience. OTOH, some companies (sometimes) understand when decisions really should be engineering-driven. Not least because, in the longer term, profits, and more, may depend upon doing that way. The MAX appears to be an example of a failure to understand that.

Seems to happen more in smaller companies, particularly when lead by engineers (like the semiconductor company I was once with).
As they grow, business (MBA) type and marketing get more and more control.

But I've seen many products that started as good ideas ruined when marketing got involved and started dictating features and other design constraints in a supposed effort to increase marketability.

[unworry]

FYI - from someone on the call :

Boeing no longer accepts questions on its CEO teleconference calls from newspaper reporters

In the 105-minute call, journalists got less than 7 minutes. Only three wire service reporters were called upon
No NYT
No WSJ
No Seattle Times

Looks like a new, not very smart policy

[Grebe]

Originally Posted by unworry

FYI - from someone on the call :



Looks like a new, not very smart policy

Circling the wagons now turning into a circular firing squad
Today on Cavuto fox news was an interview with a couple who lost their daughter on the ethopia crash. They sincerely want the whole boeing board and the rersponsible managers and the matching FAA types gone and replaced with competent- honest people - and also commented about the change from DER to ODA and Barami (sp)

Also commented about the FAA ignoring certain other agencies and recommendations

[OldnGrounded]

Originally Posted by unworry

FYI - from someone on the call :

Boeing no longer accepts questions on its CEO teleconference calls from newspaper reporters

In the 105-minute call, journalists got less than 7 minutes. Only three wire service reporters were called upon
No NYT
No WSJ
No Seattle Times

Looks like a new, not very smart policy

Or maybe "very not smart." I wonder who told them that was a good idea.

[Takwis]

The same kinds of lawyers that told Forkner to take the fifth.

[OldnGrounded]

Originally Posted by Takwis

The same kinds of lawyers that told Forkner to take the fifth.

It's a different situation. Any competent defense lawyer would advise a client at risk of criminal charges not to provide testimony (or documents if they are, effectively, "testimonial"). On the other hand, corporate executives on an earnings call would have to be pretty close to brain-dead not to know that not taking questions from the three most important media organizations (in the current context) will almost certainly result in serious suspicion -- which isn't likely to help its already-shaky stock price.

[Mr Google Head]

Any chance they’ll scrap the Max and start again?

[GlobalNav]

Originally Posted by Mr Google Head

Any chance they’ll scrap the Max and start again?

Sure, but not much chance that Boeing could afford or likely survive with the liability already burdened with.

[BDAttitude]

After they piled up as many undelivered aeroplanes as they delivered before the grounding?



Found that slide involuntarily comical. Let's hope for them they used another definition of "manageable" than lately.

[rog747]

As I always understood regarding the 737 MAX design back in the days on the drawing board was that the 737 MLG undercarriage area and the space could not be enlarged, hence the only option was to heighten the NG, and move the new type of engines upwards and forward of the wing, which has lead us to where we are today...

This is now a rather sorry and sad state of affairs, where using Grandfather rights of an old Boeing design from the 1960's has shown up serious flaws and weaknesses in trying to piggy back a massive new design on an old air frame, basically on the ''cheap'' - In the process has ended up killing almost 350 passengers and crews in two brand new planes that dived into the ground, leaving the future of the project in serious doubt as to how the aircraft if, or when it is permitted to fly passengers again will be branded.

Is the 737 MAX product name tarnished?
TUI UK Holidays and Flights have removed any reference on their web pages that they have or had, any 737 MAX in their fleet.
Ryanair's brand new fleet grounded at Boeing's factory awaiting delivery, has had the word 'MAX' painted out, and now shows Boeing 737-8 200 on their noses.

DaveReid - Yes I note the front air-stairs seem to be a Ryanair option fitted - thanks.
I think they maybe one of the only MAX customers to have chosen them?

[Less Hair]

Changing the gear for something longer would mean to change the gear bays. That would lead to some different wing structure requiring some new wing ending the grandfathering concept.

[MemberBerry]

Boeing wants it to fly, but travelers fear the 737 MAX

From the article:

Just 19 percent of business travelers and 14 percent of leisure travelers would willingly take the 737 MAX within six months of returning to the sky, according to an Atmosphere survey.

Nearly half of the 2,000 respondents said they would pay more to avoid the MAX.

Faced with this distrust, airlines are adapting.

"We will be transparent -- and communicate in advance -- with our customers who are booked to fly on a MAX aircraft, will rebook those who do not want to fly on a MAX at no charge, and for some time will not swap aircraft to a MAX if a change of aircraft is required," said a spokesperson at United Airlines, which owns 14 MAX aircraft.

[...]

According to Harteveldt, half of business passengers and 55 percent of leisure passengers consider Boeing to be "irresponsible," "arrogant" and "unsafe."

[...]

If Boeing can take comfort in anything, it may be that most travelers do not look up which jet they will fly when booking tickets.

[nnc0]

Originally Posted by ST Dog

But I've seen many products that started as good ideas ruined when marketing got involved and started dictating features and other design constraints in a supposed effort to increase marketability.

Don't fool yourelf. Ignorance and over confidence are a lethal combination and there are many engineers and pilots who would sell their grandmothers if it got them a promotion.

[Gertrude the Wombat]

Originally Posted by MemberBerry

If Boeing can take comfort in anything, it may be that most travelers do not look up which jet they will fly when booking tickets.

Unless that "do not" changes to "used not to, before the 737 MAX returned to service".

I have been in the habit of noting the aircraft type out of mild curiosity after I've bought the ticket. If the 737 MAX returns to service I'll be checking before purchase. And if Ryanair, as rumoured, end up calling it something else and leaving out the MAX word, well, that's just another reason not to choose Ryanair.

[Longtimer]

Checking out the type of aircraft prior to purchase is at best limited as the airline has the option of changing the aircraft type / gauge if they wish after your purchase. There is no guarantee of aircraft type in the purchase contract / tariff.

[Less Hair]

Even before the grounding some people filtered their searches on kayak for non-MAX flights.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Approaching, Oct. 30

From WSJ today, "Ex-Boeing Pilot Cited MAX Pressure":
"Boeing has tried for months to interview Mr. Forkner about what he meant in the messages, a person familiar with the company’s internal review of the matter said."
Taking a step back from the first reactions and gut impressions of the information in this article as well as the several previously reported articles, there's an aspect which either is quite troubling, or very likely to attract keen questioning in next week's congressional hearings -- or both.
How could this level of big aerospace giant business corporation not have and operate a thorough system for receiving, tracking, documenting, preserving, and otherwise providing a platform for addressing (in other words, resolving, where appropriate) safety and regulatory compliance concerns? In today's (poor English) vernacular "I get it" that the MAX program was a banana peel on a well-oiled floor sprinkled with very small ball bearings, but to not already be thoroughly conversant with what the chief technical pilot was thinking?
I hope - and it pains me greatly to be forced by my attorney sense (or, if I have any, or any left) to say this about the q&a next week - but I hope the questions by committee members or counsel or both drill and drill with relentless focus into the exact structure, documentation, and "org chart" accountabilities of the internal communication system for safety and regulatory compliance concerns. Year by year and quarter by quarter if necessary. Every change in any of its significant or major components or operations. Examples - if any (and oh yeah that hurts to say too) - of such concerns being reported, handled properly, and leading to resolution, year-year etc.
One million Smackers per copy if Southwest needed more training, is their contract. Getting to this level of mega-depo with the Boeing people on the Hill might help the SWAPA in their case - but if I was advising the Hill committee chairmen I'd advise them to get the subpoenas drafted right da*n now - if Boeing so much as breathes "privilege for attorney-client communications" on these particular subject matters - - - straight into United States District Court.

[Tomaski]

Originally Posted by WillowRun 6-3

From WSJ today, "Ex-Boeing Pilot Cited MAX Pressure":
"Boeing has tried for months to interview Mr. Forkner about what he meant in the messages, a person familiar with the company’s internal review of the matter said."

Entire article:

Ex-Boeing Pilot Complained of Management Pressure on MAX, Former Colleagues Say

By Andy Pasztor and Andrew Tangel
Oct. 23, 2019 3:28 pm ET

Mark Forkner, a former senior Boeing Co. BA 1.04% pilot who was publicly vaulted into the company’s 737 MAX crisis, complained years ago that he felt pressure from management to ensure the series of jets wouldn’t require expensive pilot training, according to former colleagues.

Mr. Forkner, who at the time was the chief technical pilot for the MAX and who is a focus of a federal probe of the jet’s development, became well-known Friday when internal messages that Boeing turned over to congressional investigators suggested he might have had concerns about the plane’s flight-control system after encountering some problems in a simulator.

Federal agents have in the past few months questioned Mr. Forkner’s former co-workers and supervisors about their efforts to develop the 737 MAX, the latest version of Boeing’s best-selling jet, according to people familiar with the matter. Some of the questions are related to his successful effort in 2016 and 2017 to persuade the Federal Aviation Administration not to require extra simulator sessions before allowing MAX pilots to fly passengers, one of these people said.

Mr. Forkner’s attorney David Gerger declined to address questions about his client, who is now assisting with technical matters at Boeing’s largest MAX customer, Southwest Airlines Co. Mr. Gerger told The Wall Street Journal on Monday: “Mark flew the MAX. His Air Force buddies flew the MAX. He would never put himself, his friends or any passenger in an unsafe plane.”

According to a fellow pilot who had worked closely with Mr. Forkner at Boeing, Mr. Forkner repeatedly indicated to this ex-colleague that he feared losing his job if the FAA rejected Boeing’s arguments to minimize training, and the fellow pilot recalled making that point in an interview with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

That interview is part of the widening Justice Department probe into how the MAX was designed and certified as safe by the FAA and whether Boeing officials may have misled regulators as part of that process.

Boeing didn’t respond to a request for comment about pressure on Mr. Forkner. Over the weekend, the company said it was still investigating the circumstances surrounding the internal messages. “We understand entirely the scrutiny this matter is receiving and are committed to working with investigative authorities and the U.S. Congress as they continue their investigations,” the company said. A Justice Department spokesman declined to comment.

On Tuesday, Boeing removed Kevin McAllister as head of its commercial airplanes unit, making him the highest-profile departure from the company since the MAX crisis.

The FBI, which is working with the Transportation Department’s inspector general’s office, is looking into whether inaccurate statements, incomplete technical submissions or undue management pressure inside Boeing contributed to two fatal crashes of MAX jets in less than five months, according to people familiar with the situation. The misfire of an automated flight-control feature known as MCAS led to the accidents that took a total of 346 lives and grounded the global fleet in March.

Mr. Forkner’s responsibilities at Boeing focused on pilot-training issues and devising manuals for the fleet. One of his main objectives was to make sure airlines purchasing the MAX wouldn’t have to pull pilots off moneymaking passenger flights for additional training.

Rick Ludtke, a former Boeing flight deck engineer who worked with Mr. Forkner, said: “Mark was under an enormous amount of pressure.…He clearly was stressed.”

Some of Mr. Forkner’s former colleagues recall him as an honest co-worker who wasn’t able to fly much at Boeing because of labor disputes and budget issues affecting the group he worked in. One former colleague described him as someone with the character to take a stand over safety issues. The fellow pilot said some co-workers were surprised when Mr. Forkner, known as an avid Seattle Seahawks football fan, took the Southwest job and relocated to the Dallas region, leaving a large group of relatives behind.

When Mr. Forkner’s internal Boeing messages to another pilot emerged Friday, Southwest Airlines Pilots Association President Jon Weaks said the messages showed “Boeing misled pilots, government regulators and other aviation experts about the safety of the 737 MAX.” Southwest has pulled the MAX from its schedules through early February.

In the documents that congressional investigators have gathered, which total hundreds of thousands of pages, is a Boeing marketing brochure for the MAX that advertised the jet wouldn’t require significant additional pilot training, according to Rep. Peter DeFazio, the Oregon Democrat who chairs the House Infrastructure and Transportation Committee. Boeing has said that was a design objective “always subordinate to other requirements, including safety.”

Southwest, with some 10,000 pilots, years ago signed what Mr. Ludtke has called an unusual deal for a Boeing customer: a $1 million rebate for any aircraft that required extra simulator training for cockpit crews.

Investigators for the House panel also have documents verifying that arrangement, according to a person familiar with the committee’s work. Mr. DeFazio said Mr. Forkner has declined to meet with congressional investigators. A Southwest spokeswoman said its MAX contract was a “very standard agreement” that “holds parties accountable to previously determined benefits of launching a new aircraft type.”

The union representing pilots at Southwest has sued Boeing, alleging that the plane maker rushed its 737 MAX jet to market and misrepresented the plane as safe. Boeing has said it respects the Southwest pilots but it will defend itself against the suit.

Southwest had 34 MAX jets in its fleet at the time of the grounding and was supposed to have around twice as many by the end of the year.
Mr. Forkner hasn’t been interviewed by Boeing, the company has said. In September, an FBI agent told one of the former co-workers of Mr. Forkner that he hadn’t cooperated with questioning, the fellow pilot said. Mr. Gerger declined to comment.

Boeing has tried for months to interview Mr. Forkner about what he meant in the messages, a person familiar with the company’s internal review of the matter said.

People familiar with the matter said Boeing and Mr. Forkner don’t have a joint defense agreement, indicating that their interests might not be aligned and that they aren’t routinely sharing documents or other information.

Instant messages between Mr. Forkner and a colleague in November 2016 were lighthearted and technical by turns and started with banter about drinking vodka in a hotel room.

Later in the exchange, Mr. Forkner said: “So I basically lied to the regulators (unknowingly),” apparently referring to how engineers modified the MCAS flight-control system. Mr. Gerger has said Mr. Forkner was referring to a malfunctioning simulator program, not problems with the MCAS feature itself.

In January 2017, Mr. Forkner said in an email to the FAA that all mention of MCAS should be removed from manuals because the flight control system activates “way outside the normal operating envelope,” meaning pilots would practically never experience its activation. An earlier email included Mr. Forkner’s mention of his skill at “Jedi-mind tricking” foreign regulators into adopting the FAA’s position on training requirements.
Mr. Forkner’s internal messages have sparked condemnation on Capitol Hill, where Boeing Chief Executive Dennis Muilenburg is slated to testify before two panels next week. They have also further strained an already tense relationship between Boeing and the FAA.

During the time of the internal messages, four months before U.S. regulators in March 2017 approved MAX to begin commercial service, Mr. Forkner sent a separate message from his official Boeing email account to an FAA official about working to certify the jet with the FAA and foreign regulators.
“It was a huge deal, but I got what I needed to, at least so far,” he wrote. The message ended with: “You know me. I usually get what I want.” The name of the recipient was blacked out in the copy, which was among a batch of emails obtained by congressional investigators and which was reviewed by The Wall Street Journal.

Over the weekend, Boeing said various FAA officials knew about MCAS’s final configuration regardless of what Mr. Forkner said in chat messages or emails. The company said Mr. Forkner’s counterparts at the FAA were exposed to the modified system on test flights starting a few months before his chat messages. The FAA has said it continues to review the MAX’s approval and outside recommendations to improve the agency’s certification procedures.

At Southwest, Mr. Forkner has worked on regulatory and MAX issues, people familiar with the airline said, sometimes shaping discussions between the FAA and Southwest’s management. The Southwest spokeswoman said Mr. Forkner has worked on various projects as part of the flight operations technical team but hasn’t worked as a leader on the airline’s plans to return the MAX to passenger service.