MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures

[b1lanc]

Meanwhile, how do you maintain type rating when the only model of that type in inventory were the Max?

https://news.yahoo.com/lone-737-max-...110156734.html

[Grebe]

FAA chief meets Boeing officials, tries out Max simulator

Sep. 19, 2019 at 3:28 pm Updated Sep. 19, 2019 at 6:04 p

DALLAS (AP) — The chief of the Federal Aviation Administration tested the Boeing 737 Max in a flight simulator Thursday, but the FAA declined to say how its updated anti-stall software performed.

New FAA chief Stephen Dickson is AF grad flew f-15 , then for Delta etc

Dickson, a former Air Force fighter pilot who flew earlier versions of the 737 during a long career at Delta Air Lines, had two sessions in a flight simulator to test changes Boeing has made to MCAS — making it less powerful and easier for pilots to control. In the first session, he practiced simulations of normal flights.

“It handles like a 737,” he told The Associated Press after an initial simulator run replicating normal flight conditions. “The airplane handles very well from everything I can tell.”

Later Dickson tested situations in which MCAS kicked in and pushed the nose down, but the FAA declined to make Dickson available for comment on that simulation.

Dickson said he will fly a Max jet — not just a simulator — before the plane is ungrounded.

[Jet Jockey A4]

I don't know why they allowed senior training pilots to fly the real one when all their crews go to the sim every month for some basic training on their 2 MAX sims in Toronto.

[DieselOx]

link post not allowed. google below for the link.

komonews.com/news/local/faa-chief-meets-boeing-officials-tries-out-max-simulator

Not super informative, but progress, maybe.

"After practicing simulations of normal flights, he planned to go back in the simulator and test failure situations later Thursday.

It handles like a 737," he told The Associated Press. "The airplane handles very well from everything I can tell."

Dickson said he will fly a Max jet — not just a simulator — before the plane is ungrounded.

The CEO of Ireland's Ryanair said Thursday he doesn't expect the plane to be back in service until February or March.

Canaccord Genuity analyst Ken Herbert, just back from a big aviation conference in Europe, said consensus in the industry is that, while the FAA might un-ground the Max before the end of the year, Europe's regulator is expected to take about three months longer — and could require Chicago-based Boeing to make additional changes to the plane. Regulators in Canada and India have also indicated they could break with the FAA.

Kinda thin on the testing news, but interesting that Ryanair is predicting Feb or March return to service. After possible changes required by EASA. So will the FAA then need to re-re-certify those changes?

[artee]

Originally Posted by DieselOx

Kinda thin on the testing news, but interesting that Ryanair is predicting Feb or March return to service. After possible changes required by EASA. So will the FAA then need to re-re-certify those changes?

Australia’s air safety regulator (CASA) may refuse permission for Boeing 737 Max planes to fly even if its US counterpart revokes an order grounding the aircraft:
https://www.theguardian.com/business...s-it-all-clear

[neville_nobody]

Australia’s air safety regulator (CASA) may refuse permission for Boeing 737 Max planes to fly even if its US counterpart revokes an order grounding the aircraft:

I would hazard a guess that there would be FTA implications if they tried that on.

[AerocatS2A]

Originally Posted by neville_nobody

I would hazard a guess that there would be FTA implications if they tried that on.

They're just saying the same that EASA is. They will make their own assessment.

[Speed of Sound]

Originally Posted by neville_nobody

I would hazard a guess that there would be FTA implications if they tried that on.

Tried what on?

Australian regulators have a duty of care to all who fly in Australian airspace.

[LowObservable]

Originally Posted by Grebe

But about a year after the MDC buyout in 1996, Boeing had to shut down its production line in everett in 1997 due to the fouled up incorporation of a new cure all computer system and the infusion of way too many MDC types.
.

Not exactly. The 737 line halt was announced in early October 1997, which was only eight weeks after the Macs acquisition closed.

The new system, DCAC-MRM (Define and Control Aircraft Configuration/Manufacturing Resource Management), had started in development in 1993, because production, parts supply and configuration control was already in chaos, the result of multiple computer systems that had been used to extend the basically WW2-era system that defined which parts were in which individual airplane. The problem was made worse in the early-90s recession, in which many of the experienced employees who made the creaky system work took buyout offers. DCAC-MRM fell way behind schedule and Boeing (real, legacy Boeing, long before Harry S. arrived) tried to launch multiple NG variants almost simultaneously with the old system.

[fdr]

Originally Posted by Speed of Sound

Tried what on?

Australian regulators have a duty of care to all who fly in Australian airspace.

they also have obligations under the AUS USA BIASA... which makes one wonder what the merit of any agreements is today.

[SS50]

This article is long and ugly, but not comprehensive.

Readers of this article in the New Republic will no less about the 737 MAX after reading it than before. It knowingly makes false statements to sensationalize a serious question. If the author and her editor wanted to write their own opinion piece, they should have started a blog.

[Grebe]

" The problem was made worse in the early-90s recession, in which many of the experienced employees who made the creaky system work took buyout offers."

For perspective - the 777 first flight was in 1994. Most of the 777 was designed via computer systems. The exodus in 1995 ( announced buyout with extra goodies was in March 95- most had to be out by July 1995 )- But by 97, BA was rehiring via " contractors " many of those who bailed. About 9000 bailed. Boeing had bought MDC for the defense business. The shutdown in 97 was due to multiple factors including DCAC-MRM- and Boeing wazs sued by many due to ' lack of candor ' as to what happened.
It was during that same period that The NG was undergoing major revisions in models, adding winglets, etc.

[Aihkio]

This may have been discussed already but I don't remember having seen it. So:

A damaged / misbehaving AoA transducer causes atleast:
- a stall warning
- UAS warning
- erroneous MCAS activation
In what order would a std 737 pilot start to make sense of the situation? Following either Boeing procedures or company SOPs?
​​​​​​
I also understood that a Brazilian airline got information of MCAS unlike others. Do we know how their SOPs instruct to handle an erratic activation?

Just trying to put legos in proper order.

[20driver]

Originally Posted by Aihkio

This may have been discussed already but I don't remember having seen it. So:

I also understood that a Brazilian airline got information of MCAS unlike others. Do we know how their SOPs instruct to handle an erratic activation?

Just trying to put legos in proper order.

I read that as well but never heard how they were satisfied. It is interesting that they flagged the issues.

20driver

[OldnGrounded]

Originally Posted by Aihkio

I also understood that a Brazilian airline got information of MCAS unlike others. Do we know how their SOPs instruct to handle an erratic activation?

IIRC, the only thing we've actually seem from Brazil is the ANAC Operational Evaluation Report. There is mention of MCAS, by name, on page 18. The columns for training and checking are simply marked "B," which I've assumed is analogous to the FAA definition of Level B Differences:

Level B differences are those differences in systems, controls, and indicators that have only minor procedural differences. Level B differences are of great enough degree to require formal training in general operational subjects, aircraft systems, or both, but are not of great enough degree to require systems integration training.

Maybe someone here has better knowledge.

[yanrair]

The NYT published this yesterday
it is pretty much word for word what I have been saying for months here- and many others
Itsa failure of governance and training and a sick race to the bottom safety culture .
the MCAS failing was a manageable if undesired failure which could”.and was handled fine the day before the firstbt
fatsl crash
interested in comment on this esp. from the camp who prefer to blame it on Boeing or FAA
Yanrair





https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/m...x-crashes.html

[Loose rivets]

it is pretty much word for word what I have been saying for months here

Yes, and I recall you getting much the same reaction as Langewiesche's multi-thousand word work of factoid fiction. By this I mean that by the time I'd finished reading it, I'd grown tired of realising that this wasn't quite right, or that was downright wrong but frankly, by the time I'd waded through it, I'd concluded that it would have been a total waste of time had I not got months of prior reading. I would not have gleaned a detailed truth.

We all know we could handle the situation, yes, and this includes my 80 year-old bones, if we had the hindsight of the crash details. While you can draw some conclusions from the prior flight, the third hand may have been a god-send that saved the day and we have no idea what would have happened if he'd not been on board.

[CurtainTwitcher]

yanrair, in another thread, post #1216 I wrote:

No doubt, a statistical analysis of the chances of these accidents being attributable to random crew error vs random aircraft error is so monumentally in favour of an aircraft malfunction, given the natural experiment that had been performed since 1967, the airworthiness authorities felt they had no choice but to had to act. They simply could could afford a third accident, without a monumental blow to public & pilot confidence, not just in the aircraft, but the entire system of aircraft certification.

Boeing unwittingly performed a very large scale statistical study. Given Boeing's aim was to change as little as possible in the MAX, virtually everything was constant with the exception of the MCAS software (engines and other changes have not been implicated in the accidents). Exactly as you state, same crew, same training, even the same problems & vulnerabilities with the AoA sensor (same part number, willing to be corrected). That single change has been the software.

So at first blush it is the so we can attribute the MAX accidents to that piece of software. If crews cannot handle that single software change, either the software was wrong, or the industry failed to sufficiently prepare the crews for the design expectations. How many millions of 737 departures have there been since 1967? As far as I can determine, not a single of the 172 hull loss on the 737 has been attributed to a runaway trim prior to the MAX. Two in a very short space of time for the MAX? That is why airworthiness authorities had to act.

The primary blame is the aircraft, secondary to the industry and its race to the bottom minimal investment in pilot training. The cornerstone of the sales pitch for the MAX was a single hour of home ipad study for each pilot, ie no cost at all to most operators.

[Mac the Knife]

"Once I had a railroad, made it run
Made it race against time.
Once I had a railroad,
Now it's gone
Say Buddy, Can you spare me a dime?"

Mac

Ahhhh, the Past.....

[Peter H]

Originally Posted by yanrair

the MCAS failing was a manageable if undesired failure which could and was handled fine the day before the first fatal crash

Are you describing the flight where:
- the 2-man crew failed to handle the problem
- and the day was only saved by a 3rd dead-heading pilot on the flight deck
... as "was handled fine"?