MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
How many MAX Sims are currently in service or are being prepared? One in Canada, I'm told.
Is a -800 cockpit capable of being retrofitted as a MAX as this would make it quicker to 'rush' some MAX sims into use. Looking at a bare 747 cockpit last week it did seem that a bit of de-rivetting would be required.
Is a -800 cockpit capable of being retrofitted as a MAX as this would make it quicker to 'rush' some MAX sims into use. Looking at a bare 747 cockpit last week it did seem that a bit of de-rivetting would be required.
BTW, spoke to an Air Canada MAX captain yesterday an while the aircraft in grounded, all crews go to sim training once a month to do their 3 takeoffs and landings to keep current on the aircraft. He also told me that they tried the Boeing procedure that was originally in the Boeing 737/200 books for a trim runaway and the outcome was not always positive with many crews losing the aircraft despite starting at 7000' AGL and of course knowing what was going to happen prior to starting the exercise.
Last edited by Jet Jockey A4; 18th Sep 2019 at 09:55.
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NY Times Magazine: What Really Brought Down the Boeing 737 Max?
I'm just going to put this out there, as I have heard several on this board complain in the past about the decline in flying skills -- airmanship -- of some of today's newer commercial pilots, the limited to non-existent time pilots have for engaging in actual hands-on, manual flying, etc.
Subtitle for this article: Malfunctions caused two deadly crashes. But an industry that puts unprepared pilots in the cockpit is just as guilty.
What Really Brought Down the Boeing 737 Max?
Writer is a former pilot.
Subtitle for this article: Malfunctions caused two deadly crashes. But an industry that puts unprepared pilots in the cockpit is just as guilty.
The paradox is that the failures of the 737 Max were really the product of an incredible success: a decades-long transformation of the whole business of flying, in which airplanes became so automated and accidents so rare that a cheap air-travel boom was able to take root around the world. Along the way, though, this system never managed to fully account for the unexpected: for the moment when technology fails and humans — a growing population of more than 300,000 airline pilots of variable and largely unpredictable skills — are required to intervene. In the drama of the 737 Max, it was the decisions made by four of those pilots, more than the failure of a single obscure component, that led to 346 deaths and the worldwide grounding of the entire fleet.
Writer is a former pilot.
If I'd be Boeing I'd stop this blame game. This can only backfire.
Those accidents happend due to some non-redundant, non-fail-safe, undocumented system that could override the pilots.
Those accidents happend due to some non-redundant, non-fail-safe, undocumented system that could override the pilots.
Last edited by Less Hair; 18th Sep 2019 at 13:23.
Interesting back story on Kirana and the genesis of Lion Air. This paragraph is particularly salient:
"Kirana turned out to be a master of financial dealings. The public flocked to him even while reviling his airline for its poor on-time performance and, soon enough, for its safety record. He did not appear to care about the complaints that came in. One afternoon, he pointed to a trash can in his office and said to a businessman I know, “Here’s my complaints department.” People called him ruthless, but shrewd is a better description. Having given up at typewriter sales, he was determined to succeed at something else. He told the businessman that it is a mistake in an airline venture to get wrapped up in the romance and art of flying, because money is what counts. He may have been right, except that this approach reduces pilots to journeymen and ignores the role of airmanship in safety."
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Are you suggesting Boeing had a hand in drafting/placement of this article? Having worked in PR myself, I know it's not out of the realm of possibilities, but is there really anything tangible here to indicate this?
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From the article (really an opinion piece) and addressed in comments:
I don't know anything about William Langewiesche, but, as I read the piece, I found myself wondering about possible connections with Boeing. Maybe my suspicious mind was being unfair. (Edit: I just realized who Langewiesche is: a writer as much as a former pilot and son of the "Stick & Rudder author.)
Nonetheless, Boeing’s reticence allowed a narrative to emerge: that the company had developed the system to elude regulators; that it was all about shortcuts and greed; that it had cynically gambled with the lives of the flying public; that the Lion Air pilots were overwhelmed by the failures of a hidden system they could not reasonably have been expected to resist; and that the design of the MCAS was unquestionably the cause of the accident.
But none of this was quite true."
But none of this was quite true."
Last edited by OldnGrounded; 18th Sep 2019 at 13:56.
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Two initial impressions from the article. First, there were a number of details I haven't seen published before, so I'm curious as to the author's sources. Not curious in a suspicious way, just curious. Second, in terms of contributory causes, a poorly designed aircraft, inadequately trained crews, and a corporate culture that does not put safety first are not mutually exclusive. They can all have a hand in the end result, and each issue should be addressed on their own merits.
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Just looked up the author, and now I know why the name was so familiar:
Wiki reference here
Langewiesche is the son of Wolfgang Langewiesche, author of Stick and Rudder.
Are you suggesting Boeing had a hand in drafting/placement of this article? Having worked in PR myself, I know it's not out of the realm of possibilities, but is there really anything tangible here to indicate this?
MCAS is not an anti stall system
US Pilots would not have crashed
Those pilots should just have used the trim runaway routine
Why did they not just switch off two buttons
pure coincidence?
Whenever something goes wrong be open about it. That is the most credible approach to change. Blaming pilots and customers only works against this.
Last edited by Less Hair; 18th Sep 2019 at 15:35.
. . . they tried the Boeing procedure that was originally in the Boeing 737/200 books for a trim runaway and the outcome was not always positive with many crews losing the aircraft despite starting at 7000' AGL and of course knowing what was going to happen prior to starting the exercise.
To my knowledge, this certification question still hasn't been clarified, nor the reason given for eliminating the manoeuvre from the B737 FCOM after the -200.
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Were you referring to the "roller coaster" manoeuvre, where back-pressure on the control column is reduced to permit the use of the manual trim wheel to "unjam" the stabilizer at very high speeds?
To my knowledge, this certification question still hasn't been clarified, nor the reason given for eliminating the manoeuvre from the B737 FCOM after the -200.
To my knowledge, this certification question still hasn't been clarified, nor the reason given for eliminating the manoeuvre from the B737 FCOM after the -200.
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Not just sim sessions in Canada...
Globe & Mail: "Lone Boeing 737 Max flew in Canadian airspace for pilot checks during grounding"
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/busi...checks-during/
Globe & Mail: "Lone Boeing 737 Max flew in Canadian airspace for pilot checks during grounding"
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/busi...checks-during/
Last edited by boaclhryul; 18th Sep 2019 at 16:38. Reason: URL
I agree, and that is why I am asking the question of those here who might be able to offer some clarification or thoughts. To me, if it isn't in the FCOM, QRH or FCTM then it isn't part of the drill or checklist for a jammed stab at high speed yet it is being referenced and discussed as a "problem". So, it it in force and certified, or is it not? - PJ2.
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Peter Lemme tweeted a link to the Langewiesche piece, with a few comments:
Peter Lemme @Satcom_Guru
Blame the pilots.
Blame the training.
Blame the airline standards.
Imply rampant corruption at all levels.
Claim Airbus flight envelope protection is superior to Boeing.
Fumble the technical details.
Stack the quotes with lots of hearsay to drive the theme.
Ignore everything else
Blame the pilots.
Blame the training.
Blame the airline standards.
Imply rampant corruption at all levels.
Claim Airbus flight envelope protection is superior to Boeing.
Fumble the technical details.
Stack the quotes with lots of hearsay to drive the theme.
Ignore everything else
Langewische fils added one new bit of aerodynamic information: that the elevator is unable to override the stab when the airspeed exceeds the envelope.
He omitted that the MAX no longer stopped trimming when the pilots were pulling or pushing on the control column – a major change in behavior in a decades old type that was hidden from the pilots
The article, while voluminous, also left out how simulator trials worked out; mind you, there's a limited number of sims that model MCAS. And how many model a messed up AoA vane?
He omitted that the MAX no longer stopped trimming when the pilots were pulling or pushing on the control column – a major change in behavior in a decades old type that was hidden from the pilots
The article, while voluminous, also left out how simulator trials worked out; mind you, there's a limited number of sims that model MCAS. And how many model a messed up AoA vane?
Salute!
Right, Rather. And so is Peter.
The troop sounds like he is paid by Boeing, and coveniently overlooks or misrepresents how MCAS works and the difficulty recognizing and correcting for a rogue system that was unkown to most 737 crews unti we lost an airplane.
Gums sends....
Right, Rather. And so is Peter.
The troop sounds like he is paid by Boeing, and coveniently overlooks or misrepresents how MCAS works and the difficulty recognizing and correcting for a rogue system that was unkown to most 737 crews unti we lost an airplane.
Gums sends....
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Rather a different take than the Langewiesche piece
From the latest New Republic:
CRASH COURSE: How Boeing's Managerial Revolution Created the 737 MAX Disaster
Nearly two decades before Boeing’s MCAS system crashed two of the plane-maker’s brand-new 737 MAX jets, Stan Sorscher knew his company’s increasingly toxic mode of operating would create a disaster of some kind. A long and proud “safety culture” was rapidly being replaced, he argued, with “a culture of financial bull****, a culture of groupthink.”
Sorscher, a physicist who’d worked at Boeing more than two decades and had led negotiations there for the engineers’ union, had become obsessed with management culture. He said he didn’t previously imagine Boeing’s brave new managerial caste creating a problem as dumb and glaringly obvious as MCAS (or the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, as a handful of software wizards had dubbed it). But he knew the culture was going to down a plane at some point, that it was inevitable. He actually wrote about this in one of his reports that no one read.
More
CRASH COURSE: How Boeing's Managerial Revolution Created the 737 MAX Disaster
Nearly two decades before Boeing’s MCAS system crashed two of the plane-maker’s brand-new 737 MAX jets, Stan Sorscher knew his company’s increasingly toxic mode of operating would create a disaster of some kind. A long and proud “safety culture” was rapidly being replaced, he argued, with “a culture of financial bull****, a culture of groupthink.”
Sorscher, a physicist who’d worked at Boeing more than two decades and had led negotiations there for the engineers’ union, had become obsessed with management culture. He said he didn’t previously imagine Boeing’s brave new managerial caste creating a problem as dumb and glaringly obvious as MCAS (or the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, as a handful of software wizards had dubbed it). But he knew the culture was going to down a plane at some point, that it was inevitable. He actually wrote about this in one of his reports that no one read.
More
Last edited by OldnGrounded; 18th Sep 2019 at 22:17. Reason: Restore vanished paragraph formatting
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FAA
https://www.cnbc.com/amp/2019/09/18/...e-himself.html
Can he really fly the plane before certification?
Can he really fly the plane before certification?
https://newrepublic.com/article/1549...ial-revolution
That is a very comprehensive, long and ugly read.
