MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
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The fix must be delivered, but the report needs to be kept under wraps - that is one of the mysteries to the layman here. Surely safety would benefit if all stakeholders were able to retrace the accidents *before* the planes are allowed to fly again?
Edmund
Edmund
Flight crew response time to an event is dependent on skills as well as training
Since the MCAS is there to address shortcomings re handling at low weight and aft CoG, might failure of same not require an emergency checklist advising some do/don't elements. A CoG chart with a caution area shown on the lower right corner where MCAS is a requirement might be informative.
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how much damage can a single person do?
The FAA issued an emergency AD (PDF) requiring operators to add MCAS failure indications to approved flight manuals, but did not, according to Sen. Reed, make it clear enough that further system changes would be required for safe operation. “The implication was that this pilot change would be sufficient to provide airworthiness and there was no real mention of improvements and necessary changes to the MCAS system, leading, I think, most people to conclude that there was no long-term issue with the MCAS,” Sen. Reed said. “That lack of transparency is, I think, not appropriate.” FAA Associate Administrator For Aviation Safety Ali Bahrami replied that the lack of disclosure was necessary due to the ongoing accident investigation and that “from a safety perspective we felt strongly that what we did was adequate …”
Only half a speed-brake
In a real-life scenario, with crew perplexed and under heavy cognitive load with unreliable airspeed due to (not indicated) AoA fault, the moment pilots say sod all, is this the trim trying to kill us?! is unknown.
Dedicated crew training to enable timely recognition of the phenomena was made not available. Needless to say, that taking classes does not guarantee field performance - hence the current road towards a technical solution.
The pilot cannot be part of a redundant system.
The latest EASA Safety Review* states:
“The safety risk portfolio presented in Table 7 links the safety issues to key risk areas. The highest contribution to Aircraft Upset and Runway Excursion are from “Monitoring of Flight Parameters and Automation Modes”, “Handling of Technical Failures” and “Aircraft Braking and Steering”.
fdr, #1740, MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
* https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/def...ublication.pdf Page 50
“The safety risk portfolio presented in Table 7 links the safety issues to key risk areas. The highest contribution to Aircraft Upset and Runway Excursion are from “Monitoring of Flight Parameters and Automation Modes”, “Handling of Technical Failures” and “Aircraft Braking and Steering”.
fdr, #1740, MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
* https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/def...ublication.pdf Page 50
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Has Mr.Bahrami slept through the past six months? He still blames the Lion Air pilots. And Burleson's remark "I do believe the fundamental process of how we went about certifying the Max was sound" is both laughable and horrifying. He is either too stupid to realize his mistakes or too corrupt to admit them.
And what upsets me most is that nobody is even trying to mention the fundamental contradiction between two main FAA missions - promote aviation and provide oversight thereof. It's like assigning pest control to PETA. In this case, just like in many other cases before that, those two tasks collided at full speed with devastating results. I just cannot understand why not transfer the certification and airworthiness tasks to NTSB and leave the promotional mission to FAA?
And what upsets me most is that nobody is even trying to mention the fundamental contradiction between two main FAA missions - promote aviation and provide oversight thereof. It's like assigning pest control to PETA. In this case, just like in many other cases before that, those two tasks collided at full speed with devastating results. I just cannot understand why not transfer the certification and airworthiness tasks to NTSB and leave the promotional mission to FAA?
Has Mr.Bahrami slept through the past six months? He still blames the Lion Air pilots. And Burleson's remark "I do believe the fundamental process of how we went about certifying the Max was sound" is both laughable and horrifying. He is either too stupid to realize his mistakes or too corrupt to admit them.
And what upsets me most is that nobody is even trying to mention the fundamental contradiction between two main FAA missions - promote aviation and provide oversight thereof. It's like assigning pest control to PETA. In this case, just like in many other cases before that, those two tasks collided at full speed with devastating results. I just cannot understand why not transfer the certification and airworthiness tasks to NTSB and leave the promotional mission to FAA?
And what upsets me most is that nobody is even trying to mention the fundamental contradiction between two main FAA missions - promote aviation and provide oversight thereof. It's like assigning pest control to PETA. In this case, just like in many other cases before that, those two tasks collided at full speed with devastating results. I just cannot understand why not transfer the certification and airworthiness tasks to NTSB and leave the promotional mission to FAA?
Imagine these FAA officials getting questioned by industry experts, not just some politicians.
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The crews were handed a very challenging malfunction, but it needs to be stated again that one does not trim by sight. A pilot trims by FEEL. If the controls FEEL heavy for the established pitch and power, then the pilot uses the yoke switch to trim off the pressures. The 737 requires a lot of trim inputs during the takeoff and clean up phase so yes the trim wheel is moving around a lot. The first indication that something is wrong would probably be that you are trimming, particularly in one direction, a lot more than you are used to doing. That evaluation depends on knowing what is normal and knowing what is normal depends on having sufficient experience hand-flying through the takeoff and clean up phase. Once you determine something is wrong, the proper response is not to reach for the cutout switches. The proper response is to call for the Runaway Stab Checklist. Selecting the cutouts prematurely will make the problem worse as we saw in the Ethiopian crash. The electric trim system worked just fine and overrode MCAS when it was used. Why it wasn't used properly is an important issue that goes back to how these pilots were trained. It's been reported in various threads that some airlines stopped teaching runaway trim in the sim becase it used to be such a rare event and extra training time = money. It would be interesting to learn when the last time these crews were exposed to runaway trim and/or unreliable airspeed procedures in their sim training, not that we would ever find out since their employers are probably in full CYA mode as well.
Further insight to the limitations of human performance in surprising situations.
737 stall and recovery training after briefing, a situation which had clear indication and alerting of the malfunction, i.e. minimum need for situational assessment:
“All airline pilots agreed or strongly agreed that they were surprised by the surprise stall scenario. In that scenario, less than one quarter of the airline pilots strictly followed the proper stall recovery procedure on which they had been briefed.”
Hope that the FAA heed the results of their sponsored research.
https://www.faa.gov/pilots/training/...r_Training.pdf
737 stall and recovery training after briefing, a situation which had clear indication and alerting of the malfunction, i.e. minimum need for situational assessment:
“All airline pilots agreed or strongly agreed that they were surprised by the surprise stall scenario. In that scenario, less than one quarter of the airline pilots strictly followed the proper stall recovery procedure on which they had been briefed.”
Hope that the FAA heed the results of their sponsored research.
https://www.faa.gov/pilots/training/...r_Training.pdf
The crews were handed a very challenging malfunction, but it needs to be stated again that one does not trim by sight. A pilot trims by FEEL. If the controls FEEL heavy for the established pitch and power, then the pilot uses the yoke switch to trim off the pressures. The 737 requires a lot of trim inputs during the takeoff and clean up phase so yes the trim wheel is moving around a lot. The first indication that something is wrong would probably be that you are trimming, particularly in one direction, a lot more than you are used to doing. That evaluation depends on knowing what is normal and knowing what is normal depends on having sufficient experience hand-flying through the takeoff and clean up phase. Once you determine something is wrong, the proper response is not to reach for the cutout switches. The proper response is to call for the Runaway Stab Checklist. Selecting the cutouts prematurely will make the problem worse as we saw in the Ethiopian crash. The electric trim system worked just fine and overrode MCAS when it was used. Why it wasn't used properly is an important issue that goes back to how these pilots were trained. It's been reported in various threads that some airlines stopped teaching runaway trim in the sim becase it used to be such a rare event and extra training time = money. It would be interesting to learn when the last time these crews were exposed to runaway trim and/or unreliable airspeed procedures in their sim training, not that we would ever find out since their employers are probably in full CYA mode as well.
It said to hit the cut out switches!
But later maybe trim first(if it is a good idea)
So the correct response per the AD is immediately hit the cut out switches.
Recall 3 FAA pilots simulated this & 1 failed, in real life things were not much different.
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Further insight to the limitations of human performance in surprising situations.
737 stall and recovery training after briefing, a situation which had clear indication and alerting of the malfunction, i.e. minimum need for situational assessment:
“All airline pilots agreed or strongly agreed that they were surprised by the surprise stall scenario. In that scenario, less than one quarter of the airline pilots strictly followed the proper stall recovery procedure on which they had been briefed.”
Hope that the FAA heed the results of their sponsored research.
https://www.faa.gov/pilots/training/...r_Training.pdf
737 stall and recovery training after briefing, a situation which had clear indication and alerting of the malfunction, i.e. minimum need for situational assessment:
“All airline pilots agreed or strongly agreed that they were surprised by the surprise stall scenario. In that scenario, less than one quarter of the airline pilots strictly followed the proper stall recovery procedure on which they had been briefed.”
Hope that the FAA heed the results of their sponsored research.
https://www.faa.gov/pilots/training/...r_Training.pdf
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What is the legal requirement I.A.W after the AD was issued?
It said to hit the cut out switches!
But later maybe trim first(if it is a good idea)
So the correct response per the AD is immediately hit the cut out switches.
Recall 3 FAA pilots simulated this & 1 failed, in real life things were not much different.
It said to hit the cut out switches!
But later maybe trim first(if it is a good idea)
So the correct response per the AD is immediately hit the cut out switches.
Recall 3 FAA pilots simulated this & 1 failed, in real life things were not much different.
As far as the test you refer to, it was a different malfunction than the one presented to the accident crews, particularly as it presented a runaway trim with the A/P engaged so no one was getting direct feedback through the controls. Even though the FAA reports that this malfunction has never been seen in actual operation, it deserves to be fixed because you never know when the stars will line up against you. The current FCC architecture relies very heavily on the pilots detecting a malfuntion, and if the airlines aren't going to properly train for this role then the architecture needs to be fixed.
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And what upsets me most is that nobody is even trying to mention the fundamental contradiction between two main FAA missions - promote aviation and provide oversight thereof. It's like assigning pest control to PETA. In this case, just like in many other cases before that, those two tasks collided at full speed with devastating results. I just cannot understand why not transfer the certification and airworthiness tasks to NTSB and leave the promotional mission to FAA?
Tomaski,
You've hit the proverbial nail right on the head. I think in all recurrent simulator training routines there should be at least two totally unexpected failures. It is not difficult to have a selection of such failures that the instructor can throw in at random, and to do so totally unexpectedly, so that the pilots are startled. It need not be done in the competency details when the pilots are under check but in the refresher/training type details, and with helpful debriefs afterwards. Think how often an engine is failed shortly after V1 when the pilot is half expecting it. For example, what about failing it half way through the flap retraction? Or on the approach when turning onto the ILS? And how about a TCAS when in the hold? Or some subtle instrument failures at a time of busy workload.
I have never flown the modern highly automated aircraft, but I am sure those who are familiar with them can think up some suitable problems which will suddenly dump the flying in the pilot's lap when he/she is least expecting it.
The main thing is not to use such failures as 'gotchas' but rather as a means of showing how confusing a startle can be.
You've hit the proverbial nail right on the head. I think in all recurrent simulator training routines there should be at least two totally unexpected failures. It is not difficult to have a selection of such failures that the instructor can throw in at random, and to do so totally unexpectedly, so that the pilots are startled. It need not be done in the competency details when the pilots are under check but in the refresher/training type details, and with helpful debriefs afterwards. Think how often an engine is failed shortly after V1 when the pilot is half expecting it. For example, what about failing it half way through the flap retraction? Or on the approach when turning onto the ILS? And how about a TCAS when in the hold? Or some subtle instrument failures at a time of busy workload.
I have never flown the modern highly automated aircraft, but I am sure those who are familiar with them can think up some suitable problems which will suddenly dump the flying in the pilot's lap when he/she is least expecting it.
The main thing is not to use such failures as 'gotchas' but rather as a means of showing how confusing a startle can be.
https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/behi...ulture-2080007
Boeing knew about the full danger of the MCAS issues before the crashes according to this story from AFP and knew that there should have been MCAS specific training.
Boeing knew about the full danger of the MCAS issues before the crashes according to this story from AFP and knew that there should have been MCAS specific training.
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Back in the day the airline I worked for went through a phase of giving you some multiple in realistic failure on the sim. Tbh whilst crisis management could be assessed. I actually learnt nothing as the failures were so extreme the QRH was of little help. IMHO the sim should be used to teach not demonstrate how smart an aleck the check airman is.
maybe if the dead crews had had more teaching time to confidence these accidents would not have happened. As for or MCAS being kept a secret. As said by some worse than shame on you. (Boeing)
maybe if the dead crews had had more teaching time to confidence these accidents would not have happened. As for or MCAS being kept a secret. As said by some worse than shame on you. (Boeing)
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Back in the day the airline I worked for went through a phase of giving you some multiple in realistic failure on the sim. Tbh whilst crisis management could be assessed. I actually learnt nothing as the failures were so extreme the QRH was of little help. IMHO the sim should be used to teach not demonstrate how smart an aleck the check airman is.
maybe if the dead crews had had more teaching time to confidence these accidents would not have happened. As for or MCAS being kept a secret. As said by some worse than shame on you. (Boeing)
maybe if the dead crews had had more teaching time to confidence these accidents would not have happened. As for or MCAS being kept a secret. As said by some worse than shame on you. (Boeing)
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The crews were handed a very challenging malfunction, but it needs to be stated again that one does not trim by sight. A pilot trims by FEEL. If the controls FEEL heavy for the established pitch and power, then the pilot uses the yoke switch to trim off the pressures. The 737 requires a lot of trim inputs during the takeoff and clean up phase so yes the trim wheel is moving around a lot. The first indication that something is wrong would probably be that you are trimming, particularly in one direction, a lot more than you are used to doing. That evaluation depends on knowing what is normal and knowing what is normal depends on having sufficient experience hand-flying through the takeoff and clean up phase.
When confronted with an unexpected aircraft behaviour, rotations, gees, each and every pilot - except a very few advanced aerobatics pilots - fails to react the way you seem to infer.
They invariably forget about managing throttles, stick forces etc.
For instance, when the aircraft suddenly noses down into a bunt, nothing is "as usual", especially the feel of the controls, and the last thing you are expected to do is reflect, compare, and trim.
Add to that the instructor blaring things and spurious warnings over the intercom, and tunnel vision and disorientation invariably takes place, even with experienced pilots.
How do you compare with the "usual" feel of the yoke when the stick shaker activates and the aircraft is accelerating at low altitude ?
Has anyone on this forum tried it in the sim ?
So what you propose may well be ok in the calm environment of a single failure session in the sim, but in real life in a really misbehaving aircraft with lots of alarms and stick shaker, it might be quite different, whatever your experience.